date:20180627

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-27 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 9:30 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 9:19 AM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> >>
>>> I'll be damned if I understand how all the Diophantine equations in the
>>> world put together can store one bit of information, much less a unlimited
>>> amount,  you certainly never said how on earth they could do it, and the
>>> scientists at Intel can't figure out how to do it either that's why they're
>>> still using silicon.
>>>
>>
We need silicon only to tell us what to ignore.  Too many infinite bit
strings exist in math, they exist in e, Pi, sqrt(2), etc.  The infinite
messages and data is all there, stored forever. What we ask of our
computers is to tell us which of the infinite values is relevant to us.
Data storage is a data transmission (through time, to someone in the
future).


>
>> >
>> These things take time to understand.  Start with "Meta Math!" by
>> Chaitin: https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0404335
>>
>
> I would appreciate it if you'd stop talking down to me, I have seen no
> indication you have a deeper understanding of these matters than I do and I
> read Gregory Chaitin book in "Meta-Math" in 2006 when it first came out.
>
> >
>> Do you see any difference between a computation that occurs in another
>> physical universe and a computation necessary to get the information about
>> the result into your brain?
>> What is that difference, fundamentally?
>>
>
> The information about the result needs to be communicated to me and if the
> computation was done in another physical universe I don't know how to do
> that nor do I see the point you were trying to make.
>

You would still consider it a real computation that exists, even if in
principal you cannot get the result into your brain?
My point is platonic computations are like computations that happen in
other universes, beyond the cosmological horizon, in other non-interfering
branches of the wave function, inside black holes, etc.
Whether you can get the result into your brain or not doesn't make the
difference as to whether or not they are real.



> 
>
>> >>
>>> If we're talking about consciousness its irrelevant what things are like
>>> from a objective viewpoint because subjectively time is the single most
>>> important characteristic of existence.
>>>
>>
>> >**
>> *Subjectivity is important and should be explained, but that doesn't make
>> the objective irrelevant. *
>>
>
> It's irrelevant if the subject under discussion is consciousness and that
> is pretty much all that the list wants to talk about.
>
>
>> >**
>> *If the objective theory says that an objectively timeless structure can
>> give rise to a subjectivity that contains the illusion of time, then we
>> should not demand an objective theory of reality*
>>
>
> Illusion is a perfectly respectable subjective phenomenon so its no good
> to just label something an illusion you've got to explain how the illusion
> works the way it does, only after that has been done is there any hope of
> discovering anything objective behind it.
>

This explains the illusion well:
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11921131.pdf

The reason it is important is that if objective time is not required, then
timeless platonic objects can be substrates of consciousness and
computation.



>
> >>
>>> Those equations don't crank out anything unless there is matter to form
>>> a crank and energy to turn the crank, otherwise the equations just sit on
>>> the printed page inert and dead.
>>>
>>
>> >
>> *The equation does nothing, the relation it describes does everything.
>> (Just like the physics equations in your text book are ineffectual, what
>> matters is the object described by the equations).*
>>
>
> I agree. So what are we arguing about?
>
>

The objects we hope are partly described by our equations, and whether they
exist.


>
> 
>>> >>
>>> The Deep-Blue equation doesn't crank out anything either unless its put
>>> into Deep Blue machine. And even then nothing will happen unless the
>>> machine is connected to the electrical power grid.   
>>>
>>>
>>
>> >
>> That step is required if you want to get the solutions into your brain.
>>
>
> Then physics is vital for consciousness and can do something mathematics
> can not.
>


A platonic computation could implement your consciousness without also
implementing a parallel platonic Deep-Blue chess computation and feeding in
the result into your consciousness.


>
>
>> > 
>> Its not needed to create the computations, which exist as a fundamental
>> feature of reality.
>>
>
> If its a fundamental feature of reality then its already right here and
> there would be no need to compute it again.
>

Not every existing computation is connected to supply every result to every
instance of John Clark's consciousness computation.


> And I can explain how matter can make calculations but nobody around here
> has provided even a hint of how pure numbers could do the same thing.
>
> >
>> *Assume there are two physical, A and B.

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-27 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 8:11 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 9:37 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> >>
>>> You could argue that all modern science has done is prove the vacuum is
>>> not nothing and although Leibniz was wrong about that the question remains
>>> valid, but I would say expecting science to explain how a nothing that is
>>> so nothing that it doesn't even have the potential of ever becoming
>>> something is unreasonable. Even a omnipotent omniscient God couldn't do
>>> that, it would be like asking Him to make a rock so heavy he can't lift it.
>>>
>>
>> *>This is giving up.  I think we can, and have explained why there is
>> something rather than nothing.*
>>
>
>
> That depends on how nothing nothing is. Leibniz would say although there
> is still not a definitive answer a enormous amount of progress has been
> made in answering that question, but now people say because of that very
> progress it doesn't count. If you define nothing as "that which does not
> even have the potential of ever becoming something" then the only logical
> thing for scientists to do is indeed to give up. And they are not the only
> ones, God should give up trying to answer that too. 
>
>
>> >* *
>> *Even if no thing existed, there would still be a difference between "1 =
>> 0" and "0 = 0".*
>>
>
> One doesn't exist and zero doesn't exist. No difference.
>
>

If they're not different then how can "no thing" a.k.a. "zero things"
remain consistent if there is no difference between "zero things" and "1
thing"?


>
>
>> >
>> There would still be a difference between "7 is composite" and "7 is
>> prime", and you can continue this up to far less trivial truths about much
>> bigger numbers, such as solutions to the Diophantine equation that
>> simulates the time evolution of the Schrodinger equation
>>
>
>
> So now you have an equation simulating an equation that is describing the
> probability of a event occurring in the physical world, you are describing
> with words a painting of a roulette wheel. Except of course an equation
> can't simulate anything, to do that you need a computer made of matter and
> energy to run it.
>

Something is computing/has computed the evolution of our universe.  What is
it?


>
> 
>
>
>>
>> >
>> *Consider the first person views of conscious gliders in Conway's Game of
>> Life. From their point of view*,
>>  [...]
>>
>
> A Turing Machine can be built from Conway's Life game and gliders would be
> a key part of it, but a individual glider has no intelligence and the
> chances it is conscious and has a point of view are about the same as the
> brain neurotransmitter molecule Acetylcholine  being conscious.
>
>
The smallest possible gliders might not be conscious, but this doesn't
preclude more complex gliders that could perceive and be conscious of
things in their environment.


>
> >**
> *the evolution of their game moves forward, according to discrete and
> simple rules. But they would wonder why. *
>
> 
> Physicist in the Life world might discover those rules after years of
> effort, and to them that would be a physical discovery not a mathematical
> one. And even to us who can see things from the outside of their world that
> they can't its still about physics and the movement of electrons through a
> machine made of matter.
>
> >
 >>
 
 *Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we
 understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of
 logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a
 region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that
 be going on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of
 logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?"*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> >>
>>> That is exactly why I think the field of Quantum Computers has such
>>> enormous potential.
>>>
>>
>> *>But can you explain it?*
>>
>
> 
> If I could I'd be writhing my Nobel Prize acceptance speech right now and
> not be farting around on the Everything List.
>

You are on the everything list, is there any concept of "everything" you
believe in?  Does it go beyond Everett's many worlds?


