> On 26 Jun 2018, at 02:37, Russell Standish <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> I'm not using magic. I'm asking for help. Does anyone else understand how >> physics is "explained by the inability of the universal machine to see the >> equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p) and ([]p & <>p >> & p) with p (p sigma-1)." > > I would guess that the idea is that there are different logics > applicable to different types of knowledge, and these are enumerated > by his 8 hypostases. He presumes that one of these corresponds to > observations, and consequently is a logic of empirical knowledge.
I do not presume this. It is motivated by the UDA, or the understanding of the first person indeterminacy. It is the only way to be able to say “I will bring coffee with Probability one” when you are duplicated in W and M where coffee is offered in both places. []p & <>t means “p is true in all consistent computational continuations, and there is at least one in which t (and thus p) is true”. > > That this is so, seems vaguely plausible, built as it were on the > ideas of Theatetus. That it exhaustively captures all of empirical > science is decidedly less plausible IMHO, but there you go. On the contrary, it is the use of an ontological commitment which makes the physicalist explanation not working at all in the mechanist frame. That is pure magic. Bruno > > Cheers > -- > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Senior Research Fellow [email protected] > Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
