Re: What are atheists for?

[Brent Meeker]

So you're defining computationalism as "not everything reduces to 
matter...and it's processes and relations?"  That's quite different from 
the idea that consciousness would survive substititution of different 
substrates for brains provided certain computations were preserved.


Does the existence of insurance, or chess, also contradict physicalism?

Brent

On 4/22/2017 4:03 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical 
notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce to matter, 
computationalism is false by definition, as computation as such is not 
a physical notion.


Regards,
Quentin


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Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 23/04/2017 11:10 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
How can you justify logic from physics if logic is primary to prove 
anything? You're building your lower layer upon an higher layer... 
It's contradictory.


Logic is merely the specification of rules of inference that are truth 
preserving. One can demonstrate the preservation of truth in simple 
situations (truth tables, for example) and generalize. So logic is, in 
fact, derived from our experience of the world, it is not a priori in 
any sense, and physics is not derived from logic.


Bruce


Le 23 avr. 2017 02:21, "Bruce Kellett" > a écrit :


On 23/04/2017 10:01 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

If everything reduce to matter then the tools you use to prove
and demonstrate are *false*... The truth of them are inconsistent
if only real is physically realised computations... Even the
notion of realised computation proved by definition that
computation is not a physical notion.


Existence is not a matter of definition. Rules of inference are
abstract, not concrete, but abstractions do not contradict the
concrete.

Bruce




Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 01:34, "Bruce Kellett" mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> a écrit :

On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a
mathematical notion, if physicalism is true, so everything
reduce to matter, computationalism is false by definition,
as computation as such is not a physical notion.


That is just word salad. A description of a physical process
is not, in itself, physical (unless it is written down or
stored physically). Similarly, computation is not physical in
so far as it is an abstract description of what a computer
does. But the computer is physical, and the computation does
not exist absent the computer.

It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the
thesis that physicalism is false, and then claimed that the
assumption of computationalism contradicts physicalism. But
that is logic chopping of the basest kind.

Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is
not, of itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then
attempts to argue that the notion of abstract computations
(platonia) renders the physical otiose. There is still no
contradiction. The best that Bruno can achieve is something
that seems absurd to him. But that is merely a contradiction
with his instinctive notions of what is reasonable -- it is
not a demonstrated logical contradiction.

Bruce



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Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 9:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

​> ​
> How can you justify logic from physics if logic is primary to prove
> anything?
>

​
Physics does not need logic or mathematics or anything else to prove it's
existence to us because we all have the ability to detect physics by direct
experience
​,​
​ and that far outranks proof.​
Humans originally
​ ​
invented mathematics to better understand and manipulate the physical world
​, and logic is the stuff that produces no inconsistencies with our
observation of that physical world. ​


 ​John ​K Clark

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Re: What are atheists for?

[Quentin Anciaux]

How can you justify logic from physics if logic is primary to prove
anything? You're building your lower layer upon an higher layer... It's
contradictory.


Le 23 avr. 2017 02:21, "Bruce Kellett"  a écrit :

On 23/04/2017 10:01 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

If everything reduce to matter then the tools you use to prove and
demonstrate are *false*... The truth of them are inconsistent if only real
is physically realised computations... Even the notion of realised
computation proved by definition that computation is not a physical notion.


Existence is not a matter of definition. Rules of inference are abstract,
not concrete, but abstractions do not contradict the concrete.

Bruce



Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 01:34, "Bruce Kellett"  a écrit :

> On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical
> notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce to matter,
> computationalism is false by definition, as computation as such is not a
> physical notion.
>
>
> That is just word salad. A description of a physical process is not, in
> itself, physical (unless it is written down or stored physically).
> Similarly, computation is not physical in so far as it is an abstract
> description of what a computer does. But the computer is physical, and the
> computation does not exist absent the computer.
>
> It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the thesis that
> physicalism is false, and then claimed that the assumption of
> computationalism contradicts physicalism. But that is logic chopping of the
> basest kind.
>
> Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is not, of
> itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then attempts to argue that the
> notion of abstract computations (platonia) renders the physical otiose.
> There is still no contradiction. The best that Bruno can achieve is
> something that seems absurd to him. But that is merely a contradiction with
> his instinctive notions of what is reasonable -- it is not a demonstrated
> logical contradiction.
>
> Bruce
>

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Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 23/04/2017 10:01 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
If everything reduce to matter then the tools you use to prove and 
demonstrate are *false*... The truth of them are inconsistent if only 
real is physically realised computations... Even the notion of 
realised computation proved by definition that computation is not a 
physical notion.


