John
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 6:01 PM
Subject: RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
John,
We need to have some sort of system for sorting the wrong beliefs from
Jone Mikes writes:
Stathis: wise words. (I find your Elvis - Jesus parable exaggerated).
Not really: the people who claim they saw Elvis after his alleged death are
more
numerous and more credible than the second-hand (at best) Biblical accounts of
Jesus being sighted after his
Le 08-janv.-07, à 05:36, Tom Caylor a écrit :
Do you recognize the problem of evil,
and if so, what do you believe is the solution? Do you think that the
MWI is the key to the solution?
What or who is Jesus in the MWI? Is Jesus described by a quantum wave
function? If yes, did God send
Interleaving in bold
John
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 4:55 AM
Subject: RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Tom Caylor writes:
---SKIP
Stathis Papaioannou
thing: are you atheistic or agnostic about Santa
Claus?
Stathis Papaioannou
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2007 09:19:08 -0500
Interleaving in bold
John
Tom Caylor writes:
So you believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God? What I was hoping
is that
you would say Muhammed was deluded or lying, so that the Qur'an is at best an
impressive piece of literature with some interesting moral teachings: i.e.,
what atheists
say about
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
So you believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God? What I was
hoping is that
you would say Muhammed was deluded or lying, so that the Qur'an is at best
an
impressive piece of literature with some interesting moral teachings: i.e.,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological
solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us
and who we really are meant to be. Since we were made in the image
Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. Now, if you accept, if only just for the sake of the argument, the
mechanist hypothesis, then you will see there could be an explanation
why you feel necessary to postulate such a personal God. But then I
must agree this explanation is more coherent with
Tom Caylor wrote:
So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological
solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us
and who we really are meant to be. Since we were made in the image of
the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into
Tom,
It seems you are doing to the arithmetical hypostases what Augustin did
to Plotinus's hypostases, including a relation between the three
primary hypostases and trinity (criticized by many scholars, note).
Roughly speaking, I can agree, except that I cannot put any singular
name in a
Tom Caylor wrote:
So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological
solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us
and who we really are meant to be. Since we were made in the image of
the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological
solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us
and who we really are meant to be. Since we were made in the image of
the personal God, then with the
Tom Caylor wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological
solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us
and who we really are meant to be. Since we were made in the image of
the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological
solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us
and who we really are meant to be. Since we were made in the image of
the personal God, then
Le 29-déc.-06, à 16:41, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Bruno -
It appears that you and I have essential agreement on our higher-level
epistemology.
It is possible. Note that in general those who appreciates the
hypotheses I build on, does not like so much the conclusion, and vice
versa, those
Le 29-déc.-06, à 10:57, Tom Caylor a écrit :
Just to clear this up, my above statement was not meant to be an
argument. I purposefully used the word entail rather than imply. I
wasn't saying that you cannot believe in some kind of truth without
believing in the personal God. However is
Brent Meeker wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is
something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
me to address, just bring it back up.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-d c.-06, 19:54, Tom Caylor a crit :
Le 27-déc.-06, à 23:40, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit :
All meaning is necessarily within context.
OK, but all context could make sense only to
some universal meaning. I mean I don't know,
it is difficult.
But this can be
Jef Allbright writes:
My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is
willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there
is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but
even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human
I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is
something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
me to address, just bring it back up.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-d c.-06, 19:54, Tom Caylor a crit :
On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL
Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
[TC]
My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and
we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the
absence of hope.
[BM]
Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting
your
Hi Jef,
Please, don't hesitate to skip the remarks you could find a bit too
technical, but which could help others who know perhaps a bit more on G
and G*, which are theories which I use to tackle many questions in this
list. You can come back on those remarks if ever
you got time and
Le 28-déc.-06, à 21:54, Brent Meeker a écrit : (to Jef)
I think objective should just be understood as denoting subjective
agreement from different viewpoints.
Curiosuly enough perhaps I could agree if you were saying physically
objective can be understood as denoting subjective
Bruno -
It appears that you and I have essential agreement on our higher-level
epistemology.
But I don't know much about your comp so I'll begin reading.
- Jef
Bruno Marchal wrote:
With increasing context of self-awareness, subjective values
increasingly resemble principles of the
Le 29-déc.-06, à 10:57, Tom Caylor a écrit :
I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is
something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
me to address, just bring it back up.
No problem, Tom. In fact I will print your post and read it
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
My personal experience is that there's no paradox
at all if one is willing to fully accept that within
any framework of description there is absolutely
no difference at all between a person and a
zombie, but even the most philosophically
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I realised when I was about 12 or 13 years old that there
could not be any ultimate meaning. I was very pleased and
excited with this discovery, and ran around trying to explain
it to people (mostly drawing blank looks, as I remember).
It seemed to me just another
Thanks Bruno. Much of your terminology at this point escapes me.
