Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[Bruce Kellett]

meekerdb wrote:

On 2/24/2015 10:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, February 25, 2015, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


First person indeterminacy is just another name for "in-principle
unknowable"!

No it's not. It provides an explanation of how the world can be 
completely deterministic but to you as an observer within it appear 
truly random, so that not even God would be able to tell you what you 
will experience next.


That seems to me to be a very good case of something being 
"in-principle unknowable". If it is not "in-principle unknowable", the 
onus is on you to spell out the principles and circumstances in which 
the time of the radioactive decay of a particular atom is knowable in 
advance.


MWI means, "I know it when I see it."  :-)

But more seriously, for FPI to apply to radioactive decay requires a 
continuum of observers to observe the decay at all times.


Brent


That's what MWI advocates say. But that does not answer the basic 
question -- there is nothing in that which will tell /me/ what time or 
result /I/ will observe. That piece of information, which might be of 
some importance to me, is always "in-principle unknowable".


Bruce

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Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[meekerdb]

On 2/24/2015 10:28 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, February 25, 2015, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


First person indeterminacy is just another name for "in-principle
unknowable"!

No it's not. It provides an explanation of how the world can be completely 
deterministic but to you as an observer within it appear truly random, so that not even 
God would be able to tell you what you will experience next.


That seems to me to be a very good case of something being "in-principle unknowable". If 
it is not "in-principle unknowable", the onus is on you to spell out the principles and 
circumstances in which the time of the radioactive decay of a particular atom is 
knowable in advance.


MWI means, "I know it when I see it."  :-)

But more seriously, for FPI to apply to radioactive decay requires a continuum of 
observers to observe the decay at all times.


Brent

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Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[Bruce Kellett]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, February 25, 2015, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


First person indeterminacy is just another name for "in-principle
unknowable"!

No it's not. It provides an explanation of how the world can be 
completely deterministic but to you as an observer within it appear 
truly random, so that not even God would be able to tell you what you 
will experience next.


That seems to me to be a very good case of something being "in-principle 
unknowable". If it is not "in-principle unknowable", the onus is on you 
to spell out the principles and circumstances in which the time of the 
radioactive decay of a particular atom is knowable in advance.


Bruce


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Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wednesday, February 25, 2015, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> LizR wrote:
>
>> On 25 February 2015 at 10:52, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>
>> LizR wrote:
>>
>> On 24 February 2015 at 14:23, meekerdb >  > >> wrote:
>>
>> And I don't see anything incoherent about true randomness.
>>  We seem
>> to have done well with it for a century.  If you can accept
>> randomness due to ignorance which can never be informed, why
>> not
>> inherent randomness.
>>
>> It is of course possible that the universe works on "oracles"
>> like this, this is just my personal bias towards explanations
>> that don't require infinite amounts of "in-principle unknowable"
>> data to be injected into physics. But I admit I could be wrong
>> to have that bias.
>>
>>
>> You must have difficulty with quantum mechanics, then. QM is built
>> on a lot of "in-principle unknowable" data. Hidden variable theories
>> of QM do not really work, so that in radioactive decay, for
>> instance, the time of any particular decay, and whatever it might be
>> that caused that nucleus to decay now rather than at some other
>> time, is "in-principle unknowable".
>>
>> MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are "in-principle
>> unknowable".
>>
>>
>> It seems to me that the MWI explains, in principle, where the data come
>> from - from first person indeterminacy. That isn't the same as spontaneous
>> generation of random data from nowhere.
>>
>
> First person indeterminacy is just another name for "in-principle
> unknowable"!
>

No it's not. It provides an explanation of how the world can be completely
deterministic but to you as an observer within it appear truly random, so
that not even God would be able to tell you what you will experience next.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[John Clark]

On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 , LizR  wrote:

>What would be a suitable underlying means by which the universe might
> operate, that it makes things happen at random?
>

Huh?? You've got to think what "random" means, nothing made "it" happen,
"it" is a brute fact..I don't find it astounding that some things have no
cause, I find it astounding that some things do.

> an imagine things that might appear random to us, but are actually the
> result of deterministic forces operating on scales we can't probe - e.g.
> string vibrations. But genuinely random - that seems to me to require
> extraordinary evidence.


And we do have extraordinary evidence, Bell's inequality is violated.

