Re: adult vs. child
On 11 Feb 2009, at 20:47, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote: I'm with Mike and Brent. Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you can't go out of the system. See my answer to Brent. Once A1 looks at itself in the mirror (and thus A2 too, given the protocol). A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2, and the computation differs. If A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2 and they see something different, i.e. MA1 and MA2 are distinguishable, then you've violated the hypothesis that the computations are identical. Right? I did change the protocol to make my point, which concerns only the probability of finding myself by MA1 or by MA2, but not both. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
On 11 Feb 2009, at 22:19, Brent Meeker wrote: This idea seems inconsistent with MWI. In QM the split is uncaused so it's hard to see why its influence extends into the past and increases the measure of computations that were identical before the split. I got the inspiration from the MWI, and even from David Deutsch convincing point that conceptually differentiation-talk is less wrong than bifurcation-talk. But is is not simply, in QM, a consequence of the linearity of the tensor product?, i.e. the fact that the state A*(B+C) is equivalent with (A*C)+(A*C), where A, B, C represents kets and * represents the tensor product. Of course the price to pay, as Everett first noticed, is that the states become a relative notion, and the probabilities too, making RSSA obligatory in QM. With comp it is more subtle (but then Everett uses comp and missed or abstracted himself from this subtlety). Of course we still lack a definite criteria of identity for computation. But we can already derive what can count as different computations if we want those measure question making sense. As I understand it your theory of personal identity depends on computations going through a particular state. Intuitively this implies a state at a particular moment, but a Y=II representation implies that we are taking into account not just the present state but some period of history - which would correspond with the usual idea of a person - something with a history, not just a state. Absolutely so. It is the Darwinistic aspect of comp. A species with a lot of offsprings makes higher the time life of old gene. Perhaps thats why it is said we should grow and multiply :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
On 10 Feb 2009, at 20:11, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four categories I did in the paper. If you are considering future versions of yourself, in the MWI sense, there is no randomness involved. Depending on how you define you, you will either be all of them, or you are just an observer-moment and can consider them to be other people. Regardless of definitions, this case calls for the use of Caring Measure for decision making. It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the reductionist theory of personal identity. Consider the following experiment: There are two consecutive periods of consciousness, A and B, in which you are an observer in a virtual reality program. A is your experiences between 5:00 PM and 5:01 PM while B is your experiences between 5:01 PM and 5:02 PM, subjective time. A is being implemented in parallel on two computers MA1 and MA2, so that there are actually two qualitatively identical streams of consciousness which we can call A1 and A2. At the end of the subjective minute, data is saved to disk and both MA1 and MA2 are switched off. An external operator picks up a copy of the saved data, walks over to a third computer MB, loads the data and starts up the program. After another subjective minute MB is switched off and the experiment ends. As the observer you know all this information, and you look at the clock and see that it is 5:00 PM. What can you conclude from this and what should you expect? To me, it seems that you must conclude that you are currently either A1 or A2, and that in one minute you will be B, with 100% certainty. Would you say something else? I might say that while there are two computations, there is only one stream of consciousness. You are right, but I think that Stathis is right too. When Stathis talks about two identical stream of consciousness, he make perhaps just a little abuse of language, which seems to me quite justifiable. Just give a mirror to the observer so that A *can* (but does not) look in the mirror to see if he is implemented by MA1 or by MA2. Knowing the protocol the observer can predict that IF he look at the mirror the stream of consciousness will bifurcate into A1 and A2. I don't follow that. If A1 looks in the mirror and sees A2, then, ex hypothesi, A2 looks in the mirror and sees A1 and the two streams of consciousness remain identical. I don't understand what you mean by A1 sees A2. I guess we have a misunderstanding, and I have probably be not clear. When A1 looks at itself in the third person way, he discovers is most probable running universal machine, which is MA1. So the stream of consciousness differentiate at this point. Mallah get the correct probability here. If consciousness is computation, independent of physical implementation, then computations that differ only in their physical realizations are identical and cannot be counted as more than one. But what we call the physical implementations is a sum on all possible computations going through the relevant states. The measure has to be taken on all computational histories exactly because the stream of consciousness is the same for all those computational histories. Bruno Brent Accepting the Y = II rule, that is bifurcation of future = differentiation of the whole story) makes the Stathis abuse of language an acceptable way to describe the picture. So Stathis get the correct expectation, despite the first person ambiguity in two identical stream of consciousness. If two infinitely computations *never* differentiate, should we count them as one? I am not sure but I think we should still differentiate them. UD generates infinitely often such infinitely similar streams. That should play a role for the relative (to observer-moment) measure pertaining on the computations. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote: I'm with Mike and Brent. Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you can't go out of the system. See my answer to Brent. Once A1 looks at itself in the mirror (and thus A2 too, given the protocol). A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2, and the computation differs. It is like being duplicated in two identical rooms. This change the (local and relative) measure, because if you open the box in the room you will find zero or one, but not both. And your remark that we should differentiate infinite identical platonic computations confuses me - it seems to contradict unification (which I gather you assume). Not if you distinguish first person and third person. It is the third person computations which gives the local relative probabilities, but yes the stream of consciousness (first person) is the same. This lead to a vocabulary problem like chosing the word bifurcation or differentiation for computation which, at some point *becomes* different. Consciousness is unique and immaterial. As such it resides in Platonia. Life, that is embedding in relative computaional histories is what makes consciousness differentiate. Measure can only be influenced by _different_ computations supporting the same OM. You are right, but different computations can be understood locally and globally. The computation of me up to Washington is different of the computation of me up to Moscow, even when I am still in Brussels. It is contained in the Y = II idea. Note that the same vocabulary problem occurs with Quantum Physics. Of course we still lack a definite criteria of identity for computation. But we can already derive what can count as different computations if we want those measure question making sense. Best, Bruno Cheers, Günther Michael Rosefield wrote: I agree. They are both pointers to the same abstract computation. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2009/2/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com mailto:jackmal...@yahoo.com: This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four categories I did in the paper. If you are considering future versions of yourself, in the MWI sense, there is no randomness involved. Depending on how you define you, you will either be all of them, or you are just an observer-moment and can consider them to be other people. Regardless of definitions, this case calls for the use of Caring Measure for decision making. It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the reductionist theory of personal identity. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB
2009/2/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But the same could be said about everyday life. The person who wakes up in my bed tomorrow won't be me, he will be some guy who thinks he's me and shares my memories, personality traits, physical characteristics and so on. In other words, everyone only lives transiently, and continuity of consciousness is an illusion. I think I understand your point, but I don't see that the continuity of consciousness is any more an illusion than any other continuity: the continuity of space, the persistence of objects, etc. You are just generalizing Zeno's paradox. But once you look at it that way, the question becomes, Why imagine the continuity is made up of discrete elements? It is this conceptualization, points in space, moments in time, observer moments as atoms of consciousness, that creates the paradox. So maybe we should recognize continuity as fundamental. The continuity need not be temporal, it could be a more abstract property such a causal connection or perhaps what Bruno says distinguishes a computation from a description of the computation. I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people who merely experience the illusion of being me. However, this just becomes a semantic exercise. Saying that I will wake up in my bed tomorrow is equivalent to saying that someone sufficiently similar to me will wake up in my bed tomorrow. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB causation
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: 2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1 (e.g. discarding any errors that A2 might have made) then one could say that A1 is the same person as B, while A2 is not. This is causal differentiation. Yes, but I'm assuming A1 and A2 have identical content. That actually doesn't matter - causation is defined in terms of counterfactuals. If - then, considering what happens at that moment of saving the data. If x=1 and y=1, and I copy the contents of x to z, that is not the same causal relationship as if I had copied y to z. Isn't that making the causal chain essential to the experience; contrary to the idea that the stream of consciousness is just the computation? The causal chain is not part of the computation, A1 and A2 could be implemented by different physics and hence different causation. --- On Tue, 2/10/09, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: But surely the counterfactuals are the same in each case too? In which case it is the same causal relationship. We're talking computations here, each computation will respond identically to the same counterfactual input. I believe you both are taking what I wrote out of context. Sorry if I was not clear. In the above I was talking about the moment at which the data is saved, from either A1 or A2, when making the transition to B in the thought experiment. BTW, causation (sensitivity to counterfactuals) is part of the criteria for an implementation of a computation. So in that sense causation is essential to the experience. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote: I'm with Mike and Brent. Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you can't go out of the system. See my answer to Brent. Once A1 looks at itself in the mirror (and thus A2 too, given the protocol). A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2, and the computation differs. If A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2 and they see something different, i.e. MA1 and MA2 are distinguishable, then you've violated the hypothesis that the computations are identical. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2009, at 00:38, Günther Greindl wrote: I'm with Mike and Brent. Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you can't go out of the system. See my answer to Brent. Once A1 looks at itself in the mirror (and thus A2 too, given the protocol). A1 sees MA1 and A2 sees MA2, and the computation differs. It is like being duplicated in two identical rooms. This change the (local and relative) measure, because if you open the box in the room you will find zero or one, but not both. And your remark that we should differentiate infinite identical platonic computations confuses me - it seems to contradict unification (which I gather you assume). Not if you distinguish first person and third person. It is the third person computations which gives the local relative probabilities, but yes the stream of consciousness (first person) is the same. This lead to a vocabulary problem like chosing the word bifurcation or differentiation for computation which, at some point *becomes* different. Consciousness is unique and immaterial. As such it resides in Platonia. Life, that is embedding in relative computaional histories is what makes consciousness differentiate. Measure can only be influenced by _different_ computations supporting the same OM. You are right, but different computations can be understood locally and globally. The computation of me up to Washington is different of the computation of me up to Moscow, even when I am still in Brussels. It is contained in the Y = II idea. This idea seems inconsistent with MWI. In QM the split is uncaused so it's hard to see why its influence extends into the past and increases the measure of computations that were identical before the split. Brent Note that the same vocabulary problem occurs with Quantum Physics. Of course we still lack a definite criteria of identity for computation. But we can already derive what can count as different computations if we want those measure question making sense. As I understand it your theory of personal identity depends on computations going through a particular state. Intuitively this implies a state at a particular moment, but a Y=II representation implies that we are taking into account not just the present state but some period of history - which would correspond with the usual idea of a person - something with a history, not just a state. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But the same could be said about everyday life. The person who wakes up in my bed tomorrow won't be me, he will be some guy who thinks he's me and shares my memories, personality traits, physical characteristics and so on. In other words, everyone only lives transiently, and continuity of consciousness is an illusion. I think I understand your point, but I don't see that the continuity of consciousness is any more an illusion than any other continuity: the continuity of space, the persistence of objects, etc. You are just generalizing Zeno's paradox. But once you look at it that way, the question becomes, Why imagine the continuity is made up of discrete elements? It is this conceptualization, points in space, moments in time, observer moments as atoms of consciousness, that creates the paradox. So maybe we should recognize continuity as fundamental. The continuity need not be temporal, it could be a more abstract property such a causal connection or perhaps what Bruno says distinguishes a computation from a description of the computation. I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people who merely experience the illusion of being me. However, this just becomes a semantic exercise. Saying that I will wake up in my bed tomorrow is equivalent to saying that someone sufficiently similar to me will wake up in my bed tomorrow. If continuity is fundamental then personal identity could be defined in terms of it and there could be a real difference between you and someone with the same memories, but without continuity to your past. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB
2009/2/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: If continuity is fundamental then personal identity could be defined in terms of it and there could be a real difference between you and someone with the same memories, but without continuity to your past. But that could lead to absurd conclusions. Suppose you discover that you have a disease which breaks the required continuity every time you go to sleep, and that this has been happening your whole life. Will you worry about falling asleep tonight? Should your property be disposed of tomorrow according to your will? -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: If continuity is fundamental then personal identity could be defined in terms of it and there could be a real difference between you and someone with the same memories, but without continuity to your past. But that could lead to absurd conclusions. Suppose you discover that you have a disease Who has this disease? :-) which breaks the required continuity every time you go to sleep, and that this has been happening your whole life. Will you worry about falling asleep tonight? Should your property be disposed of tomorrow according to your will? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four categories I did in the paper. If you are considering future versions of yourself, in the MWI sense, there is no randomness involved. Depending on how you define you, you will either be all of them, or you are just an observer-moment and can consider them to be other people. Regardless of definitions, this case calls for the use of Caring Measure for decision making. It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the reductionist theory of personal identity. Consider the following experiment: There are two consecutive periods of consciousness, A and B, in which you are an observer in a virtual reality program. A is your experiences between 5:00 PM and 5:01 PM while B is your experiences between 5:01 PM and 5:02 PM, subjective time. A is being implemented in parallel on two computers MA1 and MA2, so that there are actually two qualitatively identical streams of consciousness which we can call A1 and A2. At the end of the subjective minute, data is saved to disk and both MA1 and MA2 are switched off. An external operator picks up a copy of the saved data, walks over to a third computer MB, loads the data and starts up the program. After another subjective minute MB is switched off and the experiment ends. As the observer you know all this information, and you look at the clock and see that it is 5:00 PM. What can you conclude from this and what should you expect? To me, it seems that you must conclude that you are currently either A1 or A2, and that in one minute you will be B, with 100% certainty. Would you say something else? -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the reductionist theory of personal identity. Consider the following experiment: There are two consecutive periods of consciousness, A and B, in which you are an observer in a virtual reality program. A is your experiences between 5:00 PM and 5:01 PM while B is your experiences between 5:01 PM and 5:02 PM, subjective time. A is being implemented in parallel on two computers MA1 and MA2, so that there are actually two qualitatively identical streams of consciousness which we can call A1 and A2. At the end of the subjective minute, data is saved to disk and both MA1 and MA2 are switched off. An external operator picks up a copy of the saved data, walks over to a third computer MB, loads the data and starts up the program. After another subjective minute MB is switched off and the experiment ends. As the observer you know all this information, and you look at the clock and see that it is 5:00 PM. What can you conclude from this and what should you expect? To me, it seems that you must conclude that you are currently either A1 or A2, and that in one minute you will be B, with 100% certainty. Would you say something else? I'd say it's a matter of definition, and there are three basic ones: 1) If I am A1 and will become B, then A2 has an equal right to say that he will become B. Thus, one could say that I am the same person as A2. This is personal fusion. 2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1 (e.g. discarding any errors that A2 might have made) then one could say that A1 is the same person as B, while A2 is not. This is causal differentiation. 3) If I am defined as an observer-moment, then I am part of either A1 or A2, not even the whole thing - just my current experience. This is the most conservative definition and thus may be the least misleading. Regardless of definitions, what will be true is that the measure of A will be twice that of B. For example, if have not yet looked at the clock, and I want to place a bet on what it currently reads, and my internal time sense tells me only that about a minute has passed (so it is near 5:01, but I don't know which side of it), then I should bet that it is before 5:01 with effective probability 2/3. This Reflection Argument is equivalent to the famous Sleeping Beauty thought experiment. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four categories I did in the paper. If you are considering future versions of yourself, in the MWI sense, there is no randomness involved. Depending on how you define you, you will either be all of them, or you are just an observer-moment and can consider them to be other people. Regardless of definitions, this case calls for the use of Caring Measure for decision making. It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the reductionist theory of personal identity. Consider the following experiment: There are two consecutive periods of consciousness, A and B, in which you are an observer in a virtual reality program. A is your experiences between 5:00 PM and 5:01 PM while B is your experiences between 5:01 PM and 5:02 PM, subjective time. A is being implemented in parallel on two computers MA1 and MA2, so that there are actually two qualitatively identical streams of consciousness which we can call A1 and A2. At the end of the subjective minute, data is saved to disk and both MA1 and MA2 are switched off. An external operator picks up a copy of the saved data, walks over to a third computer MB, loads the data and starts up the program. After another subjective minute MB is switched off and the experiment ends. As the observer you know all this information, and you look at the clock and see that it is 5:00 PM. What can you conclude from this and what should you expect? To me, it seems that you must conclude that you are currently either A1 or A2, and that in one minute you will be B, with 100% certainty. Would you say something else? I might say that while there are two computations, there is only one stream of consciousness. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four categories I did in the paper. If you are considering future versions of yourself, in the MWI sense, there is no randomness involved. Depending on how you define you, you will either be all of them, or you are just an observer-moment and can consider them to be other people. Regardless of definitions, this case calls for the use of Caring Measure for decision making. It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the reductionist theory of personal identity. Consider the following experiment: There are two consecutive periods of consciousness, A and B, in which you are an observer in a virtual reality program. A is your experiences between 5:00 PM and 5:01 PM while B is your experiences between 5:01 PM and 5:02 PM, subjective time. A is being implemented in parallel on two computers MA1 and MA2, so that there are actually two qualitatively identical streams of consciousness which we can call A1 and A2. At the end of the subjective minute, data is saved to disk and both MA1 and MA2 are switched off. An external operator picks up a copy of the saved data, walks over to a third computer MB, loads the data and starts up the program. After another subjective minute MB is switched off and the experiment ends. As the observer you know all this information, and you look at the clock and see that it is 5:00 PM. What can you conclude from this and what should you expect? To me, it seems that you must conclude that you are currently either A1 or A2, and that in one minute you will be B, with 100% certainty. Would you say something else? I might say that while there are two computations, there is only one stream of consciousness. You are right, but I think that Stathis is right too. When Stathis talks about two identical stream of consciousness, he make perhaps just a little abuse of language, which seems to me quite justifiable. Just give a mirror to the observer so that A *can* (but does not) look in the mirror to see if he is implemented by MA1 or by MA2. Knowing the protocol the observer can predict that IF he look at the mirror the stream of consciousness will bifurcate into A1 and A2. Accepting the Y = II rule, that is bifurcation of future = differentiation of the whole story) makes the Stathis abuse of language an acceptable way to describe the picture. So Stathis get the correct expectation, despite the first person ambiguity in two identical stream of consciousness. If two infinitely computations *never* differentiate, should we count them as one? I am not sure but I think we should still differentiate them. UD generates infinitely often such infinitely similar streams. That should play a role for the relative (to observer-moment) measure pertaining on the computations. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four categories I did in the paper. If you are considering future versions of yourself, in the MWI sense, there is no randomness involved. Depending on how you define you, you will either be all of them, or you are just an observer-moment and can consider them to be other people. Regardless of definitions, this case calls for the use of Caring Measure for decision making. It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the reductionist theory of personal identity. Consider the following experiment: There are two consecutive periods of consciousness, A and B, in which you are an observer in a virtual reality program. A is your experiences between 5:00 PM and 5:01 PM while B is your experiences between 5:01 PM and 5:02 PM, subjective time. A is being implemented in parallel on two computers MA1 and MA2, so that there are actually two qualitatively identical streams of consciousness which we can call A1 and A2. At the end of the subjective minute, data is saved to disk and both MA1 and MA2 are switched off. An external operator picks up a copy of the saved data, walks over to a third computer MB, loads the data and starts up the program. After another subjective minute MB is switched off and the experiment ends. As the observer you know all this information, and you look at the clock and see that it is 5:00 PM. What can you conclude from this and what should you expect? To me, it seems that you must conclude that you are currently either A1 or A2, and that in one minute you will be B, with 100% certainty. Would you say something else? I might say that while there are two computations, there is only one stream of consciousness. You are right, but I think that Stathis is right too. When Stathis talks about two identical stream of consciousness, he make perhaps just a little abuse of language, which seems to me quite justifiable. Just give a mirror to the observer so that A *can* (but does not) look in the mirror to see if he is implemented by MA1 or by MA2. Knowing the protocol the observer can predict that IF he look at the mirror the stream of consciousness will bifurcate into A1 and A2. I don't follow that. If A1 looks in the mirror and sees A2, then, ex hypothesi, A2 looks in the mirror and sees A1 and the two streams of consciousness remain identical. If consciousness is computation, independent of physical implementation, then computations that differ only in their physical realizations are identical and cannot be counted as more than one. Brent Accepting the Y = II rule, that is bifurcation of future = differentiation of the whole story) makes the Stathis abuse of language an acceptable way to describe the picture. So Stathis get the correct expectation, despite the first person ambiguity in two identical stream of consciousness. If two infinitely computations *never* differentiate, should we count them as one? I am not sure but I think we should still differentiate them. UD generates infinitely often such infinitely similar streams. That should play a role for the relative (to observer-moment) measure pertaining on the computations. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
I agree. They are both pointers to the same abstract computation. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2009/2/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four categories I did in the paper. If you are considering future versions of yourself, in the MWI sense, there is no randomness involved. Depending on how you define you, you will either be all of them, or you are just an observer-moment and can consider them to be other people. Regardless of definitions, this case calls for the use of Caring Measure for decision making. It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the reductionist theory of personal identity. Consider the following experiment: There are two consecutive periods of consciousness, A and B, in which you are an observer in a virtual reality program. A is your experiences between 5:00 PM and 5:01 PM while B is your experiences between 5:01 PM and 5:02 PM, subjective time. A is being implemented in parallel on two computers MA1 and MA2, so that there are actually two qualitatively identical streams of consciousness which we can call A1 and A2. At the end of the subjective minute, data is saved to disk and both MA1 and MA2 are switched off. An external operator picks up a copy of the saved data, walks over to a third computer MB, loads the data and starts up the program. After another subjective minute MB is switched off and the experiment ends. As the observer you know all this information, and you look at the clock and see that it is 5:00 PM. What can you conclude from this and what should you expect? To me, it seems that you must conclude that you are currently either A1 or A2, and that in one minute you will be B, with 100% certainty. Would you say something else? I might say that while there are two computations, there is only one stream of consciousness. You are right, but I think that Stathis is right too. When Stathis talks about two identical stream of consciousness, he make perhaps just a little abuse of language, which seems to me quite justifiable. Just give a mirror to the observer so that A *can* (but does not) look in the mirror to see if he is implemented by MA1 or by MA2. Knowing the protocol the observer can predict that IF he look at the mirror the stream of consciousness will bifurcate into A1 and A2. I don't follow that. If A1 looks in the mirror and sees A2, then, ex hypothesi, A2 looks in the mirror and sees A1 and the two streams of consciousness remain identical. If consciousness is computation, independent of physical implementation, then computations that differ only in their physical realizations are identical and cannot be counted as more than one. Brent Accepting the Y = II rule, that is bifurcation of future = differentiation of the whole story) makes the Stathis abuse of language an acceptable way to describe the picture. So Stathis get the correct expectation, despite the first person ambiguity in two identical stream of consciousness. If two infinitely computations *never* differentiate, should we count them as one? I am not sure but I think we should still differentiate them. UD generates infinitely often such infinitely similar streams. That should play a role for the relative (to observer-moment) measure pertaining on the computations. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: --- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the reductionist theory of personal identity. Consider the following experiment: There are two consecutive periods of consciousness, A and B, in which you are an observer in a virtual reality program. A is your experiences between 5:00 PM and 5:01 PM while B is your experiences between 5:01 PM and 5:02 PM, subjective time. A is being implemented in parallel on two computers MA1 and MA2, so that there are actually two qualitatively identical streams of consciousness which we can call A1 and A2. At the end of the subjective minute, data is saved to disk and both MA1 and MA2 are switched off. An external operator picks up a copy of the saved data, walks over to a third computer MB, loads the data and starts up the program. After another subjective minute MB is switched off and the experiment ends. As the observer you know all this information, and you look at the clock and see that it is 5:00 PM. What can you conclude from this and what should you expect? To me, it seems that you must conclude that you are currently either A1 or A2, and that in one minute you will be B, with 100% certainty. Would you say something else? I'd say it's a matter of definition, and there are three basic ones: 1) If I am A1 and will become B, then A2 has an equal right to say that he will become B. Thus, one could say that I am the same person as A2. This is personal fusion. OK. 2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1 (e.g. discarding any errors that A2 might have made) then one could say that A1 is the same person as B, while A2 is not. This is causal differentiation. Yes, but I'm assuming A1 and A2 have identical content. 3) If I am defined as an observer-moment, then I am part of either A1 or A2, not even the whole thing - just my current experience. This is the most conservative definition and thus may be the least misleading. This is the way I think of it, at least provisionally. Regardless of definitions, what will be true is that the measure of A will be twice that of B. For example, if have not yet looked at the clock, and I want to place a bet on what it currently reads, and my internal time sense tells me only that about a minute has passed (so it is near 5:01, but I don't know which side of it), then I should bet that it is before 5:01 with effective probability 2/3. This Reflection Argument is equivalent to the famous Sleeping Beauty thought experiment. But the point is, I do look at the clock and I do know that I am A, with probability 1, and therefore that I will soon be B with probability 1. This would still be the case even if the ratio of A:B were 10^100:1. There is no option for me to feel myself suspended at 5:01 PM, or other weird experiences, because the measure of A is so much greater. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
As the observer you know all this information, and you look at the clock and see that it is 5:00 PM. What can you conclude from this and what should you expect? To me, it seems that you must conclude that you are currently either A1 or A2, and that in one minute you will be B, with 100% certainty. Would you say something else? I think if the observer knows everything I know, they can't conclude anything more or less than I can. Namely, that at 5:00 there are two computers running simulations, and in one minute there will be one computer running a simulation. I don't see how the observer asking Which one am I? is in any sense asking for more information. The problem is the word I - what does it refer to? Both computers MA1 and MA2 simulate an observer asking Which one am I. We know everything that happens - and when you've explained everything that happens, you've explained everything. (Dennett again) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
I'm with Mike and Brent. Bruno, giving A1 and A2 mirrors which would show different stuff violates Stathis' assumption of running the _same_ computation - you can't go out of the system. And your remark that we should differentiate infinite identical platonic computations confuses me - it seems to contradict unification (which I gather you assume). Measure can only be influenced by _different_ computations supporting the same OM. Cheers, Günther Michael Rosefield wrote: I agree. They are both pointers to the same abstract computation. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2009/2/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Feb 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/10 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com mailto:jackmal...@yahoo.com: This sort of talk about random sampling and luck is misleading and is exactly why I broke down the roles of effective probability into the four categories I did in the paper. If you are considering future versions of yourself, in the MWI sense, there is no randomness involved. Depending on how you define you, you will either be all of them, or you are just an observer-moment and can consider them to be other people. Regardless of definitions, this case calls for the use of Caring Measure for decision making. It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the reductionist theory of personal identity. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: 2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1 (e.g. discarding any errors that A2 might have made) then one could say that A1 is the same person as B, while A2 is not. This is causal differentiation. Yes, but I'm assuming A1 and A2 have identical content. That actually doesn't matter - causation is defined in terms of counterfactuals. If - then, considering what happens at that moment of saving the data. If x=1 and y=1, and I copy the contents of x to z, that is not the same causal relationship as if I had copied y to z. 3) If I am defined as an observer-moment, then I am part of either A1 or A2, not even the whole thing - just my current experience. This is the most conservative definition and thus may be the least misleading. This is the way I think of it, at least provisionally. OK. But the point is, I do look at the clock and I do know that I am A, with probability 1, and therefore that I will soon be B with probability 1. That contradicts what you said above about being an observer-moment. If you are, then some _other_ observer-moments will be in B, not you. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB
On Tue, Feb 10, 2009 at 07:07:50PM -0800, Jack Mallah wrote: That actually doesn't matter - causation is defined in terms of counterfactuals. If - then, considering what happens at that moment of saving the data. If x=1 and y=1, and I copy the contents of x to z, that is not the same causal relationship as if I had copied y to z. But surely the counterfactuals are the same in each case too? In which case it is the same causal relationship. We're talking computations here, each computation will respond identically to the same counterfactual input. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB
Jack Mallah wrote: --- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: 2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1 (e.g. discarding any errors that A2 might have made) then one could say that A1 is the same person as B, while A2 is not. This is causal differentiation. Yes, but I'm assuming A1 and A2 have identical content. That actually doesn't matter - causation is defined in terms of counterfactuals. If - then, considering what happens at that moment of saving the data. If x=1 and y=1, and I copy the contents of x to z, that is not the same causal relationship as if I had copied y to z. Isn't that making the causal chain essential to the experience; contrary to the idea that the stream of consciousness is just the computation? The causal chain is not part of the computation, A1 and A2 could be implemented by different physics and hence different causation. Brent Meeker 3) If I am defined as an observer-moment, then I am part of either A1 or A2, not even the whole thing - just my current experience. This is the most conservative definition and thus may be the least misleading. This is the way I think of it, at least provisionally. OK. But the point is, I do look at the clock and I do know that I am A, with probability 1, and therefore that I will soon be B with probability 1. That contradicts what you said above about being an observer-moment. If you are, then some _other_ observer-moments will be in B, not you. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: 3) If I am defined as an observer-moment, then I am part of either A1 or A2, not even the whole thing - just my current experience. This is the most conservative definition and thus may be the least misleading. This is the way I think of it, at least provisionally. OK. But the point is, I do look at the clock and I do know that I am A, with probability 1, and therefore that I will soon be B with probability 1. That contradicts what you said above about being an observer-moment. If you are, then some _other_ observer-moments will be in B, not you. But the same could be said about everyday life. The person who wakes up in my bed tomorrow won't be me, he will be some guy who thinks he's me and shares my memories, personality traits, physical characteristics and so on. In other words, everyone only lives transiently, and continuity of consciousness is an illusion. The question of survival is then the question of how to ensure that this illusion continues. QI allows the illusion to continue indefinitely. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child AB
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: 3) If I am defined as an observer-moment, then I am part of either A1 or A2, not even the whole thing - just my current experience. This is the most conservative definition and thus may be the least misleading. This is the way I think of it, at least provisionally. OK. But the point is, I do look at the clock and I do know that I am A, with probability 1, and therefore that I will soon be B with probability 1. That contradicts what you said above about being an observer-moment. If you are, then some _other_ observer-moments will be in B, not you. But the same could be said about everyday life. The person who wakes up in my bed tomorrow won't be me, he will be some guy who thinks he's me and shares my memories, personality traits, physical characteristics and so on. In other words, everyone only lives transiently, and continuity of consciousness is an illusion. I think I understand your point, but I don't see that the continuity of consciousness is any more an illusion than any other continuity: the continuity of space, the persistence of objects, etc. You are just generalizing Zeno's paradox. But once you look at it that way, the question becomes, Why imagine the continuity is made up of discrete elements? It is this conceptualization, points in space, moments in time, observer moments as atoms of consciousness, that creates the paradox. So maybe we should recognize continuity as fundamental. The continuity need not be temporal, it could be a more abstract property such a causal connection or perhaps what Bruno says distinguishes a computation from a description of the computation. Brent The question of survival is then the question of how to ensure that this illusion continues. QI allows the illusion to continue indefinitely. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: adult vs. child
--- On Sun, 2/8/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Suppose you differentiate into N states, then on average each has 1/N of your original measure. I guess that's why you think the measure decreases. But the sum of the measures is N/N of the original. I still find this confusing. Your argument seems to be that you won't live to 1000 because the measure of 1000 year old versions of you in the multiverse is very small - the total consciousness across the multiverse is much less for 1000 year olds than 30 year olds. But by an analogous argument, the measure of 4 year old OM's is higher than that of 30 year old OM's, since you might die between age 4 and 30. But here you are, an adult rather than a child. You might die between 4 and 30, but the chance is fairly small, let's say 10% for the sake of argument. So, if we just consider these two ages, the effective probability of being 30 would be a little less than that of being 4 - not enough less to draw any conclusions from. The period of adulthood is longer than that of childhood so actually you are more likely to be an adult. How likely? Just look at a cross section of the population. Some children, more adults, basically no super-old folks. Should you feel your consciousness more thinly spread or something? No, measure affects how common an observation is, not what it feels like. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