I do see that a small part of our differences below are simply due to the
imprecision of language (and my somewhat sloppy writing.)
I also sense that at the core of much of this discussion is the idea that, although we are
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is
willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there
is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but
even the most philosophically
Tom Caylor wrote:
I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is
something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
me to address, just bring it back up.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 26-d c.-06, 19:54, Tom Caylor a crit :
On Dec 26, 9:51 am,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):
[TC]
My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and
we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the
absence of hope.
[BM]
Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You
Le 27-déc.-06, à 20:11, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his
Brent Meeker writes:
It's a strange quality of delusions that psychotic people are even more
certain of their truth than non-deluded people are certain of things
which have reasonable empirical evidence in their favour.
Yet this seems understandable. The psychotic person is believing
On Fri, 2006-12-29 at 00:37 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person will give
you his reasons for his belief:
[...]
This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite
evidence in support
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious
convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a
point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence
is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief.
On 12/28/06, Johnathan Corgan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Fri, 2006-12-29 at 00:37 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person
will give
you his reasons for his belief:
[...]
This is very similar to the arguments of people with
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Although we all share the illusion of a direct and
immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can
you claim that it actually is real?
Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message,
imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the
fixed point of doubt. If we
Jef Allbright wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of
consciousness, on what basis can
you claim that it actually is real?
Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message,
imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the
fixed
Brent Meeker wrote:
Jef Allbright wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Although we all share the illusion of a direct
and immediate sense of consciousness, on what
basis can you claim that it actually is real?
Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message,
imo, of Descartes diagonal
Brent Meeker writes:
This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious
convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a
point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence
is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief.
Jef Allbright writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in
communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express
this belief of his in
Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky):
Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no
discoverable truth, then how
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky):
Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no
Le 26-déc.-06, à 23:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single
self that maintains beliefs.
Is this not a bit self-defeating? It has the form of a belief. Now I
can still
Le 27-déc.-06, à 01:52, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true,
right? We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should
always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever
we fancy.
This is a key
Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in
communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would
Le 26-déc.-06, à 19:54, Tom Caylor a écrit :
On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit :
The crux is that he is not symbolic...
I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
evidences for the idea that
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should
be what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack of
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack of precision, or
Jef Allbright wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack
Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should
be what is true, right?
I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my
Brent Meeker writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky):
Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
no truth that we can discover. But on the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit :
All meaning is necessarily within context.
OK, but all context could make sense only to
some universal meaning. I mean I don't know,
it is difficult.
But this can be seen in a very consistent way. The significance of
Jef Allbright writes:
I said might because there is one case where I am certain
of the truth, which is that I am having the present
experience.
Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of
consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jef Allbright writes:
I said might because there is one case where I am certain of the
truth, which is that I am having the present experience.
Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of
consciousness, on what basis can you claim
Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit :
It looks like I might have timed out. Hopefully this doesn't appear
two times.
On Dec 24, 8:55 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :
Bruno,
...
I believe the answer to the question, What is
On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit :
The crux is that he is not symbolic...
I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of
any clear
I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single
self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each
person is constantly switching among various different ways to think
in which different assertions,
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2006 14:59:17 -0800
I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?
I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in
communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express
this belief of his in the form of a tautology.
On Dec 26, 3:59 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single
self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each
person is constantly switching among
Bruno,
I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases. There is a lot
to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post
on
Tom Caylor writes:
Bruno,
I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases. There is a lot
to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses
Le 23-déc.-06, à 15:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno marchal writes:
Even if it is presented as good for society, the child may accept
that because of feelings of empathy for others.
OK. Note that such an empathy is hard wired in our biological
constitution. Many mammals seems
Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :
Bruno,
I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases. There is a lot
to say, but I'll start by
Le 24-déc.-06, à 11:49, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an
objective basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that
when I say I feel or desire something, this is an empirical statement:
either I do feel it or I am
On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
Bruno,
I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases.
It looks like I might have timed out. Hopefully this doesn't appear
two times.
On Dec 24, 8:55 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :
Bruno,
...
I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked
Jesus, was standing
Thanks for the explanations. I am astonished about all children being
psychopathic: I guess you mean very young one?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
To be fair that term isn't normally used for children due to its pejorative
connotations, but I think it is close to the truth.
Tom Caylor writes:
On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
Bruno,
I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
and the Christian
Tom Caylor writes:
It is the ultimate irony that Jesus was taken to be blaspheming when he
said he was one with the Father and before Abraham was, I AM, for
no one can say that they are God. the mistake is the missing
phrase at the end: ...except God.
Yes, but what if Jesus was not God?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
Bruno,
I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts
on the
Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom Caylor writes:
It is the ultimate irony that Jesus was taken to be blaspheming when he
said he was one with the Father and before Abraham was, I AM, for
no one can say that they are God. the mistake is the missing
phrase at the end: ...except God.
