Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
On 14 Apr, 17:34, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > You are right. UDA only shows that matter, whatever conception we can > have about it as far as it is primary, is void of any explanation power > given that we HAVE TO justify material appearances from the number > relation (by comp, through uda). > > You are right, but why don't you tell to the biologist that they have > not refuted vitalism? It is correct but I am not sure it is > interesting, indeed, by occam razor, which you do always when you > choose and apply a theory to something. Vitalism is probably false, it is not impossible. It has been refuted scientifically, because science deals in probabilities. The same is not true of everythingism, because everythingism is philosophy and require an assumption of Platonism. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Le 14-avr.-07, à 15:36, 1Z a écrit : > > > > On 11 Apr, 16:01, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Matter, as we >> see it and as we measure it relatively to our most probable >> computational histories, just cannot be primarily material. This is >> what the UDA is all about. > > Matter can be even if your argument is correct, since your argument > only shows it to be a redundant assumption. However, Occam's razor is > not a necessary truth. You are right. UDA only shows that matter, whatever conception we can have about it as far as it is primary, is void of any explanation power given that we HAVE TO justify material appearances from the number relation (by comp, through uda). You are right, but why don't you tell to the biologist that they have not refuted vitalism? It is correct but I am not sure it is interesting, indeed, by occam razor, which you do always when you choose and apply a theory to something. Bruno > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
On 11 Apr, 16:01, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Matter, as we > see it and as we measure it relatively to our most probable > computational histories, just cannot be primarily material. This is > what the UDA is all about. Matter can be even if your argument is correct, since your argument only shows it to be a redundant assumption. However, Occam's razor is not a necessary truth. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Bruno, addendum to my post before. You wrote: BM: But ok, you are just arguing for the non-comp assumption. [JM]: No, I just speak about 'another type' comp, a non-digital contraption that handles meaning, function, without the crutches of the (hypothetical? at least unidentified) numbers - those mysterious factors creating the world. Some fantasized earlier about using the 'digital-type' computer-idea with proteins as chips, I think the analogy came from the biological complexity. That, too, is the application of the inadequate past into a better future in my opinion. I am hoping for something NEW. I leave open the 'origination' of which the smartest brains could only utter some fantasy so far. Within their theory. In my 'narrative' I shove the qiestion under the rug of the plenitude. It is the ultimate 'given' I use (redfaced). We have no way to penetrate those fundaments which we cannot penetrate. (Trivial enough?) In spite of your perevious remark that a L-M CAN deduce things beyond our (its?) cognitive limitations. BTW: what do you mean by "interviewing the L-machine? John --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Dear Bruno, allow me to interleave below as [JM]: remarks. John - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2007 9:13 AM Subject: Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism" Le 09-avr.-07, à 16:40, John M a écrit : Stathis, I am weary about the view of 'computationalism' based on that emryonic binaryly digital toy we used yesterday. I let my tech. immagination wander and think about analog computers dealing in meanings and functions rather than bits 0 or 1. BM: But there is no universal analog computers. Analog machines can be made universal by making them able to compute the "sinus" function, but this is a way to implement a digital universal machine in an analog one. And then why would real "analog machine" be more able able to deal with meaning and functions? [JM]: I am not talking about 'analogizing' the digital kraxlwerk. I am REALLY referring to a NEW incention (discovery), like the digital computer was originally, dealing with some contraption of comparing - handling concepts, functions, meanings, ideas.I agree: it is beyond our today's level of reality(!). I do not believe that the digital-comp select analoguizing function can be universalized. I am talking about a principally different action of the future in spe. Free idea (your 'science'). In such sense SUCH 'physical 'COMPUTER' will run a conscious program, Why? You talk like if it was obvious that consciousness is related with actual third person real numbers (analog object)? At least comp explains completely why consciousness is related to real numbers, but only from the first person perspective. This is coherent with the fact that consciousness is a first person notion. [JM]: When I formulate my thoughts I do not start from 'numbers', real, Godel or not. Math comes in my thoughts as PART of a world - whether such world exists or not - and not vice versa. So far I did not get a satisfactory argument from 'outside the numbers-started image' why the elusive numbers should be responsible for all change and activity. Hence my number=god. Ref: your next remark. not a mechanisedly 'consciousified' digital program. John, with all my friendly respect, I think you miss the impact of Godel's theorem. Somehow, we know (provably so with the comp assumption) that we don't know what numbers or machines are capable of. But ok, you are just arguing for the non-comp assumption. I have nothing against it, unless you pretend that the mind-body problem would be easier to solve in such frame. it is actually not the case. [JM]: WHAT mind-body problem? the fiction of 