On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 3:03:19 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: > > > > On 1/6/2019 3:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 5 Jan 2019, at 22:18, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >> On 1/5/2019 1:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 19:35, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net > <javascript:>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 1/4/2019 3:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>>>>> On 4 Jan 2019, at 05:16, Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net > <javascript:>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 1/3/2019 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>>>>>> As a scientist, I just count the evidences, and evaluate the > plausibility of the big picture proposed.I predicted the many-world > appearances much before I realised the physicists were already open to this > for empirical reason. Once you understand that there are infinitely many > computations going through you actual state, > >>>>>> What does it mean "your actual state"? How is it defined within > the UD? > >>>>> It is defined indexically, like in a block universe, but in a more > precise way through the Gödel number of a Löbian machine in the []p & X > modes (with X in {p, <>t, <>t & p}, p being limited to the sigma_1 > (semi-computable) arithmetical sentences. > >>>> I don't think I understand that. You're saying that within all the > UD computations there are ones that implement specific Lobian machines and > their interactions with some world they are embedded in? > >>> This comes from the first person indeterminacy on the computations. > >> Every computation is a person? > > That would be a category error. We can only say that a person is > associated to (infinitely many) computations, which are those bringing your > state through your brain/body/history here and now. > > That is sufficiently vague so as to be meaningless. Which infinitely > many computations? Sometimes you write as if the computations are > instantiating conscious thoughts. But other places you refer to the > computations as being "below our substitution level" implying that they > are simulations of the brain or lower. > > > > > > > > > > >> What does it mean "a computation"? ...one of the threads of the UD? or > some state of the UD? > > A thread in the UD, or anything equivalent with the sequence (on s): > phi_i,s (j), where the s is for the sth step of the computation. The UD run > all phi_i,s (j), for all, i, j, and s. > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> To have a probability notion, we need to define the measure one by []p > & <>t. (Because with the logic G we don’t have []p -> <>t, and we need the > “<>t” to avoid the cul-de-sac (cf the typical default hypothesis in > probability theory). > >>> > >>> The FPI is on all computations (sigma_1 sentences), but they are > restricted by being those implementing consistent extensions on the Löbian > machine “you are”. > >> Consistent in what sense? Just not proving a contradiction...how does > thread of the UD prove a contradiction? > > The thread in the UD does not prove contradiction, but some threads > support Löbian machine, which can be or not consistent. The FPI is on the > thread which supports the consistent extension. (“Supports”, not “is”). > > Another vague term. What does "supports" mean? > > > > > > > > > > >> or does it mean consistent in the sense of representing a > quasi-classical world in which the electron's spin measures either UP of > DOWN but not both? > > No, that is for latter, and it concerns the “consistent continuations” > as seen in the observable modes ([]p & X, with X being p, or <>p, or <>p & > p), p sigma_1. It does not mean <>p (consistent p), but <>p v p, or, <>p v > p v []f. > > > > > > > > > >> > >>> There is no “world” per, only computations “rich enough” to continue > consistently your history (the “world” will be apparent only). > >> So will it be apparently consistent? > > Yes. > > > > > >> What would it mean for it to be inconsistent? > > To get a contradiction at some bottom level. To prove that 0 is equal to > 1. > > So some thread of the UD proving 0=1? But the treads of the UD just > compute...they don't prove anything. They are already assumed to be > functions. > > > > > > > > > > >> Logic is timeless so if it proves X and then it proves not-X that is > a contradiction. But FP experience is not timeless, so X can be true now > and not-X true later and there is no contradiction. > > I military myself to sound (and thus automatically consistent) machine. > > But the UD is executing all possible machines. > > > Real machine in real life have a non monotonic layer so that they can > revise their opinion. That is not needed to solve the mind body problem and > to derive the physical appearance from arithmetic. To interview > inconsistent machine would be like interviewing a sick people believing > that he is Napoleon to study Napoleon’s life. > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>>> Of coure, "actual state" does not refer to anything in the > mind-block picture (which is just the structure (N, 0, +, *)). The actual > state is purely