date:20200226

On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 3:29:00 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> Only 1.9% of the people who got the 1918 flu died of it,  but so many got 
> sick it ended up killing 675,000 people in the USA alone and 35 million 
> worldwide. Because it's so new the death rate for the Corvid 19 virus is 
> more uncertain but it's estimated to be between 2% and 6%, and it shows a 
> disturbingly long incubation period during which a person is infectious but 
> displays no obvious symptoms of being ill; it can be diagnosed with DNA 
> detection kits but those are in extremely short supply. Administering large 
> amounts of Corvid-19 antibodies would almost certainly cut the death rate 
> considerably but you'd need massive amounts of it and, like DNA detection 
> kits, we no longer have the infrastructure to rapidly mass produce it.
>
> Obama created a pandemic czar to deal with just this sort of thing and to 
> coordinate the activities of the various federal agencies, but in the 
> spring of 2018 the pandemic czar position was eliminated and the entire 
> chain of command was fired, and the disease fighting budgets of the Centers 
> for Disease Control, the National Safety Council, the Department of 
> Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services was cut by 15 billion 
> dollars. The infrastructure can be rebuilt but that takes not just money 
> but also time, and that is time we may not have. In 2017 Bill Gates told 
> national security advisor H.R. McMaster that cutting the disease fighting 
> budgets of federal agencies would "*significantly increase the 
> probability of a large and lethal modern-day pandemic occurring in our 
> lifetimes*". Maybe Corvid-19 will just peter out but I wouldn't count on 
> it, it's looking increasingly likely that Mr. Gates was right. We're not 
> ready.
>
> John K Clark
>

Never fear, t'Rump put Pence in front of this. Pence, a member of the 
"Brotherhood" who want to restore theocracy, will pray a lot.

When it comes to science Republicans get everything wrong. Then to make 
things worse they often have pseudoscience and ideas that "just ain't so," 
that passes for what they think is science. 

The Covid-19 appears to have a lethality of 2.3% of those who contract this 
infection. The rate of infectivity is unknown. So with this epidemic we 
might get a situation similar to the 1918 flu. The 1918 flu had a higher 
lethality rate because of pneumonia as a secondary infection, and now that 
is curable and treatable. As I see things it is possible that 1% of the 
world's population could die in the next year and that amount to nearly 80 
million people. 

LC

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Re: Wittgenstein's meta-philosophy

2020-02-26 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 2/26/2020 4:54 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:



On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 1:36:49 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:



On 2/26/2020 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>   Being sure of that sentence is true, "Dr Watson was a friend of
>> Sherlock Holmes." doesn't mean the things named in the sentence
exist.
>
> It certainly means that Watson and Homes exist, in some sense. The
> question is “is that sense interesting with respect to our goal of
> explaining "everything” (matter and consciousness) in a coherent
way?

They exist in exactly the same way arithmetic and Turing machines
exist.

Brent


Are the integers, and by extension arithmetic, fictitious? AG


I wouldn't say necessarily say "fictitous".  They are abstractions, like 
"red".  They are descriptive of sets of things.


Brent

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Re: Wittgenstein's meta-philosophy

2020-02-26 Thread Alan Grayson



On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 1:36:49 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/26/2020 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >>   Being sure of that sentence is true, "Dr Watson was a friend of 
> >> Sherlock Holmes." doesn't mean the things named in the sentence exist. 
> > 
> > It certainly means that Watson and Homes exist, in some sense. The 
> > question is “is that sense interesting with respect to our goal of 
> > explaining "everything” (matter and consciousness) in a coherent way? 
>
> They exist in exactly the same way arithmetic and Turing machines exist. 
>
> Brent 
>

Are the integers, and by extension arithmetic, fictitious? AG 

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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

2020-02-26 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 10:35 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 25 Feb 2020, at 12:43, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 10:26 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not yet
>> know what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done, one
>> copy will see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for the
>> others. He would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as
>> refuted by the M guy, and vice-versa.
>>
>
> But if he wrote p(W) = 0.9 and p(M) = 0.1 he would get exactly the same
> result. The proposed probabilities are here without effect.
>
>
> If I toss a perfect coin too.
>

Huh? If you toss a coin, perfect or not, you will get either heads or
tails -- you do not get both results in different branches of the wave
function. That is the difference here: in WM-duplication, or Everett, every
result is obtained every time, even if on different branches. That is why
the probabilities that you hypothesize at the start are irrelevant: you get
the same outcomes whatever probabilities you assign.



> Of course, that would lead directly to some problem with the iterated case
> scenario.
>

I don't understand this comment. What difficulties? All, I am saying is
that no concept of probability applies in the WM-duplication case.



