On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 3:03:19 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > > On 1/6/2019 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 5 Jan 2019, at 22:18, Brent Meeker <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >> On 1/5/2019 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 19:35, Brent Meeker <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 1/4/2019 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>>>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>>>>>> As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the > plausibility of the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world > appearances much before I realised the physicists were already open to this > for empirical reason. Once you understand that there are infinitely many > computations going through you actual state, > >>>>>> What does it mean "your actual state"? How is it defined within > the UD? > >>>>> It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more > precise way through the Gödel number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X > modes (with X in {p, <>t, <>t & p}, p being limited to the sigma_1 > (semi-computable) arithmetical sentences. > >>>> I don't think I understand that. You're saying that within all the > UD computations there are ones that implement specific Lobian machines and > their interactions with some world they are embedded in? > >>> This comes from the first person indeterminacy on the computations. > >> Every computation is a person? > > That would be a category error. We can only say that a person is > associated to (infinitely many) computations, which are those bringing your > state through your brain/body/history here and now. > > That is sufficiently vague so as to be meaningless. Which infinitely > many computations? Sometimes you write as if the computations are > instantiating conscious thoughts. But other places you refer to the > computations as being "below our substitution level" implying that they > are simulations of the brain or lower. > > > > > > > > > > >> What does it mean "a computation"? ...one of the threads of the UD? or > some state of the UD? > > A thread in the UD, or anything equivalent with the sequence (on s): > phi_i,s (j), where the s is for the sth step of the computation. The UD run > all phi_i,s (j), for all, i, j, and s. > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> To have a probability notion, we need to define the measure one by []p > & <>t. (Because with the logic G we don’t have []p -> <>t, and we need the > “<>t” to avoid the cul-de-sac (cf the typical default hypothesis in > probability theory). > >>> > >>> The FPI is on all computations (sigma_1 sentences), but they are > restricted by being those implementing consistent extensions on the Löbian > machine “you are”. > >> Consistent in what sense? Just not proving a contradiction...how does > thread of the UD prove a contradiction? > > The thread in the UD does not prove contradiction, but some threads > support Löbian machine, which can be or not consistent. The FPI is on the > thread which supports the consistent extension. (“Supports”, not “is”). > > Another vague term. What does "supports" mean? > > > > > > > > > > >> or does it mean consistent in the sense of representing a > quasi-classical world in which the electron's spin measures either UP of > DOWN but not both? > > No, that is for latter, and it concerns the “consistent continuations” > as seen in the observable modes ([]p & X, with X being p, or <>p, or <>p & > p), p sigma_1. It does not mean <>p (consistent p), but <>p v p, or, <>p v > p v []f. > > > > > > > > > >> > >>> There is no “world” per, only computations “rich enough” to continue > consistently your history (the “world” will be apparent only). > >> So will it be apparently consistent? > > Yes. > > > > > >> What would it mean for it to be inconsistent? > > To get a contradiction at some bottom level. To prove that 0 is equal to > 1. > > So some thread of the UD proving 0=1? But the treads of the UD just > compute...they don't prove anything. They are already assumed to be > functions. > > > > > > > > > > >> Logic is timeless so if it proves X and then it proves not-X that is > a contradiction. But FP experience is not timeless, so X can be true now > and not-X true later and there is no contradiction. > > I military myself to sound (and thus automatically consistent) machine. > > But the UD is executing all possible machines. > > > Real machine in real life have a non monotonic layer so that they can > revise their opinion. That is not needed to solve the mind body problem and > to derive the physical appearance from arithmetic. To interview > inconsistent machine would be like interviewing a sick people believing > that he is Napoleon to study Napoleon’s life. > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>>> Of coure, "actual state" does not refer to anything in the > mind-block picture (which is just the structure (N, 0, +, *)). The actual > state is purely phenomenological. > >>>> ?? This is supposed to explain phenomenology in terms of > computations. I understand computations, like