Re: [Fis] : Reality of Information World?!!!

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Responding to Igor -- I don't see how information can be a fundamental
category along with space, time, matter -- because it is a triadic concept,
requiring a system of interpretance that considers certain configurations
of matter in space and/or time to be significant.  So, a complixated
configuration of objects could have different significance (contain
different information) for many different systems of interpretance.

Replying to Andrei --  who said:
>> Or can such a \"proof\" only be established by a social convention -
>> consensus? In this case a matter of consesual belief. And how do we
>> then
>> proceed from this very point?
>This is a problem. Yes, modern science works in such a way. But there
>is reality which is independent of consesual belief. Soon or later this
>reality will go into teh contradiction with a social agreement.
>But as we have seen it could take hundreds and even thousands of years.
 What is bearing here is the Duhem-Quine principle, which states that:
in order to test any scientific theory it is necessary to set up an
experimental framework, which will inolve other ancillary theories and
conjectures.  If a test seems to falsify the tested theory, we can always
question these ancillary theories and conectures instead of the theory we
were testing.  In this way no theory ever needs to become falsified.

STAN


>Dear colleagues,
>
>As usual, I am bolting sporadically into the discussion with my humble
>comments. It looks like we are a bit imprisoned in the terminology here.
>Please allow me to exercise my formal "Marxist" education.
>
>The world out there does not know the word "matter". Matter is a primary
>philosophical concept, our axiome that we introduce to deal (to model) the
>real world. The concepts of "field", "particle" are derivatives of this
>axiom, and space and time are also axioms. Therefore if we go down to the
>basics, (deviating from the applied science which deals with matter
>casually), we should always keep in mind that we may change the axioms if
>necessary. The world will not change, only its description.
>
>One of the ways to do so is to introduce information as a primary category,
>which therefore needs no explanation or proof. The information incorporates
>both material and ideal (never exists without the material carrier on one
>hand, but is not limited to the carrier's physical properties). Then fields,
>particles and such like become the derivatives of the information concept.
>If we think a bit, any interaction is in fact exchange of information.
>
>Yours, Igor
>
>
>- Original Message -
>From: "Arne Kjellman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: "fis" 
>Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2006 1:57 PM
>Subject: Re: [Fis] : Reality of Information World?!!!
>
>
>> Dear John and Andrei
>>
>> As usual you hit the head of the nail - but I think there is something
>> missing:
>>
>> Andrei said:
 Fields are not less real than particles.
>>
>> John said:
 I am really advocating an information world, in which reality can be
 understood as (am inclined
 to say are) information structures. On this account, our internal
 information space and the rest of the world are of the same basic kind,
>>
>> You are dicussing the possibility to classify fields and information as
>> REAL - and "existing" on an equal level as of REALITY - as opposed to
>> something else...experience I guess.
>> Does this means you both both think it is consistently possible to
>> classifying phenomena of science into the dichomoty REAL/UNREAL (or
>> eventually MATERIAL/UNMATERIAL)?
>> I mean do you think is it possible to come to such a distinction of
>> phenomena on grounds of an obsevation science??
>> In in this case on what criteria could such a distinction possibly be
>> uphold?
>> Do you expect a possible experimental "proof"? Like the way physicists
>> strive for an experiemental "proof" of Bell's inequality for instance?
>> Or can such a "proof" only be established by a social convention -
>> consensus? In this case a matter of consesual belief. And how do we then
>> proceed from this very point?
>>
>> The SOA's line of arguing is that real/unreal distinction can only be
>> grounded on social convention - i.e., a definition that is generally
>> accepted but cannot be (ap)proved in a science based on experimental
>> evidence. (The realist's dilemma is an attempt to show that human's
>> capacity of perception is the cause that make this outcome a necessity.)
>> However a decision in consensus can only be achieved in the case each
>> individual participating in this act of consesual decision has made up his
>> mind, ie made a private decision in the matter under consideration. This
>> is why science has to take off form the individual subject's point of
>> view - the subject-oriented approach (SOA) - and accordingly make a strict
>> use of the first person's view.
>>
>> I sincerely wait for an answer in these crucial questions
>> Arne
>>
>>
>>
>> - Original Message -
>

Re: [Fis] Physical Information

[Stanley N. Salthe]

On the issue of the relation between Aristotle's causal categories and
information, here is how I would make it out:

Suppose we have a physical event that has signifiance to a system of
interpretance.  Then:

formal cause determines  WHAT HAS HAPPENED and therefore  HOW IT WAS
BROUGHT ABOUT
material cause determined  WHAT WAS UTILIZED IN CONSTRUCTING THIS HAPPENING

thus, both together determined the  LOCATION WHERE IT HAS HAPPENED

while
efficient cause determined WHEN IT HAPPENED
final cause determined WHY IT HAS HAPPENED

formal, material and final would be involved in generating the meaning of
the event.

Replying to Karl's
>Retranslating in word usage of Michael:
>The correspondence of information with the experienced, physical world is a
>TWO-WAY correspondence.
>
>After these half-steps will have been met with the customary deep silence we
>can progress to the next thought:

This "two-way correspondence" can be worked up as in Peircean semiotics.  A
sign is co-constructed by a System of Interpretance and indications from
counterstructures of (or associated with) some external situation/object.

STAN


>Quoting Michael Devereux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>
>Dear Michael,
>
>You wrote:
>
>definite.
>
>We had a brief side conversation about this last year.
>
>Landauer did define information (data)as a physical but also a 'slippery'
>experience and pretty convincingly set about proving it. That uncertain
>'slipperiness' takes us into QI and probability theory - information as
>unexpected variety within a constraint (in scientific and in aesthetic
>experience).
>
>Is the commodification of information not similar to the mechanisation of
>time as a physical clock in the eighteenth and nineteenth century -
>till Messieurs Heidegger and Einstein came along? Likewise before Humboldt
>the phenomenon of language was simply nominalist marks describing objects.
>
> From another perspective matter is form with an address (form-at) and
>form yields shape pattern and matter (in science and art). Lanadauer's
>in-format-ion corresponds to Aristotle's first - material - cause “that o
>ut of
>which a thing comes to be, and which persists,” and represents marked dat
>a,
>documents, hardware/software etc. X is what Y is made out of.
>
>John Collier's recent attempts to base 'information' on formal causation
>and symmetry breaking tend to address the second - formal - cause the
>statement
>of essence (X is what it is to be Y). [in-form-ation]. Von Weiszacker and L
>yre
>'s pragmatic school found information on the efficient cause
>(X produces Y) [in-formation] Paninformationists (like Norbert Wiener)
>who deny
>the materialist basis of information tend to describe the final cause
>(X is what Y is for) [in-for-mation].
>
>If we can ground our concepts of information on Aristotelian causation
>IS may no longer be the pseudo-science it is today.
>
>In this sense the 'difference that MAKES a difference' can be based on
>Aristotle's cause (aitos) (what makes information intrinsically information
>)
>(AITOS = make).
>
>The relationship between the phenomenon information and the material world
>is what information science is yet to discover.
>
>That split between 'informatio sensis' and 'informatio intellectus possibil
>is'
>(informationem de voluntate et meditationem de potestate nexu individuo
>commiscens et copulans) which occurred in Bacon's Novum Organum
>still continues today in rival material/nonmaterial or realist/antirealist
>information theories.
>
>In a quantum sense both are wrong and both are right at the same time.
>
>Sincerely
>
>John H
>
>
>> Dear Andrei, John, and colleagues,
>>
>> The relationship between information and the material world was
>> correctly described, I believe, some ten years ago, by Rolf Landauer,
>> the chief scientist at the IBM Watson laboratory in New York. In
>> several seminal papers he insisted that all information is physical.
>> In his words, "Information is not a disembodied abstract entity; it
>> is always tied to a physical representation. It is represented by
>> engraving on a stone tablet, a spin, a charge, a hole in a punched
>> card, a mark on paper, or some other equivalent. This ties the
>> handling of information to all the possibilities and restrictions of
>> our real physical world, its laws of physics, and its storehouse of
>> available parts." (Physics Letters A 217, 1996, p. 188.)
>> When information is exchanged between two objects, as in a
>> measurement, there is, necessarily, a transfer of some physical
>> thing. I would note that all physical objects are composed of quanta
>> and all quanta carry energy. So, according to Landauer, and many
>> scientists who have read his work, the correspondence of information
>> with the experienced, physical world is definite.
>> Cordially,
>>
>> Michael Devereux
>>
>> ___
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>> fis@listas.unizar.es
>> http://webmail.unizar.es/mailman/listinfo/fis
>>
>
>
>
>-