Existence is not a matter of definition. Rules of inference are 
abstract, not concrete, but abstractions do not contradict the concrete.


Bruce



Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 01:34, "Bruce Kellett" > a écrit :


On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a
mathematical notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce
to matter, computationalism is false by definition, as
computation as such is not a physical notion.


That is just word salad. A description of a physical process is
not, in itself, physical (unless it is written down or stored
physically). Similarly, computation is not physical in so far as
it is an abstract description of what a computer does. But the
computer is physical, and the computation does not exist absent
the computer.

It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the
thesis that physicalism is false, and then claimed that the
assumption of computationalism contradicts physicalism. But that
is logic chopping of the basest kind.

Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is not,
of itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then attempts to
argue that the notion of abstract computations (platonia) renders
the physical otiose. There is still no contradiction. The best
that Bruno can achieve is something that seems absurd to him. But
that is merely a contradiction with his instinctive notions of
what is reasonable -- it is not a demonstrated logical contradiction.

Bruce



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Re: What are atheists for?

[Quentin Anciaux]

If everything reduce to matter then the tools you use to prove and
demonstrate are *false*... The truth of them are inconsistent if only real
is physically realised computations... Even the notion of realised
computation proved by definition that computation is not a physical notion.
Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 01:34, "Bruce Kellett"  a écrit :

> On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical
> notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce to matter,
> computationalism is false by definition, as computation as such is not a
> physical notion.
>
>
> That is just word salad. A description of a physical process is not, in
> itself, physical (unless it is written down or stored physically).
> Similarly, computation is not physical in so far as it is an abstract
> description of what a computer does. But the computer is physical, and the
> computation does not exist absent the computer.
>
> It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the thesis that
> physicalism is false, and then claimed that the assumption of
> computationalism contradicts physicalism. But that is logic chopping of the
> basest kind.
>
> Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is not, of
> itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then attempts to argue that the
> notion of abstract computations (platonia) renders the physical otiose.
> There is still no contradiction. The best that Bruno can achieve is
> something that seems absurd to him. But that is merely a contradiction with
> his instinctive notions of what is reasonable -- it is not a demonstrated
> logical contradiction.
>
> Bruce
>
>
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
>
> Le 23 avr. 2017 00:42, "Bruce Kellett"  a
> écrit :
>
>> On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that
> there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul")
> that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this:
> under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is
> that physicalism leads to a contradiction,
>

 I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell out what that
 contradiction is?

>>> Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
>>> If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
>>> supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe
>>> your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also
>>> in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
>>> far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
>>> that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation
>>> argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It
>>> follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
>>> temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.
>>>
>>
>> This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In fact,
>> you examples are all completely consistent with the requirement that any
>> computation requires a physical substrate -- "a Universal Dovetailer
>> running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a far-away galaxy" is a completely
>> physical concept.
>>
>> Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is a
>> computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You have to add
>> something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism, the idea that all
>> computations exist in the abstract, in platonia, and do not require
>> physical implementation. But that is merely the assumption that physicalism
>> is false. So it may be the case that mathematical platonism does not
>> require a physical universe, but it does not contradict physicalism: it is
>> perfectly possible that your consciousness is a computation, and that
>> mathematical platonism is true, but that there is still a primitive
>> physical universe and that any actual computations require a physical
>> substrate -- as JC keeps insisting.
>>
>> No contradiction has been demonstrated.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
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Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 23/04/2017 9:03 am, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical 
notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce to matter, 
computationalism is false by definition, as computation as such is not 
a physical notion.


That is just word salad. A description of a physical process is not, in 
itself, physical (unless it is written down or stored physically). 
Similarly, computation is not physical in so far as it is an abstract 
description of what a computer does. But the computer is physical, and 
the computation does not exist absent the computer.


