date:20171128

On 11/28/2017 8:51 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:

 >> 
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?

 > 
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they
were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.

I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,

Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation 
applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution 
is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change 
in the value of fundamental constants,  Planck's constant or 
Newton's constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot 
occur in MWI.

The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal 
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii 
multiverse from the string theory landscape has physical constants 
and the number of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.

unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But 
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be 
larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in 
Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with 
radically different laws of physics it must also contain more 
modest things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of 
tails.

I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up 
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is 
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial 
conditions, air currents and the like. 

That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1

I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least convincing: air 
current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and quantum uncertainties 
in times of neural firings are not responsible for the results of coin 
tosses, or random digits of pi. We can construct classical coin 
tossers, etc. It sounds like they are very close to superdeterminism.

Well I'm pretty sure they're wrong about the coin flipping since Persis 
Diaconis trained himself (as magicians do) to flip a coin and catch it 
so consistently he can make it heads or tails at will.

Brent

Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the 
initial conditions could differ to an extent such that everything 
was identical in the two worlds up to your coin toss. I think 
Tegmark is wrong about this. His argument (as outlined in his book) 
assumes that worlds are made up at random out of the available 
constituents, so every way of filling space-time units is realized 
somewhere. But this is wrong. Worlds are not random objects, they 
follow the laws of physics, so given some initial conditions, the 
future is determined in a deterministic Everettian MW scenario. It 
is not the case that everything logically possible happens -- only 
those things that follow from the initial conditions by 
deterministic evolution happen. So although all possible initial 
conditions may be realized somewhere, not everything can follow 
deterministically -- the laws of physics cannot be broken.

Right: http://lanl.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702121v1 The Schrodinger 
equation predicts some zeros.

That is more interesting. It is not the case that everything possible 
according to some ideas actually can happen in reality.

Bruce
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

2017-11-28 Thread Bruce Kellett

On 29/11/2017 3:22 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:

 >> 
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?

 > 
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they
were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.

I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,

Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation 
applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution 
is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in 
the value of fundamental constants,  Planck's constant or Newton's 
constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.

The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal 
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii 
multiverse from the string theory landscape has physical constants 
and the number of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.

unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But 
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be 
larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in 
Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with 
radically different laws of physics it must also contain more modest 
things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of tails.

I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up 
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is 
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial 
conditions, air currents and the like. 

That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1

I don't find the arguments in this paper in the least convincing: air 
current easily overwhelm Brownian motions, and quantum uncertainties in 
times of neural firings are not responsible for the results of coin 
tosses, or random digits of pi. We can construct classical coin tossers, 
etc. It sounds like they are very close to superdeterminism.

Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the initial 
conditions could differ to an extent such that everything was 
identical in the two worlds up to your coin toss. I think Tegmark is 
wrong about this. His argument (as outlined in his book) assumes that 
worlds are made up at random out of the available constituents, so 
every way of filling space-time units is realized somewhere. But this 
is wrong. Worlds are not random objects, they follow the laws of 
physics, so given some initial conditions, the future is determined 
in a deterministic Everettian MW scenario. It is not the case that 
everything logically possible happens -- only those things that 
follow from the initial conditions by deterministic evolution happen. 
So although all possible initial conditions may be realized 
somewhere, not everything can follow deterministically -- the laws of 
physics cannot be broken.

Right: http://lanl.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702121v1 The Schrodinger 
equation predicts some zeros.

That is more interesting. It is not the case that everything possible 
according to some ideas actually can happen in reality.

Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

On 11/28/2017 7:59 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker 
wrote:

 >> 
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?

 > 
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they
were different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all
share the same physics with the same physical constant values.

I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,

Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation 
applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution 
is unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in 
the value of fundamental constants, Planck's constant or Newton's 
constant for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.

The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal 
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii multiverse 
from the string theory landscape has physical constants and the number 
of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.

unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But 
lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be 
larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in 
Everett's version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with 
radically different laws of physics it must also contain more modest 
things like a world where my coin came up heads instead of tails.

I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up 
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is 
determined by quite classical laws of physics governing initial 
conditions, air currents and the like. 

That's not so clear: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953v1

Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite unlikely that the initial 
conditions could differ to an extent such that everything was 
identical in the two worlds up to your coin toss. I think Tegmark is 
wrong about this. His argument (as outlined in his book) assumes that 
worlds are made up at random out of the available constituents, so 
every way of filling space-time units is realized somewhere. But this 
is wrong. Worlds are not random objects, they follow the laws of 
physics, so given some initial conditions, the future is determined in 
a deterministic Everettian MW scenario. It is not the case that 
everything logically possible happens -- only those things that follow 
from the initial conditions by deterministic evolution happen. So 
although all possible initial conditions may be realized somewhere, 
not everything can follow deterministically -- the laws of physics 
cannot be broken.

Right: http://lanl.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0702121v1  The Schrodinger 
equation predicts some zeros.

Brent

Bruce
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 3:46:03 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/28/2017 7:29 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>
> >> 
>>> And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally different from 
>>> the String Theory Multiverse? 
>>>  
>>>
>>
>> > 
>> I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they were 
>> different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all share the same 
>> physics with the same physical constant values.
>>
>
> I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics, unless it 
> turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. 
>
>
> Everett just takes the Schrodinger equation of evolution according to some 
> Hamiltionian.  The Hamiltonian doesn't change the physical 
> constants...that's why they're called constants.
>
> But lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be 
> larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in 
> Everett's version and MORE; 
>
>
> Right.  
>

But string theory doesn't guarantee or imply virtually identical copies of 
our universe, differing only in what outcome is realized in some quantum 
experiment. There is no clear argument of such virtually identical 
repetitions. AG 

>
> Brent
>
> after all if it contains universes with radically different laws of 
> physics it must also contain more modest things like a world where my coin 
> came up heads instead of tails. 
>
>  John K Clark  
>  
>
> 
>
>  
> -- 
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>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

2017-11-28 Thread Bruce Kellett

On 29/11/2017 2:29 pm, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker >wrote:

 >> 
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?

 > 
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they were
different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all share the
same physics with the same physical constant values.

I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics,

Everettian worlds follow from assuming that the Schrödinger equation 
applies everywhere without exception, so that all physical evolution is 
unitary. A change in the underlying physics -- such as a change in the 
value of fundamental constants,  Planck's constant or Newton's constant 
for example -- would not be unitary, so cannot occur in MWI.

The same reasoning applies to the Level I multiverse from eternal 
inflation -- same physics everywhere. However, the level ii multiverse 
from the string theory landscape has physical constants and the number 
of space-time dimensions varying from world to world.

unless it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But lets 
assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must be larger 
than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in Everett's 
version and MORE; after all if it contains universes with radically 
different laws of physics it must also contain more modest things like 
a world where my coin came up heads instead of tails.

I would suggest that there is no such world. Whether a coin comes up 
head or tails on a simple toss is not a quantum event; it is determined 
by quite classical laws of physics governing initial conditions, air 
currents and the like. Also, in the Level I multiverse it is quite 
unlikely that the initial conditions could differ to an extent such that 
everything was identical in the two worlds up to your coin toss. I think 
Tegmark is wrong about this. His argument (as outlined in his book) 
assumes that worlds are made up at random out of the available 
constituents, so every way of filling space-time units is realized 
somewhere. But this is wrong. Worlds are not random objects, they follow 
the laws of physics, so given some initial conditions, the future is 
determined in a deterministic Everettian MW scenario. It is not the case 
that everything logically possible happens -- only those things that 
follow from the initial conditions by deterministic evolution happen. So 
although all possible initial conditions may be realized somewhere, not 
everything can follow deterministically -- the laws of physics cannot be 
broken.

Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 3:14:28 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 5:34 PM,  
> wrote:
>
> >> 
>>> All 3 assume the same physics.
>>
>>
>> > 
>> For string theory, the multiverse universes could have radically 
>> different fundamental parameters; e.g., Coulomb's law with force a function 
>> of 1/ r^3, and/or no gravity, and/or whatever. In MWI, all alleged 
>> universes have the SAME laws,
>
>
>
> No,
>  
> MMI alleges that everything that can happen does happen, in a universe 
> with 4 spacial dimension Coulombs law would have a function of 1/ r^3, 
>
>  

> You need help, badly, urgently. Those other universes in the MWI allegedly 
> result in the UN-measured values of some quantum experiment performed in 
> our universe, being *observed*. If, as you claim, any fundamental 
> parameters can exist, then there would be universes where matter could NOT 
> exist, and the reproducing of the measuring scenario would be IMPOSSIBLE! AG
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

On 11/28/2017 7:29 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker >wrote:

>> 
And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally
different from the String Theory Multiverse?