> Some backup for the above two extraordinary claims would be welcome.
> (1) that brains aren't Turing emulable at any level
>

If some new fundamental laws of physics were found to be operating in human
brains that could be evidence that it's not Turing emulable, but nobody has
found even a hint of that.

(2) that there is a mechanism by which the universe might generate truly,
> rather than apparently random events.
>

Mechanism?? If a mechanism produces it then it's not random. Randomness is
a event without a cause, and I don't see anything more illogical about that
then a event with a cause.

 John K Clark

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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?

[John Clark]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 , LizR  wrote:


> > skeptical atheism appears to be based on faith.
>

I see, so belief in God  is based on faith and so is doubts about the
existence of God, but for a word to be meaningful there must be contrast,
so your need to point out something, anything, that is NOT based on faith.
And if you can't do that then "faith" is nothing but a noise made by the
mouth.

 John K Clark

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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?

[meekerdb]

Cue JKC.

Brent

On 2/24/2015 4:48 PM, LizR wrote:
Or, to put it more epistemically, skeptical atheism appears to be based on faith. It is 
based on the faith that our present ideologies will be preserved by final science. 
Current physicalism may turn out to be as delusory as Abrahamic theology.


-- Eric Steinhart, "Skeptical and Spiritual Atheisms"

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Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[Bruce Kellett]

LizR wrote:
On 25 February 2015 at 10:52, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


LizR wrote:

On 24 February 2015 at 14:23, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net> >> wrote:

And I don't see anything incoherent about true randomness. 
We seem

to have done well with it for a century.  If you can accept
randomness due to ignorance which can never be informed, why not
inherent randomness.

It is of course possible that the universe works on "oracles"
like this, this is just my personal bias towards explanations
that don't require infinite amounts of "in-principle unknowable"
data to be injected into physics. But I admit I could be wrong
to have that bias.


You must have difficulty with quantum mechanics, then. QM is built
on a lot of "in-principle unknowable" data. Hidden variable theories
of QM do not really work, so that in radioactive decay, for
instance, the time of any particular decay, and whatever it might be
that caused that nucleus to decay now rather than at some other
time, is "in-principle unknowable".

MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are "in-principle
unknowable".


It seems to me that the MWI explains, in principle, where the data come 
from - from first person indeterminacy. That isn't the same as 
spontaneous generation of random data from nowhere.


First person indeterminacy is just another name for "in-principle 
unknowable"!


Bruce

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Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to dialectics?

[LizR]

Or, to put it more epistemically, skeptical atheism appears to be based on
faith. It is based on the faith that our present ideologies will be
preserved by final science. Current physicalism may turn out to be as
delusory as Abrahamic theology.

-- Eric Steinhart, "Skeptical and Spiritual Atheisms"

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Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[LizR]

On 25 February 2015 at 10:52, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> LizR wrote:
>
>> On 24 February 2015 at 14:23, meekerdb > meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>
>> And I don't see anything incoherent about true randomness.  We seem
>> to have done well with it for a century.  If you can accept
>> randomness due to ignorance which can never be informed, why not
>> inherent randomness.
>>
>> It is of course possible that the universe works on "oracles" like this,
>> this is just my personal bias towards explanations that don't require
>> infinite amounts of "in-principle unknowable" data to be injected into
>> physics. But I admit I could be wrong to have that bias.
>>
>
> You must have difficulty with quantum mechanics, then. QM is built on a
> lot of "in-principle unknowable" data. Hidden variable theories of QM do
> not really work, so that in radioactive decay, for instance, the time of
> any particular decay, and whatever it might be that caused that nucleus to
> decay now rather than at some other time, is "in-principle unknowable".
>
> MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are "in-principle
> unknowable".


It seems to me that the MWI explains, in principle, where the data come
from - from first person indeterminacy. That isn't the same as spontaneous
generation of random data from nowhere.

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Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[Bruce Kellett]

LizR wrote:
On 24 February 2015 at 14:23, meekerdb > wrote:


And I don't see anything incoherent about true randomness.  We seem
to have done well with it for a century.  If you can accept
randomness due to ignorance which can never be informed, why not
inherent randomness.

It is of course possible that the universe works on "oracles" like this, 
this is just my personal bias towards explanations that don't require 
infinite amounts of "in-principle unknowable" data to be injected into 
physics. But I admit I could be wrong to have that bias.