> If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping in
>>> mind that it concerns your future subjective experience only.
>>>
>>
>>
>> In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the
>> protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions of
>> the duplication.
>>
>>
>> In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But the
>> question is not about where you will live after the experience (we know
>> that it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the
>> first person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever
>> *feel to live* in both city at once with this protocole.
>>
>
> And, as I have repeated shown, the first person perspective does not give
> you any expectations at all.
>
>
> If I am duplicated like in the 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24 “movie”
> scenario, I do expect seeing white noise, and I certainly don’t expect to
> see “2001, Space Odyssey” with Tibetan subtitle.
>

You make the same mistake as above with the coin tosses -- you are trying
to compare duplication scenarios to single-outcome scenarios. That is wrong
-- no matter how many pixels on your screen, they are all either black or
white, not both. And there are no other worlds in which all possibilities
occur.



> I am not sure what you mean by “the first person perspective does not give
> any expectations”.
>

Just that you cannot assign any 1p probabilities to particular outcomes in
duplication scenarios.


Do you agree that if you are promised, in Helsinki, that a cup of coffee
> will be offered to you, both in M and W, you can expect, with probability
> one, to get a cup of coffee after pushing the button in Helsinki? (Assuming
> Mechanism, of course).
>
> I would expect, in Helsinki,  to drink a cup of coffee with probability
> one (using this protocole and all default hypotheses, like no asteroids
> hurt the planet in the meantime, etc.).
>


Since both copies are given coffee, that is a certain outcome for both.

And I would consider myself maximally ignorant if that coffee will be
> Russian or American coffee.
>

Exactly, that is the point: you can't predict which brand of coffee you
will receive, even if you do know that you will be given coffee.

But bringing coffee in here adds nothing. It is yet another meaningless
distraction.

The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, but that symmetry
>> is broken from the 1p perspective of each copy. One will say “I feel to be
>> in W, and not in M” and the other will say “I feel to be in M and not in W”.
>>
>
> Regardless of any prior probability assignment.
>
>
> Exactly.
>

What? Do you actually agree that there are no meaningful probability
assignments in this case?

I cannot infer a probability from just one trial, but the probability I
>> infer from N repetitions can be any value in [0,1].
>>
>>
>> But we try to find the probability from the theory.
>>
>
> And we use the experimental data to test the theory. If you predict p(W) =
> p(M) =0.5, after a large number of duplications that prediction will be
> refuted by the majority of the copies. In fact, in the limit, only a set of
> measure zero will obtain p = 0.5 from their data.
>
>
> Then that is true for the iterated coin tossing too, and there is no
> probabilities at all.
>


There you go again. Confusing single outcome scenarios with the duplication
scenarios in which all outcomes occur. This is not 'honest dealing' in
argument, Bruno.

As I illustrated with the WMS triplication, unknown to the candidate, we
>> see that we cannot infer any probabilities, from experienc

We're not ready

Only 1.9% of the people who got the 1918 flu died of it, but so many got
sick it ended up killing 675,000 people in the USA alone and 35 million
worldwide. Because it's so new the death rate for the Corvid 19 virus is
more uncertain but it's estimated to be between 2% and 6%, and it shows a
disturbingly long incubation period during which a person is infectious but
displays no obvious symptoms of being ill; it can be diagnosed with DNA
detection kits but those are in extremely short supply. Administering large
amounts of Corvid-19 antibodies would almost certainly cut the death rate
considerably but you'd need massive amounts of it and, like DNA detection
kits, we no longer have the infrastructure to rapidly mass produce it.

Obama created a pandemic czar to deal with just this sort of thing and to
coordinate the activities of the various federal agencies, but in the
spring of 2018 the pandemic czar position was eliminated and the entire
chain of command was fired, and the disease fighting budgets of the Centers
for Disease Control, the National Safety Council, the Department of
Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services was cut by 15 billion
dollars. The infrastructure can be rebuilt but that takes not just money
but also time, and that is time we may not have. In 2017 Bill Gates told
national security advisor H.R. McMaster that cutting the disease fighting
budgets of federal agencies would "*significantly increase the probability
of a large and lethal modern-day pandemic occurring in our lifetimes*".
Maybe Corvid-19 will just peter out but I wouldn't count on it, it's
looking increasingly likely that Mr. Gates was right. We're not ready.

John K Clark

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Re: The trouble with transporters

2020-02-26 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On the other hand it's a question of how much fidelity is required.
Suppose we copied all of Donald Trump's significant brain states into an
overstuffed robotno problem.

Brent

On 2/26/2020 3:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

https://www.syfy.com/syfywire/star-treks-transporter-terrible-truth-science-behind-the-fiction

Instead of capturing all of the information down to the atomic level,
they suggested transmitting just the DNA information of a person,
along with a brain state. If you had that information, you could
presumably clone a person and then implant them with the mental state
of their previous self. It's not exactly teleportation, but it gets
the job done.

Only, even that fraction of what makes up a person comes in at 2.6
tredecillion [10^42] bits. Which is, in scientific vernacular, several
boatloads.

The estimated time to transmit, using the standard 30 GHz microwave
band used by communications satellites, would take 350,000 times
longer than the age of the universe.

