Re: JOINING Post and On measure alteration mechanisms and other practical tests for COMP

On 1/6/2012 18:57, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2012, at 11:02, acw wrote: Hello everything-list, this is my first post here, but I've been reading this list for at least half a year, and I'm afraid this post will be a bit long as it contains many thoughts I've had on my mind

Re: An analogy for Qualia

On 1/9/2012 19:54, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jan 9, 12:00 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jan 2012, at 14:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jan 9, 6:06 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: I agree with your general reply to Craig, but I disagree that computations are physical. That's the revisionist concept

Re: An analogy for Qualia

On 1/10/2012 12:03, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jan 2012, at 19:36, acw wrote: On 1/9/2012 19:54, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jan 9, 12:00 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jan 2012, at 14:50, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jan 9, 6:06 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: I agree with your general reply to

Re: An analogy for Qualia

On 1/10/2012 17:48, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jan 2012, at 12:58, acw wrote: On 1/10/2012 12:03, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jan 2012, at 19:36, acw wrote: To put it more simply: if Church Turing Thesis(CTT) is correct, mathematics is the same for any system or being you can imagine

Re: Question about PA and 1p

PA itself. On 1/11/2012 12:07 PM, acw wrote: On 1/10/2012 17:48, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jan 2012, at 12:58, acw wrote: On 1/10/2012 12:03, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jan 2012, at 19:36, acw wrote: To put it more simply: if Church Turing Thesis(CTT) is correct, mathematics is the s

Re: Question about PA and 1p

PA itself. On 1/11/2012 12:07 PM, acw wrote: On 1/10/2012 17:48, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jan 2012, at 12:58, acw wrote: On 1/10/2012 12:03, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jan 2012, at 19:36, acw wrote: To put it more simply: if Church Turing Thesis(CTT) is correct, mathematics is the s

Re: Qualia and mathematics

On 1/26/2012 08:19, Pierz wrote: As I continue to ponder the UDA, I keep coming back to a niggling doubt that an arithmetical ontology can ever really give a satisfactory explanation of qualia. It seems to me that imputing qualia to calculations (indeed consciousness at all, thought that may be t

Re: Qualia and mathematics

ate) the state is, the more unusual the nature of the qualia can be. If after drinking or ingesting some mind-altering substance, you have some unusual qualia, I'd say that at least partially points to your local brain's 'physical' (or arithmetical or computational or ...) state

Re: Qualia and mathematics

On 1/27/2012 03:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jan 26, 5:52 pm, Russell Standish wrote: On Jan 26, 1:19 am, Pierz wrote: of my own here: no properties can emerge from a complex system that are not present in primitive form in the parts of that system. There What about gliders emerging from t

Re: Qualia and mathematics

On 1/27/2012 05:55, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jan 26, 9:32 pm, acw wrote: There is nothing on the display except transitions of pixels. There is nothing in the universe, except transitions of states Only if you assume that our experience of the universe is not part of the universe. If you

Re: Qualia and mathematics

On 1/27/2012 15:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jan 27, 12:49 am, acw wrote: On 1/27/2012 05:55, Craig Weinberg wrote:> On Jan 26, 9:32 pm, acw wrote: There is nothing on the display except transitions of pixels. There is nothing in the universe, except transitions of states Only if

Re: Qualia and mathematics

On 1/31/2012 14:28, Pierz wrote: I'll tell you a campfire story of my own. One day my grandmother was going to drive my mother home across town. We were at my gran's place at the time and a close friend of mine was present. As they were about to leave, my friend went suddenly pale. She said "Don

Re: Superfluous Qualia Challenge For Comp

On 1/31/2012 18:44, Craig Weinberg wrote: When we close our eyes, we still see visual noise, even in total darkness. If qualia were based on computation, we should expect that no sensory input should equate to total blackness, since there is no information to report. Since we can dream or imagine

Re: Superfluous Qualia Challenge For Comp

On 1/31/2012 19:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Jan 31, 12:45 pm, acw wrote: A digital or analog camera would get similar amounts of noise as the eye, actually probably less than the eye. Why do you say that? Have you ever taken a photo with the lens cap on? First, the eyes don't h

Re: Ontological Problems of COMP

On 2/4/2012 14:38, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/4/2012 8:58 AM, David Nyman wrote: On 4 February 2012 12:22, Bruno Marchal wrote: No, I am not. I bet that comp is TRUE, but I don't see COMP as requiring that the physical world is supervening on numbers (up to isomorphisms) as primitives. So y

Re: Ontological Problems of COMP

On 2/6/2012 06:25, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi ACW, On 2/4/2012 1:53 PM, acw wrote: One can wonder what is the most "general" theory that we can postulate to explain our existence. Tegmark postulates all of consistent mathematics, whatever that is, but is 'all of consist

Re: Ontological Problems of COMP

On 2/7/2012 00:28, meekerdb wrote: On 2/6/2012 3:50 PM, acw wrote: I'm not so sure to term ``body'' is as meaningful if we consider the extremes which seem possible in COMP. After a digital substitution, a body could very well be some software running somewhere, on any kind of