>
> *>Computationalism can, as the infinite set of computations that realize
> your mind, all of which exist platonically at a level of finer detail than
> is relevant/necessary for the implementation of your mind.*
>
> The infinite set of computations may exist in Plato's heaven, but nearly
> all of those computations are wrong and in heaven there is no way to tell
> the difference between correct and incorrect.
>

Consciousness self-selects itself.  The non-conscious computations are not
perceived, so don't matter. The computations that implement conscious
observers find themselves as conscious observers.


> It's like the Jorge Luis Borges short story "The Library Of Babel", it
> contains every possible book of 1000 pages or less all arranged in

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-27 Thread Russell Standish

On Wed, Jun 27, 2018 at 10:39:20AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > His retort was that
> > integers weren't stuff - but I think that is somewhat of a lost in
> > translation moment. The French word etouffe
> 
> Etoffe. 
> 
> 
> 
> > basically means material,
> > and in English stuff used to mean the same, but in more recent times has
> > taken on a placeholder function, a generic collection of "things".
> >

My point about the lost in translation moment still pertains. My
grandmother used to admonish me for saying things like "... and all
that stuff", because for her, stuff meant material. Language has
changed. Colloqially, we can refer to integers, sets and stuff, and
clearly mean something along the lines of the rest of mathematics with
stuff. It is a very colloquial word, best avoided for precision :).

> 
> > 
> > One mystery does remain though - why don't we see things like Hilbert
> > hotel computers? It is a somewhat hidden assumption of
> > computationalism that such things don't exist.
> 
> Only 0, s(0), s(s(0) … are existing. You need an axiom of infinity to have a 
> Hilbert Hostel.
> 
> My axioms are only classical logic + Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz).
> 

Yes - but Deutsch's point would be: why just those axioms, and not say
some kind of infinity axiom that allows Hilbert hotels?


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: are black holes actually misunderstood wormholes?

2018-06-27 Thread Lawrence Crowell

On Wednesday, June 27, 2018 at 12:01:30 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 6:51 PM, Lawrence Crowell <
> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com > wrote:
>
>> *> My tendency is to say that wormholes do not exist.*
>
>
> It seems to me if wormholes existed we should expect to see as many White 
> Holes as Black Holes and they should be easier to detect than Black Holes 
> too, and yet nobody has ever seen a White Hole. But even if they don’t 
> exist now maybe we can build one if the laws of physics don’t forbid it.
>  
>
>> *>There are problems with these types of solutions. The biggest is they 
>> requires a source term that has negative energy*
>
> The Casimir effect has demonstrated that the vacuum between 2 conductive 
> planes that are very very close to each other contains negative energy 
> density. 
>

The energy between the plates is just lower than the vacuum outside. It is 
negative if you set the vacuum energy outside equal zero.

LC

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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-27 Thread Brent Meeker




On 6/27/2018 2:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Which is certainly shorter than providing a degree 4 universal
Diophantine equation, like below (I can’t resist):

(unknowns range on the non negative integers (= 0 included)
31 unknowns: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q,
R, S, T, W, Z, U, Y, Al, Ga, Et, Th, La, Ta, Ph, and two
parameters:  Nu and X.

X is in W_Nu iff   phi_Nu(X) stop if and only if



I don't quite follow what W_Nu is here.


The domain of the function phi_Nu. Nu is just a natural number, and 
phi_i is an enumeration of all partial computable functions. You can 
generate it by generating all programs (of one variable) in any 
programming language.






I am guessing from the context that this means for a given 
machine/program Nu, and input X, this equation has a solution IFF Nu 
halts given X as input, but I am not sure what it means to say X is 
in W_Nu.


You got it. It means nothing more than the Nu-th program P_Nu (or 
simply Nu) stops on input X.
It can be proved that the W_i (the domain of the phi_i) enumerates all 
recursively enumerable set.


You seem to have shifted from the Diophantine equations to an enumerated 
set of all partial functions.  Just to check that I understand the 
universal Diophantine equation: If I specify a value of Nu then there is 
an X for which the equations have a solution in terms of the 31 
unknowns, and the relation Nu -> X instantiates all recursively 
enumerable functions (that's the sense in which the equations are 
universal)?


Brent

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Re: are black holes actually misunderstood wormholes?

2018-06-27 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Jun 27, 2018 at 3:38 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>>
>> The Casimir effect has demonstrated that the vacuum between 2 conductive
>> planes that are very very close to each other contains negative energy
>> density.
>
>
> * >Not exactly.  There is just less positive energy density than outside
> the plates.  I don't think that's equivalent to the negative energy density
> needed to keep a wormhole open.*
>

If you talk about negative energy you've got to say negative with respect
to what. If zero isn't the energy in empty space far from any matter what
is zero? In gauge forces the important thing is not the absolute value its
the difference, that's why a bird can safely perch on one high voltage
power line but not on 2 if they are at different voltages.

John K Clark

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Re: are black holes actually misunderstood wormholes?

2018-06-27 Thread 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List

Listening in on the direct signals -- e.g. the gravity waves themselves -- that 
are produced in these extreme merger events is probably our best window into 
probing into what is actually occuring to the dynamically interacting forces at 
these energy scales.
No atom smasher we could build can match the scale of say two neutron stars 
merging into a black hole.
I think astronomy, and specifically and especially gravity wave astronomy is 
the most promising future direction of experimentation and falsification of 
dead branches of enquiry in the realm of high energy physics.
I suspect most agree that as LIGO type detectors improve these more subtle 
harmonics, overtones, echoes etc. that may be detected in the signal are going 
to become the basis for evaluation (or re-evaluation) of our current 
understanding.
Your speculation that we may become absorbed into inner world's within our own 
minds may turn out to be true, it certainly appears that we are becoming sucked 
into our devices and the "worlds" within them and that a direct neural 
interface would lead to a whole new level of immersive experience. 
But it could be a phase of infatuation that may play out and reach some maximum 
degree of penetration, in much the same way as most people not becoming 
addicted to opiods for example... though many become totally lost to the 
addiction. 
Chris

 
 
  On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 5:15 PM, Lawrence 
Crowell wrote:   I think quantum gravitation 
theories might be put to some observational tests this way.
I would not worry about wormholes and any possible interstellar future. Kip 
Thorne aside, and wormholes are sort of "his second baby" after LIGO, I doubt 
they exist and further even if they existed we would unlikely ever enter one. 
The current trajectory of technology is to find better ways of going nowhere 
ever faster. Notice how people everywhere sit or wander around looking at smart 
phones. I suspect these will communicate directly with the brain before 
terribly long. We are not going into outer-space, but more into virtual worlds 
of inner space. Digitally enhanced mental perceptions are coming, and Homo 
sapiens I suspect will becomes completely lost in it. It could be that the 
majority of people who will ever go into outer-space have already done so.
LC

