Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, Jan 06, 2019 at 10:10:23AM -0600, Jason Resch wrote:
> I am trying to make a list of what properties are comparable between two
> universes and which properties are incomparable. I think this has applications
> regarding what knowledge can be extracted via simulation of (from one's POV)
> other abstract realities and worlds (which may be actual from someone else's
> point of view).
> 
> So far this is what I have, but would appreciate other's insights/corrections:
> 
> Incomparable properties:
> 
>   • Sizes (e.g., how big is something in another universe, is a galaxy in that
> universe bigger or smaller than a planet in our universe?)
>   • Distances (what possible meaning could a meter have in that other
> universe?)
>   • Strength of forces (we could say how particles are affected by these 
> forces
> in their universe, but not how they would translate if applied to our own)
>   • Time (how long it takes for anything to happen in that other universe)
>   • Age (when it began, how long the universe has existed)
>   • Speeds (given neither distance nor time is comparable)
>   • Present (what the present time is in the other universe)
>   • Position (it has no relative position, or location relative to our own
> universe)
> 
> Comparable properties:
> 
>   • Information content (how many bits are needed to describe state)
>   • Computational complexity (how many operations need to be computed to
> advance)
>   • Dimensionality of its objects (e.g. spacetime, strings, etc.)
>   • Entropy
>   • Plankian/discrete units (e.g. in terms of smallest physically meaningful
> units)
> 
> Unsure:
> 
>   • Mass? (given forces are not comparable, but also related to energy)
>   • Energy (given its relation to both entropy and mass)
> 

I would stick with dimensionless constants - eg alpha may vary between
universes. Information is a good example of a dimensionless value too.


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Planck Length

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/6/2019 1:56 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 7:53:52 AM UTC, Brent wrote:

To measure small things you need comparably short wavelengths. If you
make a photon with a wavelength so short it can measure the Planck
length it will have so much mass-energy that it will fold spacetime
around it and become a black hole...so you won't be able to use it to
measure anything.

Brent


TY. That's clear enough. But there's a related question I was unable 
to explain to a friend recently. Suppose we have a small spherical 
cork floating on a lake, and we introduce a wave disturbance. If the 
wave length is much larger than the diameter of the sphere, it will 
just bob up and down as the wave passes. But if the wave length is 
comparable to the diameter, the wave will be partially reflected. What 
is a good *physical* argument for the existence of the reflected wave, 
tantamount to a detection of the cork? I am at loss to offer a 
physical explanation. TIA, AG


When the wavelength is on the order of the cork dimension or smaller the 
cork can't react to the wave as if it were just part of the water. 
Because of its extent it cannot move with the water at all points, so 
there are pressure gradients around the cork which become the source of 
scattered ripples.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Coherent states of a superposition

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:42 AM  wrote:

> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:46:41 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:46:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:13:57 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:

 On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM  wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC,
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:

 On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM  wrote:

>
> *Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of
> interference and coherence, without introducing your theory of
> consciousness. Mainstream thinking today is that decoherence does 
> occur,
> but this seems to imply preexisting coherence, and therefore 
> interference
> among the component states of a superposition. If the superposition is
> expressed using eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal -- 
> implying
> no mutual interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar as
> coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this basis? AG*
>

 I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is
 used off an expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal
 eigenvectors. The expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as

|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)

 where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension
 of the Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex 
 numbers
 a_i. Since these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent 
 phases. It
 is the preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that 
 is
 meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the 
 particular
 expansion that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual
 orthogonality or otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In 
 decoherence,
 the phase relationships between the terms in the original expansion are
 lost.

 Bruce

>>>
>>> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error --
>>> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have 
>>> your
>>> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>>>
>>
>> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its
>> superposition expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable
>> p. Does the phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions 
>> as
>> identical for each, or can each component in the superposition have
>> different phases? I ask this because the probability determined by any
>> complex amplitude is independent of its phase. TIA, AG
>>
>
> The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.
>

 When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating the
 phases since, presumably, they don't effect probability calculations. Do
 you have a link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG

>>>
>>> I found some links on physics.stackexchange.com which show that
>>> relative phases can effect probabilities, but none so far about how to
>>> calculate any phase angle. AG
>>>
>>
>> Here's the answer if anyone's interested. But what's the question? How
>> are wf phase angles calculated? Clearly, if you solve for the
>> eigenfunctions of some QM operator such as the p operator, any phase angle
>> is possible; its value is completely arbitrary and doesn't effect a
>> probability calculation. In fact, IIUC, there is not sufficient information
>> to solve for a unique phase. So, I conclude,that the additional information
>> required to uniquely determine a phase angle for a wf, lies in boundary
>> conditions. If the problem of specifying a wf is defined as a boundary
>> value problem, then, I believe, a unique phase angle can be calculated.
>> CMIIAW. AG
>>
>>>
> Bruce
>

> I could use a handshake on this one. Roughly speaking, if one wants to
> express the state of a system as a superposition of eigenstates, how does
> one calculate the phase angles of the amplitudes for each eigenstate? AG
>

One doesn't. The phases are arbitrary unless one interferes the system with
some other system.

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit h

Re: Coherent states of a superposition

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:46:41 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:46:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:13:57 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:

 On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM  wrote:

> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM  wrote:
>>>

 *Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of 
 interference and coherence, without introducing your theory of 
 consciousness. Mainstream thinking today is that decoherence does 
 occur, 
 but this seems to imply preexisting coherence, and therefore 
 interference 
 among the component states of a superposition. If the superposition is 
 expressed using eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal -- 
 implying 
 no mutual interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar as 
 coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this basis? AG*

>>>
>>> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used 
>>> off an expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. 
>>> The 
>>> expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as
>>>
>>>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>>>
>>> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of 
>>> the Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers 
>>> a_i. 
>>> Since these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It 
>>> is 
>>> the preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is 
>>> meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the 
>>> particular 
>>> expansion that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual 
>>> orthogonality or otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In 
>>> decoherence, 
>>> the phase relationships between the terms in the original expansion are 
>>> lost.
>>>
>>> Bruce 
>>>
>>
>> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error -- 
>> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have 
>> your 
>> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>>
>
> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its 
> superposition expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable 
> p. Does the phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions 
> as 
> identical for each, or can each component in the superposition have 
> different phases? I ask this because the probability determined by any 
> complex amplitude is independent of its phase. TIA, AG 
>

 The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.

>>>
>>> When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating the 
>>> phases since, presumably, they don't effect probability calculations. Do 
>>> you have a link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG 
>>>
>>
>> I found some links on physics.stackexchange.com which show that relative 
>> phases can effect probabilities, but none so far about how to calculate any 
>> phase angle. AG 
>>
>
> Here's the answer if anyone's interested. But what's the question? How are 
> wf phase angles calculated? Clearly, if you solve for the eigenfunctions of 
> some QM operator such as the p operator, any phase angle is possible; its 
> value is completely arbitrary and doesn't effect a probability calculation. 
> In fact, IIUC, there is not sufficient information to solve for a unique 
> phase. So, I conclude,that the additional information required to uniquely 
> determine a phase angle for a wf, lies in boundary conditions. If the 
> problem of specifying a wf is defined as a boundary value problem, then, I 
> believe, a unique phase angle can be calculated. CMIIAW. AG 
>
>>
 Bruce

>>>
I could use a handshake on this one. Roughly speaking, if one wants to 
express the state of a system as a superposition of eigenstates, how does 
one calculate the phase angles of the amplitudes for each eigenstate? AG

>
  

>>>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Planck Length

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 7:53:52 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
> To measure small things you need comparably short wavelengths.  If you 
> make a photon with a wavelength so short it can measure the Planck 
> length it will have so much mass-energy that it will fold spacetime 
> around it and become a black hole...so you won't be able to use it to 
> measure anything. 
>
> Brent 
>

TY. That's clear enough. But there's a related question I was unable to 
explain to a friend recently. Suppose we have a small spherical cork 
floating on a lake, and we introduce a wave disturbance. If the wave length 
is much larger than the diameter of the sphere, it will just bob up and 
down as the wave passes. But if the wave length is comparable to the 
diameter, the wave will be partially reflected. What is a good *physical* 
argument for the existence of the reflected wave, tantamount to a detection 
of the cork? I am at loss to offer a physical explanation. TIA, AG 