You must have difficulty with quantum mechanics, then. QM is built on a 
lot of "in-principle unknowable" data. Hidden variable theories of QM do 
not really work, so that in radioactive decay, for instance, the time of 
any particular decay, and whatever it might be that caused that nucleus 
to decay now rather than at some other time, is "in-principle unknowable".


MWI simply formalizes the fact that such data are "in-principle unknowable".

Bruce

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Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[Russell Standish]

On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 08:10:35PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> >Suppose, as people on this list have sometimes proposed, that we
> >and the world we perceive is a digital simulation in a computer
> >vastly more powerful than the ones we've built.  Suppose this
> >computer is 1e500 bit machine.
> 
> I guess you mean 10e500 bit machine. (1e500 = 1).
> 


Brent will probably jump in, but 1E500 is computer notation  for
10^{500}.


More generally, xEy (normally the E is capitalised, but lower case e
is acceptable), where x is a decimal number and y is an integer,
denotes x в 10^y - convenient for ASCII script, where neither the
times symbol (в) nor superscripts are readily available.


-- 


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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au

 Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret 
 (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html)


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Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[LizR]

On 24 February 2015 at 14:23, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 2/23/2015 12:58 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 24 February 2015 at 09:03, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  But then this undermines the idea that the arithmetic existential
>> quantifier provides the same "exists" as ostensive physical existence.
>>
>
>  That is clearly not being suggested by comp. Comp suggests that physical
> existence is "maya" - an appearance generated by underlying platonic forms.
>
> Do the Platonic forms have to exist in order to underlie maya?
>

This is where we have to work out what "exist" means. Generally it's taken
to mean "kicks back" - which maths and physical reality both do, or appear
to do, although in different ways.


> Bruno objects that he's just using the ordinary existential quantifier -
> but that quantifier is relative to predicates (predicates defined by the
> axioms in RA).  It's not the same as ostensively defined existence.  So
> it's fine to say it's some underlying kind of existence but why should we
> credence it as opposed to the dozens of other proposed underlying
> realities: Yaweh, the implicate order, or quantum field theory?  The test
> is whether the underlying ontology is part of a theory that works at the
> level of prediction where it can connect with the ostensive definitions.
>

This is where the unreasonable effectiveness comes in, or at least has to
be hand-waved away.

>   If you are conflating the equals sign with physical existence, no
> wonder you've taken against comp rather than merely being agnostic about it.
>
> Who says I'm against it?
>

You do, often. This particular discussion is in reaction to one such
statement.


> That would be a strange attitude.  I might think it's over rated, but
> that's hardly being *against* it.
>
> Yes I agree it is a strange attitude.

> Also, did you give some reason to doubt the Turing emulability of brains,
> or to think true randomness is a coherent notion?
>
> I doubt the Turing emulability of brains without also emulating a lot of
> environment that may affect the brain.
>

Then you agree with Bruno, and you have contradicted your earlier comments
about comp requiring extraordinary evidence.

>
> And I don't see anything incoherent about true randomness.  We seem to
> have done well with it for a century.  If you can accept randomness due to
> ignorance which can never be informed, why not inherent randomness.
>

It is of course possible that the universe works on "oracles" like this,
this is just my personal bias towards explanations that don't require
infinite amounts of "in-principle unknowable" data to be injected into
physics. But I admit I could be wrong to have that bias.

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Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Feb 2015, at 17:47, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/24/2015 5:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Feb 2015, at 20:46, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/23/2015 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:

On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb 
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.

The claim that what goes on inside brains is at some level  
Turing-emulable seems not necessarily extraordinary - or do you  
think it is?


Yes.  It's not crazy or outlandish, but I don't think it's  
ordinary either.


It seems like a fairly standard assumption by many scientists  
and philosophers, but I can believe it's wrong - but some  
reason to do so would be nice rather, than just a "statement  
from authority". as given here.Y


(If the conclusions Bruno has drawn from that assumption appear  
extraordinary those aren't "claims", just  
deductions  which can presumably be  
shown to be wrong through the application of logic, assuming  
they are ub fact wrong. He's provided a detailed description of  
his assumptions and deductions, so go to it.)