On Monday, June 25, 2018 at 7:44:29 PM UTC-5, cdemorsella wrote:
Thanks for your comments, Sci-fi fans will be disappointed. 
I was intrigued by the mention of these potential echoes contained within the 
off the scale intense ring down phase of a merger and also by what that would 
imply, if echoes are actually discovered to exist within the final moments of 
these extreme events.
Gravitational wave astronomy is in it's infancy and as instruments improve, my 
hope is that it can help speed forward movement in the quest for a unified 
theory. After all gravity waves are a direct sensing of the primary evolving 
dynamics of extreme systems in which our current best theories fall apart and 
begin spitting out infinities.
Chris 
 
 On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 3:51 PM, Lawrence Crowell 
wrote:  My tendency is to say that wormholes do not exist. There are problems 
with these types of solutions. The biggest is they requires a source term that 
has negative energy or T^{00} < 0. This would mean the quantum field that 
defines this source is not bounded below. This means an infinite well spring of 
radiation can exist. 
These types of spacetimes have other oddities. A wormhole can have one of its 
openings boosted or accelerated out and then accelerated back so the wormhole 
has closed timelike curves. This means a quantum state could be sent into the 
wormhole and it would return prior to then. This means a quantum state is 
duplicated. This is a non-unitary process forbidden by quantum mechanics. So I 
see this as another obstruction to the idea of wormholes.

The ring down, and I think as well the peak, of gravitational radiation may 
carry information about the quantum nature of black holes. Certainly if 
wormholes collide the quantum information of the wormhole would be contained in 
these signals or ring down. These types of data will likely require a 
spacebased system such as e-LISA in order to capture so called gravitational 
memory. This is where the configuration of test masses is different after the 
passage of the gravitational wave. The earliest projected launch date ESA will 
loft this system is 2034. We have a bit of a wait.
LC

On Saturday, June 23, 2018 at 3:01:53 PM UTC-5, cdemorsella wrote:
As LIGO increases its sensitivity it is entering a domain in which its 
instruments should be able to detect theorized ring down phase echoes (this is 
the very last portion of a merging event of massive bodies that produces a 
rapidly increasing frequency of waves that lead up to the moment of merging, as 
the two merging objects undergo a final increasingly tight cycle of rapidly 
narrowing orbits right before merging)  
This increased sensitivity

Re: are black holes actually misunderstood wormholes?

2018-06-27 Thread Brent Meeker




On 6/27/2018 10:01 AM, John Clark wrote:


/>There are problems with these types of solutions. The biggest is
they requires a source term that has negative energy/

The Casimir effect has demonstrated that the vacuum between 2 
conductive planes that are very very close to each other contains 
negative energy density.




Not exactly.  There is just less positive energy density than outside 
the plates.  I don't think that's equivalent to the negative energy 
density needed to keep a wormhole open.


Brent

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Re: Primary matter

2018-06-27 Thread Brent Meeker




On 6/27/2018 1:42 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On 27 June 2018 at 03:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:


On 6/26/2018 2:32 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On 25 June 2018 at 19:54, Brent Meeker  wrote:


On 6/25/2018 8:06 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

I don't think that's the case.  C seems to me to be capable to explaining
anything (e.g. we're living in the Matrix).  The theories of M are
certainly
incomplete, but if there is empirical data inconsistent with those
theories
it just shows they have limited domain. If there is empirical data that
is
impossible to include in M how would we know; how could we be sure that
it
could not be included?

I don't see how that fact that I am conscious and have a first person
experience of reality could be explained by M.

I suggest you should think about what you accept as good explanations of
other phenomenon.

I gave several examples before, regarding emergentist explanations.

Suppose that Darwinian theory has not been discovered, and we have the
following conversation:

T: Where does life come from?
B: Ah, well, it emerges from chemistry.
T: Fine, how does that work?
B: I told you, it emerges from chemistry. What kind of explanation
were you expecting?


I don't think Darwin had anything to do with discovering the chemical basis
of life, which I suppose is what you meant put in the future of the
exchange.

Well, he discovered the principle of selection with variability, and
how this leads to biological complexification. That is no small part
of the puzzle. I meant Darwinism in the neo-Darwinism sense, including
Mendel's postulation of genes, Crick and Watson's discovery of DNA
structure and many other things.

Notice the difference. We have all of these mechanisms to back the
"life emerges from chemistry" theory. Each one explains a piece of the
puzzle. For consciousness we have nada.


But we don't have nada.  We have some understanding of how neurons work 
and we've even made some AI based on neural nets that is surprisingly 
intelligent in a narrow domain.  We know a lot about how a brain 
produces consciousness from the way that injury or external stimulus 
affects consciousness.


I know you're thinking, "But that doesn't explain why the brain 
processes produce consciousness".  My point is that you don't ask 
/*why*/ planets produce gravity.  Once you have an equation that 
precisely predicts /*"what"*/ you stop asking /*"why"*/. When we can 
predict, manipulate, and create intelligent human-like behavior 
questions about why that behavior is conscious will seem quaint, like 
questions about why chemical reproduction constitutes life.





If you take Thomas Kuhn's ideas seriously, then consciousness seems to
be the current sticking point that is likely to trigger the next
paradigm shift. The exercise we've been through is one where you
insist that what Kuhn refers to as "normal science" can eventually
crack the problem, while I insist that it cannot. This sort of thing
happened before, it's not new.


Did Newton explain gravity?  Did Einstein?

They did, in the sense that they refer to above: they described the
mechanism. We even have nice equations that make correct predictions
all the time. You know more about that than me.


Are you satisfied with the
chemical explanation of life?

Yes. There are some mysteries remaining, my favorite one is how the
first self-replicators originated. But even there are several
plausible ideas.


I don't think there's anything "normal" or "extra-normal" in science.  There
is good science and better science; and they are measured by how
comprehensive, accurate, and predictive they are.

Kuhn proposed the term "normal science" to mean the exploitation mode
of scientific discovery, while "paradigm shift" refers to the
explorative mode. Kuhn's idea is that normal science takes place most
of the time, incrementally improving understanding within the current
paradigm. When the limits of the pardigm are reached, improvement
stalls around certain issues and eventually a reexamination of the
base assumptions is necessary. This leads to a crisis and parts of the
edifice comes tumbling down. The quintessential example is classical
physics and Einstein.


And the stall comes from asking the wrong question: like where does the 
elan vitale reside  or how does the force of gravity reach out from a 
planet?  or how can a physical process produce consciousness?


Brent

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Re: Bootstrapping Reality: The inconsistency of nothing

2018-06-27 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 3:03 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

*>1. Premise: No thing (nothing) exists.*
> *2. By "1" it follows that "0 things exist" is true. *
>

If 

"
"0 things exist" is true
" then "0 things exits" exists; but if its true then it can't exist exist.

> > 
> *Further it also follows that*
> ** [...]
>

Nothing can follow something that doesn't exist. And two can play this
game, even if you found a way to make it work that very fact that you made
it work would only prove that your nothing was not nothing enough because
it still had the potential of producing something.

John K Clark

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Re: are black holes actually misunderstood wormholes?