phenomenological. > >>>> ?? This is supposed to explain phenomenology in terms of > computations. I understand computations, like Turing machines, have > states. But I don't understand these "actual states”. > >>> I am not sure to understand your problem here. All mind state are > actual from the first person point of view. > >> "Mind state" = "a conscious thought"? OK, but then how does that > relate to the computations of a UD? > > We lost the mind-brain identity thesis. We can (by Mechanism) associate > a mind to a machine, but the mind itself is truly associated to all > computations, sufficiently similar (from the 1p view) to the one we start > with. > ?? What does "sufficiently similar" mean? It's clear on a physical, > neural computation theory of the mind, when 'mind' is instantiated at a > level far above and dependent on a physical level of atoms and > molecules. But if mind is independent of that substrate it's not clear > that 'sufficiently similar' can be defined. > > > The brain-mind association is one-one, but the mind-brain(s) association > is one-many. > > > > Imagine that your brain is duplicated, so that there are two identical > brains int who vats. Your consciousness is (non locally) associated to the > two (identical relatively to the substitution level) brains. > > The brains can't be identical if they are in different locations. They > are distinct when one is duplicated. > > > But “in reality”, your mind is associated with all computations, > > Nonsense. You're just obfuscating by using an undefined "association". > > > and the consciousness differentiates on the computations which diverges > above the substitution level. > > Note that the concept of "substitution level" already assumes a physical > substrate more fundamental that the computation. > > > > > > > > > > > > >> > >>> The definition of “[]p” is already an indexical, > >> "Indexical" literally means you can point to it. I don't understand > how you are using the word. > > > > In philosophy, “indexical” refer to words whose meaning depends on what > we can point with an index, like the words “here”, “now”, “actual”, “me”, > etc. The “[]p” means “I prove p”, with a third person notion of “I” (still > indexical, like “my body”. The 1p I is given by the variants []p & p, []p & > <>p, []p & <>p & p. Normally []p & <>p is the first person plural (but > there some difficulties here: and it could be that []p & <>p & p is the > more correct first person plural view. Quanta seems to be pure qualia, > somehow, which is confirmed by QM, by the “superposition contagion” (which > “duplicates” collection of machines). > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> and you can add axioms like “I am in Helsinki” or “I am in > Washington”, which change the actual state/machine (but G and G* still > applies to them). The phenomenologies are given by the hypostases. The > physical phenomenologies is given by the sigma_1 sentences structured by > the mode of each “material” hypostases (the one given by the X above). > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>>> We cannot define it in any 3p terms. It is pure 1p, but with > mechanism, > >>>> But the idea is to explain 1p experience in 3p terms, i.e. in terms > of computations. > >>> At the meta level only. We can define, like Theaetetus, knowledge > (which is 1p) by “[]p & p”, but only because we limit ourself, non > constructively, to sound machine. The machine itself cannot do that: “[]p & > p” cannot be define in the language of the machine, for reason similar as > the fact that they cannot define truth. > >>> > >>> This explains why the 1p “I” has to look non definable by each > concerned entity about itself, > >> Fine, I understand that. But you propose that it is definable in terms > of the computations of the UD and that's the definition I seek. > > The computation in the UD (or in RA) can support your consciousness (we > *assume* digital mechanism). > > Again, the vague "supports". The hypothesis of comp is that the > specific computation implemented in your brain is what constitutes your > consciousness and is the reason brains have the complexity to > instantiate consciousness while rocks don't. > > > But your consciousness is supported (out of time and space) by all > computations (the first person is not aware of the delay of > “reconstitution” in the UD deployment). > But in that case it would not be 'associated' with my brain and it would > not be 'about' this world. > > Brent > > > > That association is provably not constructive. There is no algorithm to > single out the computations which supports you in the UD deployment. That > is why physics is expected to be not completely computable, but the > distribution of probability can still, and should be, computably > approximable. > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> and this is what lead to retrieved consciousness associated > indexically, and non constructively, to the machine, if you are OK to > define consciousness by (immediate, with <>t) knowable, indubitable, but > also non rationally justifiable (provable) and non definable. > >> Those are all 1p attributes of propositions. The question is how they > are instantiated in the UD computations. > > > > The 1p are instanced by the “[]p & p”, in all computations which run > “[]”. (“[]” is the arithmetical Gödel’s provability predicate, []p is a > particular sigma_1 sentence (even with p not sigma_1, but for the physics, > we have to restrict the arithmetical interpretation of G on the sigma_1 p. > We use G1 = G + “p->[]p”. That is enough (thanks to a result by Albert > Visser). > > > > > > > > > >> > >>> Consciousness is just the name we give to that personal feeling. > >>> > >>> You see that consciousness has no 3p definition from the machine’s > point of view. But “we”, who knows that the machine is sound (because we > limit ourself to such machine) can know and prove this. The machine can do > the same about any machine supposed to be correct. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>>> its (meta) logic is captured by the (3p describable if the machine > assumes Mechanism) material mode. > >>>>> We know that intuitively: the actual state of the guy in Moscow is > “I am in Moscow”, and the actual state of the guy in Washington is “I am in > Washington”. Both are correct, but as everyone know (except John > apparently), both the W and M guys feel their actual state as being very > different of the mental state of their counterpart. > >>>> The trouble with that explanation is that you have jumped from > description in terms of a UD, to a description in terms of a world with > Washington and Moscow and a duplicating machine. Leaving a chasm of > explanation between the two. > >>> Which chasm? Keep in mind that (at the meta-level) we assume > computationalism. Whatever experience you live in the duplication > experience in some “world” (assuming that exist), there will be > computations in arithmetic mimicking those histories, and the 1p > indeterminacy is on those computations. Again, I was assuming some “world” > with Washington and Moscow, but that is neutral on the primary character > that such world would have with the Materialist position, which is NOT > assume. > >> You say it is not assumed. But you use it as though it is assumed and > you didn't derive it. > > I don’t. In UDA I assume computers, doctors, and certainly a physical > reality, of course, but not a primary one. Then in AUDA I assume no more > than RA or Kxy = x + Sxyz = xz(yz). When I assume “doctors”, it is neutral > if they are product of computations, or not, at the beginning stage of the > reasoning, then all this is discharged all along the reasoning, and AUDA > makes clear we do not assume more than RA or the combinators, or > equivalent. Intuitively, that happens already at the step 7 and 8. At step > seven, you should already understand that presupposing primary doctors, > primary computers, … do not work, as you need to reintroduce a strong > identity thesis which is incoherent with the fact that all computations are > realised in arithmetic. How could a primary being do the selection without > violating Mechanism? > > > > > > > > > >> > >>> That is already done at the step 1 of the UDA. There is a chasm only > if you assume the ontological of world, but that is not in need to be > assumed. Replace such world by any computation mimicking the world enough > so that the 1p view cannot distinguish such world and the computation. > >> Yes, I made that same point a long time ago, that if the UD is going to > produce conscious thoughts it must produce a "world" in which those are > thoughts about something. > > Yes, but those “worlds” are only given by a statistics on all the other > sufficiently similar computation. The AUDA mathematical part get a > proximity relations on the sigma_1 sentences, and it obeys a quantum logic, > giving hope we get something like the Born rule, and a corresponding > “Gleason theorem” which would justify it. > > If that is proved impossible, then we have refute Mechanism. > > > > > > > >>> Take, in case you feel the substitution level is very low (fine > grained) the Heisenberg Matrix of our cluster of galaxies at the level of > quarks with 10^(100^1000) decimals. It is executed somewhere in the sigma_1 > arithmetical reality (by the comp assumption). > >> It is not good enough to just say it must be in there somewhere > "assuming comp", because we are testing comp by seeing whether it describes > experience. > > We can only test comp (in the 3p sharable way, or in the 1p plural way) > by comparing the physics in the head of the machine with what we see. > Without the quantum data, I would (and have, a long time ago) conclude that > Mechanism is false or newly plausible. > > > > > > > > > >> So it is evasive to say that in the infinitude of arithmetic and UD > computations, a descriptions of your experience, and any possible > experience, in in there. > > It is just a fact that we have to take into account. There is no > evasion, we make this precise by defining “observable with measure 1” by > []p & <>p (& p), and do the math. We get a modal logic close to B, which > is related to quantum logic (by a result due to Goldblatt 1978). > > > > Bruno > > > > > > > >> Brent > >

Why - in numerical reality (UD) - can't there be vampires, werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer simulations of stories of them ... - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.