I doubt Bruno has made an error of deduction.  But I find his  
interpretation that identifies "provable" = "belief" dubious.



I do not identify "believable" with "provable by PA". I say only  
that if we assume computationalism, then the result will apply to  
all rational believer in PA. They can be quite different from PA,  
like ZF. the results apply as long as the machine is consistent,  
and believes in the axioms of PA. It would not work on you, only  
in the case your arithmetical beliefs are inconsistent with the  
theorems of PA. So, to make your remark here relevant, you should  
give us a theorem of PA that you disbelief.


That every number has a unique successor.


Then you disbelieve already in the axiom of RA, and I have no clue  
what you mean by number.


Sure you do.  You learned about numbers before you ever heard of  
infinity.


The awe and glee of the children when they have the number ha-ha is  
when they realize that they can add one to one as many times as they  
want.


But the 1p come from infinity, and is actually surprised by the  
number, the finiteness. Infinity is an old pal of the 1p. I think.




Suppose, as people on this list have sometimes proposed, that we and  
the world we perceive is a digital simulation in a computer vastly  
more powerful than the ones we've built.  Suppose this computer is  
1e500 bit machine.


I guess you mean 10e500 bit machine. (1e500 = 1).


Then there would be no number representable in the computer bigger  
than 1e500.


?

I can represent much bigger number with much less than a megabit. You  
mean that we could not described the number in extension in that  
machine.


Even with no so much memory we can represent very big number, like I  
illustrated with the diagonal some years ago.







What difference would that make?


It depends on your substitution level.

Either we are in the comp normal histories, in which case the logic of  
what we see when we look below our substitution level is given, say,  
by Z1*. We can test that.


If the test shows that "nature" violates Z1* (and the other variants)  
then we can conclude that comp is wrong, or we belong to a "perverse"  
simulation made from the normal worlds. This implies it is  
intentional, as those running the emulation needs to constantly verify  
that we don't find the mistake. It is a form of lies, manipulation and  
it has some cost. If our descendent simulate us, it will be easier to  
let us find the normal laws, and then we will be as much in the  
simulation, than in the normal world, by the arithmetical FPI. In that  
sense, we are already at all level at once.







The problem is that in physics and computer science we do postulate  
that every natural numbers have a successor.


And we postulate real numbers, complex numbers, quaternions,  
octonions, sets, continua, and the rights of man.  We can postulate  
whatever we like to construct a theory.


That is wrong. We cannot postulate that sqrt(2) is a rational numbers,  
and that all length are commensurable. We can't decide that the  
equation 2a^2 = b^2 has no trivial solutions. We really discover those  
things, that you can seen as capital subroutine to figure out  
scientific problems in math, economy, physics, biology, etc.


The point is to postulate as few things as possible, for explaining as  
much as possible, including the difficulties of consciousness and the  
appearance of matter.
























And even the Plationist idea that arithmetic exists in the sense  
necessary to instantiate the world we see is doubtful.


There is no world. But if you agree that 2+2=4 independently of  
time, mass, space (which is the natural understanding of math  
proposition), and if you agree or assume computationalism, then  
some numbers will behave like if they believe in worlds, and wi

Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[meekerdb]

On 2/24/2015 5:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Feb 2015, at 20:46, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/23/2015 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb >


Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.


The claim that what goes on inside brains is at some level Turing-emulable seems not 
necessarily extraordinary - or do you think it is?


Yes.  It's not crazy or outlandish, but I don't think it's ordinary either.

It seems like a fairly standard assumption by many scientists and philosophers, but 
I can believe it's wrong - but some reason to do so would be nice rather, than just 
a "statement from authority". as given here.Y


(If the conclusions Bruno has drawn from that assumption appear extraordinary those 
aren't "claims", just deductions which can presumably be shown to be wrong through 
the application of logic, assuming they are ub fact wrong. He's provided a detailed 
description of his assumptions and deductions, so go to it.)


I doubt Bruno has made an error of deduction.  But I find his interpretation that 
identifies "provable" = "belief" dubious.



I do not identify "believable" with "provable by PA". I say only that if we assume 
computationalism, then the result will apply to all rational believer in PA. They can 
be quite different from PA, like ZF. the results apply as long as the machine is 
consistent, and believes in the axioms of PA. It would not work on you, only in the 
case your arithmetical beliefs are inconsistent with the theorems of PA. So, to make 
your remark here relevant, you should give us a theorem of PA that you disbelief.


