Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 1:18 AM,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:54:13 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>>
>>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
 introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
 purports
 to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
 memories
 and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG

>>>
>>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
>>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and 
>>> its
>>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
>>> this idea
>>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what 
>>> we can
>>> see?
>>>
>>>
>>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding
>> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
>> to your
>> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
>> infinite; not
>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
>> cannot
>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
>> also
>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
>> some like
>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>>
>
> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies
> of everything *in itself* an argument against it?
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
 infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG

>>>
>>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why
>>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has
>>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG
>>>
>>>
>
>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
>> finite
>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 
>> m
>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible
> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the
> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random 
> process.
> AG
>

 Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on
 the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the
 real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing
 our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG

>>>
>>> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am
>>> the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body
>>> that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of
>>> some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a
>>> real number.
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of
>> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are
>> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a
>> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and
>> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the
>> variation in outcomes. Does this make more sense to you? AG
>>
>
> You might get universes close to ours, but even this would be hugely
> unlikely given the uncountable assumed number of pos

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:23:48 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:12:09 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>


 On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

 You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
> purports 
> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the 
> same memories 
> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>

 What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
 duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth 
 and its 
 inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
 this idea 
 an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of 
 what we can 
 see?


 --stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding 
>>> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
>>> to your 
>>> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
>>> infinite; not 
>>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
>>> cannot 
>>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since 
>>> they also 
>>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
>>> would 
>>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
>>> some like 
>>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>>>
>>
>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies 
>> of everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>>
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>

 If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
 should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions 
 has 
 been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 

  
>>
>>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
>>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
>>> finite 
>>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 
>>> 10^100 m 
>>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>>> -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of 
>> possible universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to 
>> think 
>> the parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random 
>> process. AG 
>>
>
> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on 
> the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to 
> the 
> real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number 
> representing 
> our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>

 But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am 
 the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body 
 that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of 
 some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a 
 real number.
  

 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of 
>>> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are 
>>> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a 
>>> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:12:09 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 17:54, > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>>
>>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
 introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
 purports 
 to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
 memories 
 and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 

>>>
>>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
>>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and 
>>> its 
>>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
>>> this idea 
>>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what 
>>> we can 
>>> see?
>>>
>>>
>>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding 
>> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
>> to your 
>> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
>> infinite; not 
>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
>> cannot 
>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
>> also 
>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
>> would 
>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
>> some like 
>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>>
>
> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies 
> of everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
 infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 

>>>
>>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
>>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
>>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>>>
>>>  
>
>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
>> finite 
>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 
>> m 
>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible 
> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the 
> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random 
> process. 
> AG 
>

 Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on 
 the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the 
 real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number 
 representing 
 our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG

>>>
>>> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am 
>>> the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body 
>>> that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of 
>>> some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a 
>>> real number.
>>>  
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of 
>> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are 
>> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a 
>> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and 
>> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the 
>> variation in outcomes. Does this make more sense to you? AG
>>
>  

> But the possibilities are not infinite if we only want to repro

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:54:13 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
>>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
>>> purports 
>>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
>>> memories 
>>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and 
>> its 
>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
>> idea 
>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what 
>> we can 
>> see?
>>
>>
>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding 
> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
> to your 
> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; 
> not 
> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
> cannot 
> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
> also 
> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
> some like 
> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>

 OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies 
 of everything *in itself* an argument against it? 

 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
>>> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>>>
>>
>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>>
>>  

> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
> finite 
> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 
> m 
> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible 
 universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the 
 parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random 
 process. 
 AG 

>>>
>>> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on 
>>> the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the 
>>> real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing 
>>> our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>>>
>>
>> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am 
>> the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body 
>> that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of 
>> some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a 
>> real number.
>>  
>>
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of 
> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are 
> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a 
> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and 
> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the 
> variation in outcomes. Does this make more sense to you? AG
>

You might get universes close to ours, but even this would be hugely 
unlikely given the uncountable assumed number of possibilities, and even a 
close call might mean no hit wiping the dinos. No exact repeats! AG 

-- 
You received this message because you 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 27/11/2017 5:17 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 November 2017 at 17:04, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 27/11/2017 4:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:

On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the
room; introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more
complications than it purports to do away with;
multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same
memories and life histories for example. Give me a
break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the
Earth and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is
the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite world,
ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a
particular assumption about the initial probability
distribution. Can you justify that assumption?


The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of
the universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the
universe. Maybe it's false; but my question is, is the
strangeness of a Level I multiverse an *argument* for its falseness?


Just because you can't prove that a hypothesis is false does not
imply that it is true. Can you prove that the Cosmological
Principle is infinitely extendible? I suggest that it is most
probably false, since there is no reason for the initial
conditions to be sufficiently uniform for it to be extrapolated
indefinitely.


Maybe, but I'm still wondering whether the *strangeness* of finite 
structures such as humans being duplicated is an argument against it, 
since it does seem to be most people's first objection to MWI.


But the duplication you seemed to be referring to was that of the 
infinite Type I multiverse. It has been conjectured that this is the 
same as the Type III multiverse of MWI, but that can almost certainly be 
disproved. Strangeness may be one reason why people react against MWI 
and the multiverse, but that is not a relevant argument in serious 
discourse on foundations.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
>>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
>>> purports
>>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
>>> memories
>>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and 
>> its
>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
>> idea
>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what 
>> we can
>> see?
>>
>>
>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding
> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
> to your
> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; 
> not
> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
> cannot
> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
> also
> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
> some like
> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>

 OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies
 of everything *in itself* an argument against it?