[Fis] Physial Infrmation

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Michael said:
>I would say that those who might claim that physics is merely applied
>mathematics, that it lacks any self standing domain, are certainly
>mistaken. Those of us who are physical scientists recognize that our
>models of the physical world must always be validated by tangible
>observations in controlled experiments. That, I believe, distinguishes
>the physical sciences from pure mathematics. I have yet to meet the
>chemist, biologist, geologist, paleontologist, astronomer, or physicist
>who seeks to treat matter itself as a disembodied abstract entity.
>Landauer certainly didnít do that, and the rest of us, also, I believe,
>clearly see the difference between a mathematical model of the physical
>world, and the world itself. Because we carefully observe that world in
>our experiments.
 SS: However, I would point out that experimental observations could be
claimed to be 'the word made machine'. That is to say, experiments are
constructed by text-guided engineering, and are in no wise interrogations
of Nature raw. This is the deep postmodern critique of natural science.
Words all the way down!

John H said:
>If info transmission is an 'event' (as Stanley and Rafael) suggest, then
>what is
>its essential structure? 'Any surprising such representing a range of suches'
>perhaps? If so then any mere transmission of physical data (signals)
>would only qualify as information under certain conditions.
>
>-snip-
>
>I suppose I am arguing that information transfer is not a transmission
>of X from point A to point B but the act of in-form-ation becomes a
>trans-form-ation to Y in the process (just as reading material print
>can inform and transform the consciousness of a reader).
 SS: Here I would plug in the triadic Uexkullian / Peircean view of
semiosis, involving object, sign, and system of interpretance (I have a pdf
of these complex relations for anyone interested.)

STAN




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Re: [Fis] Joined in consensus - after all!

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Commenting on Karl's statement below:   Not quite --

>I will also take the opportunity to say that my point with formulating the
>realist's dilemma was to point out that a human being in principle is
>unable to produce a model of human perception on the basis of
>observation/experimentation.
 I am unhappy with this IF by 'human being' you go beyond the organism
itself.  A culture can produce, say, machines that have capabilities no
human being has (X-ray, etc.), and which no single human can have generated
the theories involved.  If we observe humans using a battery of machines
that materialize various theories, then we can say that the culture is
observing human beings.  Scientific data about humans is of this kind.

>The human capacity of perception is the cause of this shortcoming
 Not shared completely with the culture.

>, which is then also a shortcoming of the experimental methodology - a
>fact that is seldom recognised. The brain-internal feed-back pathways of
>data (not information!) here play a decisive role. The human brain has not
>evolved to an instrument of truth replication at all - on the contrary the
>brain is magnificent tool of adaptation.
 But machines report the local truths they are designed -- by a culture
-- to record.

STAN 
>
>
>Karl:
>
>
>The human brain has evolved to maximise reproductional chances (Darwin).
>Insofar truth replication is a part of increasing chances of reproduction,
>that brain is preferred above others, which do not, in the quest for
>reproduction, that recognises truth. Truth being a re-membered,
>re-cognised state of the brain, the process definitely has something to do
>with re-doing something (in the same fashion, over the same subject, with
>the same methods). Therefore we can recognise that our brain is biased
>towards recognising entities which are similar to each other.  (That
>animal which recognises where it can feed and what to avoid has better
>chances of survival and reproduction than another which does not recognise
>similarities.)
>
>
>Arne:
>
>
>Well - back to our dawning consensus. When we are unable to make certain
>decisions by observation/experiments we are BOUND to decide by consensual
>decisions - and thus directed to a science based on social construction
>and consensus.
>
>
>Karl:
>
>
>The social consensus we observe is that similarity is the clever way to
>use the brain.
>
>
>Arne:
>
>
>To my mind (and Bohr's) there is only one - the domain of experience;
>personally constructed experience and shared/consensually constructed
>"experience" (or scientifically constructed models).
>
>
>Karl:
>
>
>In FIS we have constructed a common experience of trying to feel into a
>consensus that another clever way to use the brain is to concentrate on
>dissimilarities existing alongside similarities while organising into
>systems of  thought-up, abstracted, experienced, etc. ways of using the
>brain.
>
>
>Arne:
>
>
>To my surprise it seems we finally landed on a platform of consensus ---
>and I fully agree with Pedro when saying  the future will tell whether we
>are able to trascend formal analogies
>
>
>Karl:
>
>
>Why is there a need to transcend formal analogies? They are quite useful.
>Let us use the formal analogies that are there, time-honoured and
>consensual, but let us use them in a different fashion (alongside the
>usual fashions).
>
>
>Arne:
>  & achieve a new, more catholic approach to information / and science as
>a whole/
>
>
>Karl:
>
>
>Why so timid? We are the catholic fount of veritas in things concerning
>the theory of information. Indeed, this group has evolved a concept of
>information that hasx quite many aspects to it. And to be more traditional
>as by explaining it all by the logical rounding error one commits when
>conducting an addition   I mean, what is less offensive than that?
>Catholic in the sense that it is all-pervading it is because it is rooted
>in numbers and counting; catholic in that sense that it is within a system
>of concepts and fits neatly   well, counting IS the core dogma of
>mathematics.
>
>
> 
>
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Re: [FIS] Re: Concluding replies

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Note on SPAM: there is lots of spam these days in the server of this 
university. If your message is rejected, like this one from Stan, resend it 
to me, please, and I will re-enter it into the list. ---Pedro

