Le 22-mai-05, à 17:03, Stathis Papaioannou wrote (in part):
The response of those who think that consciousness is nothing special
to the above is that it is not surprising that there is a difference
between a description of an object and the object itself, and that
what I have called
Stathis: Now, I think you
will agree (although Jonathan Colvin may not) that despite this
excellent understanding of the processes giving rise to human
conscious experience, the aliens may still have absolutely no idea
what the experience is actually like.
Jonathan Colvin: No, I'd
**
Interleaving;
***
Bruno: But we can photosynthesize. And we can
understand why we
cannot travel at the speed of light. All this by
using purely
3-person description of those phenomena in some
theory.
Lee,
What you are describing here is panpsychism. If I insist that it is
impossible to know whether and in what way an entity is conscious without
actually *being* that entity oneself, then to be consistent I have to admit
that anything and everything might be conscious. OK; I admit it;
Stathis writes
If I insist that it is impossible to know whether and in
what way an entity is conscious without actually *being*
that entity oneself, then to be consistent I have to admit
that anything and everything might be conscious. OK; I
admit it; technically, I'm a panpsychist.
Stathis writes
photon or to *be* a tree photosynthesising. Most people would say that
photons and trees aren't conscious, and therefore they *can* be entirely
understood from a 3rd person perspective.
On this list?? You think that most people *here* presume that
photons and trees are not
Lee,
There are some things that can be known by examination of an object, and
there are other things that can only be known by being the object. When the
object is a human brain, this latter class of things is consciousness. (When
the object is something else, this latter class of thing is...
Le 22-mai-05, à 10:13, Lee Corbin a écrit :
[Stathis] Perhaps this is true, but it is
not logically consistent to say that it must be true and still
maintain the
1st person/ 3rd person distinction we have been discussing. This is
because
the whole point of the distinction is that it is not
Stathis writes
There are some things that can be known by examination of an object, and
there are other things that can only be known by being the object.
Okay; but some examples are probably necessary. (1) Only Mozart can
know what it's like for the Mozart auditory system to hear C-sharp
on
Stathis:
People certainly seem to take their consciousness seriously
on this list!
I've now managed to alienate both the consciousness doesn't
really exist
and the it exists and we can explain it factions. I did not
mean that there is no explanation possible for consciousness.
It is
On Fri, May 20, 2005 at 05:39:42AM -0700, James N Rose wrote:
Agreed that colour is not a characteristic of an object in itself. How
does this impact on the debate, however?
Russell,
Realize first that you just easily and aggreably opted to completely negate
Platonic 'real v.
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Stathis:
People certainly seem to take their consciousness seriously
on this list!
I've now managed to alienate both the consciousness doesn't
really exist
and the it exists and we can explain it factions. I did not
mean that there is no explanation possible for
Le 21-mai-05, à 08:31, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Stathis:
People certainly seem to take their consciousness seriously
on this list!
I've now managed to alienate both the consciousness doesn't
really exist
and the it exists and we can explain it factions. I did not
mean that there is no
Le 21-mai-05, à 15:48, Bruno Marchal a écrit :
Le 21-mai-05, à 08:31, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Stathis:
People certainly seem to take their consciousness seriously
on this list!
I've now managed to alienate both the consciousness doesn't
really exist
and the it exists and we can explain
Stathis writes
I did not
mean that there is no explanation possible for consciousness.
It is likely that in the course of time the neuronal
mechanisms behind the phenomenon will be worked out and it
will be possible to build intelligent, conscious machines.
Imagine that advanced
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Stathis:
People certainly seem to take their consciousness seriously
on this list!
I've now managed to alienate both the consciousness doesn't
really exist
and the it exists and we can explain it factions. I did not
mean that there is no explanation possible for
Le 22-mai-05, à 06:29, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Stathis:
People certainly seem to take their consciousness seriously
on this list!
I've now managed to alienate both the consciousness doesn't
really exist
and the it exists and we can explain it factions. I did not
Le 20-mai-05, à 02:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others) refer to as
qualia, you refer to as the difference between a description of a
thing and being the thing. I hate the word dualism as much as you do
(because of the implication that
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, May 19, 2005 at 07:29:33AM -0700, James N Rose wrote:
I would like to gather everyone's attention to point to
an essential conceptual error that exists in the current
debating points of this topic, which in fact has been
an egregious error in logic for
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 20-mai-05, à 02:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others) refer to as
qualia, you refer to as the difference between a description of a thing
and being the thing. I hate the word dualism as much as you do (because
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
[quoting Stathis]
My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the
duplicated system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I
became one with the new system by direct neural interface. I
don't have to go to such lengths to learn about the new
system's mass,
Le 19-mai-05, à 14:44, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
[quoting Stathis]
My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the
duplicated system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I
became one with the new system by direct neural interface. I
don't have to go to
I would like to gather everyone's attention to point to
an essential conceptual error that exists in the current
debating points of this topic, which in fact has been
an egregious error in logic for the past 2500 years,
ever since Plato.