2018-06-27 Thread John Clark

On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 6:51 PM, Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> *> My tendency is to say that wormholes do not exist.*

It seems to me if wormholes existed we should expect to see as many White
Holes as Black Holes and they should be easier to detect than Black Holes
too, and yet nobody has ever seen a White Hole. But even if they don’t
exist now maybe we can build one if the laws of physics don’t forbid it.

> *>There are problems with these types of solutions. The biggest is they
> requires a source term that has negative energy*

The Casimir effect has demonstrated that the vacuum between 2 conductive
planes that are very very close to each other contains negative energy
density.

> *> A wormhole can have one of its openings boosted or accelerated out and
> then accelerated back so the wormhole has closed timelike curves. This
> means a quantum state could be sent into the wormhole and it would return
> prior to then.*

If Many Worlds is true then travel into the past wouldn’t necessarily
create a logical paradox; I go back to yesterday and shoot myself in the
head, as soon as I turn my time machine on this entire universe comes to a
dead end so nobody is around to see a paradox, but a new universe is
created and all the people in this new universe see is somebody who must be
my twin brother has just shot me in the head. Odd perhaps but there is
nothing paradoxical about that.

> *> This means a quantum state is duplicated. *

The Black Hole information paradox makes me wonder if the quantum no
cloning theorem is really true in all circumstances, maybe it needs to be
modified. Maybe you can clone a quantum state but not if both are in the
same Everett universe so nobody can ever observe the cloning.

> *> The ring down, and I think as well the peak, of gravitational radiation
> may carry information about the quantum nature of black holes.*

We could also learn a lot by studying the ring down caused by the merger of
2 Neutron Stars because that is the most extreme condition matter can
undergo. The result of the Neutron Star merger that LIGO recently observed
produced either the most massive Neutron Star ever observed or the least
massive Black Hole ever observed, a Black Hole fate seems a little more
likely but if we had just a bit more detail in the signal we’d know for
sure. It seems to indicate that a non-spinning Neutron Star can’t be more
than 2.1 solar masses, but if it was spinning fast enough a Neutron Star
could get up to 2.7 solar masses, however if its more than 2.7 it can’t be
anything but a Black Hole.

The LHC hasn’t found anything since the Higgs and particle accelerators
haven’t found anything surprising in almost 50 years, they may have told us
all they can. To find more fundamental physics we may have to look to
things like LIGO, neutrino detectors, Dark Matter detectors, and
telescopes.

 John K Clark

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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 26 Jun 2018, at 02:54, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 1:54 PM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On 6/24/2018 6:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 3:30 PM, John Clark > > wrote:
>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> 
>> >  The only thing I am asking is:
>> 1) Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.
>> 2) ??? -> Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.
>> Do we have enough information to decide between the above two theories?  
>> Have we really ruled out anything sitting below physics?
>> 
>> If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference between a 
>> correct computation and a incorrect computation and between a corrupted 
>> memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as long as we're at this philosophic 
>> meta level that's not a  b ad definition, then I don't think anything is 
>> below physics.  
>> 
>> Physical theories are based on induction from observations and experiences.
>> 
>> That process won't give us answers to these famous questions, posed by 
>> physicists:
>> Leibniz: "Why is there something rather than nothing?"
>   "The reason that there is Something rather than Nothing is that Nothing is 
> unstable."
>   -- Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate, physics 2004
> 
> That is perhaps a reasonable analogy for the "quantum vacuum", but not the 
> philosophical nothing.  For something with the capacity to decay into 
> something else, cannot rightfully be called nothing.
>  
> 
>> Hawking: "What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a 
>> universe for them to describe? The usual approach of science of constructing 
>> a mathematical model cannot answer the questions of why there should be a 
>> universe for the model to describe. Why does the universe go to all the 
>> bother of existing?"
> "What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"
>  --- Norm Levitt, after Quine
> 
> Everything theories can explain away the arbitrariness of the equations.
>  
> 
>> Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we understand 
>> them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of logical 
>> operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a region of 
>> space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that be going on 
>> in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of logic to figure 
>> out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?"
> 
> "Because the world is made of physics, not logic."
> - Brent Meeker
> 
> That's circular. You're defining physics as something that inherently should 
> have the appearance of infinities, without a justification.  I think it is is 
> a mystery in want of an explanation.
>  
> 
> 
>> Wheeler: "Why these equations, and not others?"
> 
> "These are the ones we invented to describe what we've seen."
> - Vic Stenger
> 
> 
> That's not what Wheeler is asking.  Of course if physics were different, our 
> equations would be too. Wheeler is asking why is physics this way? 
>  
>> If we're to answer these questions, we may need some kind of metaphysical 
>> theory.  Preferably one that is simple, and can explain/predict our 
>> observations.
>> The existence of all possible computations may be one possible avenue for 
>> this. 
> 
> How would that be any better or worse than "all possible set theory"
> 
> Set's by themselves don't compute anything, and so are insufficient to 
> explain observations under a computational theory of mind.
>  
> or "all possible phsyics" 
> 
> That could work, if you define what is meant by a possible physics.  With 
> computations at least, we have a clearly defined notion of all possible 
> computations.

Yes. What set theory is lacking is a “Church-Turing” thesis. Different set 
theories proves different theorems. Contrariwise, all formal notions of 
computability are equivalent.




>  
> or "all possible novels"?
> 
> Novels by themselves don't compute anything, and so are insufficient to 
> explain observations under a computational theory of mind.
> 
>  
> 
> 
>> So far, it is not ruled out, and might even be considered to be partially 
>> confirmed.  It has the power to answer questions 2, 3 and 4.  And for anyone 
>> who accepts arithmetical realism/no-cause needed for arithmetical truth, 
>> then it can answer 1 as well.
> 
> All your questions are number 1. 
> 
> (It looks like your e-mail client changed them when you separated them)
>  
> However, I would point out that Feynman's question implies that 
> computationalism must be false.
> 
> No, this would be a consequence of computationalism as predicted by Bruno in 
> his UDA.  It is a confirmatiom, rather than a refutation, of computationalism.
>  
> 
> 
>> 
>>  
>>  
>> >> Then why is brain damage a big deal? Why do I need my brain to think?
>> 
>> >  The base computations that implement your