-

>To: fis@listas.unizar.es
>From: "Stanley N. Salthe" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Re: [FIS] Re: Concluding replies
>
>Commenting on Arne's posting, with which I substantially agree.  I find it
>useful to construct a specification hierarchy of 'realms of nature' (each
>of which is a cultural construct), as:
>{physical dynamics {material connections {biological forms {sociocultural
>traditions
> This allows us to put all of scientific knowledge in an orderly
>arrangement (in the sprit of the Unity of Knowledge outlook). Physics
>subsumes all other science  discourses, while sociology implies (material
>implication) all the others.
> Since an individual's knowing resides within sociocultural traditions,
>it is mediated by all of these realms of nature.  There remains the
>question of to what extent, say, the 'taste of an orange' is culturally
>mediated.  If it is not, then it is yet biologically mediated.  Some might
>think that only physical knowledge could be directly about the World
>itself, but we biological beings must construct culturally-mediated
>machines in order to detect -- indeed construct -- the data which we would
>hold to be physical information.
>
>STAN
>

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Re: [Fis] Response to Arne and Stan

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Richard -- A good question!   Note first that my statement is minimalist in
order just to note its large difference from the other two common
conceptions of information.
Now, in order to see that the genetic system would come under this general
usage of information as carrying meaning, we need to stipulate a 'system of
interpretance' for whom genetic information would be meaningful.  This we
can assign to the cell.  The cell enagages in measurements (semiosis) by
relating to some object (concentration of molecules, or numbers of impacts
with some kind of molecule. Its reaction to this information is to generate
interpretants (production of RNA nucleic acid entities), which induce a
sign (finished mRNA), which acts to feedback on the genetic system by
producing more RNA nucleic acid entities. The triadic relations between
Object, Interpretants and the Sign is formally like perception.  The
meaning here emerges during the triadic relations of perception.  It is
created by the cell.  The difference that makes a difference to the cell is
some marked increase in some molecular species that it can detect as
requiring a response.  If I were a cell biologist or 'systems bologist' I
probably could make this reading more detailed.

STAN

>Stan,
>
>Of your three concepts of information:
>
>> >(1) Shannon's information is a reduction in uncertainty or variety of
>> >possibilities.
>> >(2) In the mathematical sciences, information is any constraint on
>> entropy
>> >production (which is any event whatever in our universe).  It is
>> represened
>> >in constants in descriptive equations.
>> >(3) In semiotics information is Bateson's 'a difference that makes a
>> >difference' to some system of interpretance, changing ts behavior.
>
>am I correct in assuming that genetic information is falls under the
>third, semiotic info?  If so, this concept seems awfully thin to
>support something so rich and dynamic as an informed genome.
>
>
>Best regards, Richard
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[Fis] PLEASE POST Returned mail: see transcript for details

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Pedro -- Pleas post this for me.  Thanks.

STAN


for ; Sun, 5 Nov 2006 15:15:37 -0500 (EST)
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>Date: Sun, 5 Nov 2006 17:21:35 -0500
>To: fis@listas.unizar.es
>From: "Stanley N. Salthe" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: Re: [Fis] Response to Stan
>
>Replying to Richard --
>
>>Stan,
>>Your response hit the mark for me.Ý I find your assertion about the
>>primacy of the cell compelling in many respects, concisely stated, too.Ý I
>>suppose Margulis & Sagan would agree with you. Cells, however, are not
>>unique to biological systems.Ý I need to mull this over for a while, and
>>maybe read their book. But there is one thing that, to my mind, competes
>>with the cell for the title of biological primacy; it's the gene.Ý I would
>>abandon this POV if I could understand how natural selection or any other
>>known means of evolution allowed a cell to evolve a digitally "symbolic"
>>(i.e., non-stereochemical) language with a geometrically precise
>>dictionary (e.g., GAU ó> aspartic acid).Ý
> SS:  Of course, the origin of the genetic system is arguably the most
>outstanding problem facing natural science.  It seems that, other than the
>(to me) unconvincing RNA World idea, there is no compelling model of it.
>The RNA First model rests on the fact that some RNAs have catalytic
>ability.  The big problem with it is that (as far as I know) there have not
>yet been found natural conditions under which nucleic acids will form
>spontaneously.  Without this, any RNA first model of the origin of life
>walks on crutches.  This situation contrasts with that for other molecular
>constituents of living systems, for all of which conditions have been found
>that promote their formation.  Linear proteins require RNA templates, but
>branched proteinoids, which believably could have been their ancestors,
>have been formed spontaneously.  As you imply, it is known that proteinoid
>microspheres can carry out all the major functions of cells, and so we know
>that these do not require genetic information to occur.  As well, fossil
>objects not distinguishable from these microspheres have been found in
>rocks predating traces of living systems.   The most reasonable model of
>Life's origin at present seems to me to be that liquid crystalline micelles
>gave rise to some kind of proteinid microspheres, and -- here s the problem
>-- these somehow came to acquire what we know as the genetic system.
>
>>How can cells do thisÝwhen Crick's central dogma (another biological law?)
>>prohibits them from writing or rewriting their own genes, which themselves
>>amount to linear scripts of "pure digital information" (Dawkins)?Ý
> SS:  Of course, we do know of reverse transcriptase, but not of
>reverse translation.  This has not stopped some folks ( Eva Jablonka,
>Steele) from making models of this kind of thing.   I suppose their models
>are as good as the RNA Word models.
>
>>The only other time in natural history that I know of where amalgamations
>>of cells evolved a digitally symbolic language was when humans did it
>>about 10,000 years ago.Ý (This assumes, of course, thatÝsignals and
>>songsÝof insects, birds, and other social species are not digitally
>>symbolic.)
>>So the mystery for me is how living cells evolved a digital language to
>>manage its own structural affairs.Ý How can a molecular analog dictate
>>digital script?Ý
> SS: There have been some ideas (under 'origin of the genetic code')
>about how certain nucleic acid triplets could have spontaneously associated
>with particular amino acids, but I think this has been shown for very few
>of such couplets.
>
>>I know of no scientific principle that allows for ANY analogous entity in
>>nature, save humans, to store its structural information digitally on a
>>specific kind of molecular template.Ý And why only ONE kind of molecule?Ý
>>Since I can't find my answer in a hierarchical context, I've looked
>>elsewhere. So far, only parallel universes seem to hold any promise, and
>>they certainly do amount to unworldly speculation.Ý Still, there seems to
>>be something awfully important about symbolic languages and the digital
>>communication of information.
> SS: The digital ability is at the basis of all orderly entities --
>living things and machines.  Orderliness does appear to me to be the most
>highly evolved general property in the world, as shown by it increase in
>the specification hierarchy:
>{physical dynamics {chemical connectedness {biological form {linguistic
>communication
> where we see an evolution:
>{physical regularity -> {chemical distinctiveness -> {particular
>representability}}}.
>
>STAN
>


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[Fis] computation, mechanical and complex

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Attempting an understanding of John Collier's posting given  below --

He mapped systems with Atlan's "infinite sophistication" (which cannot be
modeled solely from the properties of their components) to computational
systems that do not halt given all relevant inputs, and so are not, in his
terminology, "globally mechanical", as well as to Rosen's systems that do
not have "synthetic models" (i.e., model and system do not 'commute').