> 
I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they were
different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all share the
same physics with the same physical constant values.

I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics, unless 
it turns out that only one sort of physics can happen.

Everett just takes the Schrodinger equation of evolution according to 
some Hamiltionian.  The Hamiltonian doesn't change the physical 
constants...that's why they're called constants.

But lets assume you're right, then the string theory multiverse must 
be larger than the many worlds multiverse incorporating everything in 
Everett's version and MORE;

Right.

Brent

after all if it contains universes with radically different laws of 
physics it must also contain more modest things like a world where my 
coin came up heads instead of tails.

 John K Clark  

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 9:05 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>> 
>> And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally different from
>> the String Theory Multiverse?
>> 
>>
>
> > 
> I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they were
> different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all share the same
> physics with the same physical constant values.
>

I see no reason all the Everett worlds have the same physics, unless it
turns out that only one sort of physics can happen. But lets assume you're
right, then the string theory multiverse must be larger than the many
worlds multiverse incorporating everything in Everett's version and MORE;
after all if it contains universes with radically different laws of physics
it must also contain more modest things like a world where my coin came up
heads instead of tails.

 John K Clark  

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 5:34 PM,  wrote:

>> 
>> All 3 assume the same physics.
>
>
> > 
> For string theory, the multiverse universes could have radically
> different fundamental parameters; e.g., Coulomb's law with force a function
> of 1/ r^3, and/or no gravity, and/or whatever. In MWI, all alleged
> universes have the SAME laws,

No,

MMI alleges that everything that can happen does happen, in a universe with
4 spacial dimension Coulombs law would have a function of 1/ r^3
, If string theory is right about such a universe not violating the laws
of logic then that universe can happen. and if that universe can happen
then
MWI
says it does happen.
 And such a universe would exist in the Eternal Inflation
multiverse
 too.

>
> I feel like I am arguing with a silly girl.
>

A bit sexist don't you think?

> > 
> It was YOU who defacto alleged "no smudge", implying the electron has a
> spatial extent of ZERO.
>

No, implying the electron has a spatial extent
 considerably smaller that the photographic plate, that's why I said it
would make a spot on the plate, I did not say it would make a point.

> > 
> if the electron has zero width, it would have infinite density.
>

True.

> > 
> Is this logical?
>

Given the premise the conclusion is logical, if one quality, length, can
be infinitely small then another quality, density, can be infinitely large.
B
ut nobody knows if a physical length smaller than
1.6 x 10
^-35 meters is logical, my hunch is that it is not but its only a hunch
and I could be wrong.

> >
> Experiments have placed limits on its width
>

All experiments can say is that the electron's radius is smaller that
10^16 meters, possibly much smaller, possibly infinitely smaller.

> >
>> >>
>> 
>> It can't do what you claim without violating the UP.
>>
>>
>> >> 
>> Ah but you forget to take IHA into account.
>>
>>
>
> > 
> IHA?
>

*I H*ATE *A*CRONYMS 

> > 
> Logically, its diameter must be non-zero. Otherwise its density would be
> infinite.
>

Apparently you believe that infinite is another of those stories
mathematicians tell each other in the language of mathematics. Who knows
you may be right, infinity could be a story no closer to reality that a
Harry Potter story written in the language of English.

> >
>> >> 
>> 
>> Google "Steven Weinberg, Many Worlds "repellent". If you can't find it,
>> let me know. AG
>>
>>
>> >> 
>> OK I'm officially letting you know, I just did exactly what you said
>> but I still can't find it, I still can find no evidence Weinberg thinks
>> the multiverse may have merit but not the MWI.
>>
>
> > 
> I reasonably inferred that from his words. He thinks MWI "repellent",
> meaning "ugly", and is hugely skeptical of its claims.
>

 He said repellent and I can infer ugly
,
but where did

"hugely skeptical"

come from? And
however strong Weinberg's emotional aversion to Many Worlds may be he
admits he doesn't have a better idea. Look, maybe all current quantum
interpretations are wrong and tomorrow somebody will find a better one, but
right now Many Worlds is the least bad.

 John K Clark

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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?

On 11/28/2017 6:47 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, 29 Nov 2017 at 11:52 am, Brent Meeker > wrote:

On 11/28/2017 6:33 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> If you look at everything that motivates all human endeavors, it is
> ultimately, all about realizing and maximizing good experiences
while
> avoiding and minimizing bad experiences.

Mostly, but not entirely.  People (especially parents) sacrifice
for others.

Parents sacrifice for their children because it gives them pleasure to 
see them doing well and distresses them to see them suffering.

Sure, and some sacrifice for children in Africa they'll never meet, 
because they like the idea of them suffering less.  Or they contribute 
to scientific endeavors because they value the idea of increasing 
knowledge.  But when you generalize "good experiences" to include 
thoughts about what experiences other have, then you need to consider 
that people also sacrifice maximize the bad experiences other people 
have, e.g. members of ISIL, out of revenge because they enjoy revenge.  
So "good experiences" pretty boils down to anything one can value.

Brent

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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?

2017-11-28 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Wed, 29 Nov 2017 at 11:52 am, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 11/28/2017 6:33 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> > If you look at everything that motivates all human endeavors, it is
> > ultimately, all about realizing and maximizing good experiences while
> > avoiding and minimizing bad experiences.
>
> Mostly, but not entirely.  People (especially parents) sacrifice for
> others.


Parents sacrifice for their children because it gives them pleasure to see
them doing well and distresses them to see them suffering.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: stern gerlach 360

In theory, subsequent measurements will give the same value since the first 
one puts the system in an eigenstate of the value measured. AG

On Wednesday, November 29, 2017 at 2:18:52 AM UTC, Doug Nelson wrote:
>
> What would happen if you could set up stern gerlach magnets that would 
> cause particles to bend through an entire circle back through the magnet? 
> Since there state has collapsed once and no new measurement has been 
> performed would the particles just go through the magnet and bend the same 
> way again?
>

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stern gerlach 360

2017-11-28 Thread Doug Nelson

What would happen if you could set up stern gerlach magnets that would 
cause particles to bend through an entire circle back through the magnet? 
Since there state has collapsed once and no new measurement has been 
performed would the particles just go through the magnet and bend the same 
way again?

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

On 11/28/2017 9:30 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:31 PM, Brent Meeker >wrote:

>> 
I think think the string theory Multiverse is related to the
inflation theory Multiverse and both are related to the  Everett
/
D
eutsch Multiverse. When 3 different theories independently
point in the same direction nature may be trying to tell you
something. 

> 
They don't point in the same direction.  The string theory and
inflation theory multiverse posits different universes with
different physical parameters due to random symmetry breaking. 
Everett/Deutsch assume the same physics

All 3 assume the same physics.

There must be some basic fundamental physical principles that remain 
the same in every string universe and every

Everett/Deutsch

universe, although we don't know what they are, we don't know what's 
really fundamental and what is not. 400 years ago Kepler tried to 
derive the fact that there are 7 and only 7 planets from pure 
mathematics but he failed to do so, he failed for 2 reasons, it turns 
out there are more than 7 planets and he failed because the number of 
planets is not a fundamental law of logic or physics but is a result 
of random happenstance. Some of the laws of physics that we think of 
as fundamental may be like that, they are only true in this universe. 
But there must be some laws of physics that are true in every 
universe, I'd bet money that the second law of thermodynamics is one 
of them

,
but there will be others.

And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally different 
from the String Theory Multiverse?

I didn't say they were different from each other; I said they were 
different from the mulitple worlds of Everett which all share the same 
physics with the same physical constant values.

Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/28/2017 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 27 Nov 2017, at 23:02, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 11/27/2017 10:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The formal modal formula is B(Bp -> p) -> Bp.

It looks also like wishful thinking. If you succeed in convincing a 
Löbian entity (whose beliefs are close for the Löb rule, or having 
Löb's theorem for its bewesibar predicate) that if she ever believes 
that some medication will work, then it work, then she will believe 
the medication works!


But that's equivocating on "B".  In the formula it means 
beweisbar=prove not "believes".  I think that is obfuscation.


Before Gödel, everyone thought that B was an operator for a knowledge 
predicate. But after Gödel (1931), we know that B verifies all the 
axiom of knowledge minus the key one (Bp -> p), making it into a 
(rational) notion of belief. I could have defined by axiomatically 
belief by:


The subject believes x + 0 = x, the subject believes x + s(y) = s(x + 
y), etc.


But the etc. involves infinitely many beliefs...which I don't have.

If this applies to you, as I am sure it does, the results will apply 
to you or any of your recursive computational continuations.


This would be ridiculous if that was used to model human psychology, 


Then why do continually use the word "belief" which does refer to human 
psychology?  I think you are obfuscating the assumption that your "ideal 
entities" "believe" everything provable from whatever set of axioms 
characterize them.