Yes,
Brent Meeker wrote:
That raises a fundamental question - should we believe what's
true? Of course in general we don't know what's true and we
never know it with certainity. But we do know some things,
in the scientific, provisional sense. And we also have
certain values which, as Jef
Bruno marchal writes:
Even if it is presented as good for society, the child may accept that
because of feelings of empathy for others.
OK. Note that such an empathy is hard wired in our biological
constitution. Many mammals seems to have it at some degree. Some form
of autism are
Le 20-déc.-06, à 19:06, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 19-déc.-06, à 21:32, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my
methodology
to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is
famous for its
Le 19-déc.-06, à 21:32, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my
methodology
to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is
famous for its many paradoxical thoughts.
It is certainly not a reductio against comp,
Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:04, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other
ethical principles or commandments from God:
With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp
(and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:04, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other
ethical principles or commandments from God:
With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp
(and God = +/-
Le 17-déc.-06, à 03:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Democratic system are
more
efficient to explore the political landscape and thus more efficient
in
probability to satisfy soul's natural attraction toward the
good.
The soul's natural attraction towards the good might be compared
Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other
ethical principles or commandments from God:
With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp
(and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in
the name of God is
1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
One thing Schaeffer did was remind us that the assumptions of nature
and cause were foundational to modern science.
More prevalent on the Christian Right is the Dominionist idea, shared
by Reconstructionists, that Christians alone are Biblically mandated to
Bruno Marchal writes:
The analogous statements are:
a1. umbrellas keep you dry
a2. feeding the poor reduces their suffering
We can agree on the definition of the words and on the facts asserted.
If
there is disagreement on the definition, for example if you were
thinking of
Le 16-déc.-06, à 03:49, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 15-déc.-06, à 02:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Who says the Nazis are wrong when they assert they are good?
I was not saying that they were wrong. I was saying that they were
bad.
Who says this? All
Tom Caylor wrote:
One thing Schaeffer did was remind us that the assumptions of nature
and cause were foundational to modern science.
More prevalent on the Christian Right is the Dominionist idea, shared
by Reconstructionists, that Christians alone are Biblically mandated to
occupy all
Democratic system are
more
efficient to explore the political landscape and thus more efficient
in
probability to satisfy soul's natural attraction toward the good.
The soul's natural attraction towards the good might be compared to
the body's
natural attraction to keep dry.
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
There are several differences between the axioms of ethics and aesthetics
on
the one hand and those of logic, mathematics and science on the other.
One is
that you can bet that any sentient species would arrive at exactly the
same rules
Le 15-déc.-06, à 02:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Who says the Nazis are wrong when they assert they are good?
I was not saying that they were wrong. I was saying that they were bad.
Who says this? All self-referentially correct machine sufficnetly rich
to prove elementary theorems in
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP):
There are several differences between the axioms of ethics and aesthetics
on
the one hand and those of logic, mathematics and science on the other.
One is
that you can bet that any sentient species would arrive at
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 15-déc.-06, à 02:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Who says the Nazis are wrong when they assert they are good?
I was not saying that they were wrong. I was saying that they were bad.
Who says this? All self-referentially correct machine sufficnetly rich
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2006 05:10:43 -0800
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 12-déc.-06, à 11:16, Stathis
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 13-déc.-06, à 02:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
OK, but the point is that the basic definition of bad is arbitrary.
Perhaps, but honestly I am not sure. In acomp, we can define a (very
platonist) notion of bad. The simpler and stronger one is just the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter,
We can discuss any subject rationally if we agree on axioms, but the problem
is that
in matters of value, those axioms are ultimately arbitrary.
So you say. I don't agree.
I believe that capital
punishment is wrong; not because it is not a good
Le 14-déc.-06, à 11:43, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
But there is no true/false in saying that torture is bad, unless there
is another
hidden assumption such as causing gratuitous suffering is bad, in
which case
the question becomes, why is causing gratuitous suffering bad?
Ultimately
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Tom,
The question I am interested in is not whether it would be a *good thing* for
a
personal God to exist, but whether it is *the case* that a personal God
exists.
There are all sorts of things that people would like to be true, but that
does not
make them
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter,
We can discuss any subject rationally if we agree on axioms, but the problem
is that
in matters of value, those axioms are ultimately arbitrary. I believe that
capital
punishment is wrong; not because it is not a good deterrent, or because it is
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 13-déc.-06, à 02:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
OK, but the point is that the basic definition of bad is arbitrary.
Perhaps, but honestly I am not sure. In acomp, we can define a (very
platonist) notion of bad. The simpler and
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 13-déc.-06, à 02:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
OK, but the point is that the basic definition of bad is arbitrary.
Perhaps, but honestly I am not sure. In acomp, we can define a (very
platonist) notion of bad. The simpler and
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Date: Thu, 14 Dec 2006 05:52:59 -0800
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Peter,
We can discuss any subject
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