'matter' as body upon the unidentified ideational existence? Making the essence dependent from the consequentially drawn-up physical world? Adding third person infinities makes things more complex, and in general such moves are used to hide the problem instead of solving it or even just better formulating it. [JM]: your problem when starting from the math-concept If called 'computer' at all, it is a tool. Call it 'god' and you are out. * I cannot blame Peter to be stubborn in "that's we have, (rather: see), that's we love" pragmatism. I am irresponsible enough to allow speculative conditional fantasy. That's my definition of science. Speculative conditional fantasy. Even Grand Mother physics, with theories like "the sun will rise tomorrow", become scientific only when grandmother adds "let's hope". All theories are hypothetical, even the implicit theories our brain supports since million years. Of course those theories are more difficult to put in doubt. But science appears when people have been able to take distance with such "obvious truth", like the primacy of the material world. [JM]: thanks for the consentual formulating. Of course only into my 'narrative'. But IMO advancement needs a free unrestricted mind and includes fantastic ideas. OK. But not if those fantastic ideas are used to burry problems instead of formulating them or solving them. It could perhaps be arguable that fantastic ideas like "God" or its dual idea "Matter" have been used since a long time to bury the initial deep questioning. [JM]: only if one starts from your 'beginning'. My narrative is immune to such difficulties - of course I have no complete system. Right or wrong. And of course I am not certain myself. That is the best I wish you ... Bruno [JM]: thanks for the response John http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- No virus found in
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Le 09-avr.-07, à 17:06, John M a écrit : > Thanks, Quentin. > It seems AoC is not contrary to the line I represented. > * > To your other post: I did not feel any pejorating in Peter's > "Brunoism". Bruno is appreciated with his "23rd c". views. (He joked > about it, calling the list as 100 years ahead, himself 200). > I have only ONE (logic?) objection: we all 'think ' with our 21th c. > brains and 'organize' nature (existence, world, origins, etc.) - i.e. > a sort of 'prescription for nature, how it *ever* 'should be' built - > accordingly. It is different from the 'turtle', Kronos', 'Indra's', > the 'Big Manitou's', even the 'Big Bang's' follies at different levels > of our actual epistemic developmental stages. So is even the 23rd c. > Brunoism in 21st c. math logic. My precise prescription is: > - We don't know, we can speculate. - > Speculation is good, I do it, but I beware of drawing to long > consecutive series upon its ASSUMED circumstances and warn others to > regard them as 'facts' especially in the nth level of lit. repetitions > (by calling it my 'narrative' to begin with). > > Whether 'numbers' originated the conscious mind or vice versa, (even > if Bruno restricts this idea to the natural integers, for the sake of > simplicity), I cannot imagine something more difficult than "natural numbers". The other numbers have been invented/discovered and used to simplify arithmetic. > whether those unidentified numbers have any force-activity to > construct anything, or is it something else still undiscovered today, > generating even the numbers (math) in OUR thinking, (substituted by an > unknowable "god" concept in many minds), is MY open question. OK. Note that with comp such a question is necessarily open, forever. > The 'mind-body' thesis is no good answer, because mind is unidentified > and body is not a primary concept (mostly assumed as 'material', in > the 'physical' figment of our explanatory sequence in learning about > the world). I guess you mean 'mind-body identity thesis" (for mind-body thesis). OK then. Again this is provably so with the comp assumption. Matter, as we see it and as we measure it relatively to our most probable computational histories, just cannot be primarily material. This is what the UDA is all about. > > My ramblings conclude into: it all may be right (in conditional). My > criticism aims at triggering (teasing?) better arguments. So are my > questions. We, humans, discussed comp since more than 3000 years. From that historical perspective we could doubt such discussion is worthwhile. But today we have made a giant step. We know that if we are machine (comp is true) then we will never believe in comp in any completely rational way. On the contrary, the more we understand comp, the less we can believe in it. It really asks for a spiritual, not entirely rational, counter-intuitive act of faith. But then comp has also concrete and testable consequences, and that points on a way to make even more progress, by digging a bit the math so as to make a precise refutation of comp. But until now, comp predicts only a sort of incredible weirdness, which is different from a contradiction, and this is even more true when nature seems to confirm a very similar kind of weirdness. Regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Le 09-avr.-07, à 16:40, John M a écrit : > Stathis, > I am weary about the view of 'computationalism' based on that emryonic > binaryly digital toy we used yesterday. I let my tech. immagination > wander and think about analog computers dealing in meanings and > functions rather than bits 0 or 1. But there is no universal analog computers. Analog machines can be made universal by making them able to compute the "sinus" function, but this is a way to implement a digital universal machine in an analog one. And then why would real "analog machine" be more able able to deal with meaning and functions? > In such sense > SUCH 'physical 'COMPUTER' will run a conscious program, Why? You talk like if it was obvious that consciousness is related with actual third person real numbers (analog object)? At least comp explains completely why consciousness is related to real numbers, but only from the first person perspective. This is coherent with the fact that consciousness is a first person notion. > not a mechanisedly 'consciousified' digital program. John, with all my friendly respect, I think you miss the impact of Godel's theorem. Somehow, we know (provably so with the comp assumption) that we don't know what numbers or machines are capable of. But ok, you are just arguing for the non-comp assumption. I have nothing against it, unless you pretend that the mind-body problem would be easier to solve in such frame. it is actually not the case. Adding third person infinities makes things more complex, and in general such moves are used to hide the problem instead of solving it or even just better formulating it. > If called 'computer' at all, it is a tool. Call it 'god' and you are > out. > * > I cannot blame Peter to be stubborn in "that's we have, (rather: see), > that's we love" pragmatism. I am irresponsible enough to allow > speculative conditional fantasy. That's my definition of science. Speculative conditional fantasy. Even Grand Mother physics, with theories like "the sun will rise tomorrow", become scientific only when grandmother adds "let's hope". All theories are hypothetical, even the implicit theories our brain supports since million years. Of course those theories are more difficult to put in doubt. But science appears when people have been able to take distance with such "obvious truth", like the primacy of the material world. > Of course only into my 'narrative'. But IMO advancement needs a free > unrestricted mind and includes fantastic ideas. OK. But not if those fantastic ideas are used to burry problems instead of formulating them or solving them. It could perhaps be arguable that fantastic ideas like "God" or its dual idea "Matter" have been used since a long time to bury the initial deep questioning. > Right or wrong. And of course I am not certain myself. That is the best I wish you ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
On 8 Apr, 23:01, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > From: 1Z > > > Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism. > > Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as > > Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion, > > Brunoism does not follow. Brunoism doesn't follow from physicalism, > > it is in oppostion to it. > > Could you explain what is "physical instantion" ? What means "physical" ? > Brunoism (as you called it in pejorative way) only requires as Brent said > realized infinities... that's the only way to the UD to generate all > programs... if there exists a "thing", a way to show that even "if" an > algorithm could be "run" for an "infinity of time" (with unbounded memory > space), something will prevent it to do so, then intuisonism will be shown as > true and I'll have to abandon this belief. Intuitionism can be false without Platonism being true. The falsehood of intuitionism implies a logical thesis, bivalence, not an ontological thesis about what is real. (Platonism is offered as a justifcation for bivalence, but that is an if, not an iff..) > Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Thanks, Quentin.
It seems AoC is not contrary to the line I represented.
*
To your other post: I did not feel any pejorating in Peter's "Brunoism". Bruno
is appreciated with his "23rd c". views. (He joked about it, calling the list
as 100 years ahead, himself 200).
I have only ONE (logic?) objection: we all 'think ' with our 21th c. brains and
'organize' nature (existence, world, origins, etc.) - i.e. a sort of
'prescription for nature, how it *ever* 'should be' built - accordingly. It is
different from the 'turtle', Kronos', 'Indra's', the 'Big Manitou's', even the
'Big Bang's' follies at different levels of our actual epistemic developmental
stages. So is even the 23rd c. Brunoism in 21st c. math logic. My precise
prescription is:
- We don't know, we can speculate. -
Speculation is good, I do it, but I beware of drawing to long consecutive
series upon its ASSUMED circumstances and warn others to regard them as 'facts'
especially in the nth level of lit. repetitions (by calling it my 'narrative'
to begin with).
Whether 'numbers' originated the conscious mind or vice versa, (even if Bruno
restricts this idea to the natural integers, for the sake of simplicity),
whether those unidentified numbers have any force-activity to construct
anything, or is it something else still undiscovered today, generating even the
numbers (math) in OUR thinking, (substituted by an unknowable "god" concept in
many minds), is MY open question. The 'mind-body' thesis is no good answer,
because mind is unidentified and body is not a primary concept (mostly assumed
as 'material', in the 'physical' figment of our explanatory sequence in
learning about the world).
My ramblings conclude into: it all may be right (in conditional). My criticism
aims at triggering (teasing?) better arguments. So are my questions.
Best regards
John M
- Original Message -
From: Quentin Anciaux
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2007 5:48 PM
Subject: Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Hello,
While Peter did not answer your question about AoC... AoC means, I think,
Axiom of Choice see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choice .
The correct "sigle" (in french this is the word, don't know the correct term
in english) is AC.
Regards,
Quentin
On Sunday 08 April 2007 00:47:41 John M wrote:
> IZ wrote:
> >"...arithmetic?
>
> It's widely agreed on"<
>
> In my oppinion scientific argumentation is not a democratic vote.
> Scientists overwhelmingly agreed in the Flat Earth. THEN: science changed
> and the general vote went for heliocentrism. THEN...
>
> IZ continued:
> >"... Otherwise there would (b)e problems about the
>
> existence of those platonic objects which can only be
> defined with certain, disputable axioms, such as the AoC."<
>
> Axioms in my wording are fictions necessary to prove OUR theory. (They may
> be true?) (What is AoC?)
>
> IZ also refers to Brent's 'continua'. In my nat. sci. views a discontinuum
> is an abrupt change in CERTAIN data. Can be a 'is' or 'is not', but could
> be only an aspect in which WE find an abrupt change, while in other aspects
> there is continuum. Now 'what we call it' (abrupt or slow - even monotonous
> change) is scale-dependent, depends on the magnitude of our applied
> measuring system. Measure it in parsecs, all our terrestrial items are
> homogenous. Measure in nanometers, a 'glass' is a heterogenous system. I
> find the 'Planck' measure just a domain in human (physical?) aspects, not
> providing a bottom-size for nature. (I.e. for Our thinking only. )
>
> As I explained the origination of the biochemicals certain (outside?)
> factors in the material 'mass' ('mess?) disproportionated certain
> components into diverse (localised) agglomerations and a concentration
> potential- difference arose between certain domains. Such "potential
> gradients" (in the still homogenous = continuous mass) acted as
> transport-barriers, turned into hypothetical (and later: veritable)
> 'membranes' for a discontinuum. From the material-transport view the same
> substrate became discontinuous. (Hence: cell-walls etc.) Otherwise it was
> considerable as a homogenous (continuous?) biomass.
>
> Similar 'domain'related' arguments can work in "human consciousness as
> originated from (Platonic?) math (numbers) - or vice versa. I appreciate
> Bruno'
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Stathis, I am weary about the view of 'computationalism' based on that emryonic binaryly digital toy we used yesterday. I let my tech. immagination wander and think about analog computers dealing in meanings and functions rather than bits 0 or 1. In such sense SUCH 'physical 'COMPUTER' will run a conscious program, not a mechanisedly 'consciousified' digital program. If called 'computer' at all, it is a tool. Call it 'god' and you are out. * I cannot blame Peter to be stubborn in "that's we have, (rather: see), that's we love" pragmatism. I am irresponsible enough to allow speculative conditional fantasy. Of course only into my 'narrative'. But IMO advancement needs a free unrestricted mind and includes fantastic ideas. Right or wrong. And of course I am not certain myself. John M - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2007 10:48 PM Subject: Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism" On 4/9/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: 1Z > > Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism. > Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as > Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion, > Brunoism does not follow. Brunoism doesn't follow from physicalism, > it is in oppostion to it. Could you explain what is "physical instantion" ? What means "physical" ? It's quite reasonable and straightforward at first glance: you need a physical computer to run a conscious program. But Maudlin- and Putnam-type arguments show that this idea is flawed, implying either that computationalism is wrong or else that you don't need a physical computer to run a conscious program. Peter doesn't accept these arguments, and has also hinted in the past that he is not certain about computationalism. Stathis Papaioannou -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.5.446 / Virus Database: 268.18.26/752 - Release Date: 4/8/2007 8:34 PM --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
On 4/9/07, Quentin Anciaux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: 1Z > > > > Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism. > > Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as > > Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion, > > Brunoism does not follow. Brunoism doesn't follow from physicalism, > > it is in oppostion to it. > > Could you explain what is "physical instantion" ? What means "physical" ? > It's quite reasonable and straightforward at first glance: you need a physical computer to run a conscious program. But Maudlin- and Putnam-type arguments show that this idea is flawed, implying either that computationalism is wrong or else that you don't need a physical computer to run a conscious program. Peter doesn't accept these arguments, and has also hinted in the past that he is not certain about computationalism. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
> From: 1Z > > Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism. > Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as > Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion, > Brunoism does not follow. Brunoism doesn't follow from physicalism, > it is in oppostion to it. Could you explain what is "physical instantion" ? What means "physical" ? Brunoism (as you called it in pejorative way) only requires as Brent said realized infinities... that's the only way to the UD to generate all programs... if there exists a "thing", a way to show that even "if" an algorithm could be "run" for an "infinity of time" (with unbounded memory space), something will prevent it to do so, then intuisonism will be shown as true and I'll have to abandon this belief. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Hello,
While Peter did not answer your question about AoC... AoC means, I think,
Axiom of Choice see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom_of_choice .
The correct "sigle" (in french this is the word, don't know the correct term
in english) is AC.
Regards,
Quentin
On Sunday 08 April 2007 00:47:41 John M wrote:
> IZ wrote:
> >"...arithmetic?
>
> It's widely agreed on"<
>
> In my oppinion scientific argumentation is not a democratic vote.
> Scientists overwhelmingly agreed in the Flat Earth. THEN: science changed
> and the general vote went for heliocentrism. THEN...
>
> IZ continued:
> >"... Otherwise there would (b)e problems about the
>
> existence of those platonic objects which can only be
> defined with certain, disputable axioms, such as the AoC."<
>
> Axioms in my wording are fictions necessary to prove OUR theory. (They may
> be true?) (What is AoC?)
>
> IZ also refers to Brent's 'continua'. In my nat. sci. views a discontinuum
> is an abrupt change in CERTAIN data. Can be a 'is' or 'is not', but could
> be only an aspect in which WE find an abrupt change, while in other aspects
> there is continuum. Now 'what we call it' (abrupt or slow - even monotonous
> change) is scale-dependent, depends on the magnitude of our applied
> measuring system. Measure it in parsecs, all our terrestrial items are
> homogenous. Measure in nanometers, a 'glass' is a heterogenous system. I
> find the 'Planck' measure just a domain in human (physical?) aspects, not
> providing a bottom-size for nature. (I.e. for Our thinking only. )
>
> As I explained the origination of the biochemicals certain (outside?)
> factors in the material 'mass' ('mess?) disproportionated certain
> components into diverse (localised) agglomerations and a concentration
> potential- difference arose between certain domains. Such "potential
> gradients" (in the still homogenous = continuous mass) acted as
> transport-barriers, turned into hypothetical (and later: veritable)
> 'membranes' for a discontinuum. From the material-transport view the same
> substrate became discontinuous. (Hence: cell-walls etc.) Otherwise it was
> considerable as a homogenous (continuous?) biomass.
>
> Similar 'domain'related' arguments can work in "human consciousness as
> originated from (Platonic?) math (numbers) - or vice versa. I appreciate
> Bruno's inadvertent "if we accept UD/comp" etc.etc. formula. Hard to beat,
> especially since so far there is NO successfully applicable (not even a
> dreamed-up) alternative developed sufficiently into a hopeful replacement
> for the many millennia evolved 'physical view' of our reductionist
> conventional science. Even the new ways start from there if not in
> veritable sci-fi.
>
> John M
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: 1Z
> To: Everything List
> Sent: Saturday, April 07, 2007 12:57 PM
> Subject: Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
>
> On 3 Apr, 20:08, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >
> > That brings up an issue which has troubled me. Why arithmetic?
>
> It's widely agreed on. Otherwise there would e problems about the
> existence of those platonic objects which can only be
> defined with certain, disputable axioms, such as the AoC.
>
> > Mathematical physics commonly uses continua. Most speculate that this
> > is an approximation to a more discrete structure at the Planck scale -
> > but I don't believe there has ever been any rigorous proof that this
> > kind of approximation can work.
> >
> > If we are to suppose that arithmetic "exists" because statements like
> > "2+2=4" are true independent of the physical world, then it seems that
> > calculus and analysis and geometry and topology should also "exist".
>
> Tell that to an intuitionist!
>
> > I initially thought the idea of using arithmetic as the foundational
> > ur-stuff was attractive because I assumed that infinities could be
> > avoided, i.e. allowing only "potential infinities" as in intuitionist
> > mathematics. But it appears that diagonalization arguments are
> > essential to Bruno's program and those require realized infinities.
> >
> > Brent Meeker
> >
> > > "we" are not *in* a mathematical structure, we are distributed in an
> > > infinity of mathematical structures, and physicality emerges from the
> > > interfer
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
On 7 Apr, 18:47, "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> IZ wrote:
> >"...arithmetic?
>
> It's widely agreed on"<
>
> In my oppinion scientific argumentation is not a democratic vote. Scientists
> overwhelmingly agreed in the Flat Earth. THEN: science changed and the
> general vote went for heliocentrism.
> THEN...
What makes mathematics true is not the point. Bruno is claiming that
numbers exist, and to make
his claim persuasive he focusses on the least contentious numbers.
> IZ continued:
>
> >"... Otherwise there would (b)e problems about the
>
> existence of those platonic objects which can only be
> defined with certain, disputable axioms, such as the AoC."<
>
> Axioms in my wording are fictions necessary to prove OUR theory. (They may be
> true?) (What is AoC?)
Then numbers don't exist, they are fictions too.
> IZ also refers to Brent's 'continua'. In my nat. sci. views a discontinuum is
> an abrupt change in CERTAIN data. Can be a 'is' or 'is not', but could be
> only an aspect in which WE find an abrupt change, while in other aspects
> there is continuum. Now 'what we call it' (abrupt or slow - even monotonous
> change) is scale-dependent, depends on the magnitude of our applied measuring
> system.
> Measure it in parsecs, all our terrestrial items are homogenous. Measure in
> nanometers, a 'glass' is a heterogenous system. I find the 'Planck' measure
> just a domain in human (physical?) aspects, not providing a bottom-size for
> nature. (I.e. for Our thinking only. )
>
> As I explained the origination of the biochemicals certain (outside?)
> factors in the material 'mass' ('mess?) disproportionated certain components
> into diverse (localised) agglomerations and a concentration potential-
> difference arose between certain domains. Such "potential gradients" (in the
> still homogenous = continuous mass) acted as transport-barriers, turned into
> hypothetical (and later: veritable) 'membranes' for a discontinuum. From the
> material-transport view the same substrate became discontinuous. (Hence:
> cell-walls etc.)
> Otherwise it was considerable as a homogenous (continuous?) biomass.
>
> Similar 'domain'related' arguments can work in "human consciousness as
> originated from (Platonic?) math (numbers) - or vice versa.
> I appreciate Bruno's inadvertent "if we accept UD/comp" etc.etc. formula.
> Hard to beat, especially since so far there is NO successfully applicable
> (not even a dreamed-up) alternative developed sufficiently into a hopeful
> replacement for the many millennia evolved 'physical view' of our
> reductionist conventional science.
> Even the new ways start from there if not in veritable sci-fi.
Brunoism relies on Platonism as well as computationalism.
Computationalism can be as true as tue can be, but so long as
Platonism is false, so long as a computer needs a physical instantion,
Brunoism does not follow. Brunoism doesn't follow from physicalism,
it is in oppostion to it.
> John M
>
> - Original Message -
> From: 1Z
> To: Everything List
> Sent: Saturday, April 07, 2007 12:57 PM
> Subject: Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
>
> On 3 Apr, 20:08, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > That brings up an issue which has troubled me. Why arithmetic?
>
> It's widely agreed on. Otherwise there would e problems about the
> existence of those platonic objects which can only be
> defined with certain, disputable axioms, such as the AoC.
>
> > Mathematical physics commonly uses continua. Most speculate that this is
> an approximation to a more discrete structure at the Planck scale - but I
> don't believe there has ever been any rigorous proof that this kind of
> approximation can work.
>
> > If we are to suppose that arithmetic "exists" because statements like
> "2+2=4" are true independent of the physical world, then it seems that
> calculus and analysis and geometry and topology should also "exist".
>
> Tell that to an intuitionist!
>
> > I initially thought the idea of using arithmetic as the foundational
> ur-stuff was attractive because I assumed that infinities could be avoided,
> i.e. allowing only "potential infinities" as in intuitionist mathematics.
> But it appears that diagonalization arguments are essential to Bruno's
> program and those require realized infinities.
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Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
IZ wrote:
>"...arithmetic?
It's widely agreed on"<
In my oppinion scientific argumentation is not a democratic vote. Scientists
overwhelmingly agreed in the Flat Earth. THEN: science changed and the general
vote went for heliocentrism.
THEN...
IZ continued:
>"... Otherwise there would (b)e problems about the
existence of those platonic objects which can only be
defined with certain, disputable axioms, such as the AoC."<
Axioms in my wording are fictions necessary to prove OUR theory. (They may be
true?) (What is AoC?)
IZ also refers to Brent's 'continua'. In my nat. sci. views a discontinuum is
an abrupt change in CERTAIN data. Can be a 'is' or 'is not', but could be only
an aspect in which WE find an abrupt change, while in other aspects there is
continuum. Now 'what we call it' (abrupt or slow - even monotonous change) is
scale-dependent, depends on the magnitude of our applied measuring system.
Measure it in parsecs, all our terrestrial items are homogenous. Measure in
nanometers, a 'glass' is a heterogenous system. I find the 'Planck' measure
just a domain in human (physical?) aspects, not providing a bottom-size for
nature. (I.e. for Our thinking only. )
As I explained the origination of the biochemicals certain (outside?) factors
in the material 'mass' ('mess?) disproportionated certain components into
diverse (localised) agglomerations and a concentration potential- difference
arose between certain domains. Such "potential gradients" (in the still
homogenous = continuous mass) acted as transport-barriers, turned into
hypothetical (and later: veritable) 'membranes' for a discontinuum. From the
material-transport view the same substrate became discontinuous. (Hence:
cell-walls etc.)
Otherwise it was considerable as a homogenous (continuous?) biomass.
Similar 'domain'related' arguments can work in "human consciousness as
originated from (Platonic?) math (numbers) - or vice versa.
I appreciate Bruno's inadvertent "if we accept UD/comp" etc.etc. formula. Hard
to beat, especially since so far there is NO successfully applicable (not even
a dreamed-up) alternative developed sufficiently into a hopeful replacement for
the many millennia evolved 'physical view' of our reductionist conventional
science.
Even the new ways start from there if not in veritable sci-fi.
John M
- Original Message -
From: 1Z
To: Everything List
Sent: Saturday, April 07, 2007 12:57 PM
Subject: Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
On 3 Apr, 20:08, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> That brings up an issue which has troubled me. Why arithmetic?
It's widely agreed on. Otherwise there would e problems about the
existence of those platonic objects which can only be
defined with certain, disputable axioms, such as the AoC.
> Mathematical physics commonly uses continua. Most speculate that this is
an approximation to a more discrete structure at the Planck scale - but I don't
believe there has ever been any rigorous proof that this kind of approximation
can work.
>
> If we are to suppose that arithmetic "exists" because statements like
"2+2=4" are true independent of the physical world, then it seems that calculus
and analysis and geometry and topology should also "exist".
Tell that to an intuitionist!
> I initially thought the idea of using arithmetic as the foundational
ur-stuff was attractive because I assumed that infinities could be avoided,
i.e. allowing only "potential infinities" as in intuitionist mathematics. But
it appears that diagonalization arguments are essential to Bruno's program and
those require realized infinities.
>
> Brent Meeker
>
>
>
> > "we" are not *in* a mathematical structure, we are distributed in an
> > infinity of mathematical structures, and physicality emerges from the
> > interference of them.
>
> > Why a wavy interference? Open problem.
>
> > Bruno
>
> >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
On 3 Apr, 20:08, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > That brings up an issue which has troubled me. Why arithmetic? It's widely agreed on. Otherwise there would e problems about the existence of those platonic objects which can only be defined with certain, disputable axioms, such as the AoC. > Mathematical physics commonly uses continua. Most speculate that this is an > approximation to a more discrete structure at the Planck scale - but I don't > believe there has ever been any rigorous proof that this kind of > approximation can work. > > If we are to suppose that arithmetic "exists" because statements like "2+2=4" > are true independent of the physical world, then it seems that calculus and > analysis and geometry and topology should also "exist". Tell that to an intuitionist! > I initially thought the idea of using arithmetic as the foundational ur-stuff > was attractive because I assumed that infinities could be avoided, i.e. > allowing only "potential infinities" as in intuitionist mathematics. But it > appears that diagonalization arguments are essential to Bruno's program and > those require realized infinities. > > Brent Meeker > > > > > "we" are not *in* a mathematical structure, we are distributed in an > > infinity of mathematical structures, and physicality emerges from the > > interference of them. > > > Why a wavy interference? Open problem. > > > Bruno > > >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Le 03-avr.-07, à 21:08, Brent Meeker a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Hi Tim >> >> Le 03-avr.-07, à 12:03, Tim Boykett wrote (in part): >> >>>One of the recurring ideas here is that of "mathematicalism" - an >>> idea >>> that I understand to be that we perceive things as physical that have >>> a certain >>> mathematical structure. One of the "everything" ideas that results is >>> that >>> only certain of the all-possible universes have the right stuff to be >>> perceivable, the right mathematical structure. We are in one such >>> universe, >>> and there are others. >> >> We can come back on this if you are really interested, but shortly: >> once we assume the computationalist hypothesis (in the cognitive >> science/theology), then the picture you give is most probably wrong. >> Physics keeps a better role in the sense that physics emerges from the >> "whole of arithmetic/mathematic". If you want, the physical world is >> not a special mathematical world as seen from inside, but the physical >> world somehow is the sum of all possible mathematical world where you >> are. > > That brings up an issue which has troubled me. Why arithmetic? > Mathematical physics commonly uses continua. Most speculate that this > is an approximation to a more discrete structure at the Planck scale - > but I don't believe there has ever been any rigorous proof that this > kind of approximation can work. I think that, assuming comp, the existence of third person actual infinities is undecidable for us. But infinities can be shown to be unavoidable from the first person perspective. Again we have to be aware that the same third person "truth" will appear different from the internal person points of view. Note also that comp assume classical (non intuitionnist) arithmetic, and thus some actual number theoretical infinities. > > If we are to suppose that arithmetic "exists" because statements like > "2+2=4" are true independent of the physical world, then it seems that > calculus and analysis and geometry and topology should also "exist". The situation is similar to the "Skolem paradox", the fact that that there are countable" model" of the Zermelo Fraenkel Set Theory. From inside ZF there are uncountable object, from outside, those object are countable. From inside Peano Arithmetic's mind there is indeed a sense for saying that analysis and geometry exists, and even necessarily exist. But we don't have to postulate them as ontic independent third person realities. > > I initially thought the idea of using arithmetic as the foundational > ur-stuff was attractive because I assumed that infinities could be > avoided, Certainly not. At step 7 of the UDA, you should realize that infinities and continua are unavoidable. Indeed the measure we are searching on the OMs bears on a continuum of infinite computation+oracles. The Universal dovetailer does generate, from inside, all the real numbers. > i.e. allowing only "potential infinities" as in intuitionist > mathematics. Comp, as I define it, relies heavily on the excluded middle principle, that is, classical non constructive mathematics. Intuitionism is a pure first person view of math avoiding any bet on any external third person view. It corresponds indeed to the first person "soul-like" hypostasis. To be sure, intuitionist arithmetic is quite similar to classical arithmetic, so that there is a non trivial intuitionistic form of comp, and it is a matter of technical simplicity for not using an intuitionist framework at the start. > But it appears that diagonalization arguments are essential to Bruno's > program and those require realized infinities. Yes that true, but as I said, many consequences of comp can be arrived at by restricting ourselves to effective diagonalizations, like the one I have presented with the growing computable functions and the constructive transfinite ordinals. But the very substance of comp is classical. You can make it intuitionist by using Godel -Glivenko double negation translation of classical arithmetic into intuitionistic arithmetic. Each time we use the word "exist" we should make clear from which point of view we are talking. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
On Apr 3, 5:03 am, Tim Boykett <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hello Everythingers,
>
>I was introduced to this list by Jurgen Schmidhuber, who spoke at a
> meeting that we had here in Linz in 2005. A very interesting meeting
> with Ed Fredkin, Tom Toffoli, Karl Svozil and a few others to make it
> a very full couple of days.