Boosting the bandwidth means boosting the power, and eventually you
end up asking yourself why we didn't just take a shuttlecraft and
avoid the hassle.

@philipthrift
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Re: Wittgenstein's meta-philosophy

2020-02-26 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 2/26/2020 3:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Feb 2020, at 22:24, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:

On 2/25/2020 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Feb 2020, at 03:29, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:

On 2/23/2020 6:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 23 Feb 2020, at 01:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:

On 2/22/2020 3:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 10:40:12 AM UTC-7, PGC wrote:

On Thursday, February 20, 2020 at 1:55:39 PM UTC+1, Bruno
Marchal wrote:

On 20 Feb 2020, at 01:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List  wrote:

On 2/19/2020 12:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

Wittgenstein is at the core really of *linguistic
pragmatism *

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism

Languages are tools. There is no truth "out there".

My view is that "true" means different things in
different contexts.

And in different modes (of self-reference). The
platonists dis understand that the absolute truth
requires faith in something beyond “my consciousness” or
“consciousness” (to take into account Terren Suydam’
remark).

Wittgestein up to now still has the upper hand with those
old arguments over anybody proposing science based
ontological packages metaphysically: language will seduce
people to overgeneralize, to confuse personal mysticism with
reality, to engage in false equivalencies between terms used
in formal contexts and everyday use of language, scientism
etc. Slowly, yours truly is coming around to the idea that
folks agreeing on ontology/reality/religion, which would
guide research in some allegedly correct direction; spilling
over positive effects into the world... that Wittgenstein
may prove correct in that this is a confused product of
muddled armchair thinking, not because of his generally
negative stance, but because there seem to be positive
developments out there that he couldn't have informed those
arguments with.

I see/predict metaphysics shifting from the naive armchair
forms of identity, reality, matter etc. practiced here on
this list with profound erudition, walking in circles for 20
years now (Wittgenstein says thousands of years) to
optimization and more efficient pursuit of value and benefit
questions instead, through say orchestration of highly
sophisticated forms of organization applied to education,
governing, finance, technology, problem solving, applied or
theoretical etc. that are permissionless, universally
accessible, require no hierarchy of politics, charlatan
experts, control freaks, their sycophants, and bibles of
some Messiah achieving miracles such as eternal life,
self-duplication etc.

Metaphysical setups that place less emphasis on truth,
trust, power, control, or proof and more emphasis on "can
entities such as ourselves be highly organized, solve
specific survival problems over short and long terms,
without trusting each other + instead assuming that folks
will be opportunistic and idealistic?" Example: we don't
agree on what reality may be, but we do agree on the need
for habitable living space in the long term, nutrition,
water, health, limiting self-destruction, expensive wars,
standards of living etc. quite clearly. There ARE more
appropriate politics and economics on the horizon.
Metaphysics here, shifting our old-school conceptions of
what first principles are, and you'd refute Wittgenstein
instead of running from him. Engineering incentive and not
what the game is but /how/ the game of life on this planet
could be.

About this, it is clear to me that in “I think thus I
am”, Descartes use the “first person” I. Indeed he start
from the doubt. Dubito ergo cogito, cogito ergo sum.
Descartes did not prove the existence of Descartes, bit
of his own consciousness, hoping others can do the same
reasoning for themselves. Consciousness always refer to
a first person experience implicitly: like God (truth)
it is not a thing.

You concede to Terren that "true means different things in
different contexts" but everyday like clockwork you still
barrage the list with your use of "large truth, 3p, reality
that cannot be named, mechanism is incompatible with
physicalism" and all the rest of it. I used to wonder why
you don't pursue contact with linguists, physicists, a wider
audience, and philosophers but this has ceased to surprise
me. PNGC

I think I finally got it -- what mechanism means for Bruno -- 
namely, that a human bei

Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

2020-02-26 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 2/26/2020 3:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

To take the observation of some reality as a proof that such reality exist 
ontologically, is equivalent with Aristotle's Materialism.


But to take the non-observation of many worlds as evidence they exist is 
equivalent with Kellyanne Conway's alternative facts.


Brent


The point of Plato was precisely that what we observe might be only one aspect 
of a deeper and simpler reality.


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Re: Wittgenstein's meta-philosophy

2020-02-26 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 2/26/2020 2:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
  Being sure of that sentence is true, "Dr Watson was a friend of 
Sherlock Holmes." doesn't mean the things named in the sentence exist.


It certainly means that Watson and Homes exist, in some sense. The 
question is “is that sense interesting with respect to our goal of 
explaining "everything” (matter and consciousness) in a coherent way?


They exist in exactly the same way arithmetic and Turing machines exist.

Brent

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Re: The trouble with transporters

The real point of the transporter beam was a quick way in the Star Trek screen 
plays to get the cast down to a planet quickly. It avoided lots of screen time 
with cumbersome film sequences of landing.

