Brent Meeker writes:
> > Is the duplication process good enough to match or better the mechanisms naturally in place to> > preserve the functional integrity of the brain from moment to moment? That is the question that> > needs to be answered. It would be unreasonable to speculate that the dupl
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>> If the duplicate did not feel he was the original, then he wouldn't have
>>> "all the memories
>>> and personality of the original", would he?
>>
>> Well that's the question isn't it. Is there something besides memories and
>> persona
Brent Meeker writes:
> > If the duplicate did not feel he was the original, then he wouldn't have
> > "all the memories and personality of the original", would he?
>
> Well that's the question isn't it. Is there something besides memories and
> personality that makes
> you you. Could you f
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP)
>
> > > I don't understand why you [Bruno Marchal] say
> >
> > "if duplication (at any level) is a death sentence, then comp is wrong".
> > > There must be a *minimal* level of duplication fidelity below which
> > > conscious
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP)
> > I don't understand why you [Bruno Marchal] say > > "if duplication (at any level) is a death sentence, then comp is wrong". > > There must be a *minimal* level of duplication fidelity below which > > consciousness/intelligence is not preserved, no? Or are yo
--- Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>SNIP previous<
> I we actually tried duplication, then as in all
> communication technologies, there would be errors
> and the duplication would not be perfect. But then
> the question arises, could the duplicate have
> all the memories and person
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
>
> > > Of course, it is not possible for a third person observer to be
> > > certain about first person mental states, and this woul
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
> > Of course, it is not possible for a third person observer to be > > certain about first person mental states, and this would apply to our > > teleportee: he may feel as if he is the same person as he was prior to > > the procedure, but he might be wron
Le 25-juin-06, à 10:51, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>>
>> From a logical point of view it is consistent (possible) that the one
>> reconstituted is a zombie (although this would contradict comp or the
>> choice of the level).
>
> It depends on what we mean by "all the appropriate mental and p
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > Lee,
> >
> > It’s perhaps unfortunate that we are arguing about this because I
> > think we basically agree on what Derek Parfit has called a
> > reductionist theory of personal identity (in his 1984 book “Reasons
> > and Persons”; apparently “reductionist” was no
I do apologise for my computer getting stuck in the past. I'm posting
this from Linux running under VMWare running under Windows XP. It
seems this arrangement leads to temporal paradox whenever the computer
hibernates...
Cheers
On Thu, Jun 22, 2006 at 07:08:07AM +1000, Russell Standish wrote:
>
On Sat, Jun 24, 2006 at 08:30:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 2) We are type, not token. There is no physical token. (with comp).
> Parfit thinks we are token. I have not the Parfit under the hand, I
> will give you the pages later. I don't think there are any mathematical
> token either. It
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 23-juin-06, à 07:29, George Levy a écrit :
In Bruno's calculus what are the invariances? (Comment on Tom Caylor's
post)
Logicians, traditionally, are interested in deduction invariant with
respect of the interpretation. A typical piece of log
I comment a Post by Stathis addressed to Lee and I end up with a question to Hal.
Le 24-juin-06, à 15:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Lee,
It’s perhaps unfortunate that we are arguing about this because I think we basically agree on what Derek Parfit has called a reductionist theory of pe
Le 21-juin-06, à 11:19, Russell Standish a écrit :
>
> On Thu, Jun 22, 2006 at 10:29:30PM -0700, George Levy wrote:
>> In Bruno's calculus what are the invariances? (Comment on Tom
>> Caylor's post)
>
> The main one relates to universal computation. For example, the coding
> theorem states that
Le 23-juin-06, à 06:51, Lee Corbin a écrit :
> Now the version of me who continues on Earth *would* be very
> unhappy (though he would become used to it) if each second .