Such systems (e.g., living systems) can, however, be "locally mechanical"
and support (Rosen's) 'analytical models'.  That is, some of their
functions can be given limited logical representations, one or a few at a
time.  Thus, there can be no global model of a cell or an organism -- and,
I would add, of any dissipative structure (i.e., complex, organized
material systems).  These have infinite sophistication just from the fact
that they can be classified as having scalar hierarchical structure -- that
is, they are susceptible to being classified as compositional hierarchies,
as in [context [whole [part]]]. A whole is 'emergent' from cohesion of its
parts in a given context.

Biological functions and the traits entrained by them are the products of
biological inquiry.  Gell-Mann's and J. Crutchfield's 'effective' or
'structural' complexity is estimated by the length of a list of such
functions, each of which could be represented by an analytical model which
is stepwise mechanical.  The fact of infinite sophistication is reflected
as what I call (borrowing a term from Jerry Chandler) 'perplex complexity',
the aspect of complexity that makes it resistant to prediction.

STAN

John said:
Pedro has pointed out a real problem, I think. I have a few words to say on
it that may be of some help in sorting out the issues. They derive partly
from my trying to make sense of Atlan's use of computational language along
with his claim that some biological (biochemical really) structures have
"infinite sophistication". A structure with infinite sophistication cannot
be computed from the properties of its components. Sophistication, as far
as I can tell, is a measure of computational depth, which depends on the
minimal number of computational steps to produce the surface structure from
the maximally compressed form (Charles Bennett). Atlan has made the
connection, but also noted it is not fully clear as yet, since Bennett's
measure is purely in terms of computational steps, and is relative to
maximal compression, not components. Cliff Hooker and I noted these
problems (before we knew of Atlan's work -- well, I did, but it was
presented poorly by one of his students -- see Complexly Organized
Dynamical Systems, Open Systems and Information Dynamics, 6 (1999):
241-302. You can find it at
http://www.Newcastle.edu.au/centre/casrg/publications/Cods.pdf). The
question relevant to Pedro's post is why is computation relevant if common
biological systems have infinite sophistication, and thus are not
effectively computable, even if they have finite complexity?

Here is my stab at an answer: the notion of mechanical since Goedel and
Turing (I would say since Lowenheim-Skolem, since Turing's and Goedel's
results are implicit in their theorems) breaks up into two notions,
stepwise mechanical and globally mechanical.
 A globally mechanical system can be represented by an algorithm that halts
on all relevant inputs (Knuth algorithm); these are computable globally.
 The stepwise ones have no global solution that is effectively computable,
but are computable locally (to an arbitrarily high degree of accuracy).

 The difference is similar to that between a Turing machine that halts on
all relevant inputs and one that does not. Both are machines, but only the
latter corresponds to Rosen's restricted notion of mechanical. So
computation theory can help us to understand the difference between things
that are stepwise mechanical, and things that are not. Things of infinite
sophistication are not globally mechanical. I will say without proving that
they correspond to Rosen's systems that have analytical models but no
synthetic models. They may still be mechanical in the weaker sense. In fact
I have not been able to see how they cannot be mechanical in this way.

Consequently, there are Turing machines that are mathematically equivalent
to systems of infinite sophistication, but they do not halt.

So you are probably wondering how processes of this sort can occur in
finite time. The answer is dissipation. I'll not give the solution here, as
my coauthor on another paper just came into the room and asked me how it
was going, and I said I was writing something else that was peripherally
relevant :-) A case in point is given in my commentary on Ross and Spurrett
in Behavioral and Brain Sciences titled Reduction, Supervenience, and
Physical Emergence, BBS, 27:5, pp 629-630. It is available at
http://www.nu.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/Commentary%20on%20Don%20Ross.htm
as

Re: [Fis] INTRODUCING SOCIAL AND CULTURAL COMPLEXITY

[Stanley N. Salthe]

I interleave comments upon Joe's text --

>  11th FIS Discussion Session:
> INTRODUCING SOCIAL AND CULTURAL COMPLEXITY  
> Joseph A. Tainter   
> Global Institute of Sustainability and School of >Human Evolution and
>Social Change,
> Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, USA
>   
>  Several years ago I began a fruitful collaboration with
>Timothy Allen, an ecologist at the University of Wisconsin and a leading
>thinker on hierarchy theory. Many stimulating discussions and several
>worthwhile products emerged from our work together, as well as a few
>surprises. One surprise was to find, after writing together for five
>years, that we meant different things by the term complexity. I suspect
>this kind of discovery is not unusual in interdisciplinary collaborations.
>  
> How many kinds of complexity are there? Perhaps I should
>phrase that as: How many concepts of complexity are there? There are, to
>begin, social complexity and ecological complexity.
 SS: These look to me like different applications, not kinds.

> There are algorithmic complexity and computational complexity. A simple
>foray into Wikipedia shows that computational complexity can be linear,
>logarithmic, or exponential. Complexity classes can be P or NP. There are
>complex systems, complex mechanisms, and complex behavior. Complexity can
>be specified, irreducible, or unruly. To some ecologists, complexity is
>equivalent to diversity, while to others complexity emerges through
>hierarchy (Allen and Starr 1982; Allen and Hoekstra 1992; Ahl and Allen
>1996).
 SS: See also, Salthe, 1985, Evolving Hierarcical Systems.

>Complexity can be hierarchical or heterarchical.
  SS:  Hierarchy is a model; heterarchy refers to the confused,
imperfect hierarchy one constructs in actual applications.

>Hierarchies can be simple and short, or complex and elaborate. Complexity
>can occur within a system, or by embedding types of systems. Organization
>in complex systems emerges through constraints, which can be asymmetrical
>(Allen, Tainter, and Hoekstra 1999; Allen et al. 2001) or symmetrical.
>Amidst all this conceptual fluorescence, the irony of complexity is that
>it simplifies. Elaboration of structure and organization simplifies
>behavior, making it possible for assemblages of entities to function as
>systems.
>  
> I will cut through the conceptual diversity by describing how
>many anthropologists, including myself, came to think of complexity. Two
>of history’s truisms are that most societies of today are more complex
>than those of our ancestors, and that at least since the end of the
>Pleistocene many societies have shown a seemingly inexorable tendency to
>increase in complexity.
 SS: Increasing levels in the kind of hierarchy Allen's group discusses
(what I call the scalar hierarchy, formally a compositional hierarchy, as
in [society [family [individual]]]) occurs by way of interpolation between
existing levels.  I have advanced the idea that this occurs in general in
order to increase the overall rate of energy dissipation.