LC

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Re: The trouble with transporters

On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 1:20 PM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

Obviously your genome would be necessary but not sufficient, memories would
have to be included too, but there would be no need to know the position
and momentum of every electron in your body down to the limit that
Heisenberg imposed.

 John K Clark



>

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Re: The trouble with transporters

On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 1:13 PM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

*> Quantum teleportation is the way to go. Of course the problem of getting
> every atom of a person entangled with other states is tough.*


It seems to me if you just want to make a Star Trek style teleporter that
would be vast overkill.

John K Clark




>

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Re: The trouble with transporters

I think this is cloning of quantum states, Xeroxing. You can get yourgenome 
from 23 and Me.

LC

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The trouble with transporters

Quantum teleportation is the way to go. Of course the problem of getting every 
atom of a person entangled with other states is tough. Also the classical 
information communicated can be far smaller, but is still large.

LC

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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

2020-02-26 Thread Alan Grayson



On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 4:35:54 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Feb 2020, at 12:43, Bruce Kellett > 
> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 10:26 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
>> On 24 Feb 2020, at 23:22, Bruce Kellett > 
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 12:10 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>>
>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 23:49, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>>
 On 23 Feb 2020, at 04:11, Bruce Kellett >>> > wrote:


 I don't really understand your comment. I was thinking of Bruno's 
 WM-duplication. You could impose the idea that each duplication at each 
 branch point on every branch is an independent Bernoulli trial with p = 
 0.5 
 on this (success being defined arbitrarily as W or M). Then, if these 
 probabilities carry over from trial to trial, you end up with every binary 
 sequence, each with weight 1/2^N. Summing sequences with the same number 
 of 
 0s and 1s, you get the Pascal Triangle distribution that Bruno wants.

 The trouble is that such a procedure is entirely arbitrary. The only 
 probability that one could objectively assign to say, W, on each Bernoulli 
 trial is one, 


 That is certainly wrong. If you are correct, then P(W) = 1 is written 
 in the personal diary,

>>>
>>> I did say "objectively assign". In other words, this was a 3p comment. 
>>> You confuse 1p with 3p yet again.
>>>
>>>
>>> Well, if you “objectively” assign P(W) = 1, the guy in M will 
>>> subjectively refute that prediction, and as the question was about the 
>>> subjective accessible experience, he objectively, and predictably, refute 
>>> your statement. 
>>>
>>
>>
>> And if you objectively assign p(W) = p(M) = 0.5, then with the W-guy and 
>> the M-guy will both say that your theory is refuted, since they both see 
>> only one city: W-guy, W with p = 1.0, and the M-guy, M with p =1.0..
>>
>>
>> That is *very* weird. That works for the coin tossing experience too, 
>> even for the lottery. I predicted that I have 1/10^6 to win the lottery, 
>> but I was wrong, after the gale was played I won, so the probability was 
>> one!
>>
>> In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not yet 
>> know what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done, one 
>> copy will see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for the 
>> others. He would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as 
>> refuted by the M guy, and vice-versa.
>>
>
> But if he wrote p(W) = 0.9 and p(M) = 0.1 he would get exactly the same 
> result. The proposed probabilities are here without effect.
>
>
> If I toss a perfect coin too.
>
> Of course, that would lead directly to some problem with the iterated case 
> scenario.
>
>
>
>
>
> If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping in 
>>> mind that it concerns your future subjective experience only. 
>>>
>>
>>
>> In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the 
>> protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions of 
>> the duplication.
>>
>>
>> In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But the 
>> question is not about where you will live after the experience (we know 
>> that it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the 
>> first person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever 
>> *feel to live* in both city at once with this protocole.
>>
>
> And, as I have repeated shown, the first person perspective does not give 
> you any expectations at all.
>
>
> If I am duplicated like in the 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24 “movie” 
> scenario, I do expect seeing white noise, and I certainly don’t expect to 
> see “2001, Space Odyssey” with Tibetan subtitle.
>
> I am not sure what you mean by “the first person perspective does not give 
> any expectations”.
>
> Do you agree that if you are promised, in Helsinki, that a cup of coffee 
> will be offered to you, both in M and W, you can expect, with probability 
> one, to get a cup of coffee after pushing the button in Helsinki? (Assuming 
> Mechanism, of course).
>
> I would expect, in Helsinki,  to drink a cup of coffee with probability 
> one (using this protocole and all default hypotheses, like no asteroids 
> hurt the planet in the meantime, etc.).
>
> And I would consider myself maximally ignorant if that coffee will be 
> Russian or American coffee.
>
>
>
>
>
> The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, but that symmetry 
>> is broken from the 1p perspective of each copy. One will say “I feel to be 
>> in W, and not in M” and the other will say “I feel to be in M and not in W”.
>>
>
> Regardless of any prior probability assignment.
>
>
> Exactly. 
>
>
>
>
>
> I cannot infer a probability from just one trial, but the probability I 
>> infer from N repetitions can be any value in [0,1].
>>
>>
>> But w

Re: Wittgenstein's meta-philosophy

2020-02-26 Thread PGC

On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 12:02:23 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Feb 2020, at 22:24, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Definitions are in words.  How do you define the words.  As JKC correctly 
> points out, examples are more important than definitions.  I don't use 
> physical laws to define natural numbers, I use ostensive definition by 
> examples...which is exactly how you learned numbers at your mother's knee. 
>
>
> Practically? I am OK with this. But when we do fundamental science, 
>

There is no scientific consensus on what first principles are, or if they 
even exist.