 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
>>> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>>>
>>
>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why
>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has
>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG
>>
>>

> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
> finite
> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m
> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible
 universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the
 parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random process.
 AG

>>>
>>> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on
>>> the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the
>>> real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing
>>> our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>>>
>>
>> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am
>> the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body
>> that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of
>> some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a
>> real number.
>>
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of
> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are
> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a
> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and
> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the
> variation in outcomes. Does this make more sense to you? AG
>
> But the possibilities are not infinite if we only want to reproduce a
finite structure with finite precision.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 27/11/2017 5:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 November 2017 at 16:54, > wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:


On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:


On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:


On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC,
stathisp wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,
 wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound
gorilla in the room; introducing Many Worlds
creates hugely more complications than it
purports to do away with; multiple, indeed
infinite observers with the same memories and
life histories for example. Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which
everything is duplicated to an arbitrary level of
detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants,
an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of
this idea an argument for a finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite,
expanding hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go
far enough, you return to your starting position. Many
cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not
asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite.
Measurements cannot distinguish the two possibilities.
I don't buy the former since they also concede it is
finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that
would likely be infinite in space and time, with
erupting BB universes, some like ours, most definitely
not. Like I said, FWIW. AG


OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple
copies of everything *in itself* an argument against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse
implies infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG


If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes,
why should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite
repetitions has been proven, and I don't believe it. AG

If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
finite subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius 
of 10^100 m out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.


A lot if 'ifs'!

Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36, > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
>> purports 
>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
>> memories 
>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>
>
> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and 
> its 
> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
> idea 
> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what 
> we can 
> see?
>
>
> --stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding 
 hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to 
 your 
 starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; 
 not 
 asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
 cannot 
 distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
 also 
 concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
 likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some 
 like 
 ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 

>>>
>>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of 
>>> everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
>> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>>
>
> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>
>  
>>>
 If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
 configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
 finite 
 subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m 
 out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible 
>>> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the 
>>> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random process. 
>>> AG 
>>>
>>
>> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on 
>> the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the 
>> real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing 
>> our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>>
>
> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am 
> the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body 
> that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of 
> some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a 
> real number.
>  
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of our 
universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are 
uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a 
theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and 
creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the 
variation in outcomes. Does this make more sense to you? AG

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

 You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
> purports
> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
> memories
> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>

 What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
 duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its
 inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
 idea
 an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we 
 can
 see?


 --stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere,
>>> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting
>>> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not
>>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot
>>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
>>> also
>>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
>>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some 
>>> like
>>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>>>
>>
>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of
>> everything *in itself* an argument against it?
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>

 If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why
 should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has
 been proven, and I don't believe it. AG


>>
>>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
>>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every finite
>>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m
>>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible
>> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the
>> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random process.
>> AG
>>
>
> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on the
> real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the real
> line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing our
> universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>

But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am the
same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body that
are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of some
parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a real
number.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 12:36 AM,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

 You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
> purports
> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
> memories
> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>

 What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
 duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its
 inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
 idea
 an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we 
 can
 see?


 --stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere,
>>> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting
>>> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not
>>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot
>>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
>>> also
>>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
>>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some 
>>> like
>>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>>>
>>
>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of
>> everything *in itself* an argument against it?
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>

 If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why
 should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has
 been proven, and I don't believe it. AG


>>
>>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
>>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every finite
>>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m
>>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible
>> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the
>> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random process.
>> AG
>>
>
> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on the
> real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the real
> line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing our
> universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>

There is a paper on this: https://arxiv.org/abs/1008.1066

Jason

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>>
>>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
 introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
 purports 
 to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
 memories 
 and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 

>>>
>>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
>>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its 
>>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
>>> idea 
>>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we 
>>> can 
>>> see?
>>>
>>>
>>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere, 
>> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting 
>> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not 
>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot 
>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
>> also 
>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some 
>> like 
>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>>
>
> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of 
> everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
 infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 

>>>
>>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
>>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
>>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>>>
>>>  
>
>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every finite 
>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m 
>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible 
> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the 
> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random process. 
> AG 
>

Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on the 
real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the real 
line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing our 
universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54, > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
>>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
>>> purports 
>>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
>>> memories 
>>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated 
>> to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its 
>> inhabitants, 
>> an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument 
>> for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>
>>
>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere, 
> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting 
> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not 
> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot 
> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also 
> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some 
> like 
> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>

 OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of 
 everything *in itself* an argument against it? 

 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies infinite 
>>> copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>>>
>>
>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>>
>>  

> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every finite 
> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m 
> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible 
universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the 
parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random process. 
AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
>> purports
>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
>> memories
>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>>
>
> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated
> to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants,
> an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument
> for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>
>
> --stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere,
 meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting
 position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not
 asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot
 distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also
 concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
 likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some like
 ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG

>>>
>>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of
>>> everything *in itself* an argument against it?
>>>
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies infinite
>> copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>>
>
> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why should
> there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has been
> proven, and I don't believe it. AG
>
> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every finite
subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m
out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 November 2017 at 17:04, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 27/11/2017 4:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing
>>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away
>>> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life
>>> histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to
>> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an
>> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a
>> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>
>>
>> That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular
>> assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you justify that
>> assumption?
>>
>
> The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the
> universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe it's
> false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I multiverse an
> *argument* for its falseness?
>
>
> Just because you can't prove that a hypothesis is false does not imply
> that it is true. Can you prove that the Cosmological Principle is
> infinitely extendible? I suggest that it is most probably false, since
> there is no reason for the initial conditions to be sufficiently uniform
> for it to be extrapolated indefinitely.
>

Maybe, but I'm still wondering whether the *strangeness* of finite
structures such as humans being duplicated is an argument against it, since
it does seem to be most people's first objection to MWI.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 27/11/2017 4:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications
than it purports to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite
observers with the same memories and life histories for
example. Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth
and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the
bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular
assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you
justify that assumption?


The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the 
universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe 
it's false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I 
multiverse an *argument* for its falseness?