It seems that you have merely defined computationalism as the thesis 
that physicalism is false, and then claimed that the assumption of 
computationalism contradicts physicalism. But that is logic chopping of 
the basest kind.


Bruno, at least, starts from the "Yes, doctor" idea, which is not, of 
itself, inconsistent with physicalism, and then attempts to argue that 
the notion of abstract computations (platonia) renders the physical 
otiose. There is still no contradiction. The best that Bruno can achieve 
is something that seems absurd to him. But that is merely a 
contradiction with his instinctive notions of what is reasonable -- it 
is not a demonstrated logical contradiction.


Bruce




Regards,
Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 00:42, "Bruce Kellett" > a écrit :


On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that
you claim that
there is some mysterious substance (he finally called
it a "soul")
that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I
claim is this:
under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied.
The problem is
that physicalism leads to a contradiction,


I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell
out what that
contradiction is?

Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space.
Maybe
your current computation happens in the original planet Earth
but also
in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the
simulation
argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as
unique. It
follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.


This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In
fact, you examples are all completely consistent with the
requirement that any computation requires a physical substrate --
"a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
far-away galaxy" is a completely physical concept.

Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is
a computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You
have to add something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism,
the idea that all computations exist in the abstract, in platonia,
and do not require physical implementation. But that is merely the
assumption that physicalism is false. So it may be the case that
mathematical platonism does not require a physical universe, but
it does not contradict physicalism: it is perfectly possible that
your consciousness is a computation, and that mathematical
platonism is true, but that there is still a primitive physical
universe and that any actual computations require a physical
substrate -- as JC keeps insisting.

No contradiction has been demonstrated.

Bruce



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Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 7:03 PM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

​> ​
> The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical
> notion,
>

​
Notions just like calculations are physical. A notion is a belief or a
desire but every belief or desire anyone had ever encountered requires a
brain, and every brain ever encountered requires matter that obeys the laws
of physics.

​ John K Clark​

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Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017  spudboy100 via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

*​> ​I wonder if there are aspects of physics and mathematics, that are
> "unimportant," both, materially, and conceptually, in the past, or now,
> today, that will become important much later onward?? As when Fermi
> produced the idea of the neutrino, in 1932,*
>

​
It was
​
Wolfgang Pauli who predicted the neutrino not Fermi although it was Fermi
who gave the particle its name, and it was in 1930 not 1932. Neutrinos were
not detected experimentally
​until 1956. ​



> * ​>​which in Depression times, were useless, to most physicists,*
>

​I don't see what the Depression has to do with it, and many physicist
thought Pauli was ​probably wrong but nobody thought the idea was useless.



> * ​> ​Maybe the Platonic is something inherent in the Universe, such as an
> "operating system" is to laptops, and I-phones?  We just find it currently,
> impossible to 'touch." Spin this conversation to Dark Matter, and Dark
> Energy, and we have another example.*
>

​Both Dark Matter and Dark Energy were detected experimentally, nobody
predicted them theoretically. But non-physical calculations have never been
detected and there is no theoretical basis to think they might exist.

 John K Clark ​

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Re: What are atheists for?

[Quentin Anciaux]

The contradiction is in requiring computation which is a mathematical
notion, if physicalism is true, so everything reduce to matter,
computationalism is false by definition, as computation as such is not a
physical notion.

Regards,
Quentin

Le 23 avr. 2017 00:42, "Bruce Kellett"  a écrit :

> On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that
 there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul")
 that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this:
 under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is
 that physicalism leads to a contradiction,

>>>
>>> I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell out what that
>>> contradiction is?
>>>
>> Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
>> If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
>> supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe
>> your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also
>> in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
>> far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
>> that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation
>> argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It
>> follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
>> temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.
>>
>
> This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In fact, you
> examples are all completely consistent with the requirement that any
> computation requires a physical substrate -- "a Universal Dovetailer
> running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a far-away galaxy" is a completely
> physical concept.
>
> Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is a
> computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You have to add
> something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism, the idea that all
> computations exist in the abstract, in platonia, and do not require
> physical implementation. But that is merely the assumption that physicalism
> is false. So it may be the case that mathematical platonism does not
> require a physical universe, but it does not contradict physicalism: it is
> perfectly possible that your consciousness is a computation, and that
> mathematical platonism is true, but that there is still a primitive
> physical universe and that any actual computations require a physical
> substrate -- as JC keeps insisting.
>
> No contradiction has been demonstrated.
>
> Bruce
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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Re: What are atheists for?

