Hi John,
Le 27-avr.-05, à 16:17, John M a écrit :
again a post from you with your wits. I will post my reply (if I get
the
relevant points from Russell and - if I can - ) onlist.
However your expression:
"... I think we can progress
only by understanding misunderstandings ..."<
(what I assume as '
inding
a sort of mean between Russell and John.
I will elaborate later.
Bruno
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAI
tence.J.
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2005 2:49 AM
Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
>
&g
communicating my work by finding
a sort of mean between Russell and John.
I will elaborate later.
Bruno
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROT
.
Maybe we could do this in private exchange, to be nice to the list.
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 10:30 PM
Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2005 8:09 PM
Subject: Re: "F
"Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
> Sent: Tuesday, April 19, 2005 8:09 PM
> Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
>
> Russell S. writes in his convoluted from attachment-digging out ways:
>
> "Laplace's daemon is
On Mon, Apr 18, 2005 at 05:45:58PM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> On Apr 11, 2005, at 11:11 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> > I'm dealing with these questions in an artificial life system - Tierra
> > to be precise. I have compared the original Tierra code, with one in
> > which the random no. generato
On Mon, Apr 18, 2005 at 05:14:42PM -0700, Pete Carlton wrote:
> On Apr 11, 2005, at 11:11 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> > I'm dealing with these questions in an artificial life system -
> > Tierra
> > to be precise. I have compared the original Tierra code, with one
> > in
> > which the ran
eason for my appreciation of your
> project. Just please, don't 'daemonize' it.
>
> John Mikes
>
>
> ----- Original Message -
> From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: "St
On Apr 11, 2005, at 11:11 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> I'm dealing with these questions in an artificial life system - Tierra
> to be precise. I have compared the original Tierra code, with one in
> which the random no. generator is replaced with a true random
> no. generator called HAVEGE, and an
On Apr 11, 2005, at 11:11 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I'm dealing with these questions in an artificial life system - Tierra
to be precise. I have compared the original Tierra code, with one in
which the random no. generator is replaced with a true random
no. generator called HAVEGE, and another si
hn Mikes
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2005 7:58 PM
Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
7;t misunderstand me.
Thanks for your insight
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Saturday, April 16, 2005 9:53 AM
Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
> John
John Mikes wrote:
Dear Stathis,
isn't this getting out of control?
I am not talking about your ingenious octopus question (ask the octopus!)
I am talking of the simplistic anthropomodelled and today-level-related way
of thinking: something (anything) is black or white, in other words:
it is either
Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc:
Sent: Friday, April 15, 2005 6:27 AM
Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >Le 14-avr.-05, à 14:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 14-avr.-05, à 14:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
A decision I make is "free" when I feel that I could have decided
otherwise.
OK I can take that definition of free-will, although I would bet that
free-will will always be in company of any genuine act of will.
Bruno
http
Hal Finney writes:
> On the other hand, I might aknowledge that my feeling of freedom is not
> actually consistent with the particular interpretation of the term
"freedom"
> the philosopher is trying to foist on me. In other words, if "freedom"
means
> "not bound by determinism or randomness", th
Stathis Papaioannou writes:
> This is more or less the point I was trying to make: philosophical
> discussion leads to "a troubling entaglement that seems to lead to
> contradictions". I return to what I called a definition but I should
> probably have called a description of the basic phenomeno
Hal Finney writes:
Stathis Papaioannou writes
> Here is my definition: a decision I make is "free" when I feel that I
could
> have decided otherwise.
Is the question of "free will" just a matter of definitions? Definitional
arguments are sterile and have no meaning. If I define "free will" to b
>-Original Message-
>From: John M [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2005 9:05 PM
>To: Brent Meeker; everything-list@eskimo.com
>Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
>
>
>Dear Brent,
>I wish I had the insight
gt;
> Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
> Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 2:11 AM
> Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
> Russell wrote in his attachment-style post:
>
> [RS]:
> Since we live in a quantum mechanical world, randomness is inherently
>
MAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2005 8:20 AM
Subject: RE: "Free Will Theorem"
>
>
> >-Original Message-
> >From: John M [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 10:04 PM
> >To
t the
problem is, is better than 'define it".
Cheers
John Mikes
- Original Message -
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2005 12:30 PM
Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
> Stathis Papaioannou writes
> &
>-Original Message-
>From: John M [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 10:04 PM
>To: Russell Standish; Stathis Papaioannou
>Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
>Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
..
>[JM]:
>I am sure yo
Stathis Papaioannou writes
> Here is my definition: a decision I make is "free" when I feel that I could
> have decided otherwise.
Is the question of "free will" just a matter of definitions? Definitional
arguments are sterile and have no meaning. If I define "free will" to be
a 14 pound bowlin
Please find my remarks interspaced below.
