d on Google groups but I don't
think I got a copy in my email so I am putting a copy of what I posted here:
--- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Jack Mallah wrote:
> --- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal
> > > MGA is more general (and older).
> > > The only wa
Jesse, how do you access the everything list? I ask because I have not
recieved my own posts in my inbox, nor have others such as Bruno replied. I
use yahoo email. I may need to use a different method to prevent my posts from
getting lost. They do seem to show up on Google groups though. Th
My last post worked (I got it in my email). I'll repost one later and then
post on the measure thread - though it's still a very busy time for me so maybe
not today.
--- On Mon, 2/22/10, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> OK, so you're suggesting there may not be a one-to-one relationship between
> distinc
Last post didn't show up in email. Seems random.
--- On Tue, 2/23/10, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> -even if there was a one-to-one relationship between distinct computations
> and distinct observer-moments with distinct qualia, very similar computations
> could produce very similar qualia,
Sure. So y
wrote:
> >> Jack Mallah wrote:
> > What is false is your statement that "The only way to escape the conclusion
> > would be to attribute consciousness to a movie of a computation". So your
> > argument is not valid.
>
> OK. I was talking in a contex
--- On Wed, 3/3/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Jack Mallah wrote:
> > For partial replacement scenarios, where part of a brain has
> > counterfactuals and the rest doesn't, see my partial brain paper:
> > http://cogprints.org/6321/
>
> I've finally come
Bruno, I hope you feel better. My quarrel with you is nothing personal.
--- Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Jack Mallah wrote:
> > Bruno, you don't have to assume any 'prescience'; you just have to assume
> > that counterfactuals count. No one but you considers that &#
--- On Tue, 3/2/10, David Nyman wrote:
> computationalist theory of mind would amount to the claim that consciousness
> supervenes only on realisations capable of instantiating this complete range
> of underlying physical activity (i.e. factual + counterfactual) in virtue of
> relevant physical
--- On Fri, 3/5/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> It is a different fading qualia argument, older and different from Chlamers.
> It is explained in my PhD thesis, and earlier article, bur also in MGA3 on
> this list, and in a paper not yet submitted.
Bruno, do you have the link? I searched the list a
--- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons could
> be considered black boxes, the consciousness status of which is unknown. The
> conclusion is that if the artificial neurons lack consciousness, then the
> brain would
--- On Fri, 2/6/09, russell standish wrote:
> So sorry Jacques - you need to do better. I'm sure you can!
Russell, I expected there might be some discussion of my latest eprint on this
list. That's why I'm here now - to see if there are any clarifications I
should make in it. I intend to mak
So far the responses here have not been as hostile as I feared :)
--- On Sat, 2/7/09, Jesse Mazer wrote:
> are you open to the idea
> that there might be truths about subjectivity (such as
> truths about what philosophers call 'qualia') which
> cannot be reduced to purely physical statements? Ar
--- On Sun, 2/8/09, russell standish wrote:
> He must have some model in mind which tells us how
> the "amplitude" of the branches relates to the "amplitude" of the
> original state.
The Schrodinger equation is linear and unitary. As long as it applies (in
other words, assuming the MWI, so no
--- On Sun, 2/8/09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Suppose you differentiate into N states, then on
> average each has 1/N of your original measure. I guess
> that's why you think the measure decreases. But the sum
> of the measures is N/N of the original.
>
> I still find this confusing. Your
-- On Mon, 2/9/09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Suppose I did something extremely risky as a child and survived. The
> multiverse is as a result much more densely filled with my childhood OM's.
> Now, it is true that a randomly sampled OM out of all the possible OM's
> available to me is more
--- On Mon, 2/9/09, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> good idea to resume UDA again
Bruno, I will post on the subject - but not yet. I do not want to get
sidetracked from improving my paper.
> I see you have make some progress on the subject (but not yet on
> diplomacy, unless your "crackpot" wording
--- On Sat, 2/7/09, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/2/7 Jack Mallah
> > 1. Initially, before evolution occurred, a typical Boltzmann brain (BB) had
> > about the same measure as a brain which was like what we consider a normal
> > person's (an atypical BB).
> >
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not
> clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the
> "reductionist" theory of personal identity. Consider the following experiment:
>
> There
--- On Mon, 2/9/09, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Also I still don't understand how I could be 30 years old and not 4, there
> are a lot more OM of 4 than 30... it is the argument you use for 1000 years
> old, I don't see why it can hold for 30 ?
Quentin, why would the measure of 4 year olds be "a
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah :
> > 2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1
> (e.g. discarding any errors that A2 might have made) then
> one could say that A1 is the same person as B, while A2 is
> not. This is caus
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> I don't get it. Why should the "measure" suddenly decrease at 80 (or 100)
> years old ? Why not 30 ? Why not 4 ?