Just because you can't prove that a hypothesis is false does not imply 
that it is true. Can you prove that the Cosmological Principle is 
infinitely extendible? I suggest that it is most probably false, since 
there is no reason for the initial conditions to be sufficiently uniform 
for it to be extrapolated indefinitely.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

 You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
> purports 
> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
> memories 
> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>

 What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated 
 to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, 
 an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument 
 for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


 --stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere, 
>>> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting 
>>> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not 
>>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot 
>>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also 
>>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
>>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some like 
>>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>>>
>>
>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of 
>> everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>>
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies infinite 
> copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>

If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why should 
there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has been 
proven, and I don't believe it. AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25, > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>>
>>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
 Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away 
 with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life 
 histories for example. Give me a break. AG 

>>>
>>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to 
>>> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an 
>>> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a 
>>> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>>
>>>
>>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere, 
>> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting 
>> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not 
>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot 
>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also 
>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some like 
>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>>
>
> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of 
> everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies infinite 
copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing
>>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away
>>> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life
>>> histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to
>> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an
>> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a
>> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>
>>
>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere,
> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting
> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not
> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot
> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also
> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some like
> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>

OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of
everything *in itself* an argument against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, < 
> agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing
>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away
>> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life
>> histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>>
>
> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to
> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an
> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a
> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>
>
> That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular
> assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you justify that
> assumption?
>

The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the universe
that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe it's false;
but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I multiverse an
*argument* for its falseness?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, > wrote:
>
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away 
>> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life 
>> histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>
>
> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to 
> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an 
> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a 
> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>
>
> --stathis Papaioannou
>

FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere, 
meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting 
position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not 
asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot 
distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also 
concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some like 
ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, > wrote:


You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it
purports to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with
the same memories and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated 
to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its 
inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
idea an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of 
what we can see?


That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular 
assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you justify 
that assumption?


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing
> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away
> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life
> histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>

What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to an
arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an
infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a
finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 27/11/2017 3:58 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 24 November 2017 at 10:53, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come
here to avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.


What is the "avoid" list?


"Atoms and the Void" after Democritus. The list was set up by Vic 
Stenger to discuss his writings. After he died, the list morphed to 
atvoid2 on Google Groups with many of the original participants.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 24 November 2017 at 10:53, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here to
> avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
>

What is the "avoid" list?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Jason Resch]

We've had the MW vs collapse debate many times on this list, as well as on
FOAR and Extropy-Chat lists. I might suggest searching the history of these
groups to see some of the points and counter points to each issue as I see
many of them repeated here.  I'm including a summary of some of the common
points/arguments here from previous discussions on this list and others.


*On Bell's Inequality:*

On Wednesday, November 30, 2016, Adrian Tymes  wrote:

> > Someone earlier stated Bell's Inequality implies we have to give up one
> of: locality, determinism, or realism. This list is incomplete, we must
> give up one of: locality, determinism, realism, or counterfactual
> definiteness.
>
>
>
> Counterfactual definiteness means experiments have only one outcome. MWI
> gives up counterfactual definiteness and retains locality, determinism and
> realism.
>
But experiments do have only one outcome, as experienced and observed by
> the experimenters.  Any alternate worlds are immeasurable and may as well
> not exist.
>
That's not quite what's meant by counterfactual definiteness though.

Realism, in QM also implies something different from whether or not
something is observable. According to Bohr, only measurements are real.
This view dispenses with a reality external from observers. In MWI, the
universal wave function is real independent of observers or observation.

It is why Einstein asked someone who believed in the Copenhagen
Interpretation "Do you really believe the moon only exists when you're
looking at it?"

In MW, the moon definitely does exist, even when no one is looking at it,
so it is a theory that maintains/restores realism to QM.

All of Einstein's criticisms of QM, that it abandoned realism, locality,
and determinism, are issues that are resolved by MW. I think Einstein would
have enthusiastically embraced it, had he lived to see it.



*On observability of other branches:*

On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 10:48 PM, Adrian Tymes  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 7:36 PM, Rafal Smigrodzki

 wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 5:56 PM, Adrian Tymes  wrote:

>> But experiments do have only one outcome, as experienced and observed by

>> the experimenters.  Any alternate worlds are immeasurable and may as well

>> not exist.

>

> ### If you were to say that only the observed experimental outcomes exist,

> then you imply there is something qualitatively different between the part

> of the wavefunction we do experience and the parts that we don't.


> Science is all about observability, measurement, and what actually

exists.  If you wish to speculate that something that is never

measurable, observable, or otherwise detectable must still exist, you

need evidence.


The other universes are detectable and they do effect our universe, e.g.
interference patterns.

Furthermore, you must accept the reality of the wave function (and all its
branches) in order to explain how quantum computers work.

Whether we can directly observe some phenomenon or not is irrelevant, we
can't observe the inside of black holes, beyond the cosmological horizon,
the future, things outside our light cone, etc., yet we would all agree
those things exist. What matters is whether these other universes are
predicted to exist and consequences of our best theories.

The evidence for these other branches includes all the evidence we have for
quantum mechanics. Indefensible mental gymnastics are required to believe
in both QM but deny the reality of the wave function and its many histories.



*On quantum computers:*


“Schrödinger also had the basic idea of parallel universes shortly before
Everett, but he didn't publish it. He mentioned it in a lecture in Dublin,
in which he predicted that the audience would think he was crazy. Isn't
that a strange assertion coming from a Nobel Prize winner—that he feared
being considered crazy for claiming that his equation, the one that he won
the Nobel Prize for, might be true.”
-- David Deutsch


> > Furthermore, you must accept the reality of the wave function (and all
> its

> branches) in order to explain how quantum computers work.


> The wave function works just fine in a single world too.


The wave function is a system of many universes, as Feynman said that that
a universal wave function: “must contain amplitudes for all possible worlds
depending on all quantummechanical possibilities in the past and thus one
is forced to believe in the equal reality of an infinity of possible
worlds.”

and Stephen Hawking regarded the MWI as “self-evidently correct”. When the
British actor Ken Campbell, asked him “all these trillions of universes of
the multiverse, are they as real as this one seems to be to me?” Hawking
answered, “Yes According to Feynman's idea, every possible history [of
Ken] is equally real.”