John M
- Original Message -
From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>;
Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 2:11 AM
Subject: Re: "Free Wi
In various places including a post in the All/Nothing multiverse thread:
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m5859.html
I have defined information as the potential to establish a boundary.
I have been arguing that Turing's decision procedure result points towards
the multiverse being a countable
Hal Finney wrote:
The question of free will has generated an enormous
amount of philosophical literature. I'd suggest reading
at least the first part of this page on "Compatibilism",
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/. Compatibilism is the
doctrine that free will is compatible with
On Tue, Apr 12, 2005 at 09:45:49AM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote:
> The question of free will has generated an enormous
> amount of philosophical literature. I'd suggest reading
> at least the first part of this page on "Compatibilism",
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/. Compatibilis
The question of free will has generated an enormous
amount of philosophical literature. I'd suggest reading
at least the first part of this page on "Compatibilism",
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/. Compatibilism is the
doctrine that free will is compatible with determinism. Prob
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le lundi 11 avril 2005 à 22:41 +1000, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> We would then still believe that we had "free will"
> , even though in reality we are all blindly following a predetermined
> script. How could we possibly know that this is not what is in fact
> happenin
[Forwarded to the list on behalf of Quentin Anciaux]
From: Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2005 14:53:55 +0200
Le lundi 11 avril 2005 Ã 22:41 +1000,
Norman Samish wrote:
> I have somewhat arbitrarily defined "free will" as voluntary
> actions that are both "self-determined" by a Self-Aware
> Object, and are not predictable.
> My reasoning is that if something is completely predictable,
> then there is no option for change, hence no free wi
Le 12-avr.-05, à 05:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
And does it really make much difference, whether we are talking truly
random or intractably pseudo-random?
You may be interested to know that the class
of problems soluble by machine with
pseudo-random oracle is properly contained
in the clas
On Tue, Apr 12, 2005 at 01:26:46PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >I think this situation is essentially hypothetical. No machine is
> >completely deterministic - computers are designed to be as
> >deterministic as possible, but still suffer bit errors through
> >chance. Human brains, however,
- Original Message -
From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Monday, April 11, 2005 7:28 PM
Subject: Re: "Free Will Theorem"
Norman Samish wrote:
> If "free will" simply means "self-determination" then Jonathan is
&
Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 10:41:53PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> It may be the case that quantum indeterminacy adds a random element
which
> contributes to our experience of free will, but you are dismissing the
> other theoretical possibility, which is that our brain
Apologies for double-posting. My dial-up account is rather unreliable.
Jonathan Colvin
> Norman Samish wrote:
> > If "free will" simply means "self-determination" then Jonathan is
> > right, and to the extent we are self-determined we have
> free will. He
> > says, "the only relevant questi
Norman Samish wrote:
> If "free will" simply means "self-determination" then Jonathan is
> right, and to the extent we are self-determined we have free will. He
> says, "the only relevant question as to whether our will is free is
> whether our conscious minds (our selves) determine our actio
On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 10:41:53PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> It may be the case that quantum indeterminacy adds a random element which
> contributes to our experience of free will, but you are dismissing the
> other theoretical possibility, which is that our brains are vastly,
> chaoti
Bruno wrote:
Actually I am not sure I can put any meaning on the word "free-will". My
old defense (in this and other list) was just a defense of the notion of
will. If someone can explain me how he/she distinguish free-will from
will, I would be glad.
Bruno
I currently consider "Free Will" to b
Norman Samish wrote:
But what about the sufferers of schizophrenia who Stathis Papaioannou
referred to? They exercise self-determination, and their mental state is
such that their actions, at least in some cases, are completely
predictable.
Do they have free will?
Another example might be a self
Le 11-avr.-05, à 08:08, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
Norman Samish wrote:
To have free will, the actions of a SAO cannot be completely
predictable.
To be free of complete predictability, at least some of the SAO's
actions
must ultimately depend on some kind of random event. At the most
fundamental leve
Norman Samish wrote:
> If "free will" simply means "self-determination" then
> Jonathan is right, and to the extent we are self-determined
> we have free will. He says, "the only relevant question as
> to whether our will is free is whether our conscious minds
> (our selves) determine our act
Norman Samish wrote:
To have free will, the actions of a SAO cannot be completely predictable.
To be free of complete predictability, at least some of the SAO's actions
must ultimately depend on some kind of random event. At the most
fundamental level, this must be quantum indeterminacy.
This is n
If "free will" simply means "self-determination" then Jonathan is right, and
to the extent we are self-determined we have free will. He says, "the only
relevant question as to whether our will is free is whether our conscious
minds (our selves) determine our actions."
But what about the suffer
This discussion is exhibiting the usual confusion about what free will
means. The concept itself is incoherent as generally used (taken as meaning
my actions are not determined). But then in this case they must be merely
random (which is hardly an improvement), or we require recourse to a
Descartia
48 matches
Mail list logo
