Re: Holiday Exercise

On 2/08/2016 3:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Aug 2016, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett wrote: Consider ordinary consequences of introspection: I can be conscious of several unrelated things at once. I can be driving my car, conscious of the road and traffic conditions (and responding to them

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Tuesday, 2 August 2016, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 2/08/2016 3:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 01 Aug 2016, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> Consider ordinary consequences of introspection: I can be conscious of >>> several unrelated things at once. I can be

Re: musings on time

From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, August 1, 2016 3:36 AM Subject: Re: musings on time On 29 Jul 2016, at 00:25, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote: From: Bruno Marchal To:

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it does then >> that would require some extra physical explanation, a radio link between >> brains or

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker > wrote: > > > On 8/2/2016 3:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> >> >> On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM,

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 3/08/2016 2:55 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Aug 2016, at 14:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/08/2016 3:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Aug 2016, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett wrote: Consider ordinary consequences of introspection: I can be conscious of several unrelated things at once. I can

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 3/08/2016 3:19 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker > wrote: On 8/2/2016 3:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 3/08/2016 4:28 am, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/2/2016 5:40 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: The point that I am trying to make here is that a person's consciousness at any moment can consist of many independent threads. From this I speculate that some of these separate threads could actually be

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/2/2016 3:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, 3 August 2016, Brent Meeker > wrote: On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it does

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 02 Aug 2016, at 14:40, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/08/2016 3:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Aug 2016, at 09:04, Bruce Kellett wrote: Consider ordinary consequences of introspection: I can be conscious of several unrelated things at once. I can be driving my car, conscious of the road

Re: Holiday Exercise

On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​ > both copies will have a cup of coffee after the reconstitution. Are you > OK that P("experience of drinking coffee") = 1? ​Yes, and in this case it doesn't matter if Bruno Marchal says P is the probability John

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 01 Aug 2016, at 22:01, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/1/2016 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Duplication experiments would then be a real test of the hypothesis that consciousness could be separated from the physical brain. If the duplicates are essentially separate conscious beings,

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/2/2016 5:40 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: The point that I am trying to make here is that a person's consciousness at any moment can consist of many independent threads. From this I speculate that some of these separate threads could actually be associated with separate physical bodies. In

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: There is no a priori reason why separate individuals, whether duplicates or not, cannot share a consciousness, but it is a matter of observation that they in fact do not, since telepathy is not real. Even if telepathy did occur, it would be a

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/2/2016 6:15 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It's not that it can't, but rather that it doesn't, and if it does then that would require some extra physical explanation, a radio link between brains or something. That's what I mean by illegitimately appealing to physics while claiming

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 01 Aug 2016, at 21:18, Brent Meeker wrote: On 8/1/2016 9:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: the question is would there be more than one consciousness? Well, that is an interesting question, but it is not relevant for the understanding that computationalism leads to the problem of

QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

On 02 Aug 2016, at 20:03, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: ​> ​both copies will have a cup of coffee after the reconstitution. Are you OK that P("experience of drinking coffee") = 1? ​Yes, and in this case it doesn't matter if

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/2/2016 9:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: (2) The Church-Turing thesis; and (3) Arithmetical realism; (3) is redundant. There is no (2) without (3). ?? Why not? 2+2=4 only expresses a true relation of concepts. It no more entails the reality of 2 and 4 than "Watson was Sherlock Holmes

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/2/2016 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But the argument seems somewhat circular since you assume that the different physical processes associated with location make the thoughts different. Yes, it is more pedagogical, but the "physical" used here is not assumed to be primary, and the

Re: Holiday Exercise

On 8/2/2016 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Not at all. The existence of the computations is an elementary metatheorem about Robinson Arithmetic, and already a theorem of Peano Arithmetic (still less that what is needed to enunciate Church Thesis). I don't think you can get existence from