>But of what does this complexity consist?
>  
> One essential feature of the least complex societies is that
>they show little differentiation in structure. There are few social roles
>except those arising immediately from gender, age, and personal abilities.
>Social and cultural complexity has meant, in part, the emergence of
>differentiated roles and institutions. Hunter-gatherer societies may
>contain no more than a few dozen distinct social personalities, while
>modern European censuses recognize 10,000 to 20,000 unique occupations,
>and industrial societies may contain overall more than 1,000,000 different
>types of personalities (McGuire 1983: 115).
>  
> Is this differentiation of structure all there is to social
>complexity? To conclude so would be like concluding that ecological
>complexity can be reduced to species diversity. Differentiation in
>structure is a useful starting point for understanding cultural
>complexity, but it is only the beginning. In western North America,
>anthropologists in the early 20th century compiled lists of “culture
>elements” among the remaining native peoples. It was not a very
>sophisticated approach. A culture element could be anything from the
>practice of a ritual to a kinship category, as if all such things were
>commensurate “elements.” But Julian Steward pointed out the quantitative
>contrast between the 3000 to 6000 culture elements documented among the
>native people of western North America, and the 500,000 artifact types
>that U.S. military forces landed at Casablanca in 1942 (1955: 81). The
>figures give an indication of great difference in the complexity of these
>respective societies.
>  
> But such enormous differentiation tells only part of the
>story. Complexity consists of organization as well as structural
>differentiation. The challenge of the logistical train that headed fo

Re: [Fis] Joseph Tainter's Social and Cultural Complexity

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Steven's criticisms of of Joseph's text are good ones.  I would like to
address one question he raises:

>I feel a clear definition of complexity is missing from Tainter's
>discussion and I see distinct concepts being >confused. I find myself, for
>example, wanting a clear specification of complexity versus scale and
>diversity. 
-snip-
>In my view scale and complexity are not necessarily correlated and problem
>solving efforts, in fact, do not >increase in complexity - they change and
>get smarter.

I have (Development ad Evolution, 1993, MIT Press) characterized the kind
of complexity found in the kind of hierarchical structure referred to in
Joe's text as 'extensional complexity'.  This is characterized as resulting
from the dynamical nesting of systems with very different rates of change
(large scale/slow versus smaller scale/fast), whereby systems at the
different levels cannot directly interact dynamically, and instead provide
contextual constraints on each other's dynamics -- constraints that may
change episodically because the different levels cannot synchronize.  As
viewed from any given level, such systems are subject to unantissipatable
changes, resulting in what I now call 'perplex complexity'.  This
perplexity characterizes systems which, even though we have good models of
many of their aspects, are not reliaby predictable using these models.
So, operational scale differences within one system are associated with one
kind of complexity (but not, of course, necessarily with other kinds of
complexity).  It is not clear to me that any of the kinds of complexity
alluded to in Joe's text are of the kind I point to here, but, since he is
discussing hierarchcally organized systems, it must be involved.

STAN





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Re: [Fis] Joseph Tainter's Social and Cultural Complexity

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Using my last posting for the week, I will support Guy's posting below:  As
I pointed out in my 1985 book on scale/compositional hierarchically
organized systems, the fact that different levels cannot dynamically
interact (must be separated by order of magnitude differences if they ARE
to be separated) means that we cannot sum informational constraints across
levels. Information at any level is 'incommensurable' with information at
any other level(cells could not 'understand' molecular talk!), and so one
cannot evaluate one level as more complex than another.  The whole system
of levels is, however, seen to be complex (I call it 'extensional
complexity') by most commentators.

STAN


>Dear Pedro and colleagues,
>
>I want to respond only to the first paragraph of your recent post.
>
>on 12/15/06 3:11 AM, Pedro Marijuan at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>> Dear FIS colleagues,
>>
>> I disagree with the comments by Steven and Stan on the nature of
>> complexity. How can one substantiate and quantify social complexity if the
>> previous complexity within the society's individuals has not been solved?
>> At the time being, there is no accepted rigorous evaluation of biological
>> complexity --neither number of genes, RNA transcripts, proteins, nor genome
>> size, chromosome number etc., provide individually any solid estimation;
>> together more or less. Perhaps, the only accepted single number as a proxy
>> of organismic complexity is the number of differentiated cell types
>> ---becoming similar to Joe's approach in societies (social roles, or
>> professions, plus other issues related to number of artifacts, etc.).
>[snip]
>
>In my view, measures of complexity at one level of organization ought not
>depend on the details or complexity of the lower levels upon which it is
>built.  This is to me the essence of systems emergence, which is the
>functional unification of lower level parts.   These parts may or may not be
>highly complex themselves.   In the social sphere of biology, the parts are
>organisms, or groups of organisms, but I see the complexity of  a social
>system as utterly independent of the complexity of organisms.  The stock
>exchange, or the economy in general, is extraordinarily complex.   We would
>indeed need an objective measure to compare compare the complexities of
>organisms to that of economies, but economies need not be more complex than
>organisms.  The system manifested by food coops, for example, is a system of
>very low complexity compared to the complexity of the people who compose the
>coop.
>
>I am not saying that I expect there to be no correlation between a system's
>complexity and the complexities of its component parts.  Indeed, I think
>this is a reasonable expectation, because more complex parts are likely to
>have a much more diverse and unpredictable range of behaviors than less
>complex, or non-complex, parts.   However, this need not always hold true,
>and it is not the only factor determining system complexity.
>
>To sum up, I like the catch phrase "complexity breeds simplicity", because
>it emphasizes the notion that functional unification through system
>emergence releases us from the need to drill down to the bottom in order to
>FULLY understand higher order systems.  In other words, it frees us from the
>tedious demands of the reductionistic paradigm.
>
>Regards,
>
>Guy Hoelzer
>
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Re: [Fis] Re: Continuing Discussion of Social and Cultural Complexity

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Reacting to both Igor's, Pedro's & Ted's communications:  The many
complexities facing us as society can be parsed as follows, using a
specification hierarcy:
{physical constraints (material/chemical constraints {biological
constraints {sociocultural constraints.
Here we an apply Ted's: "My understanding is that when those information
abstractions (which evolve with the system) become overloaded, a new level
of the system is created, with new, "cleaner" abstractions."

Ted continues: "But it might be - and I am sure of this - fruitful to look
at layers "below" us."
Please note that the emergence of each more specified level is formally a
refinement.  Thus, with the institution of bological constraints, many
coordinate possible ways of being (based on various abiotic dissipative
stuctures) have been excluded.  That is, with this hierarchy being a tree
of possibilities, only ONE branch has been selected by biology.  That is to
say that vast amounts of complexity have been rendered moot by moving onto
one branch.  The emergence of socio-cultural constraints has refined the
number of possible relevant constraints even further. So here I agree with
Loet, who said: "My main point is that the biological metaphor may be the
wrong starting
point for a discussion of social and cultural complexity". An example would
be, as I am experiencing even now, I do not have to worry about changing
temperatures as a winter storm (a physical perturbation)is approaching,
because my society has provided heating machines to eliminate this
worrying.  However, what happens if the electricity is knocked out by the
storm? Then would I have been cast back into biological world? -- not quite
because I now have warm blankets, fire places and other accouterments to
stave off physical danger.  So, it is often pointed out that with the
emergence of new integrative levels untold numers of possibilities are
opened up, as a blossoming of positive complexity opportunities.  What I
point out here is that untold numbers of negative complexities have been
left behind as well -- given only that the new level does not disappear
entirely.  Of course, the operation of social forces might unleash
previously hidden dangers, as when our culture invented atomic weaponry.
Prior to this we had little to worry about from fluctuatins in this aspect
of the physical world.  Yet even here it is social forces only that will
make these subatomic forces emerge to confront us directly.  In short, in
society we exist within a cocoon of reduced complexity.