Heart disease. Cancer. Stroke. Degradation of various organs leading to
death. Such ailments are known to strike older people more
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>> 2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1> (e.g. discarding
> >>> any errors that A2 might have made) then one could say that A1 is the
> >>> same person as B, while A2 is not. This is causal differentiation.
> >>
> >> Yes, but I'm ass
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is
> still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people
> who merely experience the illusion of being me.
> However, this just becomes a semantic
Hello again, Saibal!
It is good to see that I am not alone here in taking a stand against QS/QI.
What do you think of my paper? Is it unclear, convincing, unconvincing?
Are there others like us who still post here?
Regards,
Jack
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~--
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
> consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
> implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces
> the measure of each s
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah
> > And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is
> > equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as
> > compared to the number of people who will wake up
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in the argument. The important
> is what it feels like for the experimenter.
You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on, what
for practical purposes, is whether people should
Hi George. The everything list feels just like old times, no? Which is nice
in a way but has a big drawback - I can only take so much of arguing the same
old things, and being outnumbered. And that limit is approaching fast again.
At least I think your point here is new to the list.
--- On
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> You agree that if one version of me goes to bed tonight and one version of me
> wakes up tomorrow, then I should expect to wake up tomorrow. But if extra
> versions of me are manufactured and run today, then switched off when I go to
> sleep, t
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in
> the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter.
> >
> > You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on,
> > what for practical purposes, is whether
--- On Thu, 2/12/09, George Levy wrote:
> I have also been overwhelmed by the volume on this list.
> The idea is not to take more than you can chew.
Indeed.
> > --- On Wed, 2/11/09, George Levy
> > If that were the case, the Born Rule would fail.
> Perhaps the probability rule would be more li
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Brent Meeker wrote:
> >> Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's
> >> vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.
> >
> > If that is so then how do you explain the Born rule?
>
> The Born rule assumes you start with a normalized vector (i.
Hi Johnathan. I see that there are some new people like yourself here. I like
to see new people and younger people take an interest in the philosophical
issues, though at the same time it saddens me to see so many continue to fall
victim to the the QS fallacy.
I have made an important discov
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Well, this seems to be the real point of disagreement between you and the
> pro-QI people. If I am one of the extra versions and die overnight, but the
> original survives, then I have survived. This is why there can be a many to
> one relation
--- On Tue, 2/24/09, Wei Dai wrote:
> Jack, welcome back.
Hi Wei.
Now that the interesting Consciousness Online web conference is over, it's time
to get back to the this.
http://consciousnessonline.wordpress.com/
BTW, I have to say that the qualia issue remains mysterious to me. It's hard
--- On Fri, 3/6/09, Wei Dai wrote:
> > No. First, I don't agree that the real question is what the utility
> > function is or should be. The real question is whether the measure, M, is
> > conserved or whether it decreases. It's just that a lot of people don't
> > understand what that mean
--- On Tue, 3/10/09, Saibal Mitra wrote:
> http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825
>
> I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up in a
> different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I had written
> about that possibility a long time ago on this list, but no
-- On Mon, 1/25/10, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Does not the mutual interfearence between the "copies" hace something to do
> with a QM systems ability to compute exponensially more than a classical
> system? If so, then reducing the number or density of copies would lead to an
> attenuation in
--- On Tue, 1/26/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 25 Jan 2010, at 23:16, Jack Mallah wrote:
> > Killing one man is not OK just because he has a brother.
>
> In our context, the 'brother' has the same consciousness.
The "brother" most certainly does not have
I'm replying to this bit seperately since Bruno touched on a different issue
than the others have. My reply to the main "measure again '10" thread will
follow under the original title.
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I would also not say yes to a computationalist doctor, because my
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Jack is talking about copies in the common sense of initially physically
> identical beings who however occupy different places in the same spacetime
> and hence have different viewpoints and experiences.
No, that's incorrect. I don't know where you g
It's been a very busy week. I will reply to the measure thread (which is
actually more important) but that could be in a few days.
--- On Thu, 1/28/10, Jason Resch wrote:
> What about if half of your neurons were 1/2 their normal size, and the other
> half were twice their normal size? How wou
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> A little thin brain would produce a zombie?
Even if size affects measure, a zombie is not a brain with low measure; it's a
brain with zero measure. So the answer is obviously no - it would not be a
zombie. Stop abusing the language.
We know that sm
--- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Jack Mallah wrote:
> --- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal
> > > MGA is more general (and older).
> > > The only way to escape the conclusion would be to attribute consciousness
> > > to a movie of a computation
>
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