The way single-worlders get around this is by saying the wave function
doesn't refer to anything real, that it is just a useful calculating
device. But how does this non-real "useful calculating de

Feynman and the Everything

[Jason Resch]

Richard Feynman in "The Character of Physical Law" Chapter 2 wrote:

"It always bothers me that according to the laws as we understand them
today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of logical
operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a region of
space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that be going
on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of logic to
figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?"

Does computationalism provide the answer to this question, in the sense
that even the tiniest region of space is the result of an infinity of
computations going through an observer's mind state as it observes the
tiniest region of space?

Jason

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 12:55:24 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 6:36 PM, > 
> wrote:
>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> Feynman, who wasn't an MWI enthusiast
>> ​ [...]
>>
>
> *​"​Political scientist" L David Raub reports a poll of 72 of the "leading 
> cosmologists and other quantum field theorists" about the "Many-Worlds 
> Interpretation" ​[...] Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI is true" crowd listed 
> are Stephen Hawking and Nobel Laureates Murray Gell-Mann and Richard 
> Feynman. Gell-Mann and Hawking recorded reservations with the name 
> "many-worlds", but not with the theory's content. Nobel Laureate Steven 
> Weinberg is also mentioned as a many-worlder​"​ *
>
> https://www.hedweb.com/everett/everett.htm#believes
>

Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit, 
but NOT the MWI, which he characterized as "repellent". AG
 

>
> ​But to be fair, Feynman wasn't exactly an enthusiast, I think he 
> believed Many Worlds was the the least bad quantum interpretation but he 
> wasn't really a fan of philosophy and had sympathy for the "shut up and 
> calculate" ​quantum interpretation.
>  
>
>>  
>> ​> ​
>> no human observer is necessary to perform a quantum experiment.
>>
>
> ​Hey you don't have to convince me that an observer is not needed ​for 
> something to exist in one definite state, but then I'm not a fan of 
> Copenhagen.
>

You keep making the same error. The only way to understand double slit 
experiment is via superposition of states, which means no definite state 
before measurement! Does NOT apply to macro objects where interference does 
not manifest. I won't say it again! AG

>   
>  
>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> If the detector is designed for a which-way measurement, the interference 
>> is destroyed.
>>
>
> ​If the which way information is retained the interference pattern is 
> destroyed, if the information ​
> ​is destroyed then you have interference, and that is what Many Worlds 
> predicts. 
>

??? No interference in which-way experiment. AG 

>   ​
>  
>
>> ​>> ​
>>> The very heart the Copenhagen interpretation is that things do not have 
>>> definite properties 
>>> ​before​
>>>  they are measured,
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Wrong.
>>
>
> * ​"​According to the Copenhagen interpretation, physical systems 
> generally do not have definite properties prior to being measured​"​*
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation
>

You're cherry picking. The statement refers (or should refer) to quantum 
experiments which manifest interference effects and where the system being 
measured is in a superposition of states. AG 

>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> Your claim only applies in a special situation of quantum experiments 
>> which manifest interference effects.
>>
>
> I agree, interference effects
> ​ only manifest in special circumstances, when a world splits become 
> different and then the two evolve in such a way that the two become 
> identical again and so merge back together, and that is only likely to 
> happen if the difference between the two worlds is very small; that's why 
> we don't see weird quantum stuff in our macro world, like in the Earth Moon 
> system
>

But since the many worlds are disjoint, we don't SEE anything. Moreover, 
they can't become identical if they differ in what's measured! You have 
embraced a nonsense theory; not even "physics".  AG

 

> .
>
>  John K Clark​
>
> ​
>  
>
>
>>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 11:46:03 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 9:33 PM, > 
> wrote:
>
> ​>​
>>  As for collapse, it's easily seen in the double slit experiment. The 
>> electron, say, moves through space as a wave -- which explains the 
>> interference effects due to splitting into two waves, each emanating from 
>> one of the slits
>
>
> ​Then after it passes the double slit and that electron hits the 
> photographic why does it always produce one and only one spot, not a smudge 
> as one wave should and not a interference pattern as as 2 waves should? ​
>  
>

It probably is a smudge, consistent with the UP. AG 

>
>   
>> ​> ​
>> and is ALWAYS observed as localized in space, aka a PARTICLE. That is, 
>> the wave collapses into a particle! There is no other reasonable 
>> interpretation of results of the double slit experiment, which demonstrates 
>> the collapse phenomenon for those able to see.
>
>
> ​So tell me exactly what this **observer** thing is. ​
>  
> ​Exactly what is it about observation that allows it to collapse the wave 
> particle? 
>

Dunno. But using MWI without collapse, why do we get some particular value 
and not others? I don't see that a big problem has gone away. AG
 

> How complex does a thing need to be to qualify as a observer? And why do 
> you believe the moon started to orbit the earth 4.5 billion years ago, why 
> do you believe the moon had any definite properties at all 4.5 billion 
> years ago ?   
>

Current theory, based on evidence from Moon materials compared to surface 
materials on Earth, is that the Moon formed after a collision of a 
Mars-sized object many billions of years ago. Of course, the final form of 
the Moon took millions of years to complete. As that process proceeded the 
"Moon" changed a lot, but at each point in time, like any macro object, it 
had definite properties. Not a quantum problem since the system wasn't 
isolated and there is no identifiable interference effects, and no 
superposition of states. AG ​

>
> ​> ​
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
>
>  

| those infinite number of observers are indistinguishable from only 
one, and that's pretty simple.  