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 25 Jun 2018, at 02:54, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 14:55, Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>>> On 17 Jun 2018, at 02:18, Jason Resch >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> In solving Hilbert's 10th problem 
>>>  in the negative, 
>>> the work of Martin Davis, Yuri Matiyasevich, Hilary Putnam and Julia 
>>> Robinson culminated in 1970 with the MRDP theorem 
>>>  
>>> which concludes:
>>> 
>>> Every computably enumerable set has a representation as a Diophantine 
>>> equation  (an equation 
>>> involving only integer coefficients and variables).
>>> 
>>> This shocked number theorists, because it meant simple equations involving 
>>> nothing more than a few integer variables have the full power of Turing 
>>> machines.  In fact, it was shown by Yuri Matiyasevich that a universal 
>>> Diophantine equation can be made with as few as 9 unknowns.
>>> 
>>> Some examples:
>>> k is even if there exists a solution to: k - 2x = 0
>>> k is a perfect square if there exists a solution to: k - x^2 = 0
>>> k is a Fibonacci number if there exists a solution to: k^4 - k^2*x^2 - x^4 
>>> - 1 = 0
>>> (k+2) is a prime number if there exists a solution to the sum of: (these 14 
>>> equations )
>>> k is a LISP program having output n, if the equation having variables: k, 
>>> n, x1, x2, x3 ... x2 (a polynomial having ~20,000 variables 
>>> ) has a solution.
>>> The universality of Diophantine equations means there are polynomial 
>>> equations that compute things quite surprising, such as polynomials that 
>>> have solutions of 0, IFF:
>>> One of the variables "k" is a valid MP3 file.
>>> One of the variables "k" is a JPEG image containing the image of a cat 
>>> (where the equation implements the same computation as a neural network 
>>> trained to recognize images of cats)
>>> For two of the variables "y" and "x", "y" equals a state of a chess board 
>>> after deep blue makes a move given a chess board with a state of "x".
>>> For two of the variables "y" and "x", "y" equals the state of the Universal 
>>> Dovetailer after performing "n" steps of execution.
>>> 
>>> The last example seems to suggest to me, that pure arithmetical truth, 
>>> concerning the solutions to equations, is identical to computation.  That 
>>> is to say, certain mathematical statements carry with them (effectively) 
>>> Turing machines, and their executions.
>> 
>> Matiyazevic results is indeed quite impressive. It finishes an inquiry begun 
>> by Davis and Putnam with important progress by Julia Robinson, and 
>> eventually Matiyazevic got the proof, and its solved the 10th problem of 
>> Hilbert: there is no mechanical procedure to tell if a diophantine 
>> polynomial equation has a solution or not. (Assuming Church’s thesis, as 
>> Matiyzevic explains well in a ten page section in his book).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Just as all solutions to the deep-blue implementing equation is equivalent 
>>> to the computations that Deep blue makes when evaluating the board, and all 
>>> solutions to the cat recognizing equation are equivalent to the processing 
>>> done by the trained neural network, all solutions to the LISP equation are 
>>> equivalent to the execution of every possible LISP program (including the 
>>> UD).
>>> 
>>> Does this our conscious experience might be a direct consequence of 
>>> Diophantine equations?
>> 
>> Yes. Although you could *equivalently* say that our conscious experience is 
>> a direct consequence of the combinators laws Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz).
>> 
>> 
>> Do you have some references that you would recommend for someone wanting to 
>> learn more about combinator laws and how they lead to universality?
> 
> I would simply recommend Smullyan’s book “How to mock a mocking bird?”, which 
> proves in details the Turing universality of the combinators.
> 
> 
> 
> Thank you! I actually had a copy of this on my shelf, but I had yet to read 
> it.  I'll start tonight. :-)
>  
> 
> 
>> Is the above the same thing as a Y-combinator, or some more specific 
>> equation in lamda calculus or combinatorial logic? I wish to lean more.
> 
> The Y combinator is the fixed point of Yx = x(Yx). All fixed point equation 
> can be solved in combinatory logic. The Y combinator can be used to program 
> the “definition by primitive recursion”, but, as Smullyan shows well, you can 
> easily start from scratch and use the Dxyz = T(xx)yz trick. You need to be 
> able to eliminate variables from combinations, but this too is

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 25 Jun 2018, at 02:54, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 14:55, Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>>> On 17 Jun 2018, at 02:18, Jason Resch >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> In solving Hilbert's 10th problem 
>>>  in the negative, 
>>> the work of Martin Davis, Yuri Matiyasevich, Hilary Putnam and Julia 
>>> Robinson culminated in 1970 with the MRDP theorem 
>>>  
>>> which concludes:
>>> 
>>> Every computably enumerable set has a representation as a Diophantine 
>>> equation  (an equation 
>>> involving only integer coefficients and variables).
>>> 
>>> This shocked number theorists, because it meant simple equations involving 
>>> nothing more than a few integer variables have the full power of Turing 
>>> machines.  In fact, it was shown by Yuri Matiyasevich that a universal 
>>> Diophantine equation can be made with as few as 9 unknowns.
>>> 
>>> Some examples:
>>> k is even if there exists a solution to: k - 2x = 0
>>> k is a perfect square if there exists a solution to: k - x^2 = 0
>>> k is a Fibonacci number if there exists a solution to: k^4 - k^2*x^2 - x^4 
>>> - 1 = 0
>>> (k+2) is a prime number if there exists a solution to the sum of: (these 14 
>>> equations )
>>> k is a LISP program having output n, if the equation having variables: k, 
>>> n, x1, x2, x3 ... x2 (a polynomial having ~20,000 variables 
>>> ) has a solution.
>>> The universality of Diophantine equations means there are polynomial 
>>> equations that compute things quite surprising, such as polynomials that 
>>> have solutions of 0, IFF:
>>> One of the variables "k" is a valid MP3 file.
>>> One of the variables "k" is a JPEG image containing the image of a cat 
>>> (where the equation implements the same computation as a neural network 
>>> trained to recognize images of cats)
>>> For two of the variables "y" and "x", "y" equals a state of a chess board 
>>> after deep blue makes a move given a chess board with a state of "x".
>>> For two of the variables "y" and "x", "y" equals the state of the Universal 
>>> Dovetailer after performing "n" steps of execution.
>>> 
>>> The last example seems to suggest to me, that pure arithmetical truth, 
>>> concerning the solutions to equations, is identical to computation.  That 
>>> is to say, certain mathematical statements carry with them (effectively) 
>>> Turing machines, and their executions.
>> 
>> Matiyazevic results is indeed quite impressive. It finishes an inquiry begun 
>> by Davis and Putnam with important progress by Julia Robinson, and 
>> eventually Matiyazevic got the proof, and its solved the 10th problem of 
>> Hilbert: there is no mechanical procedure to tell if a diophantine 
>> polynomial equation has a solution or not. (Assuming Church’s thesis, as 
>> Matiyzevic explains well in a ten page section in his book).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Just as all solutions to the deep-blue implementing equation is equivalent 
>>> to the computations that Deep blue makes when evaluating the board, and all 
>>> solutions to the cat recognizing equation are equivalent to the processing 
>>> done by the trained neural network, all solutions to the LISP equation are 
>>> equivalent to the execution of every possible LISP program (including the 
>>> UD).
>>> 
>>> Does this our conscious experience might be a direct consequence of 
>>> Diophantine equations?
>> 
>> Yes. Although you could *equivalently* say that our conscious experience is 
>> a direct consequence of the combinators laws Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz).
>> 
>> 
>> Do you have some references that you would recommend for someone wanting to 
>> learn more about combinator laws and how they lead to universality?
> 
> I would simply recommend Smullyan’s book “How to mock a mocking bird?”, which 
> proves in details the Turing universality of the combinators.
> 
> 
> 
> Thank you! I actually had a copy of this on my shelf, but I had yet to read 
> it.  I'll start tonight. :-)

Nice! I am currently re-teaching this, so ask any question. I might sum up this 
someday. Combinators and lambda expression are very nice to study computability 
and recursion theory. The theory of everything is really given by two simple 
equation (Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz)).