[Bruce Kellett]

On 23/04/2017 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that
there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul")
that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this:
under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is
that physicalism leads to a contradiction,


I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell out what that
contradiction is?

Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe
your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also
in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation
argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It
follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.


This does not demonstrate any contradiction with physicalism. In fact, 
you examples are all completely consistent with the requirement that any 
computation requires a physical substrate -- "a Universal Dovetailer 
running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a far-away galaxy" is a 
completely physical concept.


Even given computationalism -- the idea that you consciousness is a 
computation -- there is no contradiction with physicalism. You have to 
add something else -- namely, hard mathematical platonism, the idea that 
all computations exist in the abstract, in platonia, and do not require 
physical implementation. But that is merely the assumption that 
physicalism is false. So it may be the case that mathematical platonism 
does not require a physical universe, but it does not contradict 
physicalism: it is perfectly possible that your consciousness is a 
computation, and that mathematical platonism is true, but that there is 
still a primitive physical universe and that any actual computations 
require a physical substrate -- as JC keeps insisting.


No contradiction has been demonstrated.

Bruce

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Re: What are atheists for?

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

John Clark said:
"Not exactly. Einstein didn't prove the
​ ​
luminiferous aether
​ 
didn't exist in the Platonic sense, he just proved it was unimportant. I 
suppose you could say in the vague way that Greek philosophers love that 
correct mathematical calculations exist independently of matter, but the 
trouble is incorrect mathematical calculations exist too, and the only way to 
differentiate the correct from the incorrect is by using matter that obeys the 
laws of physics."



I wonder if there are aspects of physics and mathematics, that are 
"unimportant," both, materially, and conceptually, in the past, or now, today, 
that will become important much later onward?? As when Fermi produced the idea 
of the neutrino, in 1932, which in Depression times, were useless, to most 
physicists, and utterly useless, to the common job-seeker of that time? So, as 
with today, the Platonic stuff seems "meh!", to many of us nerds, but may be in 
actuality, something that could really be useful, or important, conceptually, 
to the kiddies that discover it. Maybe the Platonic is something inherent in 
the Universe, such as an "operating system" is to laptops, and I-phones?  We 
just find it currently, impossible to 'touch." Spin this conversation to Dark 
Matter, and Dark Energy, and we have another example.


-Original Message-
From: Stathis Papaioannou 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Sat, Apr 22, 2017 5:58 pm
Subject: Re: What are atheists for?





On Sun, 23 Apr 2017 at 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes  wrote:

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
> On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that
>> there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul")
>> that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this:
>> under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is
>> that physicalism leads to a contradiction,
>
>
> I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell out what that
> contradiction is?

Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe
your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also
in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation
argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It
follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.


It is possible - addressing just this argument - that while mind is not 
localised it still needs to be implemented in a physical substrate.



In this case we avoid dualism by reverting things: ok, so it is time
and space that are generated by mind.

I think.

Telmo.


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Re: What are atheists for?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sun, 23 Apr 2017 at 12:52 am, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:

> On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> >>
> >> John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that
> >> there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul")
> >> that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this:
> >> under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is
> >> that physicalism leads to a contradiction,
> >
> >
> > I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell out what that
> > contradiction is?
>
> Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
> If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
> supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe
> your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also
> in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
> far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
> that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation
> argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It
> follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
> temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.


It is possible - addressing just this argument - that while mind is not
localised it still needs to be implemented in a physical substrate.