>
> On 1/5/2019 11:39 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote: 
> > What is the argument for the claim that we cannot, in principle, 
> > measure any length smaller than Planck length? TIA, AG 
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 3:03:19 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/6/2019 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> On 5 Jan 2019, at 22:18, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On 1/5/2019 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>  On 4 Jan 2019, at 19:35, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
>  
>  
>  
>  On 1/4/2019 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >>> As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the 
> plausibility of the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world 
> appearances much before I realised the physicists were already open to this 
> for empirical reason. Once you understand that there are infinitely many 
> computations going through you actual state, 
> >> What does it mean "your actual state"?   How is it defined within 
> the UD? 
> > It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more 
> precise way through the Gödel number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X 
> modes (with X in {p, <>t, <>t & p}, p being limited to the sigma_1 
> (semi-computable) arithmetical sentences. 
>  I don't think I understand that.  You're saying that within all the 
> UD computations there are ones that implement specific Lobian machines and 
> their interactions with some world they are embedded in? 
> >>> This comes from the first person indeterminacy on the computations. 
> >> Every computation is a person? 
> > That would be a category error. We can only say that a person is 
> associated to (infinitely many) computations, which are those bringing your 
> state through your brain/body/history here and now. 
>
> That is sufficiently vague so as to be meaningless.  Which infinitely 
> many computations?  Sometimes you write as if the computations are 
> instantiating conscious thoughts.  But other places you refer to the 
> computations as being "below our substitution level" implying that they 
> are simulations of the brain or lower. 
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> What does it mean "a computation"? ...one of the threads of the UD?  or 
> some state of the UD? 
> > A thread in the UD, or anything equivalent with the sequence (on s): 
> phi_i,s (j), where the s is for the sth step of the computation. The UD run 
> all phi_i,s (j), for all, i, j, and s. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >>> To have a probability notion, we need to define the measure one by []p 
> & <>t. (Because with the logic G we don’t have []p -> <>t, and we need the 
> “<>t” to avoid the cul-de-sac (cf the typical default hypothesis in 
> probability theory). 
> >>> 
> >>> The FPI is on all computations (sigma_1 sentences), but they are 
> restricted by being those implementing consistent extensions on the Löbian 
> machine “you are”. 
> >> Consistent in what sense?  Just not proving a contradiction...how does 
>  thread of the UD prove a contradiction? 
> > The thread in the UD does not prove contradiction, but some threads 
> support Löbian machine, which can be or not consistent. The FPI is on the 
> thread which supports the consistent extension. (“Supports”, not “is”). 
>
> Another vague term.  What does "supports" mean? 
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> or does it mean consistent in the sense of representing a 
> quasi-classical world in which the electron's spin measures either UP of 
> DOWN but not both? 
> > No, that is for latter, and it concerns the “consistent continuations” 
> as seen in the observable modes ([]p & X, with X being p, or <>p, or <>p & 
> p), p sigma_1. It does not mean <>p (consistent p), but <>p v p, or, <>p v 
> p v []f. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> 
> >>> There is no “world” per, only computations “rich enough” to continue 
> consistently your history (the “world” will be apparent only). 
> >> So will it be apparently consistent? 
> > Yes. 
> > 
> > 
> >> What would it mean for it to be inconsistent? 
> > To get a contradiction at some bottom level. To prove that 0 is equal to 
> 1. 
>
> So some thread of the UD proving 0=1?  But the treads of the UD just 
> compute...they don't prove anything.  They are already assumed to be 
> functions. 
>
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >>Logic is timeless so if it proves X and then it proves not-X that is 
> a contradiction.  But FP experience is not timeless,  so X can be true now 
> and not-X true later and there is no contradiction. 
> > I military myself to sound (and thus automatically consistent) machine. 
>
> But the UD is executing all possible machines. 
>
> > Real machine in real life have a non monotonic layer so that they can 
> revise their opinion. That is not needed to solve the mind body problem and 
> to derive the physical appearance from arithmetic. To interview 
> inconsistent machine would be like interviewing a sick people believing 
> that he is Napoleon to study Napoleon’s life. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>> 
> > Of coure,

Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

[Brent Meeker]

On 1/6/2019 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 5 Jan 2019, at 22:18, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 1/5/2019 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 4 Jan 2019, at 19:35, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 1/4/2019 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the plausibility of 
the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world appearances much before I 
realised the physicists were already open to this for empirical reason. Once 
you understand that there are infinitely many computations going through you 
actual state,

What does it mean "your actual state"?   How is it defined within the UD?