>  
> 
> 
>> Is the above the same thing as a Y-combinator, or some more specific 
>> equation in lamda calculus or combinatorial logic? I wish to lean more.
> 
> The Y combinator is the fixed point of Yx = x(Yx). All fixed point equation 
> can be solved in

Re: Primary matter

2018-06-27 Thread Telmo Menezes

On 27 June 2018 at 03:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
> On 6/26/2018 2:32 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> On 25 June 2018 at 19:54, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/25/2018 8:06 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>> I don't think that's the case.  C seems to me to be capable to explaining
>>> anything (e.g. we're living in the Matrix).  The theories of M are
>>> certainly
>>> incomplete, but if there is empirical data inconsistent with those
>>> theories
>>> it just shows they have limited domain. If there is empirical data that
>>> is
>>> impossible to include in M how would we know; how could we be sure that
>>> it
>>> could not be included?
>>>
>>> I don't see how that fact that I am conscious and have a first person
>>> experience of reality could be explained by M.
>>>
>>> I suggest you should think about what you accept as good explanations of
>>> other phenomenon.
>>
>> I gave several examples before, regarding emergentist explanations.
>>
>> Suppose that Darwinian theory has not been discovered, and we have the
>> following conversation:
>>
>> T: Where does life come from?
>> B: Ah, well, it emerges from chemistry.
>> T: Fine, how does that work?
>> B: I told you, it emerges from chemistry. What kind of explanation
>> were you expecting?
>
>
> I don't think Darwin had anything to do with discovering the chemical basis
> of life, which I suppose is what you meant put in the future of the
> exchange.

Well, he discovered the principle of selection with variability, and
how this leads to biological complexification. That is no small part
of the puzzle. I meant Darwinism in the neo-Darwinism sense, including
Mendel's postulation of genes, Crick and Watson's discovery of DNA
structure and many other things.

Notice the difference. We have all of these mechanisms to back the
"life emerges from chemistry" theory. Each one explains a piece of the
puzzle. For consciousness we have nada.

>> If you take Thomas Kuhn's ideas seriously, then consciousness seems to
>> be the current sticking point that is likely to trigger the next
>> paradigm shift. The exercise we've been through is one where you
>> insist that what Kuhn refers to as "normal science" can eventually
>> crack the problem, while I insist that it cannot. This sort of thing
>> happened before, it's not new.
>
>
> Did Newton explain gravity?  Did Einstein?

They did, in the sense that they refer to above: they described the
mechanism. We even have nice equations that make correct predictions
all the time. You know more about that than me.

> Are you satisfied with the
> chemical explanation of life?

Yes. There are some mysteries remaining, my favorite one is how the
first self-replicators originated. But even there are several
plausible ideas.

> I don't think there's anything "normal" or "extra-normal" in science.  There
> is good science and better science; and they are measured by how
> comprehensive, accurate, and predictive they are.

Kuhn proposed the term "normal science" to mean the exploitation mode
of scientific discovery, while "paradigm shift" refers to the
explorative mode. Kuhn's idea is that normal science takes place most
of the time, incrementally improving understanding within the current
paradigm. When the limits of the pardigm are reached, improvement
stalls around certain issues and eventually a reexamination of the
base assumptions is necessary. This leads to a crisis and parts of the
edifice comes tumbling down. The quintessential example is classical
physics and Einstein.

Telmo.

> Brent
>
>
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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



> On 24 Jun 2018, at 11:35, Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 04:30:54PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>> 
>> >* *
>>> *The only thing I am asking is:*
>>> *1) Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.*
>>> *2) ??? -> Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.*
>>> *Do we have enough information to decide between the above two theories?
>>> Have we really ruled out anything sitting below physics?*
>>> 
>> 
>> If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference between a
>> correct computation and a incorrect computation and between a corrupted
>> memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as long as we're at this philosophic
>> meta level that's not a  b ad definition, then I don't think anything
>> is below physics.
> 
> If you define physics that way, then you are using the term
> differently to Bruno, for whom physics is very definitely
> phenomenology - tables, chairs, billiard balls, electrons and such.
> 
> I made a somewhat similar point to Bruno, when I asked why his
> platonic arithmetic could be considered ur-stuff (which I defined to
> be pretty much how you define physics above). His retort was that
> integers weren't stuff - but I think that is somewhat of a lost in
> translation moment. The French word etouffe

Etoffe. 



> basically means material,
> and in English stuff used to mean the same, but in more recent times has
> taken on a placeholder function, a generic collection of "things".
> 
> The real point is that with computationalism (in particular the CT
> thesis), it doesn't matter what the computers are made of (ie what the
> ur-stuff really is), phenomenal physics will be the same, a
> consequence of what is computible.

So the ur stuff is given by 0, s(0), …, but it is not suff at all. It is not 
material, and eventually “matter” is a vague term referring to the prediction 
we can make, taking into account that no machine/number can localise itself in 
one computations, but only an infinity of them and this phenomenologically (as 
there is no infinities in arithmetic).



> 
> One mystery does remain though - why don't we see things like Hilbert
> hotel computers? It is a somewhat hidden assumption of
> computationalism that such things don't exist.

Only 0, s(0), s(s(0) … are existing. You need an axiom of infinity to have a 
Hilbert Hostel.

My axioms are only classical logic + Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz).

Bruno





> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>>> >>
 Then why is brain damage a big deal? Why do I need my brain to think?
 
>>> 
>>> >* *
>>> *The base computations that implement your brain may be sub-routines of a
>>> larger computation,*
>>> 
>> 
>> If true then that is an example of something physics can do but mathematics
>> can not. And I have to say that is a mighty damn important sub-routine!
>> 
>>> >>
 Without physics 2+2=3 would work just as well as 2+2=4 and insisting the
 answer is 4 would just be an arbitrary convention of no more profundity
 than the rules that tell us when to say "who" and when to say "whom".
 
 > 
>>> *For any computation to make sense, you need to be working under some
>>> definitions of integers and relations between them. *
>>> 
>> 
>> Definitions are made for our convenience, they do not create physical
>> objects. And there are an infinite number of ways integers and
>> the relations between them could have been defined, so why did
>> mathematicians pick the specific definition that they did? Because that's
>> the only one that conforms with the physical world, and thats why
>> mathematics is the best language to describe physics.
>> 
>> 
>>> * > Without that, you can't even define what a Turing machine or what a
>>> computation is.*
>>> 
>> 
>> I don't need to describe either one because I've got something much much
>> better than definitions, examples.
>> 
>> *>I can imagine a computation without a physical universe. *
>>> 
>> 
>> I can't.
>> 
>> 
>> >* *
>>> *I can't imagine a computation without some form of arithmetical law.*
>>> 
>> 
>> I can. A Turing Machine will just keep on doing what its doing regardless
>> of the English words or mathematical equations you use to describe its
>> operation.
>> 
>>> >>
 As far as simulation is concerned in some circumstances we could figure
 out that we live in a virtual reality, assuming the computer that is
 simulating us does not have finite capacity we might devise experiments
 that stretch it to its limits and we'd start to see glitches. Or the
 beings doing the simulating could simply tell us, as they have complete
 control over everything in our world so they would certainly be able
 to convince us they’re telling the truth.
 