In this case we avoid dualism by reverting things: ok, so it is time
> and space that are generated by mind.
>
> I think.
>
> Telmo.
>
-- 
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Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017  Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

​>> ​
>> ​Suppose just for ​
>> ​the sake ​of argument that non-physical computations did not exist, how
>> would our physical world be different? There would be no difference.
>> Therefore either
>> non-physical computations
>> ​ do not exist or they do but are utterly unimportant, rather like the ​l
>> uminiferous aether
>> ​.​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> This is equivalent to supposing that mathematical Platonism is false.
>

​
Not exactly. Einstein didn't prove the
​ ​
luminiferous aether
​
didn't exist in the Platonic sense, he just proved it was unimportant. I
suppose you could say in the vague way that Greek philosophers love that
correct mathematical calculations exist independently of matter, but the
trouble is incorrect mathematical calculations exist too, and the only way
to differentiate the correct from the incorrect is by using matter that
obeys the laws of physics. And separating the stuff we want from the stuff
we don't is important, that's why we say Michelangelo's huge statue of
David is 500 years old and not far older even though in the platonic sense
David was inside a gigantic block of Carrara marble
​
for 100 million years and all
​
Michelangelo
​
did was unpack it, he just removed the parts of the block that weren't
David.

Bruno likes to talk about Robinson Arithmetic but as far as I can tell
even Raphael
​
Robinson
​ never claimed he had proven the existence of non-physical calculations,
instead he showed that if you do certain activities in a certain sequence
then you can produce correct mathematical calculations without producing
any incorrect mathematical calculations. But without matter that obeys the
laws of physics you can't "do" anything, that's why a book by itself can't
perform a calculation or "do" anything else either, not even a book
on Robinson Arithmetic.

John K Clark  ​

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Re: What are atheists for?

[John Clark]

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017  Telmo Menezes  wrote:

​> ​
> Eleminativists go to the
> ​ ​
> extreme of denying that 1p views exist


I don't know any
​ e
leminativists
​ and don't anything about them
nor do I know of anyone who would say subjective experience does not exist,
except perhaps for some philosophy professors who want to be provocative
for their freshman class. But I do know plenty of people who would say the
term "1p views" does not exist except on this list

​John K Clark​




>
>

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Re: What are atheists for?

[Telmo Menezes]

On Sat, Apr 22, 2017 at 6:12 AM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
> On 4/21/2017 3:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that
>> there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul")
>> that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this:
>> under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied. The problem is
>> that physicalism leads to a contradiction,
>
>
> I don't agree that it leads to a contradiction.  Can spell out what that
> contradiction is?

Shortly (sorry for any lack of rigour):
If you assume computationalism, the computation that is currently
supporting your mind state can be repeated in time and space. Maybe
your current computation happens in the original planet Earth but also
in a Universal Dovetailer running on a Jupiter-sized computer in a
far-away galaxy. Given a multiverse, it seems reasonable to assume
that these repetitions are bound to happen (also with the simulation
argument, etc.). And yet our mind states are experienced as unique. It
follows that, given computationalism, mind cannot be spatially or
temporally situated, thus cannot be physical.

In this case we avoid dualism by reverting things: ok, so it is time
and space that are generated by mind.

I think.

Telmo.

> Brent
>
>
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Re: What are atheists for?

[Telmo Menezes]