STAN

>Dear Igor and colleagues,
>
>Your question is fascinating, perhaps at the time being rather puzzling or
>even un-answerable...
>
>What are the complexity limits of societies? Our individual limits are
>obvious ---the size of "natural bands" depended both on ecosystems and on
>the number of people with which an individual was able to communicate
>"meaningfully", keeping a mutual strong bond.  Of course, at the same
>time  the band was always dynamically subdividing in dozens and dozens of
>possible multidimensional partitions and small groups (eg. the type of
>evanescent grouping we may observe in any cocktail party). Pretty complex
>in itself, apparently.
>
>Comparatively, the real growth of complexity in societies is due (in a
>rough simplification) to "weak bonds". In this way one can accumulate far
>more identities and superficial relationships that imply the allegiance to
>sectorial codes, with inner combinatory, and easy ways to rearrange rapidly
>under general guidelines. Thus, the cumulative complexity is almost
>unaccountable in relation with the natural band --Joe provided some curious
>figures in his opening. And in the future, those figures may perfectly grow
>further, see for instance the number of scientific specialties and
>subspecialties (more than 5-6.000 today, less than 2-3.000 a generation ago).
>
>Research on social networks has highlighted the paradoxical vulnerability
>of societies to the loss of ... weak bonds. The loss of strong bonds is
>comparatively assumed with more tolerance regarding the maintenance of the
>complex structure (human feelings apart).  Let us also note that
>considering the acception of information as "distinction on the adjacent" I
>argued weeks ago, networks appear as instances of new adjacencies... by
>individual nodes provided with artificial means of communication ("channels").
>
>In sum, an economic view on social complexity may be interesting but
>secondary. What we centrally need, what we lack,  is  a serious info
>perspective on complexity (more discussions like the current one!). By the
>way, considering the ecological perspectives on complexity would be quite
>interesting too.
>
>best regards
>
>Pedro
>
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Re: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5

[Stanley N. Salthe]

This is my reply to Jerry  (acknowledging that John's reply to Jerry below
says it as well as -- probably better than -- I can), who said:

>Stan's comment deserves to be attended to.
>
>> "The many complexities facing us as society can be parsed as follows,
>>using a
>> specification hierarcy:
>> {physical constraints (material/chemical constraints {biological
>> constraints {sociocultural constraints."
>
> As I search for the substance in this comment, I focus on what might be
>the potentially misleading usage of the term "parsed."
 S: 'Parsed', as I use it loosely here, is just 'to divide into
component parts', as with a sentence -- {man {running {uphill {chasing his
hat {naked} -- the order here is not important. 

>Nor, do I understand why brackets, signifiers of separations, are used in
>this context.
 S: The set theoretic brackets are used here, as John says, to indicate
the logical relations between realms of nature, as we have constructed
them.  So, as we think biology emerged from chemistry, we can note this as
{chemistry {biology}}.  This  -- importantly -- means that biology further
constrains (the traditional usage here is 'integrates') chemistry by
instituting rules that limit what chemistry may do in biologial systems.

> I have no idea what it would mean to "parse" a "material / chemical
>constraint" in this context.
 S:  I feel free to use a grammatical operation like this when
linguistically dealing with scientific concepts because our concepts ARE,
indeed, just grammatical / logical constructs.

>Indeed, chemical logic functions in exactly the opposite direction.  
>The creative relations grow with the complexity of the system. Is this not
>what we mean by evolution?
 S: This elicits, as John notes, an interesting philosophical point.
The logic as I have used it indeed says that as evolution uncovers new
realms of nature, these are MORE restricted in their freedom than were
prior existing realms (in the ways that these prior realms were free to
explore).  Each emergence reduces degrees of freedom that were open in
prior realms.  An example I like to use is language.  As we learn a
language, it opens up immense possibilties for unique statements, BUT it
closes off possibilties that might have been opened up if we had learned
another language instead (recall the Whorffian hypothesis), and, I believe,
it blots out some intuitive aspects of our cognition just by intense mental
focusing on language.  So, a tornado is freer to attain different forms in
different locales than is an organism.

>On a personal note to Stan: We have been discussing similar concepts since
>the inception of WESS more than 20 years ago and it does not appear that
>we are converging!  :-)  :-)  :-) Unless you choose to embrace the
>creative capacities of chemical logic, I fear your mind is doomed to the
>purgatory of unending chaotic cycles, searching for a few elusive or
>perhaps imaginary "fixed points."  ;-)  :-) :-( !!!
 S:  I think the main problem in this particular case is that you need
to note the exact meaning of the set theoretic brackets.  Having noted
that, then you would have understood -- even if not agreed.

John said --
>  Hi folks,
>
> I'll take a few minutes from my moving and dealing with academic
>emergencies at UKZN to make a comment here.
 S; No wonder I haven't been able to contact you!

> Jerry brings up a point that keeps arising in the literature one
>constraints and information. Recall that Shannon said that they are the
>same thing. That is a clue.
>
>-snip-
> Stan's bracket formulation is a logical restriction (constraint), with
>the outer bracketed items logically restricting the inner ones. It is a
>neat formulation for a system developed by W.E. Johnson in his book Logic,
>in which he called the inner elements determinates and the outer ones
>determinables. The idea is a basic one in the Philosophy business, and
>these are the technical terms used there, although they are somewhat
>awkward, being relative terms, and also not words used with their English
>meaning. Jerry's problem is that if the chemical opens up a huge range of
>possibilities not available to the physical, how can we call the physical
>a constraint on the chemical. I once asked Stan a similar question, and he
>gave me an answer that satisfied me enough not to pursue the issue. The
>answer requires a distinction concerning constraints (which, recall, is
>logically equivalent to information -- any connotative difference being
>irrelevant to my point here). My colleagues and coauthors Wayne
>Christensen and Cliff Hooker once referred to the difference between
>restricting and enabling constraints. The former restrict possibilities,
>while the latter are required in order to make things possible -- mush
>produces nothing. But there is no essential difference -- context, if
>anything, makes the difference. I say 'if anything' because in many cases
>constraints (indistinguishable from informatio

RE: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Replying to LOET, who said:

>Dear colleagues,I agree with most of what is said, but it does not
>apply to  social systems because these -- and to a lesser extent also
>psychological ones  -- operate differently from the hierarchical
>formations that are generated  "naturally". That is why we oppose "nature"
>to "culture" in the semantics:  cultural (and social) systems enable us to
>model the systems under study and  this changes the hierarchical order. I
>understand that Maturana et al. argue  that the next-order systems always
>model the lower-order ones, but then the word  "model" is used
>metaphorically. The model (e.g., the biological) model enables  us to
>reconstruct the system(s) under study to such an extent that we are able
>to intervene in these systems, e.g. by using a technology. This inverts
>the  hierarchy.   Thus, let me write in Stan's notation: biological
>{psychological {social}} -- or is this precisely the opposite order, Stan?
 S: The hierarchy is not "inverted". {psychological {social}} states
both that the social realm arises out of, and is a refinement of, the
psychological, AND that the social regulates/ interprets/ controls/
contextualizes the psychological.  It is likely that there are opposing
opinions on this relationship, as some might have it be reversed.  This
decision rides on the question of whether psychology existed prior to
sociality in the biological realm.  And THAT depends upon definitions of
sociality.  I myself weakly favor the way Loet put it -- {biological
{psychological {social}}}, but I could likely be persuaded to acccept
instead {biological {social {psychological}}}.