 
>>> >
>>> T
>>> *hey could convince us something strange is going on, but they couldn't
>>> convince us they weren't lying about whatever they might be telling us
>>> about the architecture that is running the simulation. This

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

2018-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 23 Jun 2018, at 17:47, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 5:04 AM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > A physical computation is required for a physical observer to get a 
> result, but that remains true when the physical computation + the observer 
> are themselves the product of a computation
>  
> If both the physical computation and the observer are the product of some 
> sort of mystical Platonic computation

I talk about computation, as realised in the standard interpretation of 
arithmetic, or combinators, or game of life, etc. There is nothing mystical 
about this. The mystical aspect come later when a machine introspect itself.



> then why is it the observer’s responsibility to make the physical computation?

To share the results of the computations in a first person plural reality, 
which exists by arithmetic and its incompleteness, assuming Mechanism will not 
be refuted of course. That is what needed to be tested.



> And why does the observer get an erroneous answer if he makes a mistake in 
> that physical calculation? The biggest question of all, without matter and 
> the laws that govern how it interacts how does Plato determine the difference 
> between a correct calculation and a incorrect calculation?


The notion of correctness does not apply to computation, but to statements or 
proposition. 
Then, with mechanism, we do get physical laws, and we do get apparent “primary 
matter”, which is what emerges from all computations going through your state 
at a level below your substitution level.




> I know its against your nature but when answering these questions please 
> don't start talking about the term "definition” because that is a human 
> invention that can not magically conjure things into existence. And you need 
> to explain why out of the infinite number of possible definitions there is 
> something special about the particular one that you picked that has nothing 
> to do with physics. 

This is not clear. I do not see what you are trying to say. 



> 
> We’ve known for more than a century that with p-adic numbers there are an 
> infinite number of ways arithmetic could work and all of them are logically 
> consistent, but they all give radically different answers from the arithmetic 
> we find most useful in our physical world.
> 

All Turing complete theory provides the same set of all computations, and that 
is enough to get the global indeterminacy of any machine with respect to that 
universal set.




> For example, in 10-adic arithmetic the numbers 4739 and 5739 differ by only 
> one part in a thousand and 72,694,473 and 82,694,473 differ by only one part 
> in 10 million. But p-adic arithmetic won’t help you much if you’re trying to 
> figure out how fast a ball rolling down an inclined plane will go.
> 
> 

Not problem with this.

Bruno




> 
>   John K Clark   
> 
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



> On 26 Jun 2018, at 02:37, Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> 
>> I'm not using magic.  I'm asking for help.  Does anyone else understand how
>> physics is "explained by the inability of the universal machine to see the
>> equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p)  and ([]p & <>p
>> & p) with p (p sigma-1)."
> 
> I would guess that the idea is that there are different logics
> applicable to different types of knowledge, and these are enumerated
> by his 8 hypostases. He presumes that one of these corresponds to
> observations, and consequently is a logic of empirical knowledge.

I do not presume this. It is motivated by the UDA, or the understanding of the 
first person indeterminacy. It is the only way to be able to say “I will bring 
coffee with Probability one” when you are duplicated in W and M where coffee is 
offered in both places. []p & <>t means “p is true in all consistent 
computational continuations, and there is at least one in which t (and thus p) 
is true”.


> 
> That this is so, seems vaguely plausible, built as it were on the
> ideas of Theatetus. That it exhaustively captures all of empirical
> science is decidedly less plausible IMHO, but there you go.

On the contrary, it is the use of an ontological commitment which makes the 
physicalist explanation not working at all in the mechanist frame. That is pure 
magic.

Bruno




> 
> Cheers
> -- 
> 
> 
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



> On 25 Jun 2018, at 19:05, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/25/2018 5:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Do our minds impose a preferred basis?
>> 
>> No. But our material brain does, and it needs to do that to become a 
>> classical machine, or to behave classically in some branch of the wave. The 
>> classicality is imposed by the fact that the key notion (the universal 
>> machine) is a classical concept, like all concept in theoretical science.
>> 
>> 
>>> and why should different minds agree on it?
>> 
>> To make sense of any conversation.
> 
> A teleological "explanation" = magic

Of course. The explanation is that []p & <>t is first person plural, because it 
does not rely on truth, but on consistency, which is 3p definable. 
The math might still lead to a form of solipsism, to be sure, but that should 
be proved before rejecting the Mechanist theory.
I formulate a problem, and solved it at the propositional level. It is up to 
the next generation to progress.

Bruno





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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



> On 25 Jun 2018, at 18:56, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/25/2018 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> But then you recognize that the physical world is a necessary component 
> and must exist to make computationalism meaningful.
 
 But that is exactly what happen. The physical reality is 
 phenomenologically explained by the inability of the universal machine to 
 see the equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p)  and 
 ([]p & <>p & p) with p (p sigma-1). The existence of the observable is 
 explainable by the some modes of self-reference.
>>> 
>>> You'll excuse me if I don't see that as an explanation of physical reality. 
>>>  Maybe somebody else on the list does and can explain it.
>> 
>> This should be already obvious at step 7. You are the one using the magic 
>> here. I am the one asking you a question. With the UDA we know that physics 
>> has to be a statistics on many computations. To understand that this 
>> actually works until now, you need to be familiar with the logic of machine 
>> self-reference, and study the observable modes.
> 
> You often use the phrase, "...we know that X has to be..." as an invalid 
> argument; invalid because the unstated premise is "...has to be if my theory 
> is to be proven right."  It's is your theory that is in question.

It is mechanism which is in question, as it should be. But then the evidences 
are in its favour until now.


> 
> 
> I'm not using magic.  I'm asking for help.  Does anyone else understand how 
> physics is "explained by the inability of the universal machine to see the 
> equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p)  and ([]p & <>p 
> & p) with p (p sigma-1).”


Only those taking the time to study the mathematical part and are familiar with 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. Do you agree that 1) []p obeys the logic G, 
which makes no sense for a probability calculus. 2) adding <>t in the mode 
changes the logic (not obvious: this comes from incompleteness), but provides a 
probability notion (hopefully even the searched measure) on the sigma_1 
sentences (corresponding to the computations).

What do you want me to clarify? You might buy the book by Boolos (1979 or 1993).

Bruno




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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



> On 25 Jun 2018, at 18:49, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/25/2018 4:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/24/2018 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:19, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.
 I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.
>>> You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix 
>>> that is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you 
>>> declare it is exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.
>> But why adding that last steps? Why to make the diagonal exact if not to 
>> cut the other worlds?
> Because if you don't, a further evolution may undo the 
> measurement/perception.
 I know it looks sad, but that is not an argument. In fact undoing some 
 measurement/perception might be required for overall consistency, and is 
 also a useful quantum gate.
 