As simple as a woman who gives birth to twins, millions of times over and 
then some? AG ​

​> ​
>> Give me a break.
>>
>
> ​No, you get no break from logic.
>

You can see collapse in double slit experiment. No other possible 
interpretation. AG

>
>   John K Clark​
>  
>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 6:36 PM,  wrote:


> ​> ​
> Feynman, who wasn't an MWI enthusiast
> ​ [...]
>

*​"​Political scientist" L David Raub reports a poll of 72 of the "leading
cosmologists and other quantum field theorists" about the "Many-Worlds
Interpretation" ​[...] Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI is true" crowd listed
are Stephen Hawking and Nobel Laureates Murray Gell-Mann and Richard
Feynman. Gell-Mann and Hawking recorded reservations with the name
"many-worlds", but not with the theory's content. Nobel Laureate Steven
Weinberg is also mentioned as a many-worlder​"​ *

https://www.hedweb.com/everett/everett.htm#believes

​But to be fair, Feynman wasn't exactly a enthusiast, I think he believed
Many Worlds was the the least bad quantum interpretation but he wasn't
really a fan of philosophy and had sympathy for the "shut up and calculate"
​quantum interpretation.


>
> ​> ​
> no human observer is necessary to perform a quantum experiment.
>

​Hey you don't have to convince me that an observer is not needed ​for
something to exist in one definite state, but then I'm not a fan of
Copenhagen.



> ​> ​
> If the detector is designed for a which-way measurement, the interference
> is destroyed.
>

​If the which way information is retained the interference pattern is
destroyed, if the information ​
​is destroyed then you have interference, and that is what Many Worlds
predicts.   ​


> ​>> ​
>> The very heart the Copenhagen interpretation is that things do not have
>> definite properties
>> ​before​
>>  they are measured,
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Wrong.
>

* ​"​According to the Copenhagen interpretation, physical systems generally
do not have definite properties prior to being measured​"​*

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation


> ​> ​
> Your claim only applies in a special situation of quantum experiments
> which manifest interference effects.
>

I agree, interference effects
​ only manifest in special circumstances, when a world splits become
different and then the two evolve in such a way that the two become
identical again and so merge back together, and that is only likely to
happen if the difference between the two worlds is very small; that's why
we don't see weird quantum stuff in our macro world, like in the Earth Moon
system.

 John K Clark​

​



>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 9:33 PM,  wrote:

​>​
>  As for collapse, it's easily seen in the double slit experiment. The
> electron, say, moves through space as a wave -- which explains the
> interference effects due to splitting into two waves, each emanating from
> one of the slits


​Then after it passes the double slit and that electron hits the
photographic why does it always produce one and only one spot, not a smudge
as one wave should and not a interference pattern as as 2 waves should? ​



> ​> ​
> and is ALWAYS observed as localized in space, aka a PARTICLE. That is, the
> wave collapses into a particle! There is no other reasonable interpretation
> of results of the double slit experiment, which demonstrates the collapse
> phenomenon for those able to see.


​So tell me exactly what this **observer** thing is. ​

​Exactly what is it about observation that allows it to collapse the wave
particle? How complex does a thing need to be to qualify as a observer? And
why do you believe the moon started to orbit the earth 4.5 billion years
ago, why do you believe the moon had any definite properties at all 4.5
billion years ago ?​

​> ​
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing
> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away
> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life
> histories for example.


If they all have
​
the same memories and life histories
​ then those infinite number of observers are indistinguishable from only
one, and that's pretty simple.  ​

​> ​
> Give me a break.
>

​No, you get no break from logic.

  John K Clark​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 11:05:17 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 8:21 PM, > 
> wrote:
>  
>
>> >> Those who believe in non-locality as established by experimental 
>> evidence, such as Brent and Bruce, and I assume Lawrence as well, do NOT 
>> conclude this implies the future influences the past.
>>
>
> If you also believe in realism then you must believe you have found a 
> flaw in
> ​ 
> Leggett's reasoning when that Nobel Prize winner came up with his 
> inequality. I am all ears!
>  
>
>> ​> 
>> Moreover, as I pointed out clearly, there is no need of an observer for 
>> something to exist.
>> ​ ​
>>
>
> ​I agree, but you're not a fan 
> of Many Worlds so you shouldn't agree. 
>

I don't see how that follows. Feynman, who wasn't an MWI enthusiast, 
clearly argues that no human observer is necessary to perform a quantum 
experiment. If the detector is designed for a which-way measurement, the 
interference is destroyed. This shows the lack of necessity of a human 
observer, a point I've made several times but apparently you didn't read my 
comments carefully. AG 

>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> When the Earth-Moon system formed, there were no observers. Do you doubt 
>> it happened? 
>>
>
> I don't doubt it happened, but you should. The very heart the Copenhagen 
> interpretation is that things do not have definite properties 
> ​before​
>  they are measured,
>

Wrong. You have misinterpreted and over-generalized the results for a class 
of quantum experiments and observations which manifest interference 
effects, such as the double slit. I've already explained it. Do you know 
what a QUANTUM experiment is? Is the Earth-Moon a quantum experiment? If 
so, where are the INTERFERENCE effects? AG
 

> and I don't think there was much measuring going on 4.5 billion years ago. 
> But I don't doubt it happened because as a fan of Many Worlds 
> all I need is to believe a change, any sort of change, could exist 4.5 
> billion years ago. However 
>  a believer in Copenhagen needs to believe something called "measurement" 
> existed 4.5 billion years ago, and I have considerably more doubt about 
> that. 
>

Wrong again. Not an isolated system. Unrelated to double slit results 
which, as I CLEARLY explained, is the cause of your MIS-interpretation. 
Your claim only applies in a special situation of quantum experiments which 
manifest interference effects. Next time you want to make claims about my 
position, please read what I have written. No more shooting from the hip. 
AG 