On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 2:04 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 21 Apr 2017, at 12:42, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>>> I will gently help a little bit John here, if you don't mind. Not only I
>>> did
>>> claim that, but will claim it again!
>>
>>
>> No problem :)
>>
>>> I have no worry that you will see what I mean. In fact I can recast a sum
>>> up
>>> of dialog with John Clark in the following way:
>>>
>>> I say that the first person is not duplicated *from the first person
>>> perspective*. Like Brent and/or Quentin, probably others, saw is that I
>>> am
>>> just saying that, very obviously, the first person does not feel the
>>> duplication. The 1-I is not duplicated in the 1-view, it is the 1-1 view,
>>> which is actually the main invariant, so that along its history, the 1
>>> view
>>> is the same as the 1-1 views, and 1-1-1 views, etc.
>>>
>>> But John Clark will reply that such 1-view is duplicated. He is right,
>>> but
>>> that is the 3 view on the 1 views. Yes, the 3 external observer is
>>> computationalist enough to attribute an 1private experience to both
>>> copies.
>>> Then John Clark go up to the 3 view again, and I could say, you are
>>> right,
>>> but that is the 3-1-1 views, take the 1-1-1 views, which are the 1-views,
>>> and John will go up to the 3-1-1-1 views which of course are duplicated,
>>> forcing me to say that we talk about the 1-views, seen by the 1-views,
>>> seen
>>> by the 1-views, etc.
>>>
>>> John predicted once that in the movie thought experience (iterated
>>> self-duplications); where you are duplicated 24 times per second (24)
>>> during
>>> 1h30 (60 * 90), into as many copies can be sent in front of one of the
>>> 2^(16180 * 1) possible images on a screen with 16180 * 1 pixels,
>>> which can be black or white each.
>>> That he will see with certainty Ingmar Bergman movie in french "les
>>> fraises
>>> sauvages", with chinese subscripts. And then, if after the experience we
>>> ask
>>> to one among most John Clarks,(who saw white noise) that one will say
>>> that
>>> he knows that his prediction was true, as he knows (how? BTW) that a John
>>> Clark has seen les fraises sauvages. You will tell him that this is the
>>> 3-1
>>> views and that the question was for the 1-1-1-... view, and explain that
>>> the
>>> question was asked to the 1p about the 1p, and John will go up to the
>>> 3-1-1,
>>> etc.
>>>
>>> To say that consciousness is not duplicated from the view of the
>>> conscious
>>> experience is just saying that we don't feel the split, and cannot be
>>> assured that a duplication has occured without 3p clues (like a phone
>>> call
>>> of the doppelganger, or like with the statistical interference of wave of
>>> possible "states/histories").
>>>
>>> If you accept the "Theaetetus definition of knowledge" applied on
>>> provability (which by Gödel's incompleteness behave like a belief, even
>>> in
>>> the correct case), that is to define the knowability of p by the
>>> [(believability in p) with p], i.e.  [1]p = []p & p, you get the 1-views
>>> and
>>> the 1-1-views, by iterating [1], like [1][1][1]p. You get the 3-1 views
>>> with
>>> [][1]p. G is really a multimodal logic, where all the other
>>> "views/hypostases" are macro-definition, and mixing them makes
>>> (arithmetical) sense.
>>
>>
>> I'd say we are talking about different things.
>>
>> John is accusing you of naive dualism. He says that you claim that
>> there is some mysterious substance (he finally called it a "soul")
>> that is not copied in your thought experiment. What I claim is this:
>> under physicalist assumptions, everything was copied.
>
>
> Even without physicalism. Everything is copied in the 3p views. It is more
> like under the assumption that the 1p views do not exist, or that their are
> not interesting.

Exactly. When John uses ridicule/jokes, it's always to prevent serious
discussion around the first-person view. Eleminativists go to the
extreme of denying that 1p views exist (which is the dumbest possible
statement I can imagine).

> Physicalism can be invoked of course, it is the main tool
> to put the 1p/3p problem under the rug, even if all progresses in physics
> can be seen as an amendment to this. Galilee, then Einstein, then Everett
> ... bring back the "taking into account the perspective of the subject.
> Of course in cognitive science or philosophy of mind, we start from
> accepting the existence of a subject.
>
>
>> The problem is
>> that physicalism leads to a contradiction, and then we can start
>> thinking about what you describe above. Do you agree?
>
>
> I agree, up to invoking physicalism. I can imagine arithmeticalists doing
> the same error. Of course JC uses physicalism in its background assumption,
> and you allude to that fact.

What are arithmeticalists?

>
>>
>>> Thanks for the help Telmo.
>>
>>
>> The only help I can provide is to talk like a lawyer -- in the sense
>> of, trying to answer in the most succinct way to remove the "attack
>> surface" for intenti

Re: What are atheists for?