It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more precise way through the Gödel 
number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X modes (with X in {p, <>t, <>t & p}, p 
being limited to the sigma_1 (semi-computable) arithmetical sentences.

I don't think I understand that.  You're saying that within all the UD 
computations there are ones that implement specific Lobian machines and their 
interactions with some world they are embedded in?

This comes from the first person indeterminacy on the computations.

Every computation is a person?

That would be a category error. We can only say that a person is associated to 
(infinitely many) computations, which are those bringing your state through 
your brain/body/history here and now.


That is sufficiently vague so as to be meaningless.  Which infinitely 
many computations?  Sometimes you write as if the computations are 
instantiating conscious thoughts.  But other places you refer to the 
computations as being "below our substitution level" implying that they 
are simulations of the brain or lower.








What does it mean "a computation"? ...one of the threads of the UD?  or some 
state of the UD?

A thread in the UD, or anything equivalent with the sequence (on s): phi_i,s 
(j), where the s is for the sth step of the computation. The UD run all phi_i,s 
(j), for all, i, j, and s.







To have a probability notion, we need to define the measure one by []p & <>t. (Because with 
the logic G we don’t have []p -> <>t, and we need the “<>t” to avoid the cul-de-sac (cf 
the typical default hypothesis in probability theory).

The FPI is on all computations (sigma_1 sentences), but they are restricted by 
being those implementing consistent extensions on the Löbian machine “you are”.

Consistent in what sense?  Just not proving a contradiction...how does  thread 
of the UD prove a contradiction?

The thread in the UD does not prove contradiction, but some threads support 
Löbian machine, which can be or not consistent. The FPI is on the thread which 
supports the consistent extension. (“Supports”, not “is”).


Another vague term.  What does "supports" mean?







or does it mean consistent in the sense of representing a quasi-classical world 
in which the electron's spin measures either UP of DOWN but not both?

No, that is for latter, and it concerns the “consistent continuations” as seen in the observable modes ([]p & X, 
with X being p, or <>p, or <>p & p), p sigma_1. It does not mean <>p (consistent p), but 
<>p v p, or, <>p v p v []f.







There is no “world” per, only computations “rich enough” to continue 
consistently your history (the “world” will be apparent only).

So will it be apparently consistent?

Yes.



What would it mean for it to be inconsistent?

To get a contradiction at some bottom level. To prove that 0 is equal to 1.


So some thread of the UD proving 0=1?  But the treads of the UD just 
compute...they don't prove anything.  They are already assumed to be 
functions.








   Logic is timeless so if it proves X and then it proves not-X that is a 
contradiction.  But FP experience is not timeless,  so X can be true now and 
not-X true later and there is no contradiction.

I military myself to sound (and thus automatically consistent) machine.


But the UD is executing all possible machines.


Real machine in real life have a non monotonic layer so that they can revise 
their opinion. That is not needed to solve the mind body problem and to derive 
the physical appearance from arithmetic. To interview inconsistent machine 
would be like interviewing a sick people believing that he is Napoleon to study 
Napoleon’s life.














Of coure, "actual state" does not refer to anything in the mind-block picture 
(which is just the structure (N, 0, +, *)). The actual state is purely phenomenological.

?? This is supposed to explain phenomenology in terms of computations.  I understand 
computations, like Turing machines, have states.  But I don't understand these 
"actual states”.

I am not sure to understand your problem here. All mind state are actual from 
the first person point of view.

"Mind state" = "a conscious thought"?  OK, but then how does that relate to the 
computations of a UD?

We lost the mind-brain

Re: Materialism and Mechanism

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 8:53:25 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 8:20 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Of course *physical, chemical, biological, psychical, sociological *laws 
>> (to run the spectrum) are all human inventions. 
>>
>> The questions are about how these laws interrelate (and terms like 
>> *emergence, 
>> reduction, downward causation* are used).
>>
>> In terms of processing, I distinguish *experience processing* from 
>> *information 
>> processing.*
>>
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>>
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>>
>>
> From the above page: 
>
>  But suppose there was hardware that supported experiential functionality 
> as well. Programs in a language with experiential modalities could execute 
> “for real” in that computing substrate, as opposed to the 
> informational-only supporting hardware.
>
> *The connection between experience (phenomenal material consciousness) and 
> truth (experiential modal logic) would be that it is possible for there to 
> be different kinds of consciousness via alternative material substrates.*
>
> What does this imply for philosophical zombies? ([1 
> ], [2 
> ],
>  
> [3 
> ])
>  
> Are they possible within your theory?
>
> Are you familiar with Chalmer's fading and dancing qualia thought 
> experiment? [4 ]
> What does your theory predict regarding the behavior and experience of a 
> biological brain being replaced with some *information-only* hardware?
>
> Jason
>



I don't know what in the range of materials 
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry ]  can 
be used to make experience processing beings.