> we must be clear on what we assume, and what we derive, and the point is 
> that with mechanism, we can no more assume a physical universe.
>

Then pulling the trigger in the quantum immortality sense doesn't matter. 
People should do it and see the light.

> If we assume a physical universe to explain a first peson prediction, that 
> would work if that physical universe is not Turing emulable, and, 
> importantly, that it is able to make my consciousness, or my first person 
> prediction, related to that physical universe. 
>

There is evidence that most folks, with appropriate training, can see two 
cities at the same time.

> But with mechanism, that consciousness is brought by the corresponding 
> computation in arithmetic. If not, you need a non computationalist theory 
> of mind. 
>

The computationalist theory of mind is homemade determinism: it never had 
nor would it be meaningful for it to have a theory of mind because it 
couldn't be the large, godzilla of truth. People are not responsible for 
their actions anyway. But I'm sure that journals of psychology are crazy 
about your theory of mind and all it illuminates.

> If the mechanism by which the physical universe makes me conscious is 
> Turing emulable, it is automatically already emulated in arithmetic, 
> through infinitely many occurrences, and the first person prediction 
> (physics) has to be a statistics on all (relative) computations.
>
> Mechanism just make precise and rigorous the old and antic “dream 
> argument”. The LARC experience is a stunning evidence for the existence of 
> the Higgs Boson, but not a proof, as I can conceive that I will wake up and 
> realised that this LARC stuff was just a dream. 
>

Same with any of your personal fictions. You want proof, then pull the 
trigger on any living entity you're attached to, and rationally, correctly, 
like the good, correct, universal number knowing what's going on: simply 
not care, it's all UD. Humanism affirms life while your confusions contain 
a death wish. See quantum immortality. 

> We cannot prove any ontological evidence from any experience, but of 
> course we can judge some evidences and accumulation of evidences making 
> some belief more plausible than other.
>

We know you can sit around and judge things for 20 years, but it's careless 
as you don't work on alternatives or refutation in the critical spirit of 
scientific inquiry. All self-validation under the guise of education. Why 
education actually? It's all just a dream, where any notion of 
responsibility or agency in the face of determinism is negated and written 
in stone. 

The concern for definitions and axioms only arose when you wanted to reason 
> about numbers too big to comprehend or write down.
>
>
>
> It happens when we search a (fundamental) theory. With Mechanism, we have 
> to derive physics from machine biology-psychology-theology, that is from 
> the mathematics of arithmetical self-reference (from qG1*) (G1= G + 
> (p->[]p).
>

That is like Shylock with the Venetians: 

*I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, 
senses, affections, passions; fed with the same food, hurt with the same 
weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and 
cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian is? If you prick us do 
we not bleed? If you tickle us do we not laugh? If you poison us do we not 
die? And if you wrong us shall we not revenge? If we are like you in the 
rest, we will resemble you in that. If a Jew wrong a Christian, what is his 
humility? Revenge. If a Christian wrong a Jew, what should his sufferance 
be by Christian example? Why, revenge. The villainy you teach me I will 
execute, and it shall go hard but I will better the instruction. *

So what if some reasoning is sound or correct in somebody's view? That's 
easy. Madmen and Nazis can do that. Finding explanations for everything is 
psychologically related to the ultimate, deluded, infinite confession: an 
apology for existing... which is kinda sad. 

Who needs a theory of mind, to explain it, when we can enjoy the privilege 
of whatever ride we appear to have left? PGC

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Re: The trouble with transporters

On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 6:54 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

*>Instead of capturing all of the information down to the atomic level,
> they suggested transmitting just the DNA information of a person, along
> with a brain state. If you had that information, you could presumably clone
> a person and then implant them with the mental state of their previous
> self. It's not exactly teleportation, but it gets the job done. Only, even
> that fraction of what makes up a person comes in at 2.6 tredecillion
> [10^42] bits. Which is, in scientific vernacular, several boatloads. The
> estimated time to transmit, using the standard 30 GHz microwave band used
> by communications satellites, would take 350,000 times longer than the age
> of the universe.*

What the hell! How in the world did you come up with those numbers?!  In
the entire human genome there are only 3 billion base pairs, there are 4
bases so each base can represent 2 bits, there are 8 bits per byte so that
comes out to 750 meg which you could fit on a old fashioned CD audio disk.
Yes you'd have to add memory to that genomic information but the human
retina can only transmit data at about 10^6 bits per second to the brain
and that is the most information rich of the senses. A billion seconds is
32 years so the brain of a man of that age would have received 10^15 bits
from his eyes. Even if every bit of that information had been retained in
long term memory, which virtually no brain researcher thinks is anywhere
close to being true, that is still ONE HELL OF A LONG WAY from 10^42!!