That every number has a unique successor.


Then you disbelieve already in the axiom of RA, and I have no clue what you 
mean by number.


Sure you do.  You learned about numbers before you ever heard of infinity.  Suppose, as 
people on this list have sometimes proposed, that we and the world we perceive is a 
digital simulation in a computer vastly more powerful than the ones we've built.  Suppose 
this computer is 1e500 bit machine.  Then there would be no number representable in the 
computer bigger than 1e500.  What difference would that make?


The problem is that in physics and computer science we do postulate that every natural 
numbers have a successor.


And we postulate real numbers, complex numbers, quaternions, octonions, sets, continua, 
and the rights of man.  We can postulate whatever we like to construct a theory.

















And even the Plationist idea that arithmetic exists in the sense necessary to 
instantiate the world we see is doubtful.


There is no world. But if you agree that 2+2=4 independently of time, mass, space 
(which is the natural understanding of math proposition), and if you agree or assume 
computationalism, then some numbers will behave like if they believe in worlds, and 
will develop physics, etc.


What does it mean for a number to believe something?  I earlier said you identified 
"believe" with "provable" but you denied that - although it seems to me you use it that 
way.


I say that a machine believes p if the machine asserts p.


What does it mean for the machine to assert p?  Just to print out a number?  Or must it be 
an equation or an inequality?


Then, as I want machine trying to understand themselves, I limit myself to ideally 
correct (with respect to the arithmetical reality) machine which believes already to PA 
axioms and to the validity of the usual inference rules.


Isn't that a requirement that the machine prove the assertion from PA?  Does it actually 
have to go thru asserting the steps of the proof, or is it enough that the assertion be 
provable?









You can say that they are zombies, assuming some magic matter, but it is more 
interesting to look at the physics they develop, and compare with our inferred physics.







That some things may happen at random isn't.


Now that /is/ an extraordinary claim, in my opinion. What would be a suitable 
underlying means by which the universe might operate, that it makes things happen at 
random? I can imagine things that might appear random to us, but are actually the 
result of deterministic forces operating on scales we can't probe - e.g. string 
vibrations. But genuinely random - that seems to me to require extraordinary 
evidence. So far we only have evidence for "apparently random" as far as I know.


Some backup for the above two extraordinary claims would be welcome.

(1) that brains aren't Turing emulable at any level



You seem to be saying that to assert a claim is extraordinary is equivalent to 
asserting it's negation.  So if I say claiming there's a teapot orbiting Jupiter is 
extraordinary, you'll ask that I back up that extraordinary assertion?  What happened 
to agnosticism?  I don't think I made any extraordinary claim; unless mere doubt of 
Platonism has become extraordinary.


I

Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Feb 2015, at 21:03, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/23/2015 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:55, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/22/2015 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically  
and instantiate all possible thoughts - and a lot of other stuff.



That's arithmetical realism, not computationalism. However, to  
believe in the notion of Turing machines or Turing emulability  
requires assuming at least something like the peano axioms.


I think there's a difference between arithmetical realism and  
assuming there's a universal dovetailer that exists in at least  
the Platonic sense.


We need only the existence (in the usual arithmetical sense) of the  
UD and the computations. The existence of the UD is a theorem of  
PA, or even RA.





Assuming the Peano Axioms means assuming they are 'true', not that  
anything exists.


Once you assume PA, you derive the existence of many things, like  
numbers, finite computations, and sequences of computations, etc.


For example s(0) = s(0), by identity axioms, and from this you can  
derive already that the number 2 exists, by the existential  
quantifier rule F(t) ==> ExFx): Ex(x = s(s(0))).




An the existential quantifier only shows that relative to the axioms  
there is something that satisfies the WFF.



That is the case for all theories. Higgs has only shown that his boson  
exists relatively to the standard model. But then we verify.


Sae with the machine's theory of mind-matter. It predicts that the  
observable "tautologies" obeys to Z1* (or X1*, S4Grz1). We can test  
that, and up to now, it fits. It would be astonishing that it fits  
completely, but that remains to be verified.