> --  then our scientific models enable us to change nature, for example,
>by building  dykes like in Holland and thus we get: {social {biological}
>since the ecological changes can also be planned in advance.
 S: This is in line with the standard view that the social realm is
higher than the biological, and regulates/ interprets/ controls/
contextualizes the biological, AND the lower levels down to the physical as
well.  The relations, {physical constraints (material/chemical constraints
{biological constraints {sociocultural constraints, are transitive from
the higher levels.  Loet's example is not significantly different from
beavers making a dam to create a pond.  Note that this applies only to
those aspects of lower integrative levels that come under the purvue of a
particular social system.

>While lower-order systems are able to entertain a model of  the next-lower
>ones -- and even have to entertain a model -- human language  enables us
>not only to exchange these models, but also to study them and to  further
>codify them.
 S: I believe Loet is using "lower-order" here incorrectly for the
specification hierarchy formalism, which is {lower order {higher order}}.

>The further codification sharpens the knife with which we  can cut into
>the lower-level ones. We are not constrained to the next-order  lower
>level, but we can freely move through the hierarchy and develop different
>specialties accordingly (chemistry, biology, etc.).
 S: This again is true of the specification hierarchy, which, as a
subsumptive hierarchy, is, as I say above, transitive from the higher
levels down.

>Scientists are able to  adjust the focus of the lense. This is a cultural
>achievement which was  generated naturally, but once in place also had the
>possibility to distinguish  between genesis and validity. No lower-level
>systems can raise and begin to  answer this question.
 S: I have no reason, based in the hierarchy, to disagree with this.
This is why we must erect a sociocultursal level in the hierarchy.

>And doubling reality into a semantic domain that can  operate relatively
>independently of the underlying (represented) layer increases  the
>complexity which can be absorbed with an order of  magnitude.   The issue
>is heavily related to the issue of modernity as a  specific form of social
>organization. While tribes ("small groups") can still be  considered using
>the "natural" metaphor, and high cultures were still organized
>hierarchically (with the emperor or the pope at the top), modern social
>systems  set science "free" to pursue this reconstruction in a
>techno-economic evolution.  "All that is solid, will melt into air"
>(Marx). Because of our biological body,  we are part of nature, but our
>minds are entrained in a cultural dynamics at the  supra-individual level
>("culture") which feeds back and at some places is able  increasingly to
>invert the hierarchy.
 S: Again, true -- that is why we must erect a sociocultursal level in
the hierarchy!

Then STEVEN said:
>I must disagree with the notion that there is any real separation of
>nature and culture. There are things that can be known that do not exist -
>as a general category that includes culture - but culture does not stand
>alone - it's right up there with irrational numbers and televisions. 
>The forc

RE: [Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Replying to Pedro, who said:

>Those hierarchical schemes that with a few categories cover realms and
>realms of knowledge have an undeniable allure --but are they useful?
 S: This depends upon the meaning of "useful".  As my work is in
Natural Philosophy, they are useful there in the sense of allowing one to
grasp as a whole all of Nature as it has been constructed by science, along
with the logical relationships between its different realms.  As for
pragmatic usefulness, I hope never to create anything of that kind of
usefulness for our culture.

>When discussing about the complexity of human societies, or biological
>complexity, etc., one should not dispatch their amazing "boundary
>conditions" as mere constraints from the level above. I do not mean that
>one cannot produce interesting philosophical reflections (like on almost
>any theme), but probably the problem we are around on how a matrix of
>informational operations do characterize the origin, maintenance, survival,
>decay, etc. of the complex self-producing entity alive and also of its own
>"open" self-producing parts, disappears from sight.
 S: The hierarchy scheme I have presented in this discussion is meant
to show relations between realms of nature, and is not meant to be used for
the tasks you have mentioned here.  For these we need other formalisms.

In the recent
>exchanges, the interest of Jerry's chemical logics is that it contributes
>to illuminate basic problems of "form", "formation",  "conformation" ,
>"recognition", etc. upon which life combinatorics is founded molecularly
>--and that is something. It is not my turf, but I am curious on the
>relationship this approach shows with Michael Leyton's grammar process,
>with Ted's category theory, and also with Karl's multidimensional
>partitions.  No doubt that Stan's principle of maximum entropy production
>is also an important dynamic point within this molecular "soup" of complexity.
 S:  Yes, indeed.  The principle (which has now been given formal
status in Physics (R. Dewar, 2005, J. Physics, A, Math. & General 38:
L371-L381) states that dissipative systems that are capable of assuming
different configurations, will assume one that maximizes entropy
production, short of destroyng the system itself.  The paper uses the
maximum (informational) entropy principle to derive maximum (physical)
entropy production (MEP).  So this limits what configurations would be
possible in complex systems.

Later Pedro added
>  Dear Igor and colleagues,

>IGOR:  I have the impression that there is an agreement about the
>existence of biological and sociocultural constraints that impact on our
>ability to understand and manage socioeconomic complexity. These
>constraints are organized  hierarchically, as Stan puts it, {biological 
>{sociocultural }}.
>
>PEDRO:  I would agree that this is the way to organize our explanations.
>But dynamically the real world is open at all levels: very simple
>amplification or feed forward processes would produce phenomena capable of
>escalating levels and percolate around (e.g., minuscule
>oxidation-combustion phenomena initiating fires that scorch ecosystems,
>regions). Socially there is even more "openness": a very tenuous rumor may
>destroy an entire company, or put a sector on its knees... Arguing
>logically about those hierarchical schemes may be interesting only for
>semi-closed, "capsule" like entities, but not really for say (individuals
>(cities (countries)))...  My contention is that we should produce a new
>way of thinking going beyond that classical systemic, non-informational
>view.
 S: It is a mistake to suppose that hierarchies are imposing
semi-closed (?meaning?) boundaries around systems.  With, e.g., the scale
hierarchy,[cities [individuals]], the major meaning is that cities impose
constraints, of the boundary condition type, upon individuals (who must
walk in the pattern of streets, for example), while individuals contribute
to work making possible the continuity of cities. Any hierarchy is only a
way organizing our thinking about different kinds of transactions between
individuals of different scope.  Also, considering the specification
hierarchy,{physics {chemistry {biology}}}, note that the relations moving
from biology down the hierarchy are transitive -- they move through the
levels.  As well, the boundaries here are erected from the lower to the
upper, and so in that direction as well, the boundary is fluid.