[David Nyman]

On 21 Apr 2017 7:43 p.m., "John Clark"  wrote:

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:42 PM, David Nyman  wrote:

​>> ​
> all that's really saying is that we have a subjective feeling of time and
> space, but we already knew that.
>
>
> ​> ​
> It goes well beyond that, as the narrative is at pains to set out. Hoyle's
> physicist protagonist invites the other main character to place himself in
> the subjective position represented by any of the pigeon holes, in any
> order. Then he asks him to explain what he thinks his subjective experience
> would be. His response (the guy is very quick on the uptake) is that his
> experience would appear to be perfectly normally​ sequenced from a
> psycho-historical point of view, despite random ordering from an external
> perspective.
>

​
As far as intelligence is concerned when reduced to their simplest form
Hoyle's
​ ​
pigeon holes
​ ​
could
​just ​
contain a bit of tape with either a 1 or a zero written on it. But you were
talking about
​ ​
consciousness
​ not intelligence​
, and in Hoyles analogy the pigeon holes corresponds to events in the real
world, but
​what ​
in the real world corresponds
​
 to the light that is sporadically shined on various pigeon holes from time
to time? I don't think Hoyle had a
​n​
answer to that question. Also that light can't just read things it needs
​​
to be able to write things too because both intelligence and
​ ​
consciousness require memory; it's been a long time since I read the book
but I think Hoyle was rather vague about that too.


> ​> ​
> only a single 1-view can possibly represent me *at that one time and that
> one place*.


​I don't think it makes much sense to say consciousness has a place, nouns
have a place,


In the sense that Hoyle intended, I think, consciousness is what
subjectively *establishes* a place and time. The "objective" location of
whatever might be doing the establishing would be a separate issue.

David

well some nouns do (the number eleven does not) but consciousness is not a
noun. And as for time, if I could reverse time so that you could remember
the future with great accuracy but could only make very fallible guesses
about the past you would have no way of telling I had done anything at all.
The same would be true if I reset your life so you were back in the third
grade and you had to relive your entire life again up to today.


Using Hoyle's analogy, the key ingredient to your individuality is not
where the pigeon holes are
​,​
or when they are illuminated, it is in the sequence of on and off flashes.
Yes there is only one such
​ ​
sequence but it can be implemented in many places and run many different
times. That sequence no more has a time or a place than the number eleven
does.

​> ​
> here we have a single view representing my subjective situation at one
> time and in one place. A difference which as you rightly say makes no
> difference is generally agreed to be no difference, isn't that so?
>

Yes that is so, but there are circumstances where it could make a
difference.
​ ​
For example, suppose there
​are ​
2 flashlights in perfect synchronization shining their light on the same
sequence of pigeon holes at the same time
​,​
and then one of the flashlights is instantaneously destroyed. I maintain
the subjective experience would not be effected, provided light correspond
​s​
to conscious attention.
​In this context ​
​when Hoyle said "light" ​
​I'm sure he didn't mean electromagnetic waves, so I wish Hoyle had
explained what that light is and how it works​.


 John K Clark






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Re: What are atheists for?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Sat, 22 Apr 2017 at 5:20 am, John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 4:33 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> Physical computation needs matter, because a physical computation is a
>> mathematical computation implemented in a physical, material, environment.
>> ​ ​
>> But computations does not need matter,
>>
>
> ​Suppose just for ​
> ​the sake ​of argument that non-physical computations did not exist, how
> would our physical world be different? There would be no difference.
> Therefore either
> non-physical computations
> ​ do not exist or they do but are utterly unimportant, rather like the ​l
> uminiferous aether
> ​.​
>

This is equivalent to supposing that mathematical Platonism is false.

​> ​
>> Mathematical computations exist in arithmetic, in the sense that they can
>> be shown to exists in all interpretations of Robinson Arithmetic
>>
> ​ [...]
>>
>
> Oh no, we're back to Robinson Arithmetic
> ​ again! It's time for you to put your money where your mouth is, it's
> time for you to start the ​
> Robinson
> ​ Computer Corporation and become the richest man on earth. ​
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> Here you beg the question of materialism by defining "computation" by
>> "physical implementation of a mathematical computation".
>>
>
> ​Definitions suck. Examples rule.​
>
>
>
>>> ​>> ​
>>> So which ONE of us has "*THE* 1-p you"?
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Both.
>>
>
> ​If it can't distinguish anything then why the hell did you invent the
> idiotic term??​
>
>  John K Clark
>
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