Brent

but it is not a problem for the derivation of the physical laws 
(unless you believes that the universe depends conceptually of human 
psychology, but that would be a rather strong coming back to the kind 
of  anthropomorphism we usually avoid here.


Bruno







Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 6:52 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 11/28/2017 6:33 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>> If you look at everything that motivates all human endeavors, it is
>> ultimately, all about realizing and maximizing good experiences while
>> avoiding and minimizing bad experiences.
>>
>
> Mostly, but not entirely.  People (especially parents) sacrifice for
> others.
>
>
So that those they sacrifice for can have good experiences.

Jason

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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?




On 11/28/2017 6:33 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
If you look at everything that motivates all human endeavors, it is 
ultimately, all about realizing and maximizing good experiences while 
avoiding and minimizing bad experiences.


Mostly, but not entirely.  People (especially parents) sacrifice for others.

Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On Tuesday, November 28, 2017 at 9:12:17 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:59 PM,  
> wrote:
>
>  
> >> 
> The electron NEVER produces a smudge on that 
> photographic
>  plate regardless of if it went through one slit or 2 slits or no slit 
> at all. 
>
>
> > 
> Three strikes as follows: If it produced a mathematical point, it could 
> never be observed. 
>
>
> Maybe that's why there is no evidence that mathematical points exist, 
> other than in the stories mathematicians tell each other in the language of 
> mathematics.  
>

I feel like I am arguing with a silly girl. It was YOU who defacto alleged 
"no smudge", implying the electron has a spatial extent of ZERO. I claimed 
it has finite width -- which is logical considering it has a finite, 
measured mass -- and you use my claim to make a totally irrelevant, self 
serving comment about no use of some mathematical concepts in physics. You 
want to present yourself as a master of, and respectful of logic. Consider 
this; if the electron has zero width, it would have infinite density. Is 
this logical? Experiments have placed limits on its width, and some 
theories allege it has zero width. But this is wrong, as simply logic 
shows. AG

>  
>
> > 
> It can't do what you claim without violating the UP.
>
>
> Ah but you forget to take IHA into account.
>  
>

IHA? AG 

>  
>
> > 
> Moreover, you fail to take into account the finite width of the electron. 
>
>
> No experiment has indicated that the electron has any size at all, I 
> think the best experiment shows that the radius must be smaller than 
> 10^-16 meters. It's probably larger than 10^-35 meters because that's the 
> Planck Length and if it's smaller than that we're going to need new physics 
> to explain it.
>

Logically, its diameter must be non-zero. Otherwise its density would be 
infinite. AG 

>  
>
> >> 
> And even if there is which way information if that information is erased 
> after it passed the slits but before it hits the photographic plate there 
> will be a interference pattern. Think about that for a minute, its in the 
> past, the electron either went through a slit or it didn't and if the arrow 
> of time is real then there is nothing you can do about it now, 
> but apparently you can. Many Worlds can explain this without the future 
> changing the past, Copenhagen can't. 
>
>
Not very familiar with delayed choice experiment. Interesting, need to 
think about, but don't trust your conclusions. AG 

>
> > 
> The interference effect is manifest in the distribution of the ensemble. I 
> don't what what your complaint is here. 
>
>
> Use Copenhagen
>  to explain how the decision to erase or not to erase which way 
> information made *AFTER* the electrons have passed the 2 slits but before 
> they hit the photographic plate can produce a effect on that photographic 
> plate and make sure that explanation is realistic and the arrow of time is 
> respected. 
>
>
> >
> >>
> 
> Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit, 
> but NOT the MWI,
>
>
> 
> >> 
> Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? 
>
>
> > 
> Google "Steven Weinberg, Many Worlds "repellent". If you can't find it, 
> let me know. AG
>
>
> OK I'm officially letting you know, I just did exactly what you said but 
> I still can't find it, I still can find no evidence Weinberg thinks the 
> multiverse may have merit but not the MWI.
>

I reasonably inferred that from his words. He thinks MWI "repellent", 
meaning "ugly", and is hugely skeptical of its claims. WRT the multiverse 
of string theory, he seems worried that it might be true because in that 
case the mass of quarks and other parameters can't be deduced from 
fundamental principles. Luck of the draw, good or bad, would prevail. AG

>  
>
> >> 
> how can you have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a 
> multiverse? 
>  
>
>
> > 
> You keep making the same error as Brent pointed out earlier
>
>
> Brent was wrong and so are you.
>

Brent is rarely wrong. See earlier comment. AG.

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On Tuesday, November 28, 2017 at 5:30:07 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:31 PM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>
> >> 
>>> I think think the string theory Multiverse is related to the inflation 
>>> theory Multiverse and both are related to the  Everett 
>>> /
>>> D
>>> eutsch Multiverse. When 3 different theories independently point in the 
>>> same direction nature may be trying to tell you something. 
>>
>>
>> > 
>> They don't point in the same direction.  The string theory and inflation 
>> theory multiverse posits different universes with different physical 
>> parameters due to random symmetry breaking.  Everett/Deutsch assume the 
>> same physics
>>
>
> 
> All 3 assume the same physics.
>
>
For string theory, the multiverse universes could have radically different 
fundamental parameters; e.g., Coulomb's law with force a function of 1/ 
r^3, and/or no gravity, and/or whatever. In MWI, all alleged universes have 
the SAME laws, only difference being what is measured in each universe. AG 

There must be some basic fundamental physical principles that remain the 
> same in every string universe and every
>  
> Everett/Deutsch
>  
> universe, although we don't know what they are, we don't know what's 
> really fundamental and what is not. 400 years ago Kepler tried to derive 
> the fact that there are 7 and only 7 planets from pure mathematics but he 
> failed to do so, he failed for 2 reasons, it turns out there are more than 
> 7 planets and he failed because the number of planets is not a fundamental 
> law of logic or physics but is a result of random happenstance. Some of the 
> laws of physics that we think of as fundamental may be like that, they are 
> only true in this universe. But there must be some laws of physics that are 
> true in every universe, I'd bet money that the second law of thermodynamics 
> is one of them
> ,
> but there will be others. 
>
> And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally different from 
> the String Theory Multiverse?
>  
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:59 PM,  wrote:

>> >> 
>> The electron NEVER produces a smudge on that
>> photographic
>>  plate regardless of if it went through one slit or 2 slits or no slit
>> at all.
>>
>
> > 
> Three strikes as follows: If it produced a mathematical point, it could
> never be observed.
>

Maybe that's why there is no evidence that mathematical points exist,
other than in the stories mathematicians tell each other in the language of
mathematics.   

> > 
> It can't do what you claim without violating the UP.
>

Ah but you forget to take IHA into account.

> > 
> Moreover, you fail to take into account the finite width of the electron.
>

No experiment has indicated that the electron has any size at all, I think
the best experiment shows that the radius must be smaller than
10^-16 meters. It's probably larger than 10^-35 meters because that's the
Planck Length and if it's smaller than that we're going to need new physics
to explain it.

> >> 
>> And even if there is which way information if that information is erased
>> after it passed the slits but before it hits the photographic plate there
>> will be a interference pattern. Think about that for a minute, its in the
>> past, the electron either went through a slit or it didn't and if the arrow
>> of time is real then there is nothing you can do about it now,
>> but apparently you can. Many Worlds can explain this without the future
>> changing the past, Copenhagen can't.
>>
>
> > 
> The interference effect is manifest in the distribution of the ensemble. I
> don't what what your complaint is here.
>

Use Copenhagen
 to explain how the decision to erase or not to erase which way
information made *AFTER* the electrons have passed the 2 slits but before
they hit the photographic plate can produce a effect on that photographic
plate and make sure that explanation is realistic and the arrow of time is
respected.

>
>> >>
>> 
>> Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have
>> merit, but NOT the MWI,
>>
>>
>> 
>> >> 
>> Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that?
>>
>
> > 
> Google "Steven Weinberg, Many Worlds "repellent". If you can't find it,
> let me know. AG
>

OK I'm officially letting you know, I just did exactly what you said but I
still can't find it, I still can find no evidence Weinberg thinks the
multiverse may have merit but not the MWI.

> >> 
>> how can you have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without
>> a multiverse? 
>>
>>
>
> > 
> You keep making the same error as Brent pointed out earlier
>

Brent was wrong and so are you.

> 
> The Multiverse of String theory, aka the Landscape, arises in a totally
> different context and theory than the MW of the MWI.
>

I agree, the context was totally different. The string theorists had their
reasons for coming up with a Multiverse, 
 Everett
 had completely different reasons for coming up with a Multiverse, and the
reasons Eternal Inflation theorists needed a Multiverse had nothing to do
with string theory or Everett. The fact that all 3 needed a multiverse
gives strength to the idea, it certainly isn't a weakness!   