>
>  John K Clark  ​
>  
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 2:29:22 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Nov 2017, at 15:59, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>> On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The idea 
>>> that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact (many histories)" 
>>> does not work, and is not really an explanation at all -- you are simply 
>>> evading the issue.
>>>
>>>
>>> Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the linear 
>>> evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not yet seen one 
>>> proof that some action at a distance are at play in quantum mechanics, 
>>> although I agree that would be the case if the outcome where unique, as 
>>> EPER/BELL show convincingly.
>>>
>>> Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action at a 
>>> distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or just want to 
>>> dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But after Aspect, the choice 
>>> is really between deterministic and local QM + many worlds, or one world 
>>> and 3p indeterminacy and non locality. Like Maudlin said, choose your 
>>> poison.
>>>
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>>
>> I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
>> weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
>> properly. 
>>
>> Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
>> particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
>> two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. The 
>> degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
>> entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
>> spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
>> in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
>> entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
>> and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 
>>
>> We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
>> entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any idea 
>> there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
>> fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
>> entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
>> "metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is no 
>> sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 
>>
>> This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
>> thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
>> problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. 
>> It could be that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the quantum world. 
>> I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is they do not understand 
>> spatial relationships well; they get leashes and chains all tangled up and 
>> if they get wrapped up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to 
>> get out of it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and 
>> will never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness 
>> with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a far 
>> more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum system is 
>> ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding information about 
>> quantum states. This is the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing 
>> Machine that emulates other Turing machines, or a sort of Goedel 
>> self-referential process. If this is the case we may be faced with the 
>> prospect there can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and 
>> epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by 
>> any axiomatic structure.
>>
>>
>> Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here to 
>> avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
>> The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is whether many 
>> worlds avoids the implications of Bell's theorem, so that a purely local 
>> understanding of EPR is available in Everettian models. I have argued that 
>> this is not the case -- that non-locality is inherent in the entangled 
>> singlet state, and many worlds does not avoid this non-locality. I think 
>> from what you say above that you might well agree with this position.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> Of course MWI can do nothing of the sort. MWI suffers from much the same 
> problem all quantum interpretations suffer from. 
>
>
> I don't see this. the MW theory (that is the WWE without the collapse 
> axiom) explains the violation

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 8:21 PM,  wrote:


> >> Those who believe in non-locality as established by experimental
> evidence, such as Brent and Bruce, and I assume Lawrence as well, do NOT
> conclude this implies the future influences the past.
>

If you also believe in realism then you must believe you have found a flaw
in
​
Leggett's reasoning when that Nobel Prize winner came up with his
inequality. I am all ears!


> ​>
> Moreover, as I pointed out clearly, there is no need of an observer for
> something to exist.
> ​ ​
>

​I agree, but you're not a fan
of Many Worlds so you shouldn't agree.


> ​> ​
> When the Earth-Moon system formed, there were no observers. Do you doubt
> it happened?
>

I don't doubt it happened, but you should. The very heart the Copenhagen
interpretation is that things do not have definite properties
​before​
 they are measured, and I don't think there was much measuring going on 4.5
billion years ago. But I don't doubt it happened because as a fan of Many
Worlds
all I need is to believe a change, any sort of change, could exist 4.5
billion years ago. However
 a believer in Copenhagen needs to believe something called "measurement"
existed 4.5 billion years ago, and I have considerably more doubt about
that.

 John K Clark  ​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 8:22:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Nov 2017, at 00:15, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
> weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
> properly. 
>
> Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
> particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
> two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. The 
> degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
> entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
> spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
> in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
> entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
> and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 
>
> We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
> entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any idea 
> there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
> fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
> entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
> "metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is no 
> sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 
>
>
> I agree. But we can trace out locally the prediction possible, and this 
> explains locally the results in the MW view, not so in the mono-universe 
> view which requires some (incomprehensible) action at a distance. That is 
> why I took the Aspect confirmation that QM violate Bell's inequality (well 
> the CHSH's one) as a confirmation of the physical existence of the parallel 
> computations/worlds, and not of action at a distance.
>

The MWI has worlds in superposition, which as you say is preferable to the 
idea of some action at a distance. I have had many email battles with 
people over this, but this idea of action at a distance or its space plus 
time version of retrocausality keeps coming up. It is like shooting ducks 
in a carnival shooting gallery; you can shoot them down but the damned 
things keep popping back up. This does not mean I am a convert to the MWI 
interpretation. In many ways M-theory of D-branes is more friendly to the 
Copenhagen Interpretation, where D-branes are condensates of strings that 
form a classical(like) structure that act in ways as decoherence systems on 
strings. The ψ-epistemic viewpoint has some merits with respect to looking 
at the classical world as a way that information or Bayesian updates can be 
made on quantum systems. The problem of course with this is it leads into a 
sort of quantum solipsism  The converse ψ-ontological perspective avoids 
this classical-quantum dichotomy, but I have always found problems with the 
issue of contextuality. This goes back to my pointing out how MWI fails to 
indicate how an observer is "pushed" into a particular eigenbranch of the 
world and how this occurs at a given time. With the lack of simultaneity in 
special relativity and spacetime in general what is the spatial surface at 
which the world wave function appears to split according to an observer? 
 

>
>
>
>
> This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
> thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
> problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. 
> It could be that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the quantum world. 
> I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is they do not understand 
> spatial relationships well; they get leashes and chains all tangled up and 
> if they get wrapped up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to 
> get out of it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and 
> will never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness 
> with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a far 
> more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum system is 
> ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding information about 
> quantum states. This is the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing 
> Machine that emulates other Turing machines, or a sort of Goedel 
> self-referential process. If this is the case we may be faced with the 
> prospect there can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and 
> epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by 
> any axiomatic structure.
>
>
> I agree and much more can be said. In fact quantum weirdness can be proved 
> to be a consequence of Mechanism (informally with some thought experience), 
> and formally with the Gödel-Löb-Solovay theory of self-reference (which is 
> *the* theory provided by the universal machine itself when looking i

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Nov 2017, at 15:59, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The  
idea that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact  
(many histories)" does not work, and is not really an explanation  
at all -- you are simply evading the issue.


Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the  
linear evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not  
yet seen one proof that some action at a distance are at play in  
quantum mechanics, although I agree that would be the case if the  
outcome where unique, as EPER/BELL show convincingly.


Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action at  
a distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or just  
want to dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But after  
Aspect, the choice is really between deterministic and local QM +  
many worlds, or one world and 3p indeterminacy and non locality.  
Like Maudlin said, choose your poison.



Bruno


Bruce



I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here.  
In weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing  
things properly.


Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin  
1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do  
not have the two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that  
is identifiable. The degrees of freedom for the two spins are  
replaced with those of the entanglement state. It really makes no  
sense to talk about the individual spin particles existing. If the  
observer makes a measurement that results in a measurement the  
entanglement state is "violently" lost, the entanglement phase is  
transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, and the  
individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement.


We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the  
entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to  
any idea there is some "geography" associated with the individual  
spins. There in fact really is no such thing as the individual  
spins. The loss of the entangled state replaces that with the two  
spin states. Since there is no "metric" specifying where the spins  
are before the measurement there is no sense to ideas of any causal  
action that ties the two resulting spins.


This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we  
are thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking  
about our problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is  
ontic or epistemic. It could be that we are a bit like dogs with  
respect to the quantum world. I have several dogs and one thing  
that is clear is they do not understand spatial relationships well;  
they get leashes and chains all tangled up and if they get wrapped  
up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to get out of it.  
In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and will  
never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness  
with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a  
far more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum  
system is ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding  
information about quantum states. This is the a quantum form of  
Turing's Universal Turing Machine that emulates other Turing  
machines, or a sort of Goedel self-referential process. If this is  
the case we may be faced with the prospect there can't ever be a  
complete understanding of the ontic and epistemic nature of quantum  
mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by any axiomatic  
structure.


Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here  
to avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is whether  
many worlds avoids the implications of Bell's theorem, so that a  
purely local understanding of EPR is available in Everettian models.  
I have argued that this is not the case -- that non-locality is  
inherent in the entangled singlet state, and many worlds does not  
avoid this non-locality. I think from what you say above that you  
might well agree with this position.


Bruce

Of course MWI can do nothing of the sort. MWI suffers from much the  
same problem all quantum interpretations suffer from.


I don't see this. the MW theory (that is the WWE without the collapse  
axiom) explains the violation of inequality in a way which avoids any  
action at a distance, but when we assume one universe, like Einstein  
explains very clearly already in 1927, you get a notion of  
simultaneousness incompatible with special relativity and very minimal  
form of realism.


For me, as a logician, I c

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Nov 2017, at 00:15, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The  
idea that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact (many  
histories)" does not work, and is not really an explanation at all  
-- you are simply evading the issue.


Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the  
linear evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not  
yet seen one proof that some action at a distance are at play in  
quantum mechanics, although I agree that would be the case if the  
outcome where unique, as EPER/BELL show convincingly.


Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action at  
a distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or just  
want to dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But after  
Aspect, the choice is really between deterministic and local QM +  
many worlds, or one world and 3p indeterminacy and non locality.  
Like Maudlin said, choose your poison.



Bruno


Bruce



I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here.  
In weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing  
things properly.


Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin  
1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not  
have the two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is  
identifiable. The degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced  
with those of the entanglement state. It really makes no sense to  
talk about the individual spin particles existing. If the observer  
makes a measurement that results in a measurement the entanglement  
state is "violently" lost, the entanglement phase is transmitted to  
the needle states of the apparatus, and the individual spin degrees  
of freedom replace the entanglement.


We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the  
entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to  
any idea there is some "geography" associated with the individual  
spins. There in fact really is no such thing as the individual  
spins. The loss of the entangled state replaces that with the two  
spin states. Since there is no "metric" specifying where the spins  
are before the measurement there is no sense to ideas of any causal  
action that ties the two resulting spins.


I agree. But we can trace out locally the prediction possible, and  
this explains locally the results in the MW view, not so in the mono- 
universe view which requires some (incomprehensible) action at a  
distance. That is why I took the Aspect confirmation that QM violate  
Bell's inequality (well the CHSH's one) as a confirmation of the  
physical existence of the parallel computations/worlds, and not of  
action at a distance.






This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we  
are thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking  
about our problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is  
ontic or epistemic. It could be that we are a bit like dogs with  
respect to the quantum world. I have several dogs and one thing that  
is clear is they do not understand spatial relationships well; they  
get leashes and chains all tangled up and if they get wrapped up  
around a pole they simply can't figure out how to get out of it. In  
this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and will never  
be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness with  
respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a far  
more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum  
system is ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding  
information about quantum states. This is the a quantum form of  
Turing's Universal Turing Machine that emulates other Turing  
machines, or a sort of Goedel self-referential process. If this is  
the case we may be faced with the prospect there can't ever be a  
complete understanding of the ontic and epistemic nature of quantum  
mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by any axiomatic  
structure.


I agree and much more can be said. In fact quantum weirdness can be  
proved to be a consequence of Mechanism (informally with some thought  
experience), and formally with the Gödel-Löb-Solovay theory of self- 
reference (which is *the* theory provided by the universal machine  
itself when looking inward deep enough.
I can give you references if you are interested. And yes, it is  
radical ... for Aristotelian materialists, which believes that physics  
*is* metaphysics. The arithmetical explanation of the quantum is of  
course rather natural for platonic Pythagorean people. What is nice,  
is that the Gödel-Löb logics explains also the quanta as the sharable  
part of a more general consciousness or qualia theory.  You might look  
at:


Marchal B. The

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

I am not going to argue for MWI particularly, though I will say a bit next 
paragraph. The idea there are retro-causal influences that underlie 
apparent quantum nonlocality is simply wrong. The Kochen-Specker theorem 
illustrates limits on hidden variables, which means a measurement of an 
observable must be context dependent. In other words the orientation of a 
Stern-Gerlach apparatus is something determined by a classical observer and 
not by quantum mechanics. The four dimensional version of the KS theorem 
involves the 24-cell and its associated Lie group F4. It is curiously less 
complicated than the standard 3 dimensional version of the KS theorem. The 
4-dim version illustrates why it is not possible to replace QM with some 
subquantal wiring in four dimensions --- such as retrocausality. To assume 
a retrocausal structure is to say that an 8 dimensional manifold is 
equivalent to that manifold embeded in one dimension larger. In other words 
8 = 9, which is a contradiction.

