ginal Message - From: "John M"
[EMAIL PROTECTED]To: "Norman Samish"
[EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Friday, September 09, 2005 11:39
AMSubject: Re: What Computationalism is and what it is
*not*Norman, I wonder which one do you prefer:The unprovable
proof, or The Hypothetical reality?John
M
--- Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
John writes
Computationalism is yet another claim.
It's the notion that all of our own
thoughts as well could be implemented
on a Turing Machine in a way that would
deliver to us just as much
experiential satisfaction.
According
with the rest of the (real) universe this
doesn't qualify as a ''bona fide'' simulation.
Saibal
- Original Message -
From: Norman Samish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2005 05:48 AM
Subject: Re: What Computationalism is and what
--- Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Being more specific: intelligences vastly greater than
today's
might possibly as soon as 2200 A.D. be in a position
to design,
if they wanted to, a cubic meter of computing material
that
would simulate the thoughts of everyone currently
living in 2005.
--- Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Norm writes...
SNIP
Computationalism is yet another claim. It's the
notion that all of
our own thoughts as well could be implemented on a
Turing Machine in
a way that would deliver to us just as much
experiential satisfaction.
Lee
Another
On 07 Sep 2005, at 06:35, Lee Corbin wrote:
Bruno writes
[Hal wrote]
I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds
can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be
simulated on a TM.
They are wrong.
Note that this is just Bruno's opinion.
No. It is
On 07 Sep 2005, at 06:50, Lee Corbin wrote:Not sure I entirely understand, but it seems to me that we survive in "Harry potter like universes", but only get very little runtime there (i.e. have very low measure in those). What happens is that when you survive in a "Harry Potter like Universe", it
On 07 Sep 2005, at 06:44, Lee Corbin wrote:
Bruno writes
The accepted *definition* by usage that everyone uses is that it
is a *claim* that classical (non-QM) robots could be conscious,
that minds could be uploaded into computers. So invent your own
term if you don't like how the rest of
On 03 Sep 2005, at 20:54, Hal Finney wrote:Okay, I was mostly trying to clarify the terminology. The problem is that sometimes you use "comp" as if it is the same as computationalism, and sometimes it seems to include these additional concepts of the Church Thesis and Arithmetical Realism. Maybe
On 05 Sep 2005, at 19:13, Hal Finney wrote:
Bruno writes:
I will think about it, but I do think that CT and AR are just making
the YD more precise. Also everybody in cognitive science agree
explicitly or implicitly with both CT and AR, so to take them away
from YD could be more confusing.
On 06 Sep 2005, at 02:27, Lee Corbin wrote:
Bruno writes
Well, even at step 0 (Yes doctor), if the doctor is honest it will
warn you that the artificial brain is a digital device, and I cannot
imagine him explaining what that really means in all generality
without invoking Church thesis.
On 06 Sep 2005, at 04:49, Lee Corbin wrote:Why, whyever for? Isn't it true that most people don't object to their *physical* destruction because they realize that they'll continue to live on as abstract machines? For sure, those who believe fully in the Universal Distribution don't really care
At the risk of digressing...
Here are two questions to ponder:
Can the entire collection of minds (human at least) that exists be
simulated as one computer? That is, is it possible to design a
computer such that it behaves exactly like the whole of intellectual
existence does?
conversely, is
Norm writes
You [Hal Finney] say, . . . the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase
as saying that there are no physical processes more computationally
powerful than a Turing machine, or in other words that the universe could
in principle be simulated on a TM. I wouldn't be surprised if most
Bruno writes
[Hal wrote]
I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds
can be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be
simulated on a TM.
They are wrong.
Note that this is just Bruno's opinion. Hal's statement really
is true: most people don't agree with
Bruno writes
The accepted *definition* by usage that everyone uses is that it
is a *claim* that classical (non-QM) robots could be conscious,
that minds could be uploaded into computers. So invent your own
term if you don't like how the rest of the world is using
of computationalism.
Bruno writes
On 06 Sep 2005, at 04:49, Lee Corbin wrote:
Why, whyever for? Isn't it true that most people don't object to their
*physical* destruction because they realize that they'll continue to
live on as abstract machines? For sure, those who believe fully in
the
On Tue, Sep 06, 2005 at 09:35:02PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote:
Bruno writes
If minds are turing-emulable then indeed minds cannot
perceive something as being provably non-turing-emulable, but minds
can prove that 99,999...% of comp-Platonia is not turing-emulable.
I don't pretend to
Aditya writes
At the risk of digressing...
I don't think that that's possible on the Everything list by definition!
Here are two questions to ponder:
Can the entire collection of minds (human at least) that exists be
simulated as one computer? That is, is it possible to design a
On 03 Sep 2005, at 20:54, Hal Finney wrote:Okay, I was mostly trying to clarify the terminology. The problem isthat sometimes you use "comp" as if it is the same as computationalism,and sometimes it seems to include these additional concepts of the ChurchThesis and Arithmetical Realism. Maybe
Bruno writes:
I will think about it, but I do think that CT and AR are just making
the YD more precise. Also everybody in cognitive science agree
explicitly or implicitly with both CT and AR, so to take them away
from YD could be more confusing.
I think that is probably true about the
Hal Finney,
You say, . . . the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase as saying that
there are no physical processes more computationally powerful than a Turing
machine, or in other words that the universe could in principle be simulated
on a TM. I wouldn't be surprised if most people who
@eskimo.com
Sent: Monday, September 05, 2005 08:44 PM
Subject: Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
Hal Finney,
You say, . . . the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase as saying that
there are no physical processes more computationally powerful than a
Turing
machine, or in other
Bruno writes
Well, even at step 0 (Yes doctor), if the doctor is honest it will
warn you that the artificial brain is a digital device, and I cannot
imagine him explaining what that really means in all generality
without invoking Church thesis.
That's funny. My doctor never explains
Hal writes
That simple mathematical objects have a sort of existence is probably
unobjectionable, but most people probably don't give it too much thought.
For most, it's a question analogous to whether a falling tree makes a
noise when there's no one there to hear it. Whether the number 3
On 03 Sep 2005, at 07:45, Hal Finney wrote:
Bruno wrote:
Of course the reversal result introduces ambiguity in expressions
like mental activity. That is why I sum up comp by YD + CT + AR.
(Yes doctor + Church Thesis + Arithmetical realism).
But if comp is computationalism, that is the
Bruno writes:
To sum up: comp is essentially YD, if only to provide a picture of
the first person comp indeterminacy. But CT is used to give a range
for that indeterminacy (the UD*, the trace of the UD). It is by CT
that the UD is really comp-universal, and it is a consequence of CT
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