 John K Clark

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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> This question is more interesting. I tend to fall in the camp that we
> exercise little control over the ultimate decision made by such a super
> intelligence, but I am optimistic that a super intelligence will, during
> the course of its ascension, discover and formalize a system of ethics, and
> this may lead to it deciding not to wipe out other life forms.  For
> example, it might discover the same ideas expressed here (
> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arnold_Zuboff/
> publication/233329805_One_Self_The_Logic_of_Experience/links/
> 54adcdb60cf2213c5fe419ec/One-Self-The-Logic-of-Experience.pdf ) and
> therefore determine something like the golden rule is rationally justified.
>
>
> I will take a look. I read him in Mind's I. What is the golden rule?
>
>
 I am sure you have heard of it in concept, perhaps this name for it is
specific to english, but it is defined as:

The Golden Rule  (which can be
considered a law of reciprocity in some religions) is the principle of
treating others as one would wish to be treated. It is a maxim of altruism
that is found in many religions and cultures.


Basically, treating others as self.  If ethics is a field with universal
and objective answers, then I think a superintelligence will discover those
answers.

Jason

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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?

Jason,

I think there might be two ways of interpreting this, each with
different answers.

The first question: Does AI create more threats that never existed
before?

No more than a not well educated kid. Especially when with guns and
bombs.

I think the answer is most definitely yes. Some examples:
- Large scale unemployment/disempowerment of people who cannot
compete with increasing machine intelligence

The threat here is more in human stupidity, forgetting that money is a
tool for working less, not more. You are right this is frightening,
but nor more than the actual health politics (prohibition).

- Algorithms that identify and wipe out dissent / control opposition

But all technics can help. With the satellite system, we can localize
opposition through phones. Basically all technic, from fire to media,
can be misused by humans.

- New and terrifying weapons (e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HipTO_7mUOw
)
- More infrastructure and systems that can be hacked or introduce
defects (air traffic control systems, self-driving cars, etc.)

Sure, the acceleration of information machine *is* full of possible
risks.

The second question: Will super intelligence ultimately decide to
eliminate us (as meaningless, redundant, to make room for more
computation, etc.)?

Not before we download ourselves into machines, and their will be
hybrids. Then, the whole point is in succeeding to transmit our values
to our kids, digital or not.

As I said, I would say that the universal machine is born intelligent,
and can only evolves keeping that intelligence intact, or diminishing
it, like nature does with the "adult state", which is basically when
intelligence is stopped and people believe have the answer on the
fundamental questions.

There is nothing new, but things accelerates. In geological time, the
"machine/word/number development" is an explosion. A reason to make
clear our values, and take seriously education and research, but also
the arts, etc.

I think we will come back to bacteria, a modern one with GPS and
connected to all the others. We will be virtual being simulated by
colony of bacteria, a special one which adapts itself well on many
planets, and transform itself into a quantum net when "frozen" below
-40 degree celcius (). We will expand forever, in most normal future,
even if that means changing of multi-multi-... verses.

This question is more interesting. I tend to fall in the camp that
we exercise little control over the ultimate decision made by such a
super intelligence, but I am optimistic that a super intelligence
will, during the course of its ascension, discover and formalize a
system of ethics, and this may lead to it deciding not to wipe out
other life forms. For example, it might discover the same ideas
expressed here ( https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arnold_Zuboff/publication/233329805_One_Self_The_Logic_of_Experience/links/54adcdb60cf2213c5fe419ec/One-Self-The-Logic-of-Experience.pdf
) and therefore determine something like the golden rule is
rationally justified.

I will take a look. I read him in Mind's I. What is the golden rule?

Best,

Bruno

Jason

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 3:32 PM, wrote:
IIRC, this is the view of Hawking and Musk.

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:31 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>> 
>> I think think the string theory Multiverse is related to the inflation
>> theory Multiverse and both are related to the  Everett
>> /
>> D
>> eutsch Multiverse. When 3 different theories independently point in the
>> same direction nature may be trying to tell you something.
>
>
> > 
> They don't point in the same direction.  The string theory and inflation
> theory multiverse posits different universes with different physical
> parameters due to random symmetry breaking.  Everett/Deutsch assume the
> same physics
>

All 3 assume the same physics.

There must be some basic fundamental physical principles that remain the
same in every string universe and every

Everett/Deutsch

universe, although we don't know what they are, we don't know what's really
fundamental and what is not. 400 years ago Kepler tried to derive the fact
that there are 7 and only 7 planets from pure mathematics but he failed to
do so, he failed for 2 reasons, it turns out there are more than 7 planets
and he failed because the number of planets is not a fundamental law of
logic or physics but is a result of random happenstance. Some of the laws
of physics that we think of as fundamental may be like that, they are only
true in this universe. But there must be some laws of physics that are true
in every universe, I'd bet money that the second law of thermodynamics is
one of them
,
but there will be others.

And how is the Eternal Inflation Multiverse fundamentally different from
the String Theory Multiverse?

 John K Clark

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 10:46 PM,  wrote:

*> If Weinberg thinks the MWI is "repellent", do you really think he
> finds it plausible?*


Yes
 
absolutely!! Weinberg is on record for saying the universe is "pointless"
and he probably thinks being pointless is pretty repellent but I'll bet he
nevertheless thinks the existence of the universe is plausible because he's
smart enough to know that the universe (or the multiverse) is not obligated
to be concerned with the personal likes and dislikes of Steven Weinberg.
Feynman was smart enough to know that too, he didn't like many worlds any
better that Weinberg but admitted "it's possible" because he didn't have a
better idea that could explain the weird quantum world. As
 
California Institute of
 
Technology
 
physicist and Many World
s
fan
Sean Carroll
says "Our job as scientists is to formulate the best possible description
of the world as it is, not to force the world to bend to our
pre-conceptions."

 John K Clark

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Re: Feynman and the Everything

2017-11-28 Thread David Nyman

On 28 November 2017 at 13:50, Jason Resch  wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 6:06 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 27 Nov 2017, at 04:04, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>> Richard Feynman in "The Character of Physical Law" Chapter 2 wrote:
>>
>> "It always bothers me that according to the laws as we understand them
>> today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of logical
>> operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a region of
>> space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that be going
>> on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of logic to
>> figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?"
>>
>> Does computationalism provide the answer to this question,
>>
>>
>> Yes.:)
>>
>>
>>
> Very nice. It seems then Feynman's intuition was in the right place. The
> second half of the above quote was:
>
> "So I have often made the hypothesis ultimately physics will not require a
> mathematical statement, that in the end the machinery will be revealed and
> the laws will turn out to be simple, like the checker board with all its
> apparent complexities. But this is just speculation."
>
>
> So it looks like that simple machinery is the machinery of the universal
> machine and the simple laws  are those of Peano (or Robinson?) Arithmetic.
>

Note also that what we call the 'laws' of physics are in fact inferences
from observation postulated to explain and predict the behaviour of
physical phenomena. They are not themselves in principle observable and
physics doesn't concern itself with how the postulated entities 'know' how
to behave with such precision, or indeed behave at all. Wheeler, and in
turn his student Feynman, were so impressed with this precision in the case
of the electron that Wheeler was moved to suggest to Feynman (though not
entirely seriously) the idea that they might in fact all be the same one.

Computation by contrast is explicitly 'all of a piece' in this respect, in
that its entities and relations are (in principle at least) exposable and
cut from the same arithmetical cloth, as it were. Further, if entities such
as the electron were indeed to be associated with a class of identical
computations it would perhaps be less surprising that they are observed to
behave identically. In that sense Wheeler would have been right.