 John K Clark

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Re: The real numbers are not interpretable in the complex numbers as a field

2020-02-26 Thread Philip Thrift



On Wednesday, February 26, 2020 at 5:40:41 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Feb 2020, at 13:19, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> https://twitter.com/JDHamkins/status/1231910305439064064
>
> Theorem. The real numbers are not interpretable in the complex numbers as 
> a field.
>
> The result, well-known in model theory, often surprises mathematicians, 
> who sometimes expect to easily define R in C.  Yet, this isn't possible.
>
>
> That’s right.
>
> Nor can you define the natural number in any first order theory of the 
> real number. Yes, complex numbers and real numbers are imaginary tool that 
> the natural numbers cannot avoid when they try to understand themselves :)
>
> Bruno
>
>
> When I think of linking numbers and experiences I think of emoji code.

Every *emoji* is represented by a *code point* (a hexadecimal number, 
zero-padded up to at least four digits, like U+26C4). Because all 
JavaScript strings are internally (i.e. in browsers) represented in UTF-16, 
this means that each *code point*, in turn, can be represented by one or 
more 16-bit *code* unit .

https://meowni.ca/posts/emoji-emoji-emoji/




https://emojipedia.org/emoji/

😃 Every Emoji by Codepoint
😀 Grinning Face  U+1F600
😃 Grinning Face with Big Eyes  
U+1F603
😄 Grinning Face with Smiling Eyes 
 U+1F604
😁 Beaming Face with Smiling Eyes 
 U+1F601
😆 Grinning Squinting Face  
U+1F606
😅 Grinning Face with Sweat  
U+1F605
🤣 Rolling on the Floor Laughing 
 U+1F923
😂 Face with Tears of Joy  
U+1F602
🙂 Slightly Smiling Face  
U+1F642
🙃 Upside-Down Face  U+1F643
😉 Winking Face  U+1F609
😊 Smiling Face with Smiling Eyes 
 U+1F60A

...

@philipthrift

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The trouble with transporters

2020-02-26 Thread Philip Thrift



https://www.syfy.com/syfywire/star-treks-transporter-terrible-truth-science-behind-the-fiction


Instead of capturing all of the information down to the atomic level, they 
suggested transmitting just the DNA information of a person, along with a 
brain state. If you had that information, you could presumably clone a 
person and then implant them with the mental state of their previous self. 
It's not exactly teleportation, but it gets the job done.

Only, even that fraction of what makes up a person comes in at 2.6 
tredecillion [10^42] bits. Which is, in scientific vernacular, several 
boatloads.

The estimated time to transmit, using the standard 30 GHz microwave band 
used by communications satellites, would take 350,000 times longer than the 
age of the universe.

Boosting the bandwidth means boosting the power, and eventually you end up 
asking yourself why we didn't just take a shuttlecraft and avoid the hassle.

@philipthrift

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Re: The real numbers are not interpretable in the complex numbers as a field


> On 24 Feb 2020, at 13:19, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> https://twitter.com/JDHamkins/status/1231910305439064064
> 
> Theorem. The real numbers are not interpretable in the complex numbers as a 
> field.
> 
> The result, well-known in model theory, often surprises mathematicians, who 
> sometimes expect to easily define R in C.  Yet, this isn't possible.

That’s right.

Nor can you define the natural number in any first order theory of the real 
number. Yes, complex numbers and real numbers are imaginary tool that the 
natural numbers cannot avoid when they try to understand themselves :)

Bruno





> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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>  
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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.

> On 25 Feb 2020, at 12:43, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 10:26 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 24 Feb 2020, at 23:22, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 12:10 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 23:49, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> On Mon, Feb 24, 2020 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>> On 23 Feb 2020, at 04:11, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:

 I don't really understand your comment. I was thinking of Bruno's 
 WM-duplication. You could impose the idea that each duplication at each 
 branch point on every branch is an independent Bernoulli trial with p = 
 0.5 on this (success being defined arbitrarily as W or M). Then, if these 
 probabilities carry over from trial to trial, you end up with every binary 
 sequence, each with weight 1/2^N. Summing sequences with the same number 
 of 0s and 1s, you get the Pascal Triangle distribution that Bruno wants.