In a recent online interaction I had with Philip Goff @Philip_Goff 
  (who does know and talks to David 
Chalmers), he says Chalmers keep changing on qualia and consciousness. (He 
said he recently changed Daniel Denett's position.) I think Galen Strawson 
("real materialism") would say the 1995 Chalmers paper is in the final 
analysis "a denial of consciousness".

I think there can be zombies in the sense that we can make robots (like a 
Sophie @RealSophiaRobot  + Google 
Assistant of the future) that are very intelligent and functional in the 
world but have no consciousness.

- pt

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

[Jason Resch]

I am trying to make a list of what properties are comparable between two
universes and which properties are incomparable. I think this has
applications regarding what knowledge can be extracted via simulation of
(from one's POV) other abstract realities and worlds (which may be actual
from someone else's point of view).

So far this is what I have, but would appreciate other's
insights/corrections:

Incomparable properties:

   - Sizes (e.g., how big is something in another universe, is a galaxy in
   that universe bigger or smaller than a planet in our universe?)
   - Distances (what possible meaning could a meter have in that other
   universe?)
   - Strength of forces (we could say how particles are affected by these
   forces in their universe, but not how they would translate if applied to
   our own)
   - Time (how long it takes for anything to happen in that other universe)
   - Age (when it began, how long the universe has existed)
   - Speeds (given neither distance nor time is comparable)
   - Present (what the present time is in the other universe)
   - Position (it has no relative position, or location relative to our own
   universe)

Comparable properties:

   - Information content (how many bits are needed to describe state)
   - Computational complexity (how many operations need to be computed to
   advance)
   - Dimensionality of its objects (e.g. spacetime, strings, etc.)
   - Entropy
   - Plankian/discrete units (e.g. in terms of smallest physically
   meaningful units)

Unsure:

   - Mass? (given forces are not comparable, but also related to energy)
   - Energy (given its relation to both entropy and mass)


So if we simulate some other universe, we can describe and relate it to our
own physical universe in similar terms of information content,
computational complexity, dimensionality, discrete units, etc. but many
things seem to have no meaning at all: time, distance, size.

Do these reflect limits of simulation, or are they limits that apply to our
own universe itself?  e.g., if everything in this universe was made 100X
larger, and all forces similarly scaled, would we notice?  Perhaps
incomparable properties are things that are variant (and illusory) in an
objective sense.

A final question, are they truly "causally disconnected" given we can
simulate them? E.g. if we can use computers to temporarily compel matter in
our universe to behave like things in that simulated universe, then in some
sense isn't that a causal interaction?  What things can travel through such
portals of simulation beyond information?

Jason

P.S.

It is interesting that when we consider mathematical/platonic objects, we
likewise face the same limits in terms of being able to understand them.
e.g., we can't point to the Mandlebrot set, nor compare its size in terms
of physical units.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Planck Length

[John Clark]

There is a related concept, the Planck Mass that also involves the 3 most
fundamental constants in nature, the speed of light the Planck constant and
the Gravitational constant. If you take the Planck energy
(c^5*h/2*PI*G)^1/2 and confine it in a box one Planck length
(G*h/2*PI*c^3)^1/2 on a side it will turn into a Black Hole. To find the
Planck Mass we use E=MC^2 and divide the Planck Energy by c^2. The Planck
Mass works out to be .02 milligrams, about the mass of a single grain of
salt; nothing less massive than the Planck Mass can form a Black Hole
regardless of how much you compress it. Some, such as Roger Penrose, think
this marks the boundary between the quantum realm and the realm of
classical physics but most think that's a oversimplification.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Materialism and Mechanism

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 8:20 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
>
>
> Of course *physical, chemical, biological, psychical, sociological *laws
> (to run the spectrum) are all human inventions.
>
> The questions are about how these laws interrelate (and terms like *emergence,
> reduction, downward causation* are used).
>
> In terms of processing, I distinguish *experience processing* from 
> *information
> processing.*
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>
>
>From the above page:

 But suppose there was hardware that supported experiential functionality
as well. Programs in a language with experiential modalities could execute
“for real” in that computing substrate, as opposed to the
informational-only supporting hardware.