David


>
>>
>> in the sense that even the tiniest region of space is the result of an
>> infinity of computations going through an observer's mind state as it
>> observes the tiniest region of space?
>>
>>
>> That might be OK, if space was something entirely physical, which is
>> suggested by the physics of the vacuum, or general relativity, but with
>> Mechanism, spece and time might be less physical than here suggested. The
>> reason is that it is not clear how "empty space" could make a computation
>> different from another,
>>
>
> I think what I was thinking here were "closed loop feyman diagrams", where
> any possible diagram might be drawn in the tiniest area of space, so long
> as it is closed, e.g. fluctuations/particle creations are permitted so long
> as they all cancel out. So if space is physical, and enables any of these
> fluctuations to happen, then this noise can take any possible value from
> the observer's point of view (like the polarization of a photon).
>
>
>> and so space could be only a marker differentiating some computations,
>> like time seems to be in the indexical approach. All this would need big
>> advance in the mathematics of the intelligible and sensible arithmetical
>> matter. I expect space to be explained by quantum knot invariant algebra
>> due to subtil relation between BDB and DBD logical operators (I mean []<>[]
>> and <>[]<>). Kant might be right on this, apparently space and time are
>> really in the "categorie de l'entendement", I don't know Kant in English
>> sorry, but this means mainly that they belong to the mind).
>>
>>
> Thanks I very much appreciate these additional insights. I do subscribe to
> the belief that time is an illusion created by the mind. I have a little
> more trouble seeing that when extended to spacetime as a whole.  Though
> perhaps what's come closest to helping me see this picture is Amanda
> Gefter's excellent book "Trespassing on Einstein's Lawn"--I would recommend
> it to everyone on the Everything list. It takes the approach that only
> things that are invariant are real, and from there proceeds to deconstruct
> almost all of physics.
>
> Jason
>
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Re: Feynman and the Everything

On 27 Nov 2017, at 23:08, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 10:04 PM, Jason Resch   
wrote:

> Richard Feynman in "The Character of Physical Law" Chapter 2  
wrote:

"It always bothers me that according to the laws as we understand  
them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of  
logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny  
a region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can  
all that be going on in that tiny space? Why should it take an  
infinite amount of logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/ 
time is going to do?"

Obviously infinite logic is not required unless infinite precision  
is also required, but sometimes (and protein folding would be a  
good example of this) an astronomically huge number of calculations  
are required for even a very modest approximation of what is  
happening in a tiny piece of spacetime, and yet nature can do it  
with great precision in a fraction of a second. How come? Feynman  
himself took the first first tentative steps toward answering that  
question just before he died, as far as I know he was the first  
person to introduce the idea of a quantum computer.

I think Feynman did much more than that. He made lecture on  
computation(*), and get some contributions on quantum circuit and the  
non emulability of quantum machine by probabilistic Turing machine, +  
some idea on the thermodynamic of computation, not well mentioned by  
some followers, according to Hey(**).  He might just have ignored, as  
far as I can search, the mathematical notion of universal machine.  
Deutsch got it and was able to define a quantum universal machine, and  
gives a clear-cut problem where a quantum machine is very plausibly  
much more efficient (Of course Shor will do even much more in that  
respect).
Feynman disliked philosophy, but seems to get the point that the  
quantum reality was not Turing emulable in polynomial or real time.

Deustch shows also that the quantum digital universal machine does  
*not* violate the Church-Turing thesis, making (trivially) very  
elementary arithmetic emulating all quantum computers (obviously not  
in "real time" if that needs to be said, not even in "real space", but  
the "first person" can't know that ...).

... so that the question, needed to be solved to progress in the mind- 
body problem, consist in showing why the quantum computer seems to win  
"below the substitution level".

The answer is that the modal translation of the "certain bet" which is  
in arithmetic Bp & ~Bf, on p semi-computable (sigma_1) gives a quantum  
logic.  This put a highly non trivial structure accessible on the  
consistent extensions (in some sense slightly different from the one  
use in the provability logics, to be sure).
(And thanks to the G/G* separation, which splits also the quantum  
logic, we get the quanta (first person sharable (by a linear tensor  
product)) and the qualia, which extend them with non communicable  
personal data).

Bruno

(*) Feynman Lectures on Computation
https://www.amazon.com/Feynman-Lectures-Computation-Richard-P/dp/0738202967

(**) The book of Anthony J.G. Hey
https://www.amazon.com/Feynman-Computation-Anthony-Hey/dp/081334039X

> Does computationalism provide the answer to this question,

No natural phenomenon has ever been found where nature has solved a   
NP-hard problem in polynomial time. Quantum Computer expert  
Scott Aaronson actually tested this and this is what he  
found:

" taking two glass plates with pegs between them, and dipping the  
resulting contraption into a tub of soapy water. The idea is that  
the soap bubbles that form between the pegs should trace out the  
minimum Steiner tree — that is, the minimum total length of line  
segments connecting the pegs, where the segments can meet at points  
other than the pegs themselves. Now, this is known to be an NP-hard  
optimization problem. So, it looks like Nature is solving NP-hard  
problems in polynomial time!

Long story short, I went to the hardware store, bought some glass  
plates, liquid soap, etc., and found that, while Nature does often  
find a minimum Steiner tree with 4 or 5 pegs, it tends to get stuck  
at local optima with larger numbers of pegs. Indeed, often the soap  
bubbles settle down to a configuration which is not even a tree  
(i.e. contains “cycles of soap”), and thus provably can’t be  
optimal.
The situation is similar for protein folding. Again, people have  
said that Nature seems to be solving an NP-hard optimization problem  
in every cell of your body, by letting the proteins fold into their  
minimum-energy configurations. But there are two problems with this  
claim. The first problem is that proteins, just like soap bubbles,  
sometimes get stuck in suboptimal configurations — indeed, it’s  
believed that’s exactly what happens with Mad Cow Disease. The  
second problem is that, to the

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On 28 Nov 2017, at 11:56, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 12:19:53 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 26 Nov 2017, at 21:56, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

and in modal logic it is □p → p.

No, that is the reflexion formula, typically not provable in general  
(for exemple Bf -> f, with f representing the constant falsity, or  
"0 = 1") expresses consitency (~Bf), which is not provable.


Löb's theorem asserts that the machine will say Bp -> p only when  
she actually prove p, which is a statement of modesty. Obviously if  
she proves p, she can prove Bp -> p, because p / (q -> p) is a valid  
rule in classical logic. But the machine, by Löb's theorem says the  
converse, if ever she proves Bp -> p, she proves p.


The formal modal formula is B(Bp -> p) -> Bp.

You are right, it has been a long time since I looked at this.


OK. No problem. I am already glad when people can say "I was wrong".  
It means that they have a bit of the scientific attitude.






It looks also like wishful thinking. If you succeed in convincing a  
Löbian entity (whose beliefs are close for the Löb rule, or having  
Löb's theorem for its bewesibar predicate) that if she ever believes  
that some medication will work, then it work, then she will believe  
the medication works!


It solves Henkin's problem about the status of the proposition  
asserting their own provability: p <-> Bp. We know with Gödel that  
those asserting their own non-provability to a consistent system  
must be true and unprovable by the system, that is not obvious for  
the Löbian sentences, as they could a priori be false and non  
provable, or true and provable, but it happens that they are always  
true (and provable).


The modus tolens is ⌐p → ⌐□p (⌐ = NOT) which is not the  
same as p → □p. The □ means necessarily and ⌐□⌐ means not  
necessarily not or possibly abbreviated as ◊ and so  ⌐p →  
◊⌐p. Godel's theorem illustrates a case where p → □p is false;


Indeed: ~Bf -> ~B (~Bf)(consistency implies non-provability of  
consistency).


And so this is an aspect of Gödel's theorem or one way of thinking  
about it. I will be honest with physics and information theory I  
have found the computation or Turing machine approach more useful.


Gödel's is concerned with the provability notion, Turing was concerned  
with the computability notion. In fact Gödel missed the Church-thesis,  
and was very close to it, by its use of what we call now the  
"primitive recursive functions".


Computability is the only "absolute" notion here (if you are willing  
to believe in the Church-Turing thesis). provability is a relative  
notion which depends on the formal system under concern. Yet, there  
are important relation between provability and computatibility. The  
main one is that the restricted sigma_1-provability is  equivalent  
with Turing universality. But provability in general is not concerned  
by this restriction. Simulation and emulation is on the type  
computation, not of the type proof. A weak system like Robinson  
arithmetic can emulate (simulate exactly) Peano arithmetic, like I can  
in principle emulate Einstein's brain, and this without understanding  
what the simulation of Einstein explains to me. For example Robinson  
Arithmetic can prove that Peano Arithmetic can prove Robinson's  
arithmetic consistent, but that cannot convince Robinson Arithmetic.








I has been a while again since I looked at Penrose's approach to  
these matters. As I recall he leans heavily on the Cantor  
diagonalization.


The whole of Recursion Theory (Turing, Post, Kleene, ...) and  
Mathematical logic (Gödel, ...) relies on diagonalisation. It is used  
all the times everywhere. Most are constructive, some are not  
constrtuctive, and in theoretical AI, like in theoretical theology,  
most are necessarily (provably) not constructive.






Turing's demonstration of no universal Turing machine


Turing on the countrary proved the existence of a universal machine  
(in math, and later in arithmetic). Then he begun to build one. But  
the war arrived and he build only a decoder machine for fighting the  
Nazis ... Babbage can arguably be considered as the first one  
understanding that "universality" notion, but Turing is the first to  
make that explicit and precise.






and the Gödel first theorem on predicates enumerating their Gödel  
numbers are a form of diagonalization.