  And I put 'true' in scare quotes because to show that there are  
true but unprovable arithmetic propositions requires assuming that  
the numbers are infinite, which I think it just a convenience, and  
not a metaphysical necessity.


It is a mathematical necessity. if you assume a finite number of  
numbers, you can prove 0 = 1 at the metalevel.
So to you use your remark as a critics, you would need an  
ultrafinitist axioms, which indeed contradicts arithmetical  
realism, and RA, PA, etc.


If you need to resort to ultrafinitism to escape the consequence,   
you are defending computationalism, as virtually nobody believes in  
ultrafinitism.


You seem to take the same view as LizR, "You're either for my theory  
or you're for a contrary theory."  So I'll ask the same question,  
what happened to agnotsticism?


We respect agnosticism, because we are scientist. Nobody pretended  
that comp is true, or that ultrafinism is false. but to study computer  
science, and machine's theology, ultrafinitism is inadequate with the  
comp frame.




Can't ultrafinitism be true?


if comp is false, it certainly can be true. But you can't say "yes" to  
the doctor by betting on the relevance of the computation only, you  
will need some god doing non Turing emulable, nor FPI recoverable  
things. If you can make precise your theory, then why not. But it is  
useless to refute my arguments, which, if this is not yet clear,  
assume computationalism.





It can certainly be true in the same way 2+2=4 is true - i.e.  
consistent with some set of axioms.


Ultrafinitism is really another topic, even one at the opposite of the  
everything-like type of theory. And I have never find a consistent non  
trivial account of ultrafinitism.



But then this undermines the idea that the arithmetic existential  
quantifier provides the same "exists" as ostensive physical existence.


But with computationalism, the "E" of the ontological base *is*  
different from the ostensive (indexical) existence.


The first is the usual first order "E" used in the axioms for defining  
the Turing universal base (usually arithmetic, or combinators), and  
the ostensive physical existence is given by the indexical definition  
(referring to the observer) []<>Ex[]<> [... x ...], with the box, not  
of G, but of one of the 'material hypostases".  Comp explains entiely  
why "physical existence" behaves radically differently than the  
arithmetical existence, which here (with the comp. hypothesis) is more  
primary.









To be sure, I do not defend computationalism. I just study its  
consequences, and I show that a classical version of comp is  
testable.


I do find computationalism plausible, though.


What does that mean?


That I have reason to believe in Church"s thesis, and that I have  
reason to believe that there is a level of description of me such that  
I would survive with a digital functional substitution.





That it's true and ultrafinitism is false?


Well, that comp is plausibly true, and ultrafinitism plausibly false.  
But here I am weak, and I am trapped in a philosophical discussion,  
which is not part of what I intend to convey.





That ZFC isn't true and sets don't exist.


Not necessarily. ZFC is truing unive

Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Feb 2015, at 20:46, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/23/2015 7:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:16, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, LizR wrote:

On 23 February 2015 at 10:17, meekerdb 
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.

The claim that what goes on inside brains is at some level Turing- 
emulable seems not necessarily extraordinary - or do you think it  
is?


Yes.  It's not crazy or outlandish, but I don't think it's  
ordinary either.


It seems like a fairly standard assumption by many scientists and  
philosophers, but I can believe it's wrong - but some reason to  
do so would be nice rather, than just a "statement from  
authority". as given here.Y


(If the conclusions Bruno has drawn from that assumption appear  
extraordinary those aren't "claims", just deductions which can  
presumably be shown to be wrong through the application of logic,  
assuming they are ub fact wrong. He's provided a detailed  
description of his assumptions and deductions, so go to it.)


I doubt Bruno has made an error of deduction.  But I find his  
interpretation that identifies "provable" = "belief" dubious.



I do not identify "believable" with "provable by PA". I say only  
that if we assume computationalism, then the result will apply to  
all rational believer in PA. They can be quite different from PA,  
like ZF. the results apply as long as the machine is consistent,  
and believes in the axioms of PA. It would not work on you, only in  
the case your arithmetical beliefs are inconsistent with the  
theorems of PA. So, to make your remark here relevant, you should  
give us a theorem of PA that you disbelief.


That every number has a unique successor.


Then you disbelieve already in the axiom of RA, and I have no clue  
what you mean by number. The problem is that in physics and computer  
science we do postulate that every natural numbers have a successor.