*The connection between experience (phenomenal material consciousness) and
truth (experiential modal logic) would be that it is possible for there to
be different kinds of consciousness via alternative material substrates.*

What does this imply for philosophical zombies? ([1
], [2
],
[3
])
Are they possible within your theory?

Are you familiar with Chalmer's fading and dancing qualia thought
experiment? [4 ]
What does your theory predict regarding the behavior and experience of a
biological brain being replaced with some *information-only* hardware?

Jason

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Materialism and Mechanism

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 8:04:20 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 4:47 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:02:39 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift  
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift  
>>> wrote:
>>>

 On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) 
> real materialists.
>
>
>
> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the 
> consequence of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, 
> but 
> still physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The 
> physical 
> reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with 
> computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global 
> mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the 
> material 
> mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who 
> have 
> studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with 
> X 
> being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).
>
> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not 
> exist, I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.
>
> Bruno
>
>


 "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they 
 can mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to 
 physics", and 
 physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific 
 community.

 (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being 
 "explainable" by physics.)

 It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using 
 both terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I 
 will 
 typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

 Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of 
 "physicalism" (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be 
 reduced to physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" 
 definition.

 Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4


>>> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is 
>>> whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made 
>>> highlight 
>>> the difference:
>>>
>>>
>>> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be 
>>> explained or derived from anything else):*
>>> [image: primary-physicalism.png]
>>>
>>> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be 
>>> explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
>>> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]
>>>
>>> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with 
>>> that belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".
>>>
>>> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of 
>>> Primary Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to 
>>> consider why it is you believe in something so strongly despite there 
>>> being 
>>> no evidence for it.
>>>
>>>  
>>>


 But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?


>>> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet 
>>> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in 
>>> consciousness.
>>>
>>> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a 
>>> loose confirmation of digital mechanism.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) 
>> be reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of 
>> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"  
>>
>> See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
>> -  
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry
>>
>> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of 
>> these open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical 

Re: Materialism and Mechanism

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 4:47 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:02:39 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



 On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal
>>> wrote:


 On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:


 Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part)
 real materialists.



 That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the
 consequence of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but
 still physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The 
 physical
 reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with
 computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global
 mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the 
 material
 mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who 
 have
 studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with X
 being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).

 This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not
 exist, I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.

 Bruno


>>>
>>>
>>> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they
>>> can mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", 
>>> and
>>> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific 
>>> community.
>>>
>>> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being
>>> "explainable" by physics.)
>>>
>>> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both
>>> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will
>>> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
>>>
>>> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism"
>>> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to
>>> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
>>>
>>> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
>>>
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4
>>>
>>>
>> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is
>> whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight
>> the difference:
>>
>>
>> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be
>> explained or derived from anything else):*
>> [image: primary-physicalism.png]
>>
>> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be
>> explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
>> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]
>>
>> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with
>> that belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".
>>
>> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of
>> Primary Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to
>> consider why it is you believe in something so strongly despite there 
>> being
>> no evidence for it.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
>>>
>>>
>> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet
>> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in
>> consciousness.
>>
>> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose
>> confirmation of digital mechanism.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
>
> A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter)
> be reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of
> theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"
>
> See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
> -
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry
>
> Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of
> these open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not
> reducible to physical properties.
>

 Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?


>
> If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical)
> does not cover what is chemical (much less biological).
>
> Ma

Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 5 Jan 2019, at 22:18, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/5/2019 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 19:35, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 1/4/2019 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the 
>> plausibility of the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world 
>> appearances much before I realised the physicists were already open to 
>> this for empirical reason. Once you understand that there are infinitely 
>> many computations going through you actual state,
> What does it mean "your actual state"?   How is it defined within the UD?
 It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more precise 
 way through the Gödel number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X modes 
 (with X in {p, <>t, <>t & p}, p being limited to the sigma_1 
 (semi-computable) arithmetical sentences.
>>> I don't think I understand that.  You're saying that within all the UD 
>>> computations there are ones that implement specific Lobian machines and 
>>> their interactions with some world they are embedded in?
>> This comes from the first person indeterminacy on the computations.
> 
> Every computation is a person? 