Well, once you can enumerate things (constructively or not like with  
Cantor), you can diagonalize the enumeration (constructively or not ).  
I can come back on this. few people know that incompleteness is a two  
lines consequence from Church-Turing thesis, by a simple constructive  
diagonalization. I have already explain this about 5 times on this  
list, but it is so short and elegant that I might not resist coming  
back to this. It is the starting point of theoretical computer science.






What does concern me is that these mathematics involve

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On 27 Nov 2017, at 23:02, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 11/27/2017 10:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The formal modal formula is B(Bp -> p) -> Bp.

It looks also like wishful thinking. If you succeed in convincing a  
Löbian entity (whose beliefs are close for the Löb rule, or having  
Löb's theorem for its bewesibar predicate) that if she ever  
believes that some medication will work, then it work, then she  
will believe the medication works!


But that's equivocating on "B".  In the formula it means  
beweisbar=prove not "believes".  I think that is obfuscation.


Before Gödel, everyone thought that B was an operator for a knowledge  
predicate. But after Gödel (1931), we know that B verifies all the  
axiom of knowledge minus the key one (Bp -> p), making it into a  
(rational) notion of belief. I could have defined by axiomatically  
belief by:


The subject believes x + 0 = x, the subject believes x + s(y) = s(x +  
y), etc.
If this applies to you, as I am sure it does, the results will apply  
to you or any of your recursive computational continuations.


This would be ridiculous if that was used to model human psychology,  
but it is not a problem for the derivation of the physical laws  
(unless you believes that the universe depends conceptually of human  
psychology, but that would be a rather strong coming back to the kind  
of  anthropomorphism we usually avoid here.


Bruno







Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On 27 Nov 2017, at 21:53, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:56:39 PM UTC, Brent wrote:


On 11/26/2017 9:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett  
 wrote:

On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;  
introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it  
purports to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with  
the same memories and life histories for example. Give me  
abreak. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which everything is  
duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth  
and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the  
bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite world, ending  
perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular  
assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you  
justify that assumption?


The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the  
universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe.  
Maybe it's false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level  
I multiverse an *argument* for its falseness?


A multiverse is not a strange hypothesis.  If the universe arose  
from some physical process, then it is natural to suppose that same  
process could operate to produce multiple universes.  This is true  
even for supernatural creation: even if a god or gods created the  
universe they might very well create many.


Brent

Agreed. The subject is entirely speculative with zero evidence  
AFAICT. I don't believe in infinite repeats, and I offered a thought  
experiment to show a scenario with no repeats. AG


Zero universe, one universe, two universes, omega universes, aleph_1  
universes, ... all assumption of the number of universe is  
speculative. But if we assume Mechanism or Quantum Mechanism, we tend  
to zero universes, and infinitely many histories, as a consequence of  
the theories.
There is not one evidence for a "Universe" if taken as an ontological  
("really existing") being.


The collapse assumption is worst than speculative, as it assumes that  
QM is simply wrong, without any evidence, nor any precision of where  
it becomes wrong. Then it speculates on magical things like the spooky  
action at a distance, a 3p physical indeterminism, etc.


Bruno



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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On 27 Nov 2017, at 20:46, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:13:32 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com  
wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 4:48:12 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Nov 2017, at 21:58, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Friday, November 24, 2017 at 12:15:46 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 22 Nov 2017, at 22:51, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>  I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case  
of the MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must  
be realized in some world.   I see no reason for this  
assumption other than an insistence to fully reify the wf in  
order to avoid "collapse".


The MWI people don't have to assume anything because there  
is absolutely nothing in t he Schrodinger Wave E  
quation  about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who  
have to assume that somehow it does. 


It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE  
alone didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.


Brent

Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name  
indicates, based on the assumption that all possible  
measurements MUST be measured, in this case in other worlds.


That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of  
the waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically  
the assumption that the wave does not apply to the observer:  
they assumed QM was wrong for the macroscopic world (Bohr) or  
for the conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) depending where you  
put the cut.


CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible  
results of measurements. They don't assert that every possible  
measurement will be realized.

What do you mean by realize?

 Realized = Measured. AG



Measured by who?

Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds  
the problem seems to metastasize. AG


More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the  
wave is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the  
particles. The waves evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down.  
Are you OK to say that a measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says  
that the measurement gives either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down,  
but that NEVER occurs once we abandon the collapse. So without  
collapse, a measurement is a first person experience. In this  
case, it is arguably the same as the experience of being duplicated.


If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state  
(without the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be  
able to evaluate your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ).  
For example, I am not clear how you apply linearly.Does each term  
in the sum represent a tensor product? TIA AG


I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable  
interaction, which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product  
of Alice (|A>)and a simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (| 
UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> .


Before the measurement Alice is NOT entangled with the entangled  
pair since it is isolated;


Well, there is not entangled pair here. As I said, I was coming on  
the very basic: the linearity of the tensor product on superposition.




nor afterward since the system being measured is now NOT in a  
superposition of states.


Assuming a collapse, which I don't. Without collapse, you can never  
eliminate a superposition.





So your tensor addition is based on fallacies,


? Be explicit, please.

When you write  |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> , on left  
side you're assuming Alice is entangled with the entangled pair. But  
she is NOT since the entangled pair is assumed to be isolated before  
the measurement. AG


As I said, we agree on this. There is no entanglement. I am just  
reminding the linearity of the tensor product. There are no pairs of  
particle.





Correction:
Since the right term on LHS is NOT the state of the entangled pair  
before measurement, it must be after measurement.  How can Alice be  
entangled with a superposition that spans two universes? Still  
doesn't make sense. AG



OK. But in that part of the explanation, there were just no  
entanglement. Once Alice measure that single simple one-particle  
superposition, she get entangled with the particle, but that is NOT  
the singlet state used in EPR-BELL. For this look at the appendice of  
Michael Clive Price here (or in the archive, as we have discussed this  
already more than once).

Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 5:03 AM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:

>
>
> If you have some time/patience, let me know what you think of my arguments
> here:
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.02009
>
>

Telmo,

Interesting read.

In general I have a lot of sympathy for this view.

I think there may be an inverse relationship between intelligence and
confidence in actions.  That is, the more intelligence the super
intelligence becomes, the less certain it may be about whether a given
course of action is correct, and this could lead to a paralysis of sorts.

I've also read a few science fiction stories where upon being uploaded,
people modify their brains to activate their pleasure centers and
effectively become zombies thereafter.  I wonder though, and perhaps this
relates to the nature of possible conscious experiences, would a
super-intelligence prefer to exist and continually stimulate its utility
function, or would it be equally (or more?) happy to define its utility
function as being maximized by not existing and then kill itself?  E.g.
with the choice between an eternal heroine trip/orgasm vs. suicide, what
would a rational agent choose?

Another question, what if a super intelligence agreed with the ideas
expressed in the one-self paper and it determined its self interest extends
to all conscious beings. Would it, acting under such a belief, seek to help
(and not modify) existing conscious life realize their utility functions,
or would it instead decide to modify the utility functions of those other
conscious life forms it has the power to change? Would it modify their
utility functions to seek to stop existing and then kill them?  If it does
so instantaneously, it doesn't seem like it really ever modified their
utility functions in the first place and instead of assisting their
suicides, is murdering them.

It seem to me, that under computationalism, realizing conscious states
requires computation, and in our universe computation requires time.
Therefore maximizing the types and kinds of conscious states one wants to
exist requires persistence over time.  I think for a conscious super
intelligence, utility functions must somehow be based of the perceived
utility of various conscious experiences.  Ceasing to exist (or ceasing to
realize new conscious states) serves only to eliminate your own
contribution of experiences to the total set of experiences that exist.
Therefore the super intelligence that kills itself, is in effect, deciding
a preference for the other already extant conscious life forms and their
experiences over its own.

If you look at everything that motivates all human endeavors, it is
ultimately, all about realizing and maximizing good experiences while
avoiding and minimizing bad experiences.

Another consideration is that so long as the ratio of superintelligences
that clone themselves remains greater than the ratio of superintelligences
that modify their utility function to become inert (over some period of
time) remains greater than 1, it seems they will be subject to darwinian
forces and will be selected for those with lower rates of modifying their
utility function to become inert.

Overall your paper leads to a great number of interesting topics that
deserve further exploration. Thanks for sharing it.

