On 14 Aug, 03:11, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Colin Hales wrote:
> > Here's a nice pic to use in discussion from GEB. The map for a
> > formal system (a tree). A formal system could not draw this picture.
>
> Where's your proof of this assertion?
Seconded.
--~--~-~--~~~--
I think I have at least two problems, not necessarily well formulated.
I accept that there are concepts(mathematical) that are not necessrily
part of the physical Universe(Multiverse). I do not see that there are
only the abstractions.
Also, Bruno mentions QM, as being included in COMP. QM is an
i
On 14 Aug 2009, at 04:11, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Colin Hales wrote:
>> Here's a nice pic to use in discussion from GEB. The map for a
>> formal system (a tree). A formal system could not draw this picture.
>
> Where's your proof of this assertion?
Indeed. A case could be make that only a f
On 14 Aug 2009, at 03:21, Colin Hales wrote:
> Here's a nice pic to use in discussion from GEB. The map for a
> formal system (a tree). A formal system could not draw this picture.
> It is entirely and only ever 'a tree'. Humans dance in the forest.
> col
You may compare Hofstadter's
Colin Hales wrote:
> Here's a nice pic to use in discussion from GEB. The map for a
> formal system (a tree). A formal system could not draw this picture.
Where's your proof of this assertion?
Brent
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you
On 13 Aug, 10:30, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 13 Aug 2009, at 10:53, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 13 Aug, 01:42, Colin Hales wrote:
>
> >> I am not saying humans are magical. I am saying that humans do /not/
> >> operate formally like COMP and that '/formally handling
> >> inconsistency/' is not t
On 13 Aug 2009, at 10:53, 1Z wrote:
>
>
>
> On 13 Aug, 01:42, Colin Hales wrote:
>
>> I am not saying humans are magical. I am saying that humans do /not/
>> operate formally like COMP and that '/formally handling
>> inconsistency/' is not the same thing as '/delivering inconsistency
>> b
On 13 Aug, 01:42, Colin Hales wrote:
> I am not saying humans are magical. I am saying that humans do /not/
> operate formally like COMP and that '/formally handling
> inconsistency/' is not the same thing as '/delivering inconsistency by
> being an informal/ /system/'. BTW I mean informal
2009/8/13 Colin Hales :
>
>
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> 2009/8/12 Colin Hales :
>
>
> My motivation to kill COMP is purely aimed at bring a halt to the delusion
> of the AGI community that Turing-computing will ever create a mind. They are
> throwing away $millions based on a false belief. Their
On 13 Aug 2009, at 02:42, Colin Hales wrote:
> It starts with the simple posit that if COMP is true then all
> differences between a COMP world (AC) and the natural world (NC)
> should be zero under all circumstances and the AC/NC distinction
> would be false.
The difference between natu
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Colin,
>
> We agree on the conclusion. We disagree on vocabulary, and on the
> validity of your reasoning.
>
> Let us call I-comp the usual indexical mechanism discussed in this
> list (comp).
> Let us call m-comp the thesis that there is a primitive "natural
> world", a
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/12 Colin Hales :
>
>> My motivation to kill COMP is purely aimed at bring a halt to the delusion
>> of the AGI community that Turing-computing will ever create a mind. They are
>> throwing away $millions based on a false belief. Their expectations need to
>> be
On 11 Aug 2009, at 02:06, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> I am behind, because I was away delivering Science talk to Star Trek
> fans.
> I am uncertain what to take away from this thread, and could use the
> clarification.
I will think about it. It could help if you were a bit more specific.
>
> As an
t;> It seems that to me that until one understands the nature of
>> the extreme Idealism that COMP entails, no arguement based on the
>> physical will do...
>>
>> "I refute it thus!"
>> -Dr. Johnson http://www.samueljohnson.com/refutati.html
&g
2009/8/12 Colin Hales :
> My motivation to kill COMP is purely aimed at bring a halt to the delusion
> of the AGI community that Turing-computing will ever create a mind. They are
> throwing away $millions based on a false belief. Their expectations need to
> be scientifically defined for a change
Colin Hales wrote:
> Hi,
> I guess I am pretty much over the need for any 'ism whatever. I can
> re-classify my ideas in terms of an 'ism, but that process tells me
> nothing extra and offers no extra empirical clue. I think I can classify
> fairly succinctly the difference between approaches:
futati.html
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Colin Hales <mailto:c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au>
> *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, August 11, 2
al Message -
From: Colin Hales
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Tuesday, August 11, 2009 9:51 PM
Subject: Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Aug 2009, at 09:08, Colin Hales wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 0
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 10 Aug 2009, at 09:08, Colin Hales wrote:
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>> On 06 Aug 2009, at 04:37, Colin Hales wrote:
>>>
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review a
I am behind, because I was away delivering Science talk to Star Trek
fans.
I am uncertain what to take away from this thread, and could use the
clarification.
As an aside, I read(or tried to) read the SANE paper on the plane.
Ronald
On Aug 10, 11:24 am
Hi Peter,
>> Bruno's "comp" is something rather different and idiosyncratic
>
>
> You keep saying this. This is a lie.
I am not yet entirely sure of this. Let me correct my statement by
saying that this is just a common lie, similar to those who have been
made purposefully in the seve
On 10 Aug 2009, at 11:04, 1Z wrote (to Colin Hales):
>>
>
> I am not sure what you are saying here. Computationalism is
> generally taken to be a claim about the mind, and is quite a
> respectable thesis
I agree
>
> Bruno's "comp" is something rather different and idiosyncratic
You keep sayin
On 10 Aug, 03:54, Colin Hales wrote:
> ronaldheld wrote:
> > As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is
> > well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of
> > mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or
> > something else?
> >
On 10 Aug 2009, at 09:08, Colin Hales wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 06 Aug 2009, at 04:37, Colin Hales wrote:
>>
>>> Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
>>> refutation of computationalism.
>>> It's going through peer review at the moment.
>>>
>>> The basi
Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 06 Aug 2009, at 04:37, Colin Hales wrote:
>
>> Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
>> refutation of computationalism.
>> It's going through peer review at the moment.
>>
>> The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of
russell standish wrote:
> Nobody is suggesting that brains are Turing machines. All that is
> being suggested (by COMP) is that brains perform computations (and
> nothing but), hence can be perfectly emulated by a Turing machine, by
> virtue of the Church-Turing thesis.
>
"/Nobody is suggesti
On Mon, Aug 10, 2009 at 12:54:00PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote:
> ronaldheld wrote:
> > As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is
> > well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of
> > mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or
> >
ronaldheld wrote:
> As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is
> well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of
> mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or
> something else?
> Ronald
>
On 08 Aug 2009, at 20:01, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Actually physicians have literally created new interesting branch in
> math
I mean physicists of course. So sorry.
Well, actually I know a physician, Philippe Smets, the creator of
IRIDIA, where I am working, who was a physician, not a physic
big, yet
definable, set.
I have few doubts that we share a very long story.
Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental? I doubt it.
Bruno
>
> Ronald
>
> On Aug 6, 10:23 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Colin Hales w
As a formally trained Physicist, what do I accept? that Physics is
well represented mathematically? That the Multiverse is composed of
mathematical structures some of which represent physical laws? Or
something else?
Ronald
On Aug 6, 10:23 pm, Brent Me
Colin Hales wrote:
>
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Colin Hales wrote:
>>
>>> Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
Colin Hales wrote:
> Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
> refutation of computationalism.
> It's going through peer review
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Colin Hales wrote:
>
>> Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>> Colin Hales wrote:
>>>
>>>
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review at the moment.
The basic p
Rex Allen wrote:
> If computationalism is true, and computation is the source of
> conscious experience, then shouldn't we expect that what is
> ontologically real is the simplest possible universe that can develop
> and support physical systems that are Turing equivalent?
>
> Does our universe lo
Colin Hales wrote:
>
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Colin Hales wrote:
>>
>>> Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
>>> refutation of computationalism.
>>> It's going through peer review at the moment.
>>>
>>> The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the confl
If computationalism is true, and computation is the source of
conscious experience, then shouldn't we expect that what is
ontologically real is the simplest possible universe that can develop
and support physical systems that are Turing equivalent?
Does our universe look like such a universe?
If
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Colin Hales wrote:
>
>> Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
>> refutation of computationalism.
>> It's going through peer review at the moment.
>>
>> The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of
>> 'physics-as-computat
On 6 Aug, 03:37, Colin Hales wrote:
> (b) is not a claim of truth or falsehood. It is a claim that the very
> idea of ever proposing COMP (= doubting that COMP is true) is
> impossible. This is because it is a formal system trying, with a fixed,
> formal set of rules (even self modifying acco
On Thu, Aug 06, 2009 at 12:37:38PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote:
>
> (b) is not a claim of truth or falsehood. It is a claim that the very
> idea of ever proposing COMP (= doubting that COMP is true) is
> impossible. This is because it is a formal system trying, with a fixed,
> formal set of rule
On 06 Aug 2009, at 04:37, Colin Hales wrote:
> Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
> refutation of computationalism.
> It's going through peer review at the moment.
>
> The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of
> 'physics-as-computation'
Hi,
it seems you start with the assumptions that an AI can't do science as
humans... to conclude just that.
Regards,
Quentin
2009/8/6 Colin Hales :
> Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed refutation
> of computationalism.
> It's going through peer review at the moment.
Colin Hales wrote:
> Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
> refutation of computationalism.
> It's going through peer review at the moment.
>
> The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of
> 'physics-as-computation' with the type of computation
Man this is a tin of worms! I have just done a 30 page detailed
refutation of computationalism.
It's going through peer review at the moment.
The basic problem that most people fall foul of is the conflation of
'physics-as-computation' with the type of computation that is being
carried out in a
On 31 July, 22:39, David Nyman wrote:
> I note that the recent posts by Peter Jones - aka the mysterious 1Z,
> and the originator of the curiously useful 'real in the sense I am
> real' or RITSIAR - occurred shortly after my taking his name in vain.
> Hmm...
>
> Anyway, this signalled the r
Bruno,
let me continue as 'enfent terrible':
Isn't the Church Thesis - and whatever WE suspect by it - also human
illusions?
(Watch out: the next question will concern 'numbers'!)
John M
On Mon, Aug 3, 2009 at 6:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> John,
> Is not the difference between human and no
On Mon, Aug 3, 2009 at 7:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> John,
> Is not the difference between human and non human a human illusion?
> With Church Turing thesis we can suspect the existence of universal
> illusions.
Maybe illusions can be detected due to timing discrepancies between
the original ve
John,
Is not the difference between human and non human a human illusion?
With Church Turing thesis we can suspect the existence of universal
illusions.
Bruno
On 01 Aug 2009, at 21:52, John Mikes wrote:
> David,
> I thought you are facing the Scottish mountains for a relaxation and
> ins
2009/8/1 John Mikes :
Hi John
Actually, I posted the diatribe just before setting off on the
seven-hour drive to the Scottish hills. It's raining just at the
moment so I'm taking the opportunity to thank you for your post and
for your concern for my welfare, but this is positively the last
you'
2009/8/1 Brent Meeker :
> Is the physics account of life incomplete or wrong?
I'm not claiming this.
> Do you consider "life" to have been
> eliminated?
No I dont. In my piece I defined computation as an arbitrary - though
humanly useful - interpretative model imposed on, but not tied to,
spe
David,
I thought you are facing the Scottish mountains for a relaxation and instead
here is a long - enjoyable- tirade about ideas which I try to put below into
a shorthand form by *my* vocabulary. But first a plea to Mrs. N:
*'please, do keep David away from te computer for the time of the Scottis
David Nyman wrote:
...
> Now, you don't of course have to accept COMP. But if you want to be a
> physical realist, it means you can only hang on to the computational
> explanation of mind by eliminating the mind itself from reality.
> Personally, not being committed to such an explanation, this d
I note that the recent posts by Peter Jones - aka the mysterious 1Z,
and the originator of the curiously useful 'real in the sense I am
real' or RITSIAR - occurred shortly after my taking his name in vain.
Hmm...
Anyway, this signalled the resumption of a long-running debate about
the validit
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