That would be a category error. We can only say that a person is associated to 
(infinitely many) computations, which are those bringing your state through 
your brain/body/history here and now.




> What does it mean "a computation"? ...one of the threads of the UD?  or some 
> state of the UD?

A thread in the UD, or anything equivalent with the sequence (on s): phi_i,s 
(j), where the s is for the sth step of the computation. The UD run all phi_i,s 
(j), for all, i, j, and s.






> 
>> To have a probability notion, we need to define the measure one by []p & 
>> <>t. (Because with the logic G we don’t have []p -> <>t, and we need the 
>> “<>t” to avoid the cul-de-sac (cf the typical default hypothesis in 
>> probability theory).
>> 
>> The FPI is on all computations (sigma_1 sentences), but they are restricted 
>> by being those implementing consistent extensions on the Löbian machine “you 
>> are”.
> Consistent in what sense?  Just not proving a contradiction...how does  
> thread of the UD prove a contradiction? 

The thread in the UD does not prove contradiction, but some threads support 
Löbian machine, which can be or not consistent. The FPI is on the thread which 
supports the consistent extension. (“Supports”, not “is”).




> or does it mean consistent in the sense of representing a quasi-classical 
> world in which the electron's spin measures either UP of DOWN but not both?

No, that is for latter, and it concerns the “consistent continuations” as seen 
in the observable modes ([]p & X, with X being p, or <>p, or <>p & p), p 
sigma_1. It does not mean <>p (consistent p), but <>p v p, or, <>p v p v []f.




> 
> 
>> There is no “world” per, only computations “rich enough” to continue 
>> consistently your history (the “world” will be apparent only).
> 
> So will it be apparently consistent? 

Yes. 


> What would it mean for it to be inconsistent?

To get a contradiction at some bottom level. To prove that 0 is equal to 1.




>   Logic is timeless so if it proves X and then it proves not-X that is a 
> contradiction.  But FP experience is not timeless,  so X can be true now and 
> not-X true later and there is no contradiction.

I military myself to sound (and thus automatically consistent) machine. Real 
machine in real life have a non monotonic layer so that they can revise their 
opinion. That is not needed to solve the mind body problem and to derive the 
physical appearance from arithmetic. To interview inconsistent machine would be 
like interviewing a sick people believing that he is Napoleon to study 
Napoleon’s life.






> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
 Of coure, "actual state" does not refer to anything in the mind-block 
 picture (which is just the structure (N, 0, +, *)). The actual state is 
 purely phenomenological.
>>> ?? This is supposed to explain phenomenology in terms of computations.  I 
>>> understand computations, like Turing machines, have states.  But I don't 
>>> understand these "actual states”.
>> I am not sure to understand your problem here. All mind state are actual 
>> from the first person point of view.
> "Mind state" = "a conscious thought"?  OK, but then how does that relate to 
> the computations of a UD?

We lost the mind-brain identity thesis. We can (by Mechanism) associate a mind 
to a machine, but the mind itself is truly associated to all computations, 
sufficiently similar (from the 1p view) to the one we start with.
The brain-mind association is one-one, but the mind-brain(s) association is 
one-many.

Imagine that your brain is duplicated, so that there are two identical brains 
int who vat

Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 1:49:06 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/5/2019 9:49 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>> But is this consistent with https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2 which 
>> showed spacetime to be smooth down to 1/525 of the Planck length?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> *If we can't measure a Planck length, how can we measure of fraction of 
> that value? How large are those tiles in relation to Planck length? AG*
>
>
> By looking for the cumulative effect of the EM waves interacting with the 
> "graininess" of spacetime over very many grains.  The idea is that photons 
> of wavelength very long compared to the grain size will just average over 
> them as though they were continua. But very high energy, gamma ray photons, 
> with much shorter wavelength, will experience the graininess and propagate 
> slightly slower, which over cosmological distances will produce a 
> difference in arrival time at our telescopes.  Read the paper.
>
> Brent
>



I don't know enough about the LQG mathematics to reconcile it with the 
result 

"Such limits constrain dispersive effects created, for example, by the 
spacetime foam of quantum gravity. In the context of quantum gravity, our 
bounds set M1c2 greater than 525 times the Planck mass, suggesting that 
spacetime is smooth at energies near and slightly above the Planck mass."