> percent of him was taken away to hell forever. This is because
> I must anticipate being in hell (just as you are sayin
Le 23-juin-06, à 07:29, George Levy a écrit :
> In Bruno's calculus what are the invariances? (Comment on Tom Caylor's
> post)
Logicians, traditionally, are interested in deduction invariant with
respect of the interpretation. A typical piece of logic is that: from
"p & q" you can infer "p"
Le 24-juin-06, à 07:19, Colin Hales a écrit :
>
> Hi,
>
> [ALL]
> Lee, I seem to have miss-attributed the source of my guffaw that lead
> to my
> little outburst to Bruno. Apologies to all as appropriate... :-)
That's what I call a "scientific attitude". Doing errors, discovering
them, admit
ps.com> Subject: RE: A calculus of personal identity> Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2006 16:45:41 -0700> > > Stathis writes> > > Perhaps it would help if I spoke about my computer rather > > than myself. Clearly, its physical state changes from moment > > to moment: the ph
Hi,
[ALL]
Lee, I seem to have miss-attributed the source of my guffaw that lead to my
little outburst to Bruno. Apologies to all as appropriate... :-)
[John Mikes]
> Brent, Colin and Bruno:
> I had my decade-long struggle on 3-4 discussion lists (~psych and ~Physx)
> about "objective reality" be
And please, take into account that the "model" you talked about is not
fixed, it is a snapshot "at a time" and changes continually into different
occurring characteristics. So our conclusions are temporary-based.
It is hard to do "science" with such premises, but who s
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
>>Bruno writes
>
>
>
>>>I see what you mean and I agree with you, but now, you were again
>>>talking about third person description of the first person point of
>>>view (I will write 1-pov, 3-pov, ...).
>>
>>Yes. I find that the 1st person accounts to be pretty s
>
> Bruno writes
>> I see what you mean and I agree with you, but now, you were again
>> talking about third person description of the first person point of
>> view (I will write 1-pov, 3-pov, ...).
>
> Yes. I find that the 1st person accounts to be pretty subjective,
> actually. They also le
On Thu, Jun 22, 2006 at 10:29:30PM -0700, George Levy wrote:
> In Bruno's calculus what are the invariances? (Comment on Tom Caylor's post)
The main one relates to universal computation. For example, the coding
theorem states that complexity measures will differ by at most a
constant, regardless
Lee Corbin wrote:
>I find that the 1st person accounts to be pretty subjective,
>actually. They also lead to inconsistencies and unnecessary
>differences of opinion.
>
Interestingly the geocentric Aristotelian system was replaced by the
heliocentric Copernican system. Then Relativity and Quantu
Bruno writes
> >> BM: In that case I would say there is (at first sight)
> >> 999/1000 that in the next minute I will be the one
> >> sent in the place P, so that in the "long run", there
> >> is almost no chance I continue my normal life. I will be
> >> upset.
> >
> > LC: I would say that you wi
Stathis writes
> Perhaps it would help if I spoke about my computer rather
> than myself. Clearly, its physical state changes from moment
> to moment: the phosphors on the screen, the position of the
> hard disk, the electrical activity in the CPU...
> changing the CPU or the hard disk or the
Le 21-juin-06, à 08:13, Lee Corbin a écrit :
snip
>
>> BM: In that case I would say there is (at first sight) 999/1000 that
>> in
>> next minute I will be the one send in the place P, so that in the
>> "long
>> run", there is almost no chance I continue my normal life. I will be
>> upset.
>
>
Le 21-juin-06, à 08:04, Lee Corbin a écrit :
> What is fain unutterable is that one might be in two
> places at the same time, that is, that each is a fully
> legitimate continuation of the other. That goes against
> our instincts.