Re: Ontological Problems of COMP

On 2/7/2012 05:08, meekerdb wrote: On 2/6/2012 5:37 PM, acw wrote: On 2/7/2012 00:28, meekerdb wrote: On 2/6/2012 3:50 PM, acw wrote: I'm not so sure to term ``body'' is as meaningful if we consider the extremes which seem possible in COMP. After a digital substitution, a body

Re: Ontological Problems of COMP

On 2/7/2012 06:11, meekerdb wrote: On 2/6/2012 9:55 PM, acw wrote: On 2/7/2012 05:08, meekerdb wrote: On 2/6/2012 5:37 PM, acw wrote: On 2/7/2012 00:28, meekerdb wrote: On 2/6/2012 3:50 PM, acw wrote: I'm not so sure to term ``body'' is as meaningful if we consider the extr

Re: Ontological Problems of COMP

On 2/7/2012 06:15, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/6/2012 6:50 PM, acw wrote: On 2/6/2012 06:25, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi ACW, On 2/4/2012 1:53 PM, acw wrote: snip Before reading the UDA, I used to think that something like Tegmark's solution would be general enough and sufficient, but

Re: Time and Concurrency Platonia?

On 2/10/2012 13:54, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: [SPK] I do not see how this deals effectively with the concurrency problem! :-( Using the Platonia idea is a cheat as it is explicitly unphysical. But physics by itself does not explain consciousness either (as shown by

Re: Free Floating entities

On 2/10/2012 14:01, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Another way to think of it would be in the terms of the Church Turing Thesis, where you expect that a computation (in the Turing sense) to have result and that result is independent of all your implementations, such a

Re: Truth values as dynamics?

On 2/11/2012 05:49, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: I think the idea of Platonia is closer to the fact that if a sentence has a truth-value, it will have that truth value, regardless if you know it or not. Sure, but it is not just you to whom a given sentence may have

Re: COMP theology

On 2/11/2012 06:32, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try an

Re: Truth values as dynamics?

On 2/12/2012 15:48, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/11/2012 5:15 PM, acw wrote: On 2/11/2012 05:49, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: I think the idea of Platonia is closer to the fact that if a sentence has a truth-value, it will have that truth value, regardless if you know

Re: The Anthropic Trilemma - Less Wrong

On 2/12/2012 17:29, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Folks, I would like to bring the following to your attention. I think that we do need to revisit this problem. http://lesswrong.com/lw/19d/the_anthropic_trilemma/ The Anthropic Trilemma 21Elie

Re: On Pre-existing Fields

On 2/14/2012 02:55, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2012 5:27 PM, acw wrote: [SPK] There is a problem with this though b/c it assumes that the field is pre-existing; it is the same as the "block universe" idea that Andrew Soltau and others are wrestling with. Why is a pre-existin

Re: The Anthropic Trilemma - Less Wrong

On 2/14/2012 03:00, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2012 5:54 PM, acw wrote: On 2/12/2012 17:29, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Folks, I would like to bring the following to your attention. I think that we do need to revisit this problem. http://lesswrong.com/lw/19d/the_anthropic_trilemma/ The

Re: On Pre-existing Fields

On 2/14/2012 05:57, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2012 11:18 PM, acw wrote: On 2/14/2012 02:55, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2012 5:27 PM, acw wrote: [SPK] There is a problem with this though b/c it assumes that the field is pre-existing; it is the same as the "block universe"

Re: On Pre-existing Fields

On 2/14/2012 13:45, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/14/2012 5:13 AM, acw wrote: How does the existence on an entity determine its properties? Please answer this question. What do "soundness" and "consistency" even mean when there does not exist an unassailable way of defining

Re: On Pre-existing Fields

On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] Interesting. How then do we explain the fact that humans suffer all kinds of computational errors such as schizophrenia, dismorphia, etc. We intentionally lie... The list of computationally erroneous behavior of the brain is almost endless. How doe

Re: On Pre-existing Fields

On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote: On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] Interesting. How then do we explain the fact that humans suffer all kinds of computational errors such as schizophrenia, dismorphia, etc. We intentionally lie... The

Re: On Pre-existing Fields

On 2/16/2012 17:58, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote: On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote: On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] Interesting. How then do we explain the fact that humans suffer all kinds of computational

Re: On Pre-existing Fields

On 2/16/2012 19:09, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/16/2012 1:16 PM, acw wrote: On 2/16/2012 17:58, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote: On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote: On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] Interesting

Re: On Pre-existing Fields

On 2/16/2012 19:26, meekerdb wrote: On 2/16/2012 10:16 AM, acw wrote: On 2/16/2012 17:58, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/16/2012 11:54 AM, acw wrote: On 2/16/2012 15:59, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/16/2012 6:57 AM, acw wrote: On 2/15/2012 07:07, Stephen P. King wrote: [SPK] Interesting. How

Re: On Pre-existing Fields

On 2/16/2012 20:40, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/16/2012 2:32 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/16/2012 11:09 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility that the brain can be emulated by a Universal Turing Machine. It would be helpful if we first establi

Re: On Pre-existing Fields

On 2/16/2012 22:37, meekerdb wrote: On 2/16/2012 1:00 PM, acw wrote: On 2/16/2012 20:40, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/16/2012 2:32 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/16/2012 11:09 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: All of this substitution stuff is predicated upon the possibility that the brain can be

Re: up to some resource bound

On 2/16/2012 23:08, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/16/2012 3:06 PM, acw wrote: On 2/16/2012 19:09, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/16/2012 1:16 PM, acw wrote: The assumption in COMP is that a subst. level exists, it's the main assumption! What does that practically mean? That you can event

Re: The free will function

On 2/20/2012 03:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: > If I am a simulation, and a programmer watches 'me' and can intervene > and change my program and the program of my universe at will, then to > me they are a true God, and I would be well advised to pray to them. > I think you might be misunderstanding C

Re: The free will function

On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z wrote: On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg wrote: .. Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions still aren't reality It doesn't matter if they believe in the simulation or not, the belief itself is only pos

Re: The free will function

On 2/20/2012 18:37, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 20, 10:32 am, acw wrote: On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:> On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Zwrote: On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinbergwrote: .. Believable falsehoods are falsehoods and convincing illusions still aren't reali

Re: UD* and consciousness

On 2/22/2012 14:49, Terren Suydam wrote: However I don't understand how Mary could have anything but a single continuation given the determinism of the sim. How could a counterfactual arise in this thought experiment? Can you give a "concrete" example? Mary's brain/SIM implementation is determini

Re: The free will function

On 2/22/2012 17:17, marty684 wrote: Bruno, If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP) which can express states to an arbitrary degree of precision, is there any room for chance or probability? And if so, how do they arise? (If you've been over this before, please refer me to th

Re: The free will function

On 2/21/2012 02:27, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 20, 2:53 pm, acw wrote: On 2/20/2012 18:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:> On Feb 20, 10:32 am, acw wrote: On 2/20/2012 13:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:> On Feb 19, 11:57 pm, 1Z wrote: On Feb 20, 4:41 am, Craig Weinberg

Re: UD* and consciousness

On 2/24/2012 20:51, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 3:30 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 2:27 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/24/2012 10:26 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: I certainly will. In the meantime, do you have an example from Damasio (or any other source) that could

Re: UD* and consciousness

On 2/24/2012 22:20, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 4:47 PM, acw wrote: On 2/24/2012 20:51, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 3:30 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 2:27 PM, meekerdbwrote: On 2/24/2012 10:26 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: I

Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote: On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely Turing emulable. But it makes them enough T

Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

On 3/1/2012 18:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 9:57 AM, acw wrote: On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote: On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical

Re: COMP test (ontology of COMP)

On 3/1/2012 19:06, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 10:39 AM, acw wrote: On 3/1/2012 18:16, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 9:57 AM, acw wrote: On 3/1/2012 16:54, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote: On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno

Re: The Relativity of Existence

On 3/2/2012 03:37, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 7:14 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 3/1/2012 9:27 AM, Bob Zannelli wrote: The Relativity of Existence Authors: Stuart Heinrich Subjects: History and Philosophy of Physic

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

John Clark, it seems to me that you're intentionally ignoring the 1p (first person) point of view (qualia or subjective experience) and one's expectations from that point of view. To follow UDA and get COMP's conclusions you need these assumptions: Mind (1p), Mechanism (surviving a digital sub

Re: Two Mathematicians in a Bunker and Existence of Pi

On 3/6/2012 06:59, meekerdb wrote: On 3/5/2012 9:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 10:42 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 3/5/2012 8:28 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 7:24 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 3/5/2012 4:57

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is indeterminated? Although comp might seem to entail 100% determinacy, just

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

On 3/12/2012 00:39, meekerdb wrote: On 3/11/2012 2:43 PM, acw wrote: On 3/11/2012 21:44, R AM wrote: This discussion has been long and sometimes I am confused about the whole point of the exercise. I think the idea is that if comp is true, then the future content of subjective experience is

Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

On 3/12/2012 05:50, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Mar 8, 2012 at 1:52 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Do they really have to state that they assume existence exists? You mean that primary matter exists? Yes that is an hypothesis. So your complaint is that a biologist like Richard Dawkins doesn'

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/11/2012 8:30 PM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 00:39, meekerdb wrote: This implies that our measure is strongly correlated with the regularity of physics. I'm not sure you can show that, but if it's true it means that physics is fundamen

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is such that there always exists a standard what is the "Real" version? If it is not possib

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

On 3/12/2012 09:41, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 3:49 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 08:04, Stephen P. King wrote: On 3/12/2012 2:53 AM, acw wrote: On 3/12/2012 05:43, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, Could it be that we are tacitly assuming that our notion of Virtual is such that there

Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains

On 4/1/2012 14:33, David Nyman wrote: Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My recent remarks about "game physics" got me thinking about this dist

Re: A question for Bruno about Artificial Brains

On 4/2/2012 00:43, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Apr 01, 2012 at 02:33:44PM +0100, David Nyman wrote: Bruno, when you talk about the doctor offering one a replacement brain you usually describe the substitute as digital, although I think you have sometimes just said that it is artificial. My