The MWI may have connections to the multiverse. Susskind and others have 
speculated on this. It is not clear though whether this is that solid in 
its conclusion --- even just on a theoretical level. The type-I multiverse 
has regions on a flat spatial surface that replicates other regions, where 
there could be other Earths with all of us, but with differences that are 
associated with MWI eigenbranching of histories. These regions must of 
course be causally isolated from each other, lest we admit quantum cloning. 
This might extend to type II multiverse with different cosmologies entirely 
that are related to our world by MWI eigenbranching. 

I am not so sure about these things, though I don't dismiss them. I have 
some issues with all quantum interpretations, and they all appear 
incomplete. With MWI the problem is there is no mechanism for assigning the 
point of an eigenbranch event. If you have the quantum amplitude for the 
decay of a radioactive isotope there is nothing in that process to indicate 
where a decoherent event should occur that in MWI corresponds to this 
eigenbranching. In MWI there is then this yggdrasillian branched world, 
corresponding potentially to the multiverse, but there is nothing in QM 
which tells us how the observer or the phenomenological frame of the world 
is split onto different paths. 

LC

On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 11:00:46 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 2:33:16 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 11:24:36 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
> The quantum concept of "things only exist when I look at them" originates 
> in the double slit experiment, and is sort-of limited to situations of this 
> type. To calculate the probabilities correctly as Feynman clearly explains 
> in his Lectures, one must calculate |A + B|^2, not (|A|^2  + |B|^2), the 
> latter being OK for classical physics, where A and B are the wf's or 
> amplitudes entering slits A and B respectively. Think of the electron or 
> photon as waves when we don't look, going through both slits and as 
> particles when observed. One way to interpret the first term is to say, 
> "The system is in both A and B states simultaneously, not in either state 
> exclusively." But regardless of the words chosen, one must use the first 
> calculation to make correct quantum predictions. Moreover, AFAIK, the MWI 
> does not avoid this conclusion even if it uses different words. In sum, to 
> make the general claim that QM says "things only exist when I look at them" 
> is misleading, and for most situations like macro events, simply wrong. AG 
>
>>  
>>
>>> ​But it really doesn't matter,​
>>>  as long as there is no logical self contradiction there is nothing 
>>> wrong with bizarre
>>> ​.​
>>> Occam's razor doesn't say we should embrace the least bizarre theory
>>> ​,​
>>> it says we should embrace the simplest theory
>>> ​,​
>>> and
>>> ​ one that doesn't need to explain the collapse is simpler than one that 
>>> does. 
>>>
>>> Unlike Copenhagen Many Worlds has no need to  to explain how when or why 
>>> the wave function collapse
>>> ​s​
>>> because the hypothesized collapse has no observable consequences. The 
>>> wave collapse is a needless complication that does nothing but get rid of 
>>> the multiverse for people who don't like the idea of a multiverse, its 
>>> wheels within wheels rather like the epicycles of old for people who didn't 
>>> like the idea of the planets going around the Sun rather than the Earth.  
>>>
>>> The wave function says the multiverse exists, to get rid of it 
>>> additional complications are needed and those complications do not improve 
>>> the ability to predict experimental results one bit
>>> ​, so they have no point.​
>>>  
>>>
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away 
>> with; multi

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Nov 2017, at 23:48, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 2:51:56 PM UTC-7,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:


On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of  
the MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be  
realized in some world. ​ ​ I see no reason for this  
assumption other than an insistence  to fully reify  
the wf in order to avoid "collapse".


The MWI people don't have to assume anything because ​there is  
absolutely nothing in ​t he Schrodinger ​Wave ​E  
quation​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people  
who have to assume that somehow it does. ​


It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone  
didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.


Brent

Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name  
indicates, based on the assumption that all possible measurements  
MUST be measured, in this case in other worlds.


That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the  
waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the  
assumption that the wave does not apply to the observer: they  
assumed QM was wrong for the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the  
conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) depending where you put the  
cut.


CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results  
of measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement  
will be realized.

What do you mean by realize?

 Realized = Measured. AG

Measured by who?

Doesn't this identical question come up in MWI, but with Many Worlds  
the problem seems to metastasize. AG


Not really. With the MWI the problem is partially solved with the  
Mechanist first person indeterminacy or weakening of i. The only  
problem, in case we use the first person mechanist indterminacy is  
that we have to extract the quantum wave itself from elementary  
arithmetic and its internal logics of self-reference. That has been  
done partially, and up to now the results are confirmed by nature. For  
this I suggest you read my papers.







More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the  
wave is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles.  
The waves evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to  
say that a measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the  
measurement gives either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that  
NEVER occurs once we abandon the collapse. So without collapse, a  
measurement is a first person experience. In this case, it is  
arguably the same as the experience of being duplicated.


If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state  
(without the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be  
able to evaluate your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ).



I think I have done this in some later post.



I believe you have misapplied tensor linearity. TIA, AG



Where?




Without collapse, the measurement are described by the quantum laws.

That's precisely what QM doesn't describe, which constitutes part  
of the measurement problem. AG


Just see above. QM describes precisely why the observers believe  
correctly (with respect to their first person notion) having done  
measurement, and got precise outcomes, but from the 3p waves  
perspectives, all we have is a structured collection of relative  
states (which all exists and are structured in arithmetic, BTW).
An observer along a superposition up + down, *is* the same state as  
the observer along up superposed with the observer down, if he look  
in the {up + down, up - down} basis, "he" will see he is in up 
+down, but if he looks in the {up down} basis; the observer  
consciousness differentiate, in his first person perspective, but  
the solution of the wave describes the two outcomes realized from  
the point of view of each observer. You can't decide to make one of  
them into a zombie.


 I have no idea what you mean. Please try again. AG

The tensor product is linear, so A(up + down) = (A up) + (A down). OK?

But this doesn't appear in singlet state, and I don't see why it is  
relevant. How can an observer can be in a superposed state? It's the  
system which is in a superposed state, which is never observed  
AFAIK. AG


Hmm... you seem to endorse Bohr's dualist split of the subject, which  
is exactly what the MWI avoid. The observer is described by by QM, as  
is the system "observer + observed". Linearity of evolution of