I would say that what is really unutterable is that one might *
Lee Corbin writes:
> > Actually, my personal view is that *none* of my copies > > are me, whether in the future, the past, in a parallel > > universe or coming out of a teleporter in this universe.> > Of course, you realize the cost to our communication the> taking of this stance entails. I do k
Stathis writes
> Lee Corbin writes:
> > Well, people here are prepared to accept that at each
> > moment the universe splits into innumerable copies,
> > that physics is governed by equations that Feynman
> > (erroneously IMO) says nobody can understand, and
> > our lives are not as they appear
Lee Corbin writes:
> Well, people here are prepared to accept that at each> moment the universe splits into innumerable copies,> that physics is governed by equations that Feynman> (erroneously IMO) says nobody can understand, and> our lives are not as they appear, but are composed> of ensemble
Brent Meeker writes:
> I wonder if our sense of identiy is more dependent on the world than we suppose. I recall reading> somewhere, in the 1960's when sensory deprivation experiments were "the new thing", that people who> stayed in the sensory deprivation tanks more than an hour or so found t
Bruno writes
> > [In the case of thousands of copies being made
> > each second, and all but one annihilated after
> > whatever... a microsecond will do]
> > No important difference exists between one person
> > to whom this is happening, and his neighbor to
> > whom it is not. They both feel sim
Stathis writes
> > No important difference exists between one person
> > to whom this is happening, and his neighbor to
> > whom it is not. They both feel similarly, and
> > by hypothesis lead very similar lives.
> If we had evolved in a world where multiple copies of
> people exist at the same
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Tom Caylor writes:
>
> > Without really getting into your thought experiment, I want to ask a
> > question. What does it mean to "experience a minute of continuous
> > consciousness"? OK, we have a biological clock that gives us a rough
> > sense of relative pa
Le 20-juin-06, à 09:43, Lee Corbin a écrit :
>
> I have before stated my long-held opinions on this,
> namely that it's best to regard one's duplicates
> as self. As a corollary, the "you" that ends up
> in one place is "100% you" and so is the other.
If you meant by self "my third person self
Lee Corbin writes:
> I have before stated my long-held opinions on this,> namely that it's best to regard one's duplicates> as self. As a corollary, the "you" that ends up> in one place is "100% you" and so is the other.> > Consider this alternative experiment: we reveal to> you that every minu
Tom Caylor writes:
> Without really getting into your thought experiment, I want to ask a> question. What does it mean to "experience a minute of continuous> consciousness"? OK, we have a biological clock that gives us a rough> sense of relative passing of time. But I don't think you maintai
I have before stated my long-held opinions on this,
namely that it's best to regard one's duplicates
as self. As a corollary, the "you" that ends up
in one place is "100% you" and so is the other.
Consider this alternative experiment: we reveal to
you that every minute of the last two years you h
On Mon, Jun 19, 2006 at 12:17:47PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Actually, the marquis de Sade (a famous mechanist philosopher, alas
> also, following la Mettrie, a famous materialist!) actually reason like
> that. If you expect to be demented or just to be dead, nothing between
> now and th
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Finally, a variation on the type of thought experiments we have been
> discussing (I'd be surprised if someone hasn't already brought this up
> sometime, but I don't recall seeing it). We agree that if someone spends a
> minute in Brussels, then is destructively
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > rather, it has been so fundamental to our evolution that it has a
> > tenacity at the visceral level that is only otherwise seen in the
> > delusions of the psychotic patient. But evolution has not had to cope
> > with teleportation, mind duplication, duplication with
Le 18-juin-06, à 15:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I should clarify, I have taken "amnesia in Moscow" as meaning that you arrive in Moscow with a proportion of your pre-teleportation memories missing, so that total amnesia would mean you are unconscious or in a vegetative state, as after a sev
Le 17-juin-06, à 14:41, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
The problem hinges on an answer to the question, what criteria must be satisfied for two instantiations of a person to be the "same" person? In the world with which we are familiar, most people would agree that there is an objectively right
I should clarify, I have taken "amnesia in Moscow" as meaning that you arrive in Moscow with a proportion of your pre-teleportation memories missing, so that total amnesia would mean you are unconscious or in a vegetative state, as after a severe head injury. On re-reading, I see that you probabl
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