Jason

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Re: Feynman and the Everything

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 7:50 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 6:06 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 27 Nov 2017, at 04:04, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>> Richard Feynman in "The Character of Physical Law" Chapter 2 wrote:
>>
>> "It always bothers me that according to the laws as we understand them
>> today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of logical
>> operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a region of
>> space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that be going
>> on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of logic to
>> figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?"
>>
>> Does computationalism provide the answer to this question,
>>
>>
>> Yes.:)
>>
>>
>>
> Very nice. It seems then Feynman's intuition was in the right place. The
> second half of the above quote was:
>
> "So I have often made the hypothesis ultimately physics will not require a
> mathematical statement, that in the end the machinery will be revealed and
> the laws will turn out to be simple, like the checker board with all its
> apparent complexities. But this is just speculation."
>
>
> So it looks like that simple machinery is the machinery of the universal
> machine and the simple laws  are those of Peano (or Robinson?) Arithmetic.
>
>
>>
>> in the sense that even the tiniest region of space is the result of an
>> infinity of computations going through an observer's mind state as it
>> observes the tiniest region of space?
>>
>>
>> That might be OK, if space was something entirely physical, which is
>> suggested by the physics of the vacuum, or general relativity, but with
>> Mechanism, spece and time might be less physical than here suggested. The
>> reason is that it is not clear how "empty space" could make a computation
>> different from another,
>>
>
> I think what I was thinking here were "closed loop feyman diagrams", where
> any possible diagram might be drawn in the tiniest area of space, so long
> as it is closed, e.g. fluctuations/particle creations are permitted so long
> as they all cancel out. So if space is physical, and enables any of these
> fluctuations to happen, then this noise can take any possible value from
> the observer's point of view (like the polarization of a photon).
>
>
>> and so space could be only a marker differentiating some computations,
>> like time seems to be in the indexical approach. All this would need big
>> advance in the mathematics of the intelligible and sensible arithmetical
>> matter. I expect space to be explained by quantum knot invariant algebra
>> due to subtil relation between BDB and DBD logical operators (I mean []<>[]
>> and <>[]<>). Kant might be right on this, apparently space and time are
>> really in the "categorie de l'entendement", I don't know Kant in English
>> sorry, but this means mainly that they belong to the mind).
>>
>>
> Thanks I very much appreciate these additional insights. I do subscribe to
> the belief that time is an illusion created by the mind. I have a little
> more trouble seeing that when extended to spacetime as a whole.  Though
> perhaps what's come closest to helping me see this picture is Amanda
> Gefter's excellent book "Trespassing on Einstein's Lawn"--I would recommend
> it to everyone on the Everything list. It takes the approach that only
> things that are invariant are real, and from there proceeds to deconstruct
> almost all of physics.
>
> Jason
>
>
I wanted to add, it also shows that the function (if you can call it that)
of practically every physical law is to ensure consistency between
observers. I think you would like it.

Jason

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Re: Feynman and the Everything

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 6:06 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 27 Nov 2017, at 04:04, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
> Richard Feynman in "The Character of Physical Law" Chapter 2 wrote:
>
> "It always bothers me that according to the laws as we understand them
> today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of logical
> operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a region of
> space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that be going
> on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of logic to
> figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?"
>
> Does computationalism provide the answer to this question,
>
>
> Yes.:)
>
>
>
Very nice. It seems then Feynman's intuition was in the right place. The
second half of the above quote was:

"So I have often made the hypothesis ultimately physics will not require a
mathematical statement, that in the end the machinery will be revealed and
the laws will turn out to be simple, like the checker board with all its
apparent complexities. But this is just speculation."


So it looks like that simple machinery is the machinery of the universal
machine and the simple laws  are those of Peano (or Robinson?) Arithmetic.


>
> in the sense that even the tiniest region of space is the result of an
> infinity of computations going through an observer's mind state as it
> observes the tiniest region of space?
>
>
> That might be OK, if space was something entirely physical, which is
> suggested by the physics of the vacuum, or general relativity, but with
> Mechanism, spece and time might be less physical than here suggested. The
> reason is that it is not clear how "empty space" could make a computation
> different from another,
>

I think what I was thinking here were "closed loop feyman diagrams", where
any possible diagram might be drawn in the tiniest area of space, so long
as it is closed, e.g. fluctuations/particle creations are permitted so long
as they all cancel out. So if space is physical, and enables any of these
fluctuations to happen, then this noise can take any possible value from
the observer's point of view (like the polarization of a photon).


> and so space could be only a marker differentiating some computations,
> like time seems to be in the indexical approach. All this would need big
> advance in the mathematics of the intelligible and sensible arithmetical
> matter. I expect space to be explained by quantum knot invariant algebra
> due to subtil relation between BDB and DBD logical operators (I mean []<>[]
> and <>[]<>). Kant might be right on this, apparently space and time are
> really in the "categorie de l'entendement", I don't know Kant in English
> sorry, but this means mainly that they belong to the mind).
>
>
Thanks I very much appreciate these additional insights. I do subscribe to
the belief that time is an illusion created by the mind. I have a little
more trouble seeing that when extended to spacetime as a whole.  Though
perhaps what's come closest to helping me see this picture is Amanda
Gefter's excellent book "Trespassing on Einstein's Lawn"--I would recommend
it to everyone on the Everything list. It takes the approach that only
things that are invariant are real, and from there proceeds to deconstruct
almost all of physics.

Jason

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On 27 Nov 2017, at 18:10, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 8:29:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Nov 2017, at 15:59, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The  
idea that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact  
(many histories)" does not work, and is not really an explanation  
at all -- you are simply evading the issue.


Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the  
linear evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not  
yet seen one proof that some action at a distance are at play in  
quantum mechanics, although I agree that would be the case if the  
outcome where unique, as EPER/BELL show convincingly.


Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action  
at a distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or  
just want to dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But  
after Aspect, the choice is really between deterministic and local  
QM + many worlds, or one world and 3p indeterminacy and non  
locality. Like Maudlin said, choose your poison.



Bruno


Bruce



I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments  
here. In weighing in here I might be making an error of not  
addressing things properly.


Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin  
1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do  
not have the two spin particles. The entanglement state is all  
that is identifiable. The degrees of freedom for the two spins are  
replaced with those of the entanglement state. It really makes no  
sense to talk about the individual spin particles existing. If the  
observer makes a measurement that resultsin a  
measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the  
entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the  
apparatus, and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the  
entanglement.


We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of  
the entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is  
blind to any idea there is some "geography" associated with the  
individual spins. There in fact really is no such thing as the  
individual spins. The loss of the entangled state replaces that  
with the two spin states. Since there is no "metric" specifying  
where the spins are before the measurement there is no sense to  
ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins.


This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we  
are thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking  
about our problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is  
ontic or epistemic. It could be that we are a bit like dogs with  
respect to the quantum world. I have several dogs and one thing  
that is clear is they do not understand spatial relationships  
well; they get leashes and chains all tangled up and if they get  
wrapped up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to get  
out of it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain  
power and will never be able to understand QM in some way that has  
a completeness with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality.  
There is also a far more radical possibility. It is that a  
measurement of a quantum system is ultimately a set of quantum  
states that are encoding information about quantum states. This is  
the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing Machine that  
emulates other Turing machines, or asort of Goedel  
self-referential process. If this is the case we may be faced with  
the prospect there can't ever be a complete understanding of the  
ontic and epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some  
sense not knowable by any axiomatic structure.


Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here  
to avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is whether  
many worlds avoids the implications of Bell's theorem, so that a  
purely local understanding of EPR is available in Everettian  
models. I have argued that this is not the case -- that non- 
locality is inherent in the entangled singlet state, and many  
worlds does not avoid this non-locality. I think from what you say  
above that you might well agree with this position.


Bruce

Of course MWI can do nothing of the sort. MWI suffers from much the  
same problem all quantum interpretations suffer from.


I don't see this. the MW theory (that is the WWE without the  
collapse axiom) explains the violation of inequality in a way which  
avoids any action at a distance, but when we assume one universe,  
like Einstein explains very clearly already

Re: Feynman and the Everything



On 27 Nov 2017, at 04:04, Jason Resch wrote:



Richard Feynman in "The Character of Physical Law" Chapter 2 wrote:

"It always bothers me that according to the laws as we understand  
them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of  
logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny  
a region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can  
all that be going on in that tiny space? Why should it take an  
infinite amount of logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/ 
time is going to do?"


Does computationalism provide the answer to this question,


Yes.:)



in the sense that even the tiniest region of space is the result of  
an infinity of computations going through an observer's mind state  
as it observes the tiniest region of space?


That might be OK, if space was something entirely physical, which is  
suggested by the physics of the vacuum, or general relativity, but  
with Mechanism, spece and time might be less physical than here  
suggested. The reason is that it is not clear how "empty space" could  
make a computation different from another, and so space could be only  
a marker differentiating some computations, like time seems to be in  
the indexical approach. All this would need big advance in the  
mathematics of the intelligible and sensible arithmetical matter. I  
expect space to be explained by quantum knot invariant algebra due to  
subtil relation between BDB and DBD logical operators (I mean []<>[]  
and <>[]<>). Kant might be right on this, apparently space and time  
are really in the "categorie de l'entendement", I don't know Kant in  
English sorry, but this means mainly that they belong to the mind).