And even the Plationist idea that arithmetic exists in the sense  
necessary to instantiate the world we see is doubtful.


There is no world. But if you agree that 2+2=4 independently of  
time, mass, space (which is the natural understanding of math  
proposition), and if you agree or assume computationalism, then  
some numbers will behave like if they believe in worlds, and will  
develop physics, etc.


What does it mean for a number to believe something?  I earlier said  
you identified "believe" with "provable" but you denied that -  
although it seems to me you use it that way.


I say that a machine believes p if the machine asserts p. Then, as I  
want machine trying to understand themselves, I limit myself to  
ideally correct (with respect to the arithmetical reality) machine  
which believes already to PA axioms and to the validity of the usual  
inference rules.







You can say that they are zombies, assuming some magic matter, but  
it is more interesting to look at the physics they develop, and  
compare with our inferred physics.








That some things may happen at random isn't.

Now that is an extraordinary claim, in my opinion. What would be  
a suitable underlying means by which the universe might operate,  
that it makes things happen at random? I can imagine things that  
might appear random to us, but are actually the result of  
deterministic forces operating on scales we can't probe - e.g.  
string vibrations. But genuinely random - that seems to me to  
require extraordinary evidence. So far we only have evidence for  
"apparently random" as far as I know.


Some backup for the above two extraordinary claims would be  
welcome.


(1) that brains aren't Turing emulable at any level



You seem to be saying that to assert a claim is extraordinary is  
equivalent to asserting it's negation.  So if I say claiming  
there's a teapot orbiting Jupiter is extraordinary, you'll ask  
that I back up that extraordinary assertion?  What happened to  
agnosticism?  I don't think I made any extraordinary claim; unless  
mere doubt of Platonism has become extraordinary.


It is better to use "realism" instead of Platonism, which is  
related, but different. Arithmetical realism is believed by all  
scientists, and almost all philosophers. Platonism is a different  
matter, as it implies something like "no more than the numbers, or  
that the world of ideas". Arithmetical realism is in the assumption  
(in Church thesis notably). Platonism is among the counter- 
intuitive conclusions.








(2) that there is a mechanism by which the universe might  
generate truly, rather than apparently random events.


I'm not sure it's possible to have a mechanism that generates  
truly random events.  I think that's like asking for an algorithm  
that produces truly random numbers.  - although it may turn on the  
meaning of "mechanism".


Well, if you enlarge mechanism by replacing computable function by  
function, then, by Cantor, you get 2^aleph_zero genuine random  
functions, but there is no eviden

Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Feb 2015, at 20:42, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/23/2015 7:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:01, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/22/2015 3:43 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 12:32, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.

For it to be extraordinary, it would have to be beyond ordinary.  
However computationalism isn't just ordinary but its the  
majority opinion among philosophers of mind.
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically  
and instantiate all possible thoughts - and a lot of other stuff.


That is a deduction, not a postulate.


A deduction from what?  That arithmetic exists


To say that "arithmetic exists" is ambiguous. The UDA-deduction use  
only Church Thesis and "yes doctor". The AUDA deduction use only  
Church thesis (to motivate the sigma_1 restriction).


But "yes doctor" is also ambiguous.


?



Does it mean that a physical substitution is possible (which most  
people believe) or does it mean that an abstract computation is  
enough.


It only means that you survive a physical substitution (a digital one,  
made at some level ...).


Then it is proved, from that assumption, that the physical must be  
explained by relative "abstract" computations, (which exists very  
concretely in arithmetic. Keep in mind that for number theorist, like  
hardy who I quoted on this subject, a natural numbers is the most  
concrete thing he can think of ...).




And don't say that's invoking 'magic'.  A physical substitution,  
according to QM, entails entanglement with the environment.


This means only that you are using a very low level of substitution. I  
have explained that this does not change anything in the reasoning. In  
the UD* there are infinities of simulation of your brain entanglement  
with your environment.


Or you mean that there is something physical needed which is not  
Turing emulable, in which case we are out of the scope of the theory I  
study the consequences of.




Which is why I think the MG argument only shows that movie graph  
simulation will work within a world simulation - not within this  
world.


I am interested in explaining things like "this world", so I work in a  
theory which does not assume "this world".


Bruno



Brent





and there's a mapping from true theorems of PA to numbers?