>
>One of the recurring ideas here is that of "mathematicalism" - an
> idea
> that I understand to be that we perceive things as physical that have
> a certain
> mathematical structure. One of the "everything" ideas that results is
> that
> only certain of the all-possible universes have the right stuff to be
> perceivable, the right mathematical structure. We are in one such
> universe,
> and there are others.
>
> Are there any people working on the idea of what these structures should
> be like? The questions that seem relevant include:
> What are the properties of a system such that is can be perceived
> in a way that we regard as being "physical?" Are there requirements for
> 3D ness? If we were in another universe, would we perceive it
> differently?
> Do we only perceive the world as being mathematicsl ("the
> unreasonable effectiveness
> of mathematics") because of our brain wiring? Or are our brains wired
> that way
> because the world is mathematical in that way?
>
Max Tegmark has several publications about the expected physical
properties needed for complex life, including why 3+1 spacetime on the
bottom of this page:
http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/press.html
Jason
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Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Hi Tim > > Le 03-avr.-07, à 12:03, Tim Boykett wrote (in part): > >>One of the recurring ideas here is that of "mathematicalism" - an >> idea >> that I understand to be that we perceive things as physical that have >> a certain >> mathematical structure. One of the "everything" ideas that results is >> that >> only certain of the all-possible universes have the right stuff to be >> perceivable, the right mathematical structure. We are in one such >> universe, >> and there are others. > > We can come back on this if you are really interested, but shortly: > once we assume the computationalist hypothesis (in the cognitive > science/theology), then the picture you give is most probably wrong. > Physics keeps a better role in the sense that physics emerges from the > "whole of arithmetic/mathematic". If you want, the physical world is > not a special mathematical world as seen from inside, but the physical > world somehow is the sum of all possible mathematical world where you > are. That brings up an issue which has troubled me. Why arithmetic? Mathematical physics commonly uses continua. Most speculate that this is an approximation to a more discrete structure at the Planck scale - but I don't believe there has ever been any rigorous proof that this kind of approximation can work. If we are to suppose that arithmetic "exists" because statements like "2+2=4" are true independent of the physical world, then it seems that calculus and analysis and geometry and topology should also "exist". I initially thought the idea of using arithmetic as the foundational ur-stuff was attractive because I assumed that infinities could be avoided, i.e. allowing only "potential infinities" as in intuitionist mathematics. But it appears that diagonalization arguments are essential to Bruno's program and those require realized infinities. Brent Meeker > > "we" are not *in* a mathematical structure, we are distributed in an > infinity of mathematical structures, and physicality emerges from the > interference of them. > > Why a wavy interference? Open problem. > > Bruno > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Hi Tim Le 03-avr.-07, à 12:03, Tim Boykett wrote (in part): >One of the recurring ideas here is that of "mathematicalism" - an > idea > that I understand to be that we perceive things as physical that have > a certain > mathematical structure. One of the "everything" ideas that results is > that > only certain of the all-possible universes have the right stuff to be > perceivable, the right mathematical structure. We are in one such > universe, > and there are others. We can come back on this if you are really interested, but shortly: once we assume the computationalist hypothesis (in the cognitive science/theology), then the picture you give is most probably wrong. Physics keeps a better role in the sense that physics emerges from the "whole of arithmetic/mathematic". If you want, the physical world is not a special mathematical world as seen from inside, but the physical world somehow is the sum of all possible mathematical world where you are. "we" are not *in* a mathematical structure, we are distributed in an infinity of mathematical structures, and physicality emerges from the interference of them. Why a wavy interference? Open problem. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Speaking about "Mathematicalism"
Hello Everythingers,
I was introduced to this list by Jurgen Schmidhuber, who spoke at a
meeting that we had here in Linz in 2005. A very interesting meeting
with Ed Fredkin, Tom Toffoli, Karl Svozil and a few others to make it
a very full couple of days.
One of the recurring ideas here is that of "mathematicalism" - an
idea
that I understand to be that we perceive things as physical that have
a certain
mathematical structure. One of the "everything" ideas that results is
that
only certain of the all-possible universes have the right stuff to be
perceivable, the right mathematical structure. We are in one such
universe,
and there are others.
Are there any people working on the idea of what these structures should
be like? The questions that seem relevant include:
What are the properties of a system such that is can be perceived
in a way that we regard as being "physical?" Are there requirements for
3D ness? If we were in another universe, would we perceive it
differently?
Do we only perceive the world as being mathematicsl ("the
unreasonable effectiveness
of mathematics") because of our brain wiring? Or are our brains wired
that way
because the world is mathematical in that way?
We are putting together a third Data Ecologies meeting this year
with a theme complex around model building, perception, complexity
and related ideas. We would be interested whether anybody from here
might be able to speak about these ideas. Anybody?
please follow up to the list or to me directly, as appropriate
Tim
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