 The squared amplitudes can be asymptotical, and get the number zero is not 
 always possible, but all what counts is to be relatively small to have 
 enough determinism to keep the partial control.
>>> And how much is that?
>> Enough to get two or three decimals right, like in all sciences. Enough to 
>> get a man on the moon, and build electronic microscope. In nanotechnology we 
>> might need more decimals correct, and what counts is the probability that 
>> the client is satisfied, or the patient cured. Only in metaphysics, we have 
>> to reject a theory if the 100^1000th decimal is wrong. Metaphysics has not 
>> the notion of “FAPP”, because the purpose is not practical at all. It 
>> concerns a possible knowledge only.
> 
> Right.  And I thought you claimed to be doing metaphysics, not engineering.  
> Hence the need to get zeroes on the off-diagonal.

I don’t see why. 

Bruno


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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

2018-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 25 Jun 2018, at 18:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/25/2018 4:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:26, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/24/2018 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:
>> >  Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber 
>> performs, say, a spin measurement.
>> 
>> But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not need 
>> to be made and there is nothing special about Joe, if Everett is 
>> right the same thing happens every time an electron in Joe's skin 
>> encounters a photon, or for that matter whenever an electron 
>> anywhere encounters anything.
> 
> That's where MWI gets fuzzy. 
 
 Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the 
 universe wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a 
 personal history. Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a 
 better wording than “many-worlds” which is often confusing.
 
 
 
> Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic difference 
> create different worlds?  That can't be right because "worlds" are 
> classical things.  So the Heisenberg but problem seems to reappear in 
> different form.
 
 Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate from 
 our perspective when they make difference for us, like when they can 
 no more interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave (in the 
 Schroedinger picture) and relative state related to macroscopic 
 irreversibility, which needs only the classical chaos to be 
 irreversible FAPP. Histories are internal things, already a form of 
 first person plural notion. 
>>> 
>>> Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order 
>>> that it constitutes a conscious distinct state?  That's how the 
>>> Heisenberg cut problem reappears at a different level.
>> 
>> Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure statistics 
>> theory provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss e^(-x^2) instead 
>> of Pascal triangle. You don’t need 0 on the diagonal, only tiny numbers.
> 
> I think you mean OFF the diagonal. 
 
 Indeed.
 
 
 
> But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny?  I have 
> thought that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit of 
> probability; but it has been pointed out that even tiny numbers may add 
> up when the density matrix is transformed to some other basis.
 
 It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal points 
 of view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for consciousness to 
 differentiate into universal machine (relative) state. In the case (which 
 I doubt) that the brain is a quantum computer, we would be able to exploit 
 the numbers which are not tiny in the relevant base to exploit quantum 
 computing ability.
 
 
 
 
 
> 
>> You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and classical 
>> chaos will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology,
> 
> So you say.  But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a theory 
> of how perception is realized.
 
 But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is mainly 
 [a]p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of self-reference G, or 
 G*.
 
 It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions of very 
 elementary arithmetic.
 
 (You might need to study some books on self-reference (the provability 
 logic) to get the point).
>>> 
>>> So you're claiming that you have derived QM from perception (as described 
>>> by provability). 
>> 
>> 
>> No, my main claim, and oldest result, is that IF mechanism is true THEN 
>> physics must be extracted in a very special way. You don’t need to see the 
>> derivation of physics to understand that physicalism does not work with 
>> Mechanism. But the point is to do the test before.
>> 
>> Then it took me 30 years to make the test, and I showed that when we derive 
>> physics in that very special way, we get the first evidence that mechanism 
>> is correct, as we get the

Re: Radioactive Decay States

2018-06-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 23 Jun 2018, at 00:13, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, June 22, 2018 at 10:13:37 AM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
> On Thursday, June 21, 2018 at 6:48:53 PM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, June 21, 2018 at 11:18:25 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
> The emergent nuclear interaction occurs on a time scale of 10^{-22}seconds. 
> The superposition of a decayed and nondecayed nucleus occurs in that time 
> before decoherence.
> 
> Is that calculated / postulated if the radioactive source interacts with its 
> environment? Can't it be isolated for a longer duration? If so, what does 
> that imply about being in the pure states mentioned above? AG 
> 
> Quantum physics experiments on nonlocality are done usually with optical and 
> IR energy photons. The reason is that techniques exist for making these sort 
> of measurements and materials are such that one can pass photons through beam 
> splitters or hold photons in entanglements in mirrored cavities and the rest. 
> At higher energy up into the X-ray domain such physics becomes very 
> difficult. At intermediate energy where you have nuclear physics of nucleons 
> and mesons and further at higher energy of elementary particles things become 
> impossible. This is why in QFT there are procedures for constructing 
> operators that have nontrivial commutations on and in the light cone so 
> nonlocal physics does not intrude into phenomenology. Such physics is 
> relevant on a tiny scale compared to the geometry of your detectors.
> 
> LC
> 
> I've been struggling lately with how to interpret a superposition of states 
> when it is ostensibly unintelligible, e.g., a cat alive and dead 
> simultaneously, or a radioactive source decayed and undecayed simultaneously. 
> If we go back to the vector space consisting of those "little pointing 
> things", it follows that any vector which is a sum of other vectors, 
> simultaneously shares the properties of the components in its sum. This is 
> simple and obvious. I therefore surmise that since a Hilbert space is a 
> linear vector space, this interpretation took hold as a natural 
> interpretation of superpositions in quantum mechanics, and led to 
> Schroedinger's cat paradox. I don't accept the explanation of decoherence 
> theory, that we never see these unintelligible superpositions because of 
> virtually instantaneous entanglements with the environment. Decoherence 
> doesn't explain why certain bases are stable; others not, even though, 
> apriori, all bases in a linear vector space are equivalent. These 
> considerations lead me to the conclusion that a quantum superposition of 
> states is just a calculational tool, and when the superposition consists of 
> orthogonal component states, it allows us to calculate the probabilities of 
> the measured system transitioning to the state of any component. In this 
> interpretation, essentially the CI, there remains the unsolved problem of 
> providing a mechanism for the transition from the SWE, to the collapse to one 
> of the eigenfunctions when the the measurement occurs. I prefer to leave that 
> as an unsolved problem, than accept the extravagance of the MWI, or 
> decoherence theory, which IMO doesn't explain the paradoxes referred to 
> above, but rather executes what amounts to a punt, claiming the paradoxes 
> exist for short times so can be viewed as nonexistent, or solved. AG. 

It is not for short time, it is forever. You are just postulating that QM is 
wrong, which is indeed what the Copenhagen theory suggest.

An excellent book both on QM, interpretation and quantum logic is the book by 
Bub. I am rereading it.

Now, the MW is not so extravagant when you put it in the Mechanist frame. 
Indeed, it is expected once you believe that Diophantine equations have 
solutions. All computations or histories  exist, with relative probabilities 
structured by the constraints of relative self-correctness. From that view, it 
is the uniqueness of the physical universe which seems extravagant, I would say.

Bruno



>  
> 
> LC
> 
> On Thursday, June 21, 2018 at 5:50:12 PM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>  Why don't we observe the pure states, decayed + undecayed, or decayed - 
> undecayed? TIA, AG
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

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Re: Radioactive Decay States

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