 The trouble is that such a procedure is entirely arbitrary. The only 
 probability that one could objectively assign to say, W, on each Bernoulli 
 trial is one,
>>> 
>>> That is certainly wrong. If you are correct, then P(W) = 1 is written in 
>>> the personal diary,
>>> 
>>> I did say "objectively assign". In other words, this was a 3p comment. You 
>>> confuse 1p with 3p yet again.
>> 
>> Well, if you “objectively” assign P(W) = 1, the guy in M will subjectively 
>> refute that prediction, and as the question was about the subjective 
>> accessible experience, he objectively, and predictably, refute your 
>> statement. 
>> 
>> 
>> And if you objectively assign p(W) = p(M) = 0.5, then with the W-guy and the 
>> M-guy will both say that your theory is refuted, since they both see only 
>> one city: W-guy, W with p = 1.0, and the M-guy, M with p =1.0..
> 
> That is *very* weird. That works for the coin tossing experience too, even 
> for the lottery. I predicted that I have 1/10^6 to win the lottery, but I was 
> wrong, after the gale was played I won, so the probability was one!
> 
> In Helsinki, the guy write P(W) = P(M) = 1/2. That means he does not yet know 
> what outcome he will feel to live. Once the experience is done, one copy will 
> see W, and that is coherent with his prediction, same for the others. He 
> would have written P(W) = 1, that would have been felt as refuted by the M 
> guy, and vice-versa.
> 
> But if he wrote p(W) = 0.9 and p(M) = 0.1 he would get exactly the same 
> result. The proposed probabilities are here without effect.

If I toss a perfect coin too.

Of course, that would lead directly to some problem with the iterated case 
scenario.

>> If not, tell me what is your prediction in Helsinki again, by keeping in 
>> mind that it concerns your future subjective experience only. 
>> 
>> 
>> In Helsinki I can offer no value for the probability since, given the 
>> protocol, I know that all probabilities will be realized on repetitions of 
>> the duplication.
> 
> In the 3p picture. Indeed, that is, by definition, the protocol. But the 
> question is not about where you will live after the experience (we know that 
> it will be in both cities), but what do you expect to live from the first 
> person perspective, and here P(W & M) is null, as nobody will ever *feel to 
> live* in both city at once with this protocole.
> 
> And, as I have repeated shown, the first person perspective does not give you 
> any expectations at all.

If I am duplicated like in the 2^(16180 * 1) * (60 * 90) * 24 “movie” 
scenario, I do expect seeing white noise, and I certainly don’t expect to see 
“2001, Space Odyssey” with Tibetan subtitle.

I am not sure what you mean by “the first person perspective does not give any 
expectations”.

Do you agree that if you are promised, in Helsinki, that a cup of coffee will 
be offered to you, both in M and W, you can expect, with probability one, to 
get a cup of coffee after pushing the button in Helsinki? (Assuming Mechanism, 
of course).

I would expect, in Helsinki,  to drink a cup of coffee with probability one 
(using this protocole and all default hypotheses, like no asteroids hurt the 
planet in the meantime, etc.).

And I would consider myself maximally ignorant if that coffee will be Russian 
or American coffee.

> 
> The experience is totally symmetrical in the 3p picture, but that symmetry is 
> broken from the 1p perspective of each copy. One will say “I feel to be in W, 
> and not in M” and the other will say “I feel to be in M and not in W”.
> 
> Regardless of any prior probability assignment.

Exactly. 

> 
> 
>> I cannot infer a probability from just one trial, but the probability I 
>> infer from N repetitions can be any value in [0,1].
> 
> But we try to find the probability from the theory.
> 
> And we use the exp

Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.



> On 25 Feb 2020, at 23:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 2/25/2020 8:53 AM, smitra wrote:
>> On 22-02-2020 01:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
>>> On 2/21/2020 4:00 PM, smitra wrote:
 On 16-02-2020 05:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
> On 2/15/2020 9:30 AM, smitra wrote:
> 
>> The main issue is unitary time evolution. This is a rather
>> unambiguous thing that one can check in experiments. A breakdown of
>> unitary time evolution has never been observed.
>> 
>> As Brent has pointed out, unitary evolution breaks down every time
>> we
>> observe a particular result for a measurement (to say nothing of
>> black
>> holes). Your focus on unitary evolution is misplaced -- it is not
>> universally observed.
> 
> This has no bearing on the unitary time evolution of an isolated
> system. We can infer from measurements that an isolated system does
> evolve in a unitary way. Non-unitary time evolution would violate the
> known laws of physics.
>>> 
>>> Only the "known" law that all time evolution is unitary.  In the
>>> Transactional interpretation there are random violations of unitary
>>> evolution, as there are GRW and other real collapse versions of QM.
>>> You, like most MWI proponents, assume your purist version is a "law of
>>> physics" when the whole question is "What are the laws physics."
>>> 
>>> Brent
>> 
>> When comparing different theories one has to weigh up the experimental 
>> evidence to see what theory fits the evidence the best. Normally we would 
>> consider theories that introduce new, as of yet unobserved physics when it's 
>> not clear that the theory solves a real problem, to be extremely 
>> speculative. This is the case for collapse theories, they introduce new 
>> physics that has never been observed, 
> 
> They would say nothing else has been observed.  Certainly multiple worlds 
> have not been observed. 