Bruno






Jason

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?

2017-11-28 Thread Telmo Menezes

Hi Jason,

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 11:09 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
> I think there might be two ways of interpreting this, each with different
> answers.
>
> The first question: Does AI create more threats that never existed before?
>
> I think the answer is most definitely yes. Some examples:
> - Large scale unemployment/disempowerment of people who cannot compete with
> increasing machine intelligence
> - Algorithms that identify and wipe out dissent / control opposition
> - New and terrifying weapons (e.g.
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HipTO_7mUOw )
> - More infrastructure and systems that can be hacked or introduce defects
> (air traffic control systems, self-driving cars, etc.)
>
> The second question: Will super intelligence ultimately decide to eliminate
> us (as meaningless, redundant, to make room for more computation, etc.)?
>
> This question is more interesting. I tend to fall in the camp that we
> exercise little control over the ultimate decision made by such a super
> intelligence, but I am optimistic that a super intelligence will, during the
> course of its ascension, discover and formalize a system of ethics, and this
> may lead to it deciding not to wipe out other life forms.  For example, it
> might discover the same ideas expressed here (
> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arnold_Zuboff/publication/233329805_One_Self_The_Logic_of_Experience/links/54adcdb60cf2213c5fe419ec/One-Self-The-Logic-of-Experience.pdf
> ) and therefore determine something like the golden rule is rationally
> justified.

On a more serious note, the paper above is very interesting, thanks.

If you have some time/patience, let me know what you think of my arguments here:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.02009

Telmo.

> Jason
>
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 3:32 PM,  wrote:
>>
>> IIRC, this is the view of Hawking and Musk.
>>
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

2017-11-28 Thread Lawrence Crowell

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 12:19:53 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 26 Nov 2017, at 21:56, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> and in modal logic it is □p → p.
>
>
> No, that is the reflexion formula, typically not provable in general (for 
> exemple Bf -> f, with f representing the constant falsity, or "0 = 1") 
> expresses consitency (~Bf), which is not provable.
>
> Löb's theorem asserts that the machine will say Bp -> p only when she 
> actually prove p, which is a statement of modesty. Obviously if she proves 
> p, she can prove Bp -> p, because p / (q -> p) is a valid rule in classical 
> logic. But the machine, by Löb's theorem says the converse, if ever she 
> proves Bp -> p, she proves p.
>
> The formal modal formula is B(Bp -> p) -> Bp.
>

You are right, it has been a long time since I looked at this.  
 

>
> It looks also like wishful thinking. If you succeed in convincing a Löbian 
> entity (whose beliefs are close for the Löb rule, or having Löb's theorem 
> for its bewesibar predicate) that if she ever believes that some medication 
> will work, then it work, then she will believe the medication works!
>
> It solves Henkin's problem about the status of the proposition asserting 
> their own provability: p <-> Bp. We know with Gödel that those asserting 
> their own non-provability to a consistent system must be true and 
> unprovable by the system, that is not obvious for the Löbian sentences, as 
> they could a priori be false and non provable, or true and provable, but it 
> happens that they are always true (and provable).
>
> The modus tolens is ⌐p → ⌐□p (⌐ = NOT) which is not the same as p → □p. 
> The □ means necessarily and ⌐□⌐ means not necessarily not or possibly 
> abbreviated as ◊ and so  ⌐p → ◊⌐p. Godel's theorem illustrates a case where 
> p → □p is false; 
>
>
> Indeed: ~Bf -> ~B (~Bf)(consistency implies non-provability of 
> consistency).
>

And so this is an aspect of Gödel's theorem or one way of thinking about 
it. I will be honest with physics and information theory I have found the 
computation or Turing machine approach more useful.

I has been a while again since I looked at Penrose's approach to these 
matters. As I recall he leans heavily on the Cantor diagonalization. 
Turing's demonstration of no universal Turing machine and the Gödel first 
theorem on predicates enumerating their Gödel numbers are a form of 
diagonalization.

What does concern me is that these mathematics involve infinite systems, 
and with physics we can only measure finite quantities. I has been a 
thought that somehow physical systems might in effect approximate Univeral 
TMs or Gödel's theorem in a truncated or finite manner. This might be at 
the intersection of P vs NP and prvability vs undecidability. I am though 
not versed enough in these matters to push on with it.

LC
 

>
>
> a proposition about an math system is true, but is not necessarily or 
> provably true.
>
>
> Well the Löbian systems are completely captured by G, for the provable 
> statement on provability, and G* for the true statement on provability.
>
> G has axioms 
>
> B(p -> q) -> (Bp -> Bq)
> Bp -> BBp  (redundant, follows from Löb).
> B(Bp -> p) -> Bp (Löb)
>
> With the rule of modus ponens and necessitation a/Ba.
>
> G* has as axioms all theorem of G, +
> Bp -> p
>
> But lost the necessitation rule. I let you show that G* is inconsistent if 
> you add the necessitation rule.
>
>
>
> If that is false then ⌐□p → ⌐p is false or ◊⌐p → ⌐p is false. We can then 
> only say that p being true is "possible." This seems to have some 
> connection with quantum measurement and the update on knowledge of a system 
> with prior probabilities =  plausible estimates.
>
> I wrote a paper involving Gödel's theorem, but it was not that well 
> received. I will take a look at the paper on the web. I have a certain 
> cautionary issue with these sorts of issues. I have learned lots of 
> physicists take some umbrage with it.
>
>
> Penrose has repeated old errors in the field, already well addressed in 
> the literature. That a great mathematician could be wrong on Gödel wary a 
> bit the physicists. I decided to do mathematics and mathematical logic to 
> masteries metamathematics, as it solved already many problem I was 
> interested in in biology and genetics. I can give you reference on this. 
> Gödel's theorem is only a first big theorem in a very rich field, and it 
> has important relation with computer science, and, by consequence, in the 
> computationalist approach of the mind-body problem.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> LC
>
> ...

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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?

2017-11-28 Thread Telmo Menezes

There is an old sci-fi novel (by Stanislaw Lem I believe), where the
main powers decide to move all the automatic weapons to the moon and
fight a permanent war there, without harming anyone on earth. Who
knows... :)

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 11:33 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> Scary video...because it's nearly true.
>
> http://autonomousweapons.org/
>
> Brent
>
>
> On 11/27/2017 1:32 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> IIRC, this is the view of Hawking and Musk.
>
>
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

On 27 Nov 2017, at 01:55, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 6:36 PM,  wrote:

> Feynman, who wasn't an MWI enthusiast [...]

"Political scientist" L David Raub reports a poll of 72 of the  
"leading cosmologists and other quantum field theorists" about the  
"Many-Worlds Interpretation" [...] Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI  
is true" crowd listed are Stephen Hawking and Nobel Laureates Murray  
Gell-Mann and Richard Feynman. Gell-Mann and Hawking recorded  
reservations with the name "many-worlds", but not with the theory's  
content. Nobel Laureate Steven Weinberg is also mentioned as a many- 
worlder"

https://www.hedweb.com/everett/everett.htm#believes

This link does not work anymore, but recently Jason gave

 http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html

But to be fair, Feynman wasn't exactly a enthusiast, I think he  
believed Many Worlds was the the least bad quantum interpretation  
but he wasn't really a fan of philosophy and had sympathy for the  
"shut up and calculate" quantum interpretation.

You are right. Feynman does not hide the philosophical difficulties,  
but still wrote in his "The nature of Light" popular book, if I  
remember well, that the collapse is a collective hallucination.

Bruno

 > no human observer is necessary to perform a quantum  
experiment.

Hey you don't have to convince me that an observer is not  
needed for something to exist in one definite state, but then I'm  
not a fan of Copenhagen.

> If the detector is designed for a which-way measurement, the  
interference is destroyed.

If the which way information is retained the interference pattern  
is destroyed, if the information is destroyed then you have  
interference, and that is what Many Worlds predicts.   
>> The very heart the Copenhagen interpretation is that things  
do not have definite properties before they are measured,

> Wrong.

 "According to the Copenhagen interpretation, physical systems  
generally do not have definite properties prior to being measured 
"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation

> Your claim only applies in a special situation of quantum  
experiments which manifest interference effects.

I agree, interference effects only manifest in special  
circumstances, when a world splits become different and then the two  
evolve in such a way that the two become identical again and so  
merge back together, and that is only likely to happen if the  
difference between the two worlds is very small; that's why we don't  
see weird quantum stuff in our macro world, like in the Earth Moon  
system.

 John K Clark

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM