Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-04 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/4/2012 12:05 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Dear Bruno,

The primacy of 17 or 43 or any other number is such that it can 
be apprehended, at least in principle, by /at least one entity/ 
(please note that this is a lower bound concept!). This implies that 
in the absence of that possibility of apprehension (by at least one 
entity) that there is no such thing as primeness.



This is totally ridiculous, Stephen. With comp, it is obvious that the 
primacy of 43 is conceptually far simpler than the  (true) fact that 
the primacy of 43 can be apprehended by a type of machine/numbers.


You are like a biologist telling Morgan that it is stupid to hope to 
understand the genetic of the fly before understanding the genetic of 
the zoologist.


Bruno


Dear Bruno,

NO! What I am doing is like demanding that Morgan exists before I 
will agree that Morgan knows about the genetics of a fly.


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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-04 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 03 Nov 2012, at 16:39, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/3/2012 8:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:24, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't consider truth as an object. The numbers can be  
considered as the (only) object. truth concerns only the  
propositions about those objects and the derivative notions.


   OK, then how is it that you seem to imply that truth is  
independent of 1p, i.e. that it is a valuation internal to  
experience?


Explain me why how you think that the content of the primeness of  
43  depends on experience, and of whom.




Dear Bruno,

The primacy of 17 or 43 or any other number is such that it can  
be apprehended, at least in principle, by at least one entity  
(please note that this is a lower bound concept!). This implies that  
in the absence of that possibility of apprehension (by at least one  
entity) that there is no such thing as primeness.



This is totally ridiculous, Stephen. With comp, it is obvious that the  
primacy of 43 is conceptually far simpler than the  (true) fact that  
the primacy of 43 can be apprehended by a type of machine/numbers.


You are like a biologist telling Morgan that it is stupid to hope to  
understand the genetic of the fly before understanding the genetic of  
the zoologist.


Bruno








The "dependency" that I am claiming for the properties of numbers is  
no different from the dependency of properties (in the sense of  
being definite) for physical objects; there must exist some means to  
determine or otherwise measure or prove what those particular  
properties might be.
Finitists fail because they assume that only a finite number of  
entities can in principle exist that can determine the properties of  
some arbitrary number. (See Normal J. Wildberger's ideas for an  
example of finitism in mathematics) I propose that there are an  
infinity of possible worlds, each with a potential infinity of  
entities that can, at least in principle, determine the properties  
of any arbitrary number. This is the same idea, I think, as Godel's  
infinite tower of theories, each of which can determine the truth  
value for any theory which is a subset of itor implied to exist  
by it.
I am just inverting the idea of the Forcing axiom of Cohen. I  
start with an ambiguous notion of the One and reduce it down to  
where it is a fragment, a monad, a subset of the totality of all  
possible, and yet it reflects all of its  ancestors as it is  
never not a proper part of the One. This is just an elaboration of  
Leibniz' idea of monads...


The idea that a property has content is nonsensical, IMHO.  
Primeness (of numbers) is a property of numbers, and like any other  
object, they are nothing more than bounded bundles (clopen sets?) of  
properties defined in relation to other bounded bundles of  
properties. Only the One is isolated and independent of all things,  
as it *is* all things! It cannot be "aware" of anything other than  
itself, by definition.


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-03 Thread meekerdb 

On 11/3/2012 6:24 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't consider truth as an object. The numbers can be considered as the (only) 
object. truth concerns only the propositions about those objects and the derivative 
notions.


OK, then how is it that you seem to imply that truth is independent of 1p, i.e. that 
it is a valuation internal to experience?


My view of it is that arithmetic is model of counting, adding and combining in pairs.  All 
of these can be informally defined ostensively and so various propositions can be seen to 
be true or false.  The model is extended to arbitrarily large numbers, and evaluation is 
arbitrarily extended by induction.


Brent

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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-03 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/3/2012 6:58 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/3/2012 2:22 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/3/2012 12:44 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/2/2012 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be 
meaningful in the absence of any means to evaluate its 
meaningfulness. 



So what means do you used to evaluate, "Either snow is white or 
snow is not white."?


My eyes can still discriminate colors from each other... I use 
them.


So do you use your color discrimination to evaluate,"Either klognee 
is grue or klognee is not grue."?


Brent
--


Well, I don't know, I never tried. Have you? How did it work out?


Well, that's very curious since the sentence is a tautology and is 
obviously true.


Brent

Esas palabras no tienen significansa.

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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-03 Thread meekerdb 

On 11/3/2012 2:22 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/3/2012 12:44 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/2/2012 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful in the absence 
of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness. 



So what means do you used to evaluate, "Either snow is white or snow is not 
white."?


My eyes can still discriminate colors from each other... I use them.


So do you use your color discrimination to evaluate,"Either klognee is grue or klognee 
is not grue."?


Brent
--


Well, I don't know, I never tried. Have you? How did it work out?


Well, that's very curious since the sentence is a tautology and is obviously 
true.

Brent

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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-03 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/3/2012 8:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:43, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[BM] All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend 
on us and on our theories.


[SPK] No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be 
meaningful in the absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness.


That is arithmetical realism. A statement like Church thesis and 
comp makes no sense at all without it.
I have never heard about someone not believing in arithmetical 
realism. It is really basic. To pretend that arithmetical realism is 
false already needs arithmetical realism.

Dear Bruno,

You have now heard of someone like that! Church's thesis and comp 
make sense to me without AR, I don't pretend that I am the only mind 
and that it is because my thoughts can agree with those of other 
minds that there is something "real" to all of us. You still do not 
see thecrypto-solipsism 
of 
your philosophical stance! I am not alone is noticing this! (See the 
linked passage here 
 
for a discussion) David Deutsch has a long discussion of this problem 
in his book/The Fabric of Reality/.


At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk%3AThe_Fabric_of_Reality , I 
found the following:


"Philosophers keep getting tangled up trying to prove scientific 
theories using pure logic alone, without any basis of facts. Viewing 
them as explanations instead brings many advantages, such as the 
ability to choose the simplest theory that fits the evidence.
As an example, he demolishes Solipsism. Solipsism is generally 
supposed to be irrefutable, on the grounds that if everything is a 
dream, then so are the results of any test one could do.
Deutsch refutes that by taking the theory seriously (as he says) and 
thinking out the ramifications. How is it that everything 
(specifically all fields of science) forms a consistent whole, even 
things one does not yet know? How do other, imaginary people know 
things that you do not? How can they have skills that you cannot equal?
The end result is that you have a theory which includes all the 
complexity of the apparent world, plus an additional notion that it 
is the dream of a single entity. Thus it is actually a more 
complicated theory, not a simpler one."


Sound familiar?


I don't see anything relevant for our (unclear) issue.


Umm, must I put the quote in different words for you?

Here is what Google translator gives us:

"Les philosophes garder s'empêtrer essayer de prouver les théories 
scientifiques utilisant la logique pure seul, sans aucune base de faits. 
Les considérant comme des explications provoque au contraire de nombreux 
avantages, comme la possibilité de choisir la théorie la plus simple qui 
s'adapte à la preuve.
A titre d'exemple, il démolit solipsisme. Le solipsisme est généralement 
censé être irréfutable, au motif que si tout est un rêve, alors si sont 
les résultats d'un test qu'on pourrait faire.
Deutsch réfute que, en prenant au sérieux la théorie (comme il dit) et 
de la pensée sur les ramifications. Comment se fait-il que tout (en 
particulier tous les domaines de la science) constitue un ensemble 
cohérent, même des choses qu'on ne sait pas encore? Comment puis-autres, 
des personnages imaginaires savoir des choses que vous n'avez pas? 
Comment peuvent-ils avoir des compétences que vous pouvez ne pas 
correspondre?
Le résultat final est que vous avez une théorie qui comprend toute la 
complexité du monde apparent, plus une notion supplémentaire qui est le 
rêve d'une seule et même entité. Ainsi, il est en fait une théorie plus 
compliquée, pas un système plus simple."







Realism is not a single theory, there are many forms of realism 
. You seem to have a 
"naive realist" view of numbers, in that we can apprehend them 
directly or at least that the properties of numbers are innate and 
yet are apprehended directly.


I said innate for numbers, with the logic and their laws. I don't say 
innate for humans in the usual psychological sense. You are digressing.


Why is it different for numbers? What makes numbers "special"? You 
claim that numbers have dreams and other crypto-psychological claims, so 
why not?







I see this theory as nonsensical


Mee too, but this is not related to arithmetical realism.


OK, can you see how my critique of AR works? I claim that AR 
assumes too much; that it assumes innate properties without any 
explanation of ho

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-03 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/3/2012 8:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:24, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't consider truth as an object. The numbers can be considered 
as the (only) object. truth concerns only the propositions about 
those objects and the derivative notions.


   OK, then how is it that you seem to imply that truth is 
independent of 1p, i.e. that it is a valuation internal to experience?


Explain me why how you think that the content of the primeness of 43  
depends on experience, and of whom.




Dear Bruno,

The primacy of 17 or 43 or any other number is such that it can be 
apprehended, at least in principle, by /at least one entity/ (please 
note that this is a lower bound concept!). This implies that in the 
absence of that possibility of apprehension (by at least one entity) 
that there is no such thing as primeness. The "dependency" that I am 
claiming for the properties of numbers is no different from the 
dependency of properties (in the sense of being definite) for physical 
objects; there must exist some means to determine or otherwise measure 
or prove what those particular properties might be.
Finitists fail because they assume that only a finite number of 
entities can in principle exist that can determine the properties of 
some arbitrary number. (See Normal J. Wildberger 
's ideas for an example of 
finitism in mathematics) I propose that there are an infinity of 
possible worlds, each with a potential infinity of entities that can, at 
least in principle, determine the properties of any arbitrary number. 
This is the same idea, I think, as Godel's infinite tower of theories, 
each of which can determine the truth value for any theory which is a 
subset of it or implied to exist by it.
I am just inverting the idea of the Forcing axiom of Cohen 
. I start with 
an ambiguous notion of the One and reduce it down to where it is a 
fragment, a monad, a subset of the totality of all possible, and yet it 
reflects all of itsancestors 
 as it is never not 
a proper part of the One. This is just an elaboration of Leibniz' idea 
of monads...


The idea that a property has content is nonsensical, IMHO. 
Primeness (of numbers) is a property of numbers, and like any other 
object, they are nothing more than bounded bundles (clopen sets?) of 
properties defined in relation to other bounded bundles of properties. 
Only the One is isolated and independent of all things, as it *is* all 
things! It cannot be "aware" of anything other than itself, by definition.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-03 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:43, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[BM] All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend  
on us and on our theories.


[SPK] No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be  
meaningful in the absence of any means to evaluate its  
meaningfulness.


That is arithmetical realism. A statement like Church thesis and  
comp makes no sense at all without it.
I have never heard about someone not believing in arithmetical  
realism. It is really basic. To pretend thatarithmetical  
realism is false already needs arithmetical realism.

Dear Bruno,

You have now heard of someone like that! Church's thesis and  
comp make sense to me without AR, I don't pretend that I am the only  
mind and that it is because my thoughts can agree with those of  
other minds that there is something "real" to all of us. You still  
do not see the crypto-solipsism of your philosophical stance! I am  
not alone is noticing this! (See the linked passage here for a  
discussion) David Deutsch has a long discussion of this problem in  
his book The Fabric of Reality.


At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk%3AThe_Fabric_of_Reality , I  
found the following:


"Philosophers keep getting tangled up trying to prove scientific  
theories using pure logic alone, without any basis of facts. Viewing  
them as explanations instead brings many advantages, such as the  
ability to choose the simplest theory that fits the evidence.
As an example, he demolishes Solipsism. Solipsism is generally  
supposed to be irrefutable, on the grounds that if everything is a  
dream, then so are the results of any test one could do.
Deutsch refutes that by taking the theory seriously (as he says) and  
thinking out the ramifications. How is it that everything  
(specifically all fields of science) forms a consistent whole, even  
things one does not yet know? How do other, imaginary people know  
things that you do not? How can they have skills that you cannot  
equal?
The end result is that you have a theory which includes all the  
complexity of the apparent world, plus an additional notion that it  
is the dream of a single entity. Thus it is actually a more  
complicated theory, not a simpler one."


Sound familiar?


I don't see anything relevant for our (unclear) issue.




Realism is not a single theory, there are many forms of realism.  
You seem to have a "naive realist" view of numbers, in that we can  
apprehend them directly or at least that the properties of numbers  
are innate and yet are apprehended directly.


I said innate for numbers, with the logic and their laws. I don't say  
innate for humans in the usual psychological sense. You are digressing.





I see this theory as nonsensical


Mee too, but this is not related to arithmetical realism.


as it offers no explanation as to how properties of numbers match up  
with those of our thoughts about numbers.


Comp makes that clear, as the reality is arithmetical, or equivalent.



Umm, maybe you think that by equating the dreams of numbers to our  
inner thoughts, you can avoid this problem.


This follows from comp. I have not chosen this.




OK. Nice Move! But we are left empty handed when it comes time to  
explain thoughts of change and the problem of arithmetic bodies.


I am just formulating the problem, and solve a part of it.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-03 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:24, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't consider truth as an object. The numbers can be considered  
as the (only) object. truth concerns only the propositions about  
those objects and the derivative notions.


   OK, then how is it that you seem to imply that truth is  
independent of 1p, i.e. that it is a valuation internal to experience?


Explain me why how you think that the content of the primeness of 43   
depends on experience, and of whom.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-03 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
[BM] All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend on 
us and on our theories.


[SPK] No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be 
meaningful in the absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness.


That is arithmetical realism. A statement like Church thesis and comp 
makes no sense at all without it.
I have never heard about someone not believing in arithmetical 
realism. It is really basic. To pretend that arithmetical realism is 
false already needs arithmetical realism.

Dear Bruno,

You have now heard of someone like that! Church's thesis and comp 
make sense to me without AR, I don't pretend that I am the only mind and 
that it is because my thoughts can agree with those of other minds that 
there is something "real" to all of us. You still do not see 
thecrypto-solipsism 
of 
your philosophical stance! I am not alone is noticing this! (See the 
linked passage here 
 
for a discussion) David Deutsch has a long discussion of this problem in 
his book/The Fabric of Reality/.


At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk%3AThe_Fabric_of_Reality , I 
found the following:


"Philosophers keep getting tangled up trying to prove scientific 
theories using pure logic alone, without any basis of facts. Viewing 
them as explanations instead brings many advantages, such as the ability 
to choose the simplest theory that fits the evidence.
As an example, he demolishes Solipsism. Solipsism is generally supposed 
to be irrefutable, on the grounds that if everything is a dream, then so 
are the results of any test one could do.
Deutsch refutes that by taking the theory seriously (as he says) and 
thinking out the ramifications. How is it that everything (specifically 
all fields of science) forms a consistent whole, even things one does 
not yet know? How do other, imaginary people know things that you do 
not? How can they have skills that you cannot equal?
The end result is that you have a theory which includes all the 
complexity of the apparent world, plus an additional notion that it is 
the dream of a single entity. Thus it is actually a more complicated 
theory, not a simpler one."


Sound familiar?

Realism is not a single theory, there are many forms of realism 
. You seem to have a "naive 
realist" view of numbers, in that we can apprehend them directly or at 
least that the properties of numbers are innate and yet are apprehended 
directly. I see this theory as nonsensical as it offers no explanation 
as to how properties of numbers match up with those of our thoughts 
about numbers. Umm, maybe you think that by equating the dreams of 
numbers to our inner thoughts, you can avoid this problem. OK. Nice 
Move! But we are left empty handed when it comes time to explain 
thoughts of change and the problem of arithmetic bodies.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-03 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/3/2012 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't consider truth as an object. The numbers can be considered as 
the (only) object. truth concerns only the propositions about those 
objects and the derivative notions.


OK, then how is it that you seem to imply that truth is independent 
of 1p, i.e. that it is a valuation internal to experience?


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-03 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 02 Nov 2012, at 21:19, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/2/2012 12:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

  I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that  
"numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the  
explanation an infinite regress.


Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress  
disappear.


Dear Bruno,

   Only if arithmetic truth is theory independent,


Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth is so independent of any  
effective theory that no such theory can get it. mathematical  
logic, and math, cannot have any meaning without arithmetical truth  
being independent of theories.




Dear Bruno,

"Truth is Independence of theories" cannot mean that truth is a  
meaningful value in the primitive ontological level. The relation  
'Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth' cannot even exist as a  
meaningful expression because there is no differentiation of  
expression at the ontologically primitive level. The same argument  
that disallows for the existence of a self-aware Universal mind  
applies. Let me step through a crude sketch of the argument here.


A Universal collection of facts is such that there is no facts  
that is not included, it must cover all possible worlds (ala  
Kripke), it must be Complete.
The universal set of all facts is not a self-consistent set as  
there exists facts in one world that are inconsistent with facts in  
some other possible world.
A mind is such that its facts are mutually consistent or else it  
is insane or non-self-aware.
A self-aware mind must have some knowledge of facts concerning  
its existence or else it is not self-aware.
A universal mind must "know all facts of all possible worlds" or  
else it would not be universal.
   A Universal mind is thus either insane (inconsistent) or non-self- 
aware.


You are to much precise in a too much fuzzy theory.







but that ruins your result! It truth is theory independent then it  
is impossible for us to be able to know of it.


That is mathematical solipsism.


I know! My point is that comp implies the singular existence of  
a mind (universal number that is the sum of all other universal  
numbers) that is incapable of knowing what it is as there is nothing  
within its preview that is it not. It is a Universal Mind



It is obviously false.


We disagree.


Then all your references to Boolean algebra becomes nonsensical.  
Sometimes I can make sense of what you say, but then you add some  
assertion which put so much confusion that I think I was projecting  
sense on a sentence which was comp-meaningfully serendipitously.







Theories are lantern on little pieces of the truth, which does not  
depend on the theory, even if the lantern can bring shadows, and  
also hid some other piece of truth.


You insist on the concept of truth as a Platonic Object with  
innate properties. I disagree with this concept as I see it as  
incoherent.


I don't consider truth as an object. The numbers can be considered as  
the (only) object. truth concerns only the propositions about those  
objects and the derivative notions.






All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend on us  
and on our theories.


No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be  
meaningful in the absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness.


That is arithmetical realism. A statement like Church thesis and comp  
makes no sense at all without it.
I have never heard about someone not believing in arithmetical  
realism. It is really basic. To pretend that arithmetical realism is  
false already needs arithmetical realism.




In the absence of a means to determine some property, it is  
incoherent and sometimes inconsistent to claim that the property has  
some particular value and the absence of all other possible values.


In math this is called (mathematical) solipsism.



This is like claiming to know exactly what is in a black box that  
cannot ever be opened or even located.


Not at all. (Arithmetical) Truth on the contrary is beyond the  
knowledge of any machine.









All knowledge is 'theory laden' - as David Deutsch explains well.



They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points  
(some provably, some non provably). No problem.


   Maybe you might write up an explanation of how arithmetic truth  
is inde

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-03 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/3/2012 12:44 AM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/2/2012 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful 
in the absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness. 



So what means do you used to evaluate, "Either snow is white or snow 
is not white."?


My eyes can still discriminate colors from each other... I use them.


So do you use your color discrimination to evaluate,"Either klognee is 
grue or klognee is not grue."?


Brent
--


Well, I don't know, I never tried. Have you? How did it work out?

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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 11/2/2012 10:38 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful in the absence of 
any means to evaluate its meaningfulness. 



So what means do you used to evaluate, "Either snow is white or snow is not 
white."?


My eyes can still discriminate colors from each other... I use them.


So do you use your color discrimination to evaluate,"Either klognee is grue or klognee is 
not grue."?


Brent

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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-02 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/2/2012 10:48 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 11/2/2012 3:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/2/2012 12:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

  I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers 
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation 
an infinite regress.


Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress 
disappear.


Dear Bruno,

   Only if arithmetic truth is theory independent,


Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth is so independent of any 
effective theory that no such theory can get it. mathematical logic, 
and math, cannot have any meaning without arithmetical truth being 
independent of theories.




Dear Bruno,

"Truth is Independence of theories" cannot mean that truth is a 
meaningful value in the primitive ontological level. The relation 
'Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth' cannot even exist as a 
meaningful expression because there is no differentiation of 
expression at the ontologically primitive level. The same argument 
that disallows for the existence of a self-aware Universal mind 
applies. Let me step through a crude sketch of the argument here.


A Universal 
 
collection of facts is such that there is no facts that is not 
included, it must cover all possible worlds (ala Kripke), it must be 
Complete.
The universal set of all facts is not a self-consistent set as 
there exists facts in one world that are inconsistent with facts in 
some other possible world.
A mind is such that its facts are mutually consistent or else it 
is insane or non-self-aware.
A self-aware mind must have some knowledge of facts concerning 
its existence or else it is not self-aware.
A universal 
 mind 
must "know all facts of all possible worlds" or else it would not be 
universal.
   A Universal mind is thus either insane (inconsistent) or 
non-self-aware.


I don't see any 'either/or'.  Your premises imply an universal mind is 
impossible - one cannot KNOW contradictory propositions; whether one 
is self-aware or not.


I like the way you think!  ;-)







but that ruins your result! It truth is theory independent then it 
is impossible for us to be able to know of it.


That is mathematical solipsism.


I know! My point is that comp implies the singular existence of a 
mind (universal number that is the sum of all other universal 
numbers) that is incapable of knowing what it is as there is nothing 
within its preview that is it not. It is a Universal Mind



It is obviously false.


We disagree.

Theories are lantern on little pieces of the truth, which does not 
depend on the theory, even if the lantern can bring shadows, and 
also hid some other piece of truth.


You insist on the concept of truth as a Platonic Object with 
innate properties. I disagree with this concept as I see it as 
incoherent.


All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend on us 
and on our theories.


No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be 
meaningful in the absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness. 



So what means do you used to evaluate, "Either snow is white or snow 
is not white."?


My eyes can still discriminate colors from each other... I use them.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-02 Thread meekerdb 

On 11/2/2012 3:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/2/2012 12:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

  I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers float in a sea of 
universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an infinite regress.


Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress disappear.


Dear Bruno,

   Only if arithmetic truth is theory independent,


Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth is so independent of any effective theory that no 
such theory can get it. mathematical logic, and math, cannot have any meaning without 
arithmetical truth being independent of theories.




Dear Bruno,

"Truth is Independence of theories" cannot mean that truth is a meaningful value in 
the primitive ontological level. The relation 'Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth' 
cannot even exist as a meaningful expression because there is no differentiation of 
expression at the ontologically primitive level. The same argument that disallows for 
the existence of a self-aware Universal mind applies. Let me step through a crude sketch 
of the argument here.


A Universal  collection 
of facts is such that there is no facts that is not included, it must cover all possible 
worlds (ala Kripke), it must be Complete.
The universal set of all facts is not a self-consistent set as there exists facts in 
one world that are inconsistent with facts in some other possible world.
A mind is such that its facts are mutually consistent or else it is insane or 
non-self-aware.
A self-aware mind must have some knowledge of facts concerning its existence or else 
it is not self-aware.
A universal  mind must 
"know all facts of all possible worlds" or else it would not be universal.

   A Universal mind is thus either insane (inconsistent) or non-self-aware.


I don't see any 'either/or'.  Your premises imply an universal mind is impossible - one 
cannot KNOW contradictory propositions; whether one is self-aware or not.






but that ruins your result! It truth is theory independent then it is impossible for 
us to be able to know of it.


That is mathematical solipsism.


I know! My point is that comp implies the singular existence of a mind (universal 
number that is the sum of all other universal numbers) that is incapable of knowing what 
it is as there is nothing within its preview that is it not. It is a Universal Mind



It is obviously false.


We disagree.

Theories are lantern on little pieces of the truth, which does not depend on the 
theory, even if the lantern can bring shadows, and also hid some other piece of truth.


You insist on the concept of truth as a Platonic Object with innate properties. I 
disagree with this concept as I see it as incoherent.



All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend on us and on our 
theories.


No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful in the absence 
of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness. 



So what means do you used to evaluate, "Either snow is white or snow is not 
white."?

Brent

In the absence of a means to determine some property, it is incoherent and sometimes 
inconsistent to claim that the property has some particular value and the absence of all 
other possible values. This is like claiming to know exactly what is in a black box that 
cannot ever be opened or even located.





All knowledge is 'theory laden' - as David Deutsch explains well.



They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some provably, some non 
provably). No problem.


   Maybe you might write up an explanation of how arithmetic truth is independent of 
any ability to prove it.


Gödel's proof explains this very well. The idea that truth = proof is intuitionism, and 
technically, it changes nothing for arithmetic (only for analysis).




Wrong. Gödel's proof does not prove that truth has a particular value independent of 
the means to know that value. Gödel's proof tells is that theories what (as individuals) 
include Arithmetic will contain statements that cannot be evaluated by those theories as 
individuals. We can build infinite towers of theories that allow evaluation of the truth 
of statments, but int he absence of those towers, there is no

Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-02 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/2/2012 12:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

  I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers 
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation 
an infinite regress.


Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress 
disappear.


Dear Bruno,

   Only if arithmetic truth is theory independent,


Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth is so independent of any 
effective theory that no such theory can get it. mathematical logic, 
and math, cannot have any meaning without arithmetical truth being 
independent of theories.




Dear Bruno,

"Truth is Independence of theories" cannot mean that truth is a 
meaningful value in the primitive ontological level. The relation 'Gödel 
+ Tarski => Arithmetical Truth' cannot even exist as a meaningful 
expression because there is no differentiation of expression at the 
ontologically primitive level. The same argument that disallows for the 
existence of a self-aware Universal mind applies. Let me step through a 
crude sketch of the argument here.


A Universal 
 collection 
of facts is such that there is no facts that is not included, it must 
cover all possible worlds (ala Kripke), it must be Complete.
The universal set of all facts is not a self-consistent set as 
there exists facts in one world that are inconsistent with facts in some 
other possible world.
A mind is such that its facts are mutually consistent or else it is 
insane or non-self-aware.
A self-aware mind must have some knowledge of facts concerning its 
existence or else it is not self-aware.
A universal 
 mind must 
"know all facts of all possible worlds" or else it would not be universal.

   A Universal mind is thus either insane (inconsistent) or non-self-aware.



but that ruins your result! It truth is theory independent then it is 
impossible for us to be able to know of it.


That is mathematical solipsism.


I know! My point is that comp implies the singular existence of a 
mind (universal number that is the sum of all other universal numbers) 
that is incapable of knowing what it is as there is nothing within its 
preview that is it not. It is a Universal Mind



It is obviously false.


We disagree.

Theories are lantern on little pieces of the truth, which does not 
depend on the theory, even if the lantern can bring shadows, and also 
hid some other piece of truth.


You insist on the concept of truth as a Platonic Object with innate 
properties. I disagree with this concept as I see it as incoherent.


All this makes sense only because such truth does not depend on us and 
on our theories.


No, that is an incoherent statement as it pretends to be meaningful 
in the absence of any means to evaluate its meaningfulness. In the 
absence of a means to determine some property, it is incoherent and 
sometimes inconsistent to claim that the property has some particular 
value and the absence of all other possible values. This is like 
claiming to know exactly what is in a black box that cannot ever be 
opened or even located.





All knowledge is 'theory laden' - as David Deutsch explains well.



They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some 
provably, some non provably). No problem.


   Maybe you might write up an explanation of how arithmetic truth is 
independent of any ability to prove it.


Gödel's proof explains this very well. The idea that truth = proof is 
intuitionism, and technically, it changes nothing for arithmetic (only 
for analysis).




Wrong. Gödel's proof does not prove that truth has a particular 
value independent of the means to know that value. Gödel's proof tells 
is that theories what (as individuals) include Arithmetic will contain 
statements that cannot be evaluated by those theories as individuals. We 
can build infinite towers of theories that allow evaluation of the truth 
of statments, but int he absence of those towers, there is no such thing 
as definiteness for truths.


--
Onward!

Stephen

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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-02 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:33, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

  I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers  
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation  
an infinite regress.


Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress  
disappear.


Dear Bruno,

   Only if arithmetic truth is theory independent,


Gödel + Tarski => Arithmetical Truth is so independent of any  
effective theory that no such theory can get it. mathematical logic,  
and math, cannot have any meaning without arithmetical truth being  
independent of theories.





but that ruins your result! It truth is theory independent then it  
is impossible for us to be able to know of it.


That is mathematical solipsism. It is obviously false. Theories are  
lantern on little pieces of the truth, which does not depend on the  
theory, even if the lantern can bring shadows, and also hid some other  
piece of truth. All this makes sense only because such truth does not  
depend on us and on our theories.






All knowledge is 'theory laden' - as David Deutsch explains well.



They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some  
provably, some non provably). No problem.


   Maybe you might write up an explanation of how arithmetic truth  
is independent of any ability to prove it.


Gödel's proof explains this very well. The idea that truth = proof is  
intuitionism, and technically, it changes nothing for arithmetic (only  
for analysis).



Bruno



That might support your idea of "arithmetic realism" against my  
claim against it.




That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to  
be Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if  
not it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be  
distinguishable from to have individual values. The totality of  
numbers is an infinity and thus have the property that their  
proper parts cannot be distinguished from their totality. How does  
the One accomplish this? It seems to me that we have to assume  
that the One is conscious of the numbers and that makes the  
numbers something "different" from the One for 1) to work and this  
is no different from what a finite mind does. My point here is  
that a mind cannot be infinite because it would be incapable of  
distinguishing it's self from any of its proper parts - making it  
the ultimate solipsist. Do there exist maps between the totality  
of an infinite set to an improper part? If yes, what are their  
necessary properties?


The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't  
see why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence  
for this.


   I agree 100% with you on this.



Bruno


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-01 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 11/1/2012 11:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

   I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers 
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an 
infinite regress.


Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress 
disappear.


 Dear Bruno,

Only if arithmetic truth is theory independent, but that ruins your 
result! It truth is theory independent then it is impossible for us to 
be able to know of it. All knowledge is 'theory laden' - as David 
Deutsch explains well.




They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some 
provably, some non provably). No problem.


Maybe you might write up an explanation of how arithmetic truth is 
independent of any ability to prove it. That might support your idea of 
"arithmetic realism" against my claim against it.




That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to be 
Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if not 
it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be distinguishable 
from to have individual values. The totality of numbers is an 
infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot be 
distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish this? 
It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is conscious of 
the numbers and that makes the numbers something "different" from the 
One for 1) to work and this is no different from what a finite mind 
does. My point here is that a mind cannot be infinite because it 
would be incapable of distinguishing it's self from any of its proper 
parts - making it the ultimate solipsist. Do there exist maps between 
the totality of an infinite set to an improper part? If yes, what are 
their necessary properties?


The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't see 
why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence for this.


I agree 100% with you on this.



Bruno


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-11-01 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 01 Nov 2012, at 00:35, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

   I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers  
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an  
infinite regress.


Replace the One by arithmetical truth, and the infinite regress  
disappear.


They reappear *in* arithmetical truth, but have fixed points (some  
provably, some non provably). No problem.






That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of the One to be  
Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, but if not  
it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be distinguishable  
from to have individual values. The totality of numbers is an  
infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot  
be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish  
this? It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is  
conscious of the numbers and that makes the numbers something  
"different" from the One for 1) to work and this is no different  
from what a finite mind does. My point here is that a mind cannot be  
infinite because it would be incapable of distinguishing it's self  
from any of its proper parts - making it the ultimate solipsist. Do  
there exist maps between the totality of an infinite set to an  
improper part? If yes, what are their necessary properties?


The One is solipsist, as the one is unique and alone. But I don't see  
why it should be conscious. It might be, but I see no evidence for this.


Bruno





   The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument  
against the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I  
argued above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper  
parts is the same as Bruno's measure problem.


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-10-31 Thread Stephen P. King 

On 10/31/2012 9:39 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net  
10/31/2012

Dear Roger,

I think that this idea is exactly wrong. The idea that "numbers 
float in a sea of universal mind (the One)" makes the explanation an 
infinite regress. That is OK if and only if you allow for the concept of 
the One to be Kaufman and Zuckerman's Quine Atom aka Russell operator, 
but if not it does not work. Why? Because numbers have to be 
distinguishable from to have individual values. The totality of numbers 
is an infinity and thus have the property that their proper parts cannot 
be distinguished from their totality. How does the One accomplish this? 
It seems to me that we have to assume that the One is conscious of the 
numbers and that makes the numbers something "different" from the One 
for 1) to work and this is no different from what a finite mind does. My 
point here is that a mind cannot be infinite because it would be 
incapable of distinguishing it's self from any of its proper parts - 
making it the ultimate solipsist. Do there exist maps between the 
totality of an infinite set to an improper part? If yes, what are their 
necessary properties?


The idea of 2) seems to be demolished by Dennett's argument against 
the homunculus or else the One is strictly a solipsist as I argued 
above. I suspect that the mapping between wholes and improper parts is 
the same as Bruno's measure problem.


--
Onward!

Stephen


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Re: Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-10-31 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 31 Oct 2012, at 14:39, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).


The ONE is much more than the universal mind, as it is where the  
universal minds compete, perhaps before eventually recognizing  
themselves and reuniting, or fusing, and coming back to the ONE  
(Plotinus' conversion).







2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Not really because the "multiverse illusion" emerges from the  
statistical interference in all realities/dreams. But what you say  
might be locally true, if our substitution level is very low, like if  
a difference in the 10^(10^1000) decimal of h-bar would prevents  
consciousness to occur, or make it completely different (no need of  
zombies here). That would be astonishing, given the evidence, but comp  
certainly does not exclude, yet, such weird possibility. This would  
give a multi-multi-verse, at the least, as we already have evidence  
that our branches in the quantum multiverse can, and mostly, do  
interfere.


Bruno








Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/31/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-30, 12:38:34
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm




On 30 Oct 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/30/2012 7:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 29 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 10/29/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:

[Bruno Marchal wrote:] So numbers are universal and can be treated  
mathematically as always.





   I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the  
existence of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is  
equivalent to claiming that unspecified statements are true or false  
even in the absence of the possibility of discovering the fact.





Dear Bruno



I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers.


   No, I do not. My claim is that Numbers are objects in the mind of  
conscious beings.



This contradicts what you said before. It contradicts comp  
immediately, as comp needs the understanding of what a computer can  
do, even in absence of any conscious observer.


Dear Bruno,

   It contradicts your version of comp, yes, but not mine, as I see  
minds and numbers as co-existing simultaneously, there is no  
ontological priority between them in my version.




Comp is only the assumption that the brain is a machine, to be  
short. Then it is proved that the TOE is arithmetic (or recursively  
equivalent). Matter and mind arise from the numbers (and + and *).  
If you reintroduce a mind assumption, mind will be epiphenomenal. It  
you reintroduce matter, it will be epinomenal.
















If there does not exist worlds where entities to whom numbers are  
concepts then there is no such thing as a concept of numbers in such  
worlds.



But with comp, a conscious observer is explained by number  
relations. We explain the concept of numbers, and of human  
understanding of numbers, by number relations (computations).




   Sure, but we should be able to 'go the other way' as well! You  
seem to insist on a well founded relation where as I do not!




I derive proposition. I suggest nothing, nor do I insist on nothing,  
except on reasoning validly. I am not a philosopher. you must  
understand the technical result before philosophising on it. It is  
subtle as comp makes a part of philosophy of mind into a branch of  
science (indeed, arithmetic/computer science).











My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems  
apply only to the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not  
to numbers themselves.




Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for  
some machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense.


   Your version, yes.



Not my version. "My" version is just a technically more precise that  
the version used in some literature. Comp is the same for everybody.  
"My" Version implies all other one, as it is a very weaker version  
(because it does not depend on which level of substitution we use).














And then your argument is not valid, as with numbers, the miracle is  
that we can specify the concept of numbers, as this result in  
defining some arithmetical sigma_1 complete theory in terms of 0,  
s(0), ... and the laws of addition and multiplication, that  
everybody understands (unless philosophers?).



   I am a philosopher! My argument rests only on the fact that the  
'miracle' is exactly as you state it here: we exist and have a  
concept of numbers and can ascertain the truth o

Could universes in a multiverse be solipsistic ? Would this be a problem ?

2012-10-31 Thread Roger Clough 
Hi Bruno Marchal

1) Yes, numbers float in a sea of universal mind (the One).  

2) Here's a thought. If the universe acts like a gigantic
homunculus, with the supreme monad or One as its mind,
then could there be a solipsism to our universe such that
other multiverse versions of oiur universe could not access
(the mind of) ours ? Would this be a problem for multiverse
theories ?


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/31/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


- Receiving the following content -  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-30, 12:38:34 
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 




On 30 Oct 2012, at 14:23, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 10/30/2012 7:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 



On 29 Oct 2012, at 22:38, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 10/29/2012 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 


On 29 Oct 2012, at 14:36, Stephen P. King wrote:  

[Bruno Marchal wrote:] So numbers are universal and can be treated 
mathematically as always.  




I agree, but the concept of numbers has no meaning prior to the existence 
of objects that can be counted. To think otherwise is equivalent to claiming 
that unspecified statements are true or false even in the absence of the 
possibility of discovering the fact.  




Dear Bruno 



I think you confuse numbers, and the concept of numbers.  


No, I do not. My claim is that Numbers are objects in the mind of conscious 
beings.  


This contradicts what you said before. It contradicts comp immediately, as comp 
needs the understanding of what a computer can do, even in absence of any 
conscious observer.  

Dear Bruno, 

It contradicts your version of comp, yes, but not mine, as I see minds and 
numbers as co-existing simultaneously, there is no ontological priority between 
them in my version.  



Comp is only the assumption that the brain is a machine, to be short. Then it 
is proved that the TOE is arithmetic (or recursively equivalent). Matter and 
mind arise from the numbers (and + and *). If you reintroduce a mind 
assumption, mind will be epiphenomenal. It you reintroduce matter, it will be 
epinomenal. 















If there does not exist worlds where entities to whom numbers are concepts then 
there is no such thing as a concept of numbers in such worlds.  


But with comp, a conscious observer is explained by number relations. We 
explain the concept of numbers, and of human understanding of numbers, by 
number relations (computations). 



Sure, but we should be able to 'go the other way' as well! You seem to 
insist on a well founded relation where as I do not! 



I derive proposition. I suggest nothing, nor do I insist on nothing, except on 
reasoning validly. I am not a philosopher. you must understand the technical 
result before philosophising on it. It is subtle as comp makes a part of 
philosophy of mind into a branch of science (indeed, arithmetic/computer 
science).  










My argument is that concepts of truth and provability of theorems apply only to 
the concepts of numbers and their constructions, not to numbers themselves. 



Truth applies to proposition, or sentences representing them for some 
machine/numbers. If not, comp does not even makes sense. 

Your version, yes. 



Not my version. "My" version is just a technically more precise that the 
version used in some literature. Comp is the same for everybody. "My" Version 
implies all other one, as it is a very weaker version (because it does not 
depend on which level of substitution we use). 













And then your argument is not valid, as with numbers, the miracle is that we 
can specify the concept of numbers, as this result in defining some 
arithmetical sigma_1 complete theory in terms of 0, s(0), ... and the laws of 
addition and multiplication, that everybody understands (unless philosophers?). 
 


I am a philosopher! My argument rests only on the fact that the 'miracle' 
is exactly as you state it here: we exist and have a concept of numbers and can 
ascertain the truth of arithmetic statements. My claim is that truth valuations 
supervene on the ability of consciousness to form concepts of numbers. 


That is idealism, if not solipsism. In comp plotinus term, you confuse the 
outer God (the objective ultimate truth) and the inner God, or the sould of the 
individual inquirer. 



No, Idealism is that only the mind exists, i.e. idealism takes the mind as 
ontologically primitive. Solipsism is the condition of a mind such that it can 
only interact with some version of itself. 



Given that matter comes from the numbers, if the number comes from the human 
mind, everything comes from the human mind. This is a version of (collective) 
solipsism. 









I question the entire idea of numbers existing as separate Platonic entities. 
In the absence of consciousness, there is no such thing as a concept! 



Again, we need only the relation between the numbers, not the concept o