On 13 June 2012 14:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
*The question "why am I David" is twofold:*
*
*
*- One aspect is "trivial" and admit the same explanation as "why am I in W
and not in M" in the WM-duplication. Here comp can explain that there is no
answer possible to that question (first person indete
On 12 Jun 2012, at 22:48, David Nyman wrote:
On 12 June 2012 17:36, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, but the expression "from the current state of any universal
machine" (different sense of universal, of course) already *assumes*
the restriction of universal attention to a particular state of a
par
On 12 June 2012 17:36, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Yes, but the expression "from the current state of any universal
>> machine" (different sense of universal, of course) already *assumes*
>> the restriction of universal attention to a particular state of a
>> particular machine.
>>
>
> But is that not
On 11 Jun 2012, at 17:44, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 6/11/2012 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time.
On 11 Jun 2012, at 15:09, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not
enough? It
seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal
machine, it
will look like a special moment is chosen out of
On 11 June 2012 16:27, meekerdb wrote:
That seems confused. The theory is that 'you' are some set of those states.
> If you introduce an external 'knower' you've lost the explanatory function
> of the theory.
>
Well, I'm referring to Hoyle's idea, which explicitly introduces such a
knower. But
On 6/11/2012 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to
say that
they are simul
On 6/11/2012 6:09 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It
seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it
will look like a special moment is chosen out of the others
On 11 June 2012 13:04, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why do you think that pure indexicality (self-reference) is not enough? It
> seems clear to me that from the current state of any universal machine, it
> will look like a special moment is chosen out of the others, for the
> elementary reason that suc
On 10 Jun 2012, at 22:57, David Nyman wrote:
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to
say that
they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some
On 10 June 2012 17:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I am not sure I understand your problem with that simultaneity. The
> arithmetical relations are out of time. It would not make sense to say that
> they are simultaneously true, because this refer to some "time", and can
> only be used as a metaphor.
On 09 Jun 2012, at 23:59, Nick Prince wrote:
On Jun 9, 11:17 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Jun 2012, at 20:52, Nick Prince wrote:
On Jun 8, 8:45 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Nick,
This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the
(absence
of) first person view?
On 09 Jun 2012, at 22:23, meekerdb wrote:
On 6/9/2012 3:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Imagine that you decide to kill yourself with an atomic bomb, so as
to maximize your annihilation probability. Then it might be that
your probability of surviving in a world where you are just not
deciding
On 09 Jun 2012, at 15:42, David Nyman wrote:
On 9 June 2012 11:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Such a backtracking (proposed once by Saibal Mitra on this list)
can also be
used to defend the idea that there is only one person, and that
personal
identity is a relative "illusory" notion. We might
On Jun 9, 11:17 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 08 Jun 2012, at 20:52, Nick Prince wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Jun 8, 8:45 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> Hi Nick,
>
> >> This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence
> >> of) first person view?
>
> > I've drawn the branches
On 6/9/2012 3:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Imagine that you decide to kill yourself with an atomic bomb, so as to maximize your
annihilation probability. Then it might be that your probability of surviving in a world
where you are just not deciding to kill yourself is bigger than surviving from s
On 6/9/2012 2:44 AM, Pierz wrote:
On Saturday, June 9, 2012 12:27:43 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
On 6/8/2012 7:02 PM, Pierz wrote:
I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take
seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other
what if
On 9 June 2012 11:17, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Such a backtracking (proposed once by Saibal Mitra on this list) can also be
> used to defend the idea that there is only one person, and that personal
> identity is a relative "illusory" notion. We might be a "God" playing a
> trick to himself, notabl
On 08 Jun 2012, at 20:52, Nick Prince wrote:
On Jun 8, 8:45 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Nick,
This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence
of) first person view?
I've drawn the branches so that they represent a 3p viewpoint of
someone observing us over time - i.e
On Saturday, June 9, 2012 12:27:43 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote:
>
> On 6/8/2012 7:02 PM, Pierz wrote:
>
> I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take
> seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other
> what ifs. But I think I see a couple of
On 08 Jun 2012, at 19:30, Johnathan Corgan wrote:
On Fri, Jun 8, 2012 at 12:45 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the
(absence of)
first person view?
I think this is actually the point--calculations of expected future
experiences based on
On 6/8/2012 7:02 PM, Pierz wrote:
I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take
seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other
what ifs. But I think I see a couple of flaws in this argument. Firstly, I am
not sure about the equation of un
I don't know, somehow this whole argument is not something I could take
seriously enough to get worked up over - too many what ifs piled up on other
what ifs. But I think I see a couple of flaws in this argument. Firstly, I am
not sure about the equation of unconsciousness with death. Why should
On Jun 8, 8:45 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Nick,
>
> This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence
> of) first person view?
I've drawn the branches so that they represent a 3p viewpoint of
someone observing us over time - i.e. we are schrodingers cat! So U
means obser
On Fri, Jun 8, 2012 at 12:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence of)
> first person view?
I think this is actually the point--calculations of expected future
experiences based on now being in the neighborhood of D (which result
in "tor
Hi Nick,
This is a bit unclear. How is U and D distinguished from the (absence
of) first person view?
Given that very minimal change in the brain seems to be able to send
someone in the "amnesic arithmetical heaven", as illustrated by some
drugs, I am not sure we should worry about QM imm
Oops - so the new branching diagrams came out wrong. OK they should
read
U to U or D or C and C to C or U.
On Jun 8, 12:11 am, Nick Prince wrote:
> I’ve just read the following paper :
>
> http://istvanaranyosi.net/resources/Should%20we%20fear%20qt%20final.pdf
>
> which argues that it is pos
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