Only the usual (and non computable!) mapping between arithmetical  
proposition to {yes, no}. Physicists use them too.


They use that they are true relations, not the the referents exist.

Brent

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Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Feb 2015, at 18:28, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:

Yes, as an explanation for the universe, is computationalism-math- 
cellular automata can be falsified?



The point is only that if you assume that your brain (not the  
universe) is Turing emulable, then the universe is no more explainable  
by the choice of one theory (be it cellurlar automata, topological  
functor, etc.). On the contrary, you have to explains the universe by  
a sort of infinite games involving all explanations/theories/universal- 
numbers.


What we can say is that IF my brain is Turing emulable, then the  
physical/observable universe is definitely not

-a cellular automata
-a quantum cellular automata (although this one might be the winner  
but that needs to be justfied)

-this universal system
-this other universal system

To be sure, the existence of a (completely 3p sharable) physical  
realities is open, in the comp theory.







Or, maybe its simply the truth, and the physicists, let us say, who  
don't like it, find it too annoying to deal with?


They do not address the problem. They are not aware of the amount of  
induction they use in the implicit assumption that there is a physical  
universe. But they progress, like in the line Galilee, Einstein,  
Everett.


Many miss the biggest discovery of all time: the universal Turing  
machine.


It is a recurring happening. In our story, and talking roughly, the  
last time where the big bang, the origin of life, the origin of  
brains, the origin of languages, the origin of computers, etc.


Universal machines loves to add and multiplies things, including  
themselves, etc.






Plus, there's no funding for such a proof, as in a grant$, so why  
bother?


What proofs? It is just computer science, and theology, in the old  
sense (before it implies Aristotelian theologies, with creators and/or  
creation).


There is no possible funding for fundamental research.
You are in the luckiest case when there is not to much funding  
*against* fundamental research.




Refutation is not possible,


The point of the more technical part of what I try to convey is that  
computationalism *is* testable, once you accept some classical  
definition in analytical philosophy. But this is mainly agreeing that  
knowable obeys the axioms (of S4):


knowable p  ->  p
knowable p -> knowable (knowable p)
knowable (p -> q) -> (knowable p -> knowable q)

Together with the modus ponens and the necessitation rule (from A  
deduce knowable A).


Gödel's beweisbar predicate does not obeys to that logic, making it  
into a belief instead of knowability, and indeed it will be an  
indexical relative rational "belief". But this makes the theaetetus'  
definition meaningful for the machine, and the intensional variant  
(bewesibar("p") & p) obeys to S4 described above. (Indeed to S4 + Grz).




if the phenomena does not exist, or, alternatively, its a profound  
fact of existence and thus, harder to measure and identify??




It is science, and it is far more easy to refute than string theory.  
It is a matter of time, and interest we find in nature observable  
refutable a proposition in ether S4Grz1, Z1*; or X1*.


But the main interest is that if we listen to the machine's theologies  
(classical or weakened) we come back with the right, and perhaps  
necessity, of doubt and critical research in the theological field.


Today, it is still argument by authority, with varying degree of  
violence. It is the wolf argument, to follow leader.


Today, the human *applied* science is still this, summing up a little  
bit:


1) the boss is right,
2) the boss is always right,
3) in the case the boss is wrong, apply 1 or 2,
4) especially in the case the boss is wrong, apply 1 or 2.

Our animal nature don't like nature teaching us the doubt, evolution  
has not anticipated that brain would anticipate evolution, so it is  
harder to be serious on the human issue when embedded in human  
relation and living the first person experience. It is normal that  
such an understanding can take time. But many pay the big price in  
amount of avoidable suffering.



Bruno






-Original Message-
From: Bruno Marchal 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Feb 23, 2015 11:47 am
Subject: Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic


On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:55, meekerdb wrote:


On 2/22/2015 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically and  
instantiate all possible thoughts - and a lot of other stuff.



That's arithmetical realism, not computationalism. However, to  
believe in the notion of Turing machines or Turing emulability  
requires assuming at least something like the peano axioms.


I think there's a difference between arithmetical realism and  
assuming there's a universal dovetailer that exists in at least the  
Platonic sense.


We need only the existence (in the usual arithmetical sense) of the  
UD and the computations. The existence of the UD is a theorem of PA,  
or