Nor as one world be observed. We observe a world, not the fact that it is 
unique. The number of worlds (0, 1, 2, …) is a problem in metaphysics, not in 
physics.



> The observation is always that there is a single result.

Yes. That’s why the W-guy needs some theory and confirmation to accept the 
existence of the M-guy, and without the quantum statistical interference, or 
without Mechanism in Cognitive Science, we would not discuss about many-worlds 
or many-histories, or many-computations, etc.

To take the observation of some reality as a proof that such reality exist 
ontologically, is equivalent with Aristotle's Materialism. The point of Plato 
was precisely that what we observe might be only one aspect of a deeper and 
simpler reality.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> and it's then a purported solution for an issue that's entirely 
>> philosophical, with no bearing on ordinary physics.
>> 
>> It's a bit like opposing Einstein's theory of relativity because of a 
>> dislike of having to abandon absolute time, and then having to introduce the 
>> ether which comes with a lot of potentially experimentally observable 
>> baggage that you then need to explain away.
>> 
>> Saibal
>> 
> 
> 
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Re: Wittgenstein's meta-philosophy


> On 25 Feb 2020, at 22:24, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 2/25/2020 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Feb 2020, at 03:29, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 2/23/2020 6:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 23 Feb 2020, at 01:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 2/22/2020 3:52 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, February 22, 2020 at 10:40:12 AM UTC-7, PGC wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, February 20, 2020 at 1:55:39 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 Feb 2020, at 01:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 2/19/2020 12:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
 
 
 Wittgenstein is at the core really of linguistic pragmatism 
 
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neopragmatism 
 
 
 Languages are tools. There is no truth "out there".
>>> 
>>> My view is that "true" means different things in different contexts. 
>> 
>> And in different modes (of self-reference). The platonists dis 
>> understand that the absolute truth requires faith in something beyond 
>> “my consciousness” or “consciousness” (to take into account Terren 
>> Suydam’ remark).
>> 
>> Wittgestein up to now still has the upper hand with those old arguments 
>> over anybody proposing science based ontological packages 
>> metaphysically: language will seduce people to overgeneralize, to 
>> confuse personal mysticism with reality, to engage in false 
>> equivalencies between terms used in formal contexts and everyday use of 
>> language, scientism etc. Slowly, yours truly is coming around to the 
>> idea that folks agreeing on ontology/reality/religion, which would guide 
>> research in some allegedly correct direction; spilling over positive 
>> effects into the world... that Wittgenstein may prove correct in that 
>> this is a confused product of muddled armchair thinking, not because of 
>> his generally negative stance, but because there seem to be positive 
>> developments out there that he couldn't have informed those arguments 
>> with.
>> 
>> I see/predict metaphysics shifting from the naive armchair forms of 
>> identity, reality, matter etc. practiced here on this list with profound 
>> erudition, walking in circles for 20 years now (Wittgenstein says 
>> thousands of years) to optimization and more efficient pursuit of value 
>> and benefit questions instead, through say orchestration of highly 
>> sophisticated forms of organization applied to education, governing, 
>> finance, technology, problem solving, applied or theoretical etc. that 
>> are permissionless, universally accessible, require no hierarchy of 
>> politics, charlatan experts, control freaks, their sycophants, and 
>> bibles of some Messiah achieving miracles such as eternal life, 
>> self-duplication etc.
>> 
>> Metaphysical setups that place less emphasis on truth, trust, power, 
>> control, or proof and more emphasis on "can entities such as ourselves 
>> be highly organized, solve specific survival problems over short and 
>> long terms, without trusting each other + instead assuming that folks 
>> will be opportunistic and idealistic?" Example: we don't agree on what 
>> reality may be, but we do agree on the need for habitable living space 
>> in the long term, nutrition, water, health, limiting self-destruction, 
>> expensive wars, standards of living etc. quite clearly. There ARE more 
>> appropriate politics and economics on the horizon. Metaphysics here, 
>> shifting our old-school conceptions of what first principles are, and 
>> you'd refute Wittgenstein instead of running from him. Engineering 
>> incentive and not what the game is but how the game of life on this 
>> planet could be. 
>>  
>> 
>> About this, it is clear to me that in “I think thus I am”, Descartes use 
>> the “first person” I. Indeed he start from the doubt. Dubito ergo 
>> cogito, cogito ergo sum. Descartes did not prove the existence of 
>> Descartes, bit of his own consciousness, hoping others can do the same 
>> reasoning for themselves. Consciousness always refer to a first person 
>> experience implicitly: like God (truth) it is not a thing.
>> 
>> You concede to Terren that "true means different things in different 
>> contexts" but everyday like clockwork you still barrage the list with 
>> your use of "large truth, 3p, reality that cannot be named, mechanism is 
>> incompatible with physicalism" and all the rest of it. I used to wo

Re: Wittgenstein's meta-philosophy