Recent postings cite:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
[quoting Stathis]
My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the
duplicated
system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I became
one with
the new system by direct neural interface. I don't have to
go to such
lengths to learn about the new system's mass, volume,
OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others) refer to as
qualia, you refer to as the difference between a description of a thing and
being the thing. I hate the word dualism as much as you do (because of the
implication that we may end up philosophically in the 16th century if we
: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 6:22 PM
Subject: RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
snip
Stathis: Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever
meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing?
My argument (which
On Thu, May 19, 2005 at 07:29:33AM -0700, James N Rose wrote:
I would like to gather everyone's attention to point to
an essential conceptual error that exists in the current
debating points of this topic, which in fact has been
an egregious error in logic for the past 2500 years,
ever since
Yes, this is what I meant. What it is like to be something can only be
answered from the 1st person perspective.
--Stathis
Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever meaningfully include
what it is like to be that thing?
What do you mean by include ? Does the artificial brain
Stathis: OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others)
refer to as qualia, you refer to as the difference between a
description of a thing and being the thing. I hate the word
dualism as much as you do (because of the implication that
we may end up philosophically in the
- Original Message -
From: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Jonathan Colvin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Thursday, May 19, 2005 10:23 PM
Subject: Re: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Dear Jonathan,
A mental fiction indeed, but one that we can not just imagine away
This fits in well: the philosopher of consciousness and mathematician,
David Chalmers, coined the phrase:
Experience is information from the inside; Physics is information from
the outside.
Which I quite like. It's in his book The Conscious Mind: towards a
fundamental theory which is heavy going,
Stathis writes
I was using the term information loosely, to include what is commonly
termed qualia, subjective experience etc. I agree that if a physical system
is fully specified, then that is all you need in order to duplicate or
emulate the system. The new system will do everything the
Sent: Wednesday, May 18, 2005 3:07 AM
Subject: RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Stathis writes
I was using the term information loosely, to include what is commonly
termed qualia, subjective experience etc. I agree that if a physical
system
is fully specified, then that is all
Stathis: I agree with Lee's and Jonathan's comments, except that I
think there is something unusual about first person
experience/ qualia/ consciousness in that there is an aspect
that cannot be communicated unless you experience it (a blind
man cannot know what it is like to see, no
Le 17-mai-05, à 09:06, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I agree with Lee's and Jonathan's comments, except that I think there
is something unusual about first person experience/ qualia/
consciousness in that there is an aspect that cannot be communicated
unless you experience it (a blind man
Le 17-mai-05, à 09:56, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Is it any
stranger that a blind man can not see, than that a description of a
billiard
ball's properties (weight, diameter, colour etc) can not bruise me?
It is different with comp. because a description of you + a description
of billiard ball,
Jonathan,
Your post suggests to me a neat way to define what is special about first
person experience: it is the gap in information between what can be known
from a description of an object and what can be known from being the object
itself. This is a personal thing, but I think it is at least
Stathis: Your post suggests to me a neat way to define what is special
about first person experience: it is the gap in information
between what can be known from a description of an object and
what can be known from being the object itself.
But how can being an object provide any extra
Jonathan contrasts descriptions and what the descriptions describe:
Stathis: Your post suggests to me a neat way to define what is special
about first person experience: it is the gap in information
between what can be known from a description of an object and
what can be known from
Stathis wrote
[Here is] a neat way to define what is special about first
person experience: it is the gap in information between what can be known
from a description of an object and what can be known from being the object
itself. This is a personal thing, but I think it is at least a
no idea what it is like to see. However, what reason is there to
extrapolate from this that there must be some special explanation for the
interaction between body and mind? What do you lose if you simply accept,
as per Gilbert Ryle, that the mind is what the brain does? Otherwise, you
could
visual perception, but still have
no idea what it is like to see. However, what reason is there to
extrapolate from this that there must be some special explanation for the
interaction between body and mind? What do you lose if you simply accept,
as per Gilbert Ryle, that the mind is what the brain
Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2005 9:07 PM
Subject: RE: What do you lose if you simply accept...
Dear Stephen,
I have to confess that the mathematical intricacies of Chu spaces are
quite beyond me. However
Lee corbin wrote: Pratt's disdain follows from the obvious failures of
other models.
It does not take a logician or mathematician or philosopher of
unbelievable IQ to see that the models of monism that have
been advanced have a fatal flaw:
the inability to prove the necessity of
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