Turing machines, have > states. But I don't understand these "actual states”. > >>> I am not sure to understand your problem here. All mind state are > actual from the first person point of view. > >> "Mind state" = "a conscious thought"? OK, but then how does that > relate to the computations of a UD? > > We lost the mind-brain identity thesis. We can (by Mechanism) associate > a mind to a machine, but the mind itself is truly associated to all > computations, sufficiently similar (from the 1p view) to the one we start > with. > ?? What does "sufficiently similar" mean? It's clear on a physical, > neural computation theory of the mind, when 'mind' is instantiated at a > level far above and dependent on a physical level of atoms and > molecules. But if mind is independent of that substrate it's not clear > that 'sufficiently similar' can be defined. > > > The brain-mind association is one-one, but the mind-brain(s) association > is one-many. > > > > Imagine that your brain is duplicated, so that there are two identical > brains int who vats. Your consciousness is (non locally) associated to the > two (identical relatively to the substitution level) brains. > > The brains can't be identical if they are in different locations. They > are distinct when one is duplicated. > > > But “in reality”, your mind is associated with all computations, > > Nonsense. You're just obfuscating by using an undefined "association". > > > and the consciousness differentiates on the computations which diverges > above the substitution level. > > Note that the concept of "substitution level" already assumes a physical > substrate more fundamental that the computation. > > > > > > > > > > > > >> > >>> The definition of “[]p” is already an indexical, > >> "Indexical" literally means you can point to it. I don't understand > how you are using the word. > > > > In philosophy, “indexical” refer to words whose meaning depends on what > we can point with an index, like the words “here”, “now”, “actual”, “me”, > etc. The “[]p” means “I prove p”, with a third person notion of “I” (still > indexical, like “my body”. The 1p I is given by the variants []p & p, []p & > <>p, []p & <>p & p. Normally []p & <>p is the first person plural (but > there some difficulties here: and it could be that []p & <>p & p is the > more correct first person plural view. Quanta seems to be pure qualia, > somehow, which is confirmed by QM, by the “superposition contagion” (which > “duplicates” collection of machines). > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> and you can add axioms like “I am in Helsinki” or “I am in > Washington”, which change the actual state/machine (but G and G* still > applies to them). The phenomenologies are given by the hypostases. The > physical phenomenologies is given by the sigma_1 sentences structured by > the mode of each “material” hypostases (the one given by the X above). > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>>> We cannot define it in any 3p terms. It is pure 1p, but with > mechanism, > >>>> But the idea is to explain 1p experience in 3p terms, i.e. in terms > of computations. > >>> At the meta level only. We can define, like Theaetetus, knowledge > (which is 1p) by “[]p & p”, but only because we limit ourself, non > constructively, to sound machine. The machine itself cannot do that: “[]p & > p” cannot be define in the language of the machine, for reason similar as > the fact that they cannot define truth. > >>> > >>> This explains why the 1p “I” has to look non definable by each > concerned entity about itself, > >> Fine, I understand that. But you propose that it is definable in terms > of the computations of the UD and that's the definition I seek. > > The computation in the UD (or in RA) can support your consciousness (we > *assume* digital mechanism). > > Again, the vague "supports". The hypothesis of comp is that the > specific computation implemented in your brain is what constitutes your > consciousness and is the reason brains have the complexity to > instantiate consciousness while rocks don't. > > > But your consciousness is supported (out of time and space) by all > computations (the first person is not aware of the delay of > “reconstitution” in the UD deployment). > But in that case it would not be 'associated' with my brain and it would > not be 'about' this world. > > Brent > > > > That association is provably not constructive. There is no algorithm to > single out the computations which supports you in the UD deployment. That > is why physics is expected to be not completely computable, but the > distribution of probability can still, and should be, computably > approximable. > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> and this is what lead to retrieved consciousness associated > indexically, and non constructively, to the machine, if you are OK to > define consciousness by (immediate, with <>t) knowable, indubitable, but > also non rationally justifiable (provable) and non definable. > >> Those are all 1p attributes of propositions. The question is how they > are instantiated in the UD computations. > > > > The 1p are instanced by the “[]p & p”, in all computations which run > “[]”. (“[]” is the arithmetical Gödel’s provability predicate, []p is a > particular sigma_1 sentence (even with p not sigma_1, but for the physics, > we have to restrict the arithmetical interpretation of G on the sigma_1 p. > We use G1 = G + “p->[]p”. That is enough (thanks to a result by Albert > Visser). > > > > > > > > > >> > >>> Consciousness is just the name we give to that personal feeling. > >>> > >>> You see that consciousness has no 3p definition from the machine’s > point of view. But “we”, who knows that the machine is sound (because we > limit ourself to such machine) can know and prove this. The machine can do > the same about any machine supposed to be correct. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>>> its (meta) logic is captured by the (3p describable if the machine > assumes Mechanism) material mode. > >>>>> We know that intuitively: the actual state of the guy in Moscow is > “I am in Moscow”, and the actual state of the guy in Washington is “I am in > Washington”. Both are correct, but as everyone know (except John > apparently), both the W and M guys feel their actual state as being very > different of the mental state of their counterpart. > >>>> The trouble with that explanation is that you have jumped from > description in terms of a UD, to a description in terms of a world with > Washington and Moscow and a duplicating machine. Leaving a chasm of > explanation between the two. > >>> Which chasm? Keep in mind that (at the meta-level) we assume > computationalism. Whatever experience you live in the duplication > experience in some “world” (assuming that exist), there will be > computations in arithmetic mimicking those histories, and the 1p > indeterminacy is on those computations. Again, I was assuming some “world” > with Washington and Moscow, but that is neutral on the primary character > that such world would have with the Materialist position, which is NOT > assume. > >> You say it is not assumed. But you use it as though it is assumed and > you didn't derive it. > > I don’t. In UDA I assume computers, doctors, and certainly a physical > reality, of course, but not a primary one. Then in AUDA I assume no more > than RA or Kxy = x + Sxyz = xz(yz). When I assume “doctors”, it is neutral > if they are product of computations, or not, at the beginning stage of the > reasoning, then all this is discharged all along the reasoning, and AUDA > makes clear we do not assume more than RA or the combinators, or > equivalent. Intuitively, that happens already at the step 7 and 8. At step > seven, you should already understand that presupposing primary doctors, > primary computers, … do not work, as you need to reintroduce a strong > identity thesis which is incoherent with the fact that all computations are > realised in arithmetic. How could a primary being do the selection without > violating Mechanism? > > > > > > > > > >> > >>> That is already done at the step 1 of the UDA. There is a chasm only > if you assume the ontological of world, but that is not in need to be > assumed. Replace such world by any computation mimicking the world enough > so that the 1p view cannot distinguish such world and the computation. > >> Yes, I made that same point a long time ago, that if the UD is going to > produce conscious thoughts it must produce a "world" in which those are > thoughts about something. > > Yes, but those “worlds” are only given by a statistics on all the other > sufficiently similar computation. The AUDA mathematical part get a > proximity relations on the sigma_1 sentences, and it obeys a quantum logic, > giving hope we get something like the Born rule, and a corresponding > “Gleason theorem” which would justify it. > > If that is proved impossible, then we have refute Mechanism. > > > > > > > >>> Take, in case you feel the substitution level is very low (fine > grained) the Heisenberg Matrix of our cluster of galaxies at the level of > quarks with 10^(100^1000) decimals. It is executed somewhere in the sigma_1 > arithmetical reality (by the comp assumption). > >> It is not good enough to just say it must be in there somewhere > "assuming comp", because we are testing comp by seeing whether it describes > experience. > > We can only test comp (in the 3p sharable way, or in the 1p plural way) > by comparing the physics in the head of the machine with what we see. > Without the quantum data, I would (and have, a long time ago) conclude that > Mechanism is false or newly plausible. > > > > > > > > > >> So it is evasive to say that in the infinitude of arithmetic and UD > computations, a descriptions of your experience, and any possible > experience, in in there. > > It is just a fact that we have to take into account. There is no > evasion, we make this precise by defining “observable with measure 1” by > []p & <>p (& p), and do the math. We get a modal logic close to B, which > is related to quantum logic (by a result due to Goldblatt 1978). > > > > Bruno > > > > > > > >> Brent > >
Why - in numerical reality (UD) - can't there be vampires, werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer simulations of stories of them ... - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