But one thing may be happening is that LQG may model space as 
(Planck-sized) cells, so a single path from A to B through space would be 
jig-jaggy, but if multiple paths from A to B were "averaged", then a more 
continuous result would appear.

- pt


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Materialism and Mechanism

[Philip Thrift]

On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:02:39 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 2:05 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:52:19 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>


 On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 12:02:53 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 6:13 AM Philip Thrift  
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 4:26:11 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 17:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Physicists today (as I've observed) are not (for the most part) real 
>>> materialists.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is true, and physicists have rarely problem with the 
>>> consequence of Mechanism. Now, some physicist can be immaterialist, but 
>>> still physicalist (like Tegmark was at some moment at least). The 
>>> physical 
>>> reality would be a mathematical reality among others, but with 
>>> computationalism, the physical reality comes from a more global 
>>> mathematical phenomenon based on the behaviour/semantics of the 
>>> material 
>>> mode of self-rereyence (involving probabilities, i.e., for those who 
>>> have 
>>> studied the self-referential modes available, the []p & X modes, with X 
>>> being either p, or <>t, or p & <>t).
>>>
>>> This makes mechanism testable, and if quantum mechanics did not 
>>> exist, I would have thought that Mechanism is already refuted.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> "Physicalism"/"Physical" are words that needs deprecating, as they 
>> can mean (to some philosophers of science) "can be reduced to physics", 
>> and 
>> physics is what is currently-accepted in the physics scientific 
>> community.
>>
>> (When I use "physical", I mean it in the sense of being "explainable" 
>> by physics.)
>>
>> It gets worse: "In this entry, I will adopt the policy of using both 
>> terms ['materialism' and 'physicalism'] interchangeably, though I will 
>> typically refer to the thesis we will discuss as ‘physicalism’."
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/
>>
>> Better to just use "materialism" and reject the use of "physicalism" 
>> (unless it refers to a the particular meaning of "can be reduced to 
>> physics"), though materialism has a "weak" and "strong" definition.
>>
>> Galen Strawson defines what "hard-nosed materialism" is:
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HvHVo6TslV4
>>
>>
> The important distinction, which may be lost in your definitions, is 
> whether "primariness" is assumed or not.  These diagrams I made highlight 
> the difference:
>
>
> *Primary Physicalism (Physics is at the bottom, and cannot be 
> explained or derived from anything else):*
> [image: primary-physicalism.png]
>
> *Non-Primary Physicalism (Physics is not at the bottom, and can be 
> explained or derived from something more fundamental):*
> [image: non-primary-physicalism.png]
>
> You could also be agnostic on the question, let's call someone with 
> that belief a "*Primary Physicalism Agnostic*".
>
> Currently, scientists have collected zero evidence in favor of Primary 
> Physicalism. So if you strongly believe it, you might want to consider 
> why 
> it is you believe in something so strongly despite there being no 
> evidence 
> for it.
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>> But what exactly would be a "test for Mechanism"?
>>
>>
> If you replace one or more of your neurons with a mechanical yet 
> functionally equivalent replacement and experience no change in 
> consciousness.
>
> The existence and utility of cochlear implants can be seen as a loose 
> confirmation of digital mechanism.
>
> Jason
>



 A question remains though: Can chemistry (or biology for that matter) 
 be reduced to physics? By that it is typically meant "Can problems of 
 theoretical chemistry be reduced to The Standard Model?"  

 See  *List of unsolved problems in chemistry*
 -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_unsolved_problems_in_chemistry

 Except for a leap of faith ("The Standard Model can explain all of 
 these open problems in chemistry"), there could be chemical properties not 
 reducible to physical properties.

>>>
>>> Doesn't that require chemical reactions that violate physical laws?
>>>  
>>>

 If that is the case, what is physical (as I have defined physical) does 
 not cover what is chemical (much less biological).

 Matter includes all levels of "stuff": physical, chemical, biological, 
 psychical. So materialism is the agnostic position: It doesn't matter 
 whether ev