STAN

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Re: [Fis] Continuing Discussion of Social and Cultural Complexity

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Pedro said:

>Dear Igor and Stan,
>
-snip-
>
>The realm of economy is almost pure information. Rather than planning,
>markets are very clever ways to handle informational complexity. They
>partake a number of formal properties (eg, power laws) indicating that they
>work as info conveyors on global, regional & sectorial, local scales.
>Paradoxically, "rational" planning can take a man to the moon, or win a
>war, but cannot bring bread and butter to the breakfast table every day.
>Planning only, lacks the openness, flexibility, resilience, etc. of
>markets. A combination of both, with relative market superiority looks
>better...
 It is hard for me to visualize the economy as being almost pure
information!  This is to forget about so-called 'externalities' -- sources
and sinks, storms, wars, climate change -- even holidays!  The larger scale
material environment constrains the economy, while that(perhaps mostly as
information) constrains human action.

STAN

>with regards,
>
>Pedro
>
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RE: [Fis] Continuing Discussion of Social and Cultural Complexity

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Guy -- Yes, you are right.  But I was reacting to Pedro's "The realm of
economy is almost pure information."  Some aspects of an economy must be
seen to be dynamics, not just all of it pure constraints (here I reference
Pattee's 'dynamics / constraints' dichotomy).  It is during the dynamics
that physical entropy is produced.  Of course, informational entropy will
certainly be magnified in the constraint realm of an economy.  As well, in
order to set up constraints, dynamical activities would have to be
undertaken.

Then Pedro asked:

>On the second track, about hierarchies and boundary conditions, shouldn't
>we distinguish more clearly between the latter (bound. cond.) and
>"constraints"?
  S: Basing my views on Pattee's general distinction between dynamics
and constraints, the relation between constraint and boundary conditions is
{constraint {boundary condition}}.  That is, boundary conditions are one
kind of constraint.  Constraints are informational inputs to any dynamical
system, and can be of many kinds.

STAN
-

>Stan,
>
>Aren't all constraints a form of information?  I see constraints as
>informing the bounds of the adjacent possible and adjacent probable.  If
>this is correct, then it would seem to render the economy as "almost pure
>information".  In fact, I think it would render all emergent systems as
>pure information.  Wouldn't it?
>
>Regards,
>
>Guy
>
>
>-Original Message-
>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Stanley N. Salthe
>Sent: Sat 2/24/2007 2:51 PM
>To: fis@listas.unizar.es
>Subject: Re: [Fis] Continuing Discussion of Social and Cultural   Complexity
>
>Pedro said:
>
>>Dear Igor and Stan,
>>
>-snip-
>>
>>The realm of economy is almost pure information. Rather than planning,
>>markets are very clever ways to handle informational complexity. They
>>partake a number of formal properties (eg, power laws) indicating that they
>>work as info conveyors on global, regional & sectorial, local scales.
>>Paradoxically, "rational" planning can take a man to the moon, or win a
>>war, but cannot bring bread and butter to the breakfast table every day.
>>Planning only, lacks the openness, flexibility, resilience, etc. of
>>markets. A combination of both, with relative market superiority looks
>>better...
> It is hard for me to visualize the economy as being almost pure
>information!  This is to forget about so-called 'externalities' -- sources
>and sinks, storms, wars, climate change -- even holidays!  The larger scale
>material environment constrains the economy, while that(perhaps mostly as
>information) constrains human action.
>
>STAN
>
>>with regards,
>>
>>Pedro
>>
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RE: [Fis] Continuing Discussion of Social and Cultural Complexity

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Pedro notes :

>Thanks, Stan and others.
>
>Very briefly, I was thinking on the economy (together with most of social
>structure) as the "arrows" or bonds that connect the "nodes" of
>individuals. Take away the arrows, the bonds, and you are left with a mere
>swarm of structureless, gregarious individuals. Change the type of
>connectivity, you get markets, planned economies, mixed ones, etc. Thus,
>very roughly, in the evolution of social bonds I see a trend toward more
>complex and info-entropic social structures: far less strong bonds, far
>more weak bonds. Curiously, these complex societies also devour far more
>energy and produce far more physical entropy (both types of entropies seem
>to go hand with hand)... Well, and what are finally those social "bonds"
>but information?
>
>best regards
>Pedro
>PS. I would not quite agree with Pattee's view of constraints...

 I especially note:
>Curiously, these complex societies also devour far more
>energy and produce far more physical entropy (both types of entropies seem
>to go hand with hand).
 Yes, but this is a complicated fact.  As long as our economy is a
growing one, these facts will continue to hold.  Growing -- immature --
systems are energy hot & profligate compared with later stages.  And, of
course, the harder any work is done, the greater the proportion of
dissipated energy that goes into entropy.  We are entrained by the ideology
of youthfulness in all our endeavors, but many folks now see the day
arriving when this can no longer seem to be forward looking.  Our culture
will have to mature sometime (in preparation for its being swept away!).
 I also note Loet's
>the former (social systems)may remain differentiated in terms of
>distributions (which
>produce and self-reproduce entropy).
 It is indeed tempting to suppose that, in the philosophical
perspective, the object of human economies is to produce entropy!

STAN

>At 23:28 01/03/2007, you wrote:
>>Guy -- Yes, you are right.  But I was reacting to Pedro's "The realm of
>>economy is almost pure information."  Some aspects of an economy must be
>>seen to be dynamics, not just all of it pure constraints (here I reference
>>Pattee's 'dynamics / constraints' dichotomy).  It is during the dynamics
>>that physical entropy is produced.  Of course, informational entropy will
>>certainly be magnified in the constraint realm of an economy.  As well, in
>>order to set up constraints, dynamical activities would have to be
>>undertaken.
>>
>>Then Pedro asked:
>>
>> >On the second track, about hierarchies and boundary conditions, shouldn't
>> >we distinguish more clearly between the latter (bound. cond.) and
>> >"constraints"?
>>   S: Basing my views on Pattee's general distinction between dynamics
>>and constraints, the relation between constraint and boundary conditions is
>>{constraint {boundary condition}}.  That is, boundary conditions are one
>>kind of constraint.  Constraints are informational inputs to any dynamical
>>system, and can be of many kinds.
>>
>>STAN
>>-
>>
>> >Stan,
>> >
>> >Aren't all constraints a form of information?  I see constraints as
>> >informing the bounds of the adjacent possible and adjacent probable.  If
>> >this is correct, then it would seem to render the economy as "almost pure
>> >information".  In fact, I think it would render all emergent systems as
>> >pure information.  Wouldn't it?
>> >
>> >Regards,
>> >
>> >Guy
>
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Re: [Fis] Mind, matter, meaning and information

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Commenting on Robin's text, he said:

>In this paper I combine and extend some ideas of Daniel Dennett with
>one from Wittgenstein and another from physics. Dennett introduced the
>concepts of the physical, design and intentional stances (1987), and
>has suggested (with John Haugeland) that â*œsome concept of INFORMATION
>could serve eventually to unify mind, matter, and meaning in a single
>theory.â* (Dennett and Haugeland, 1987, emphasis in the original)
 S: I'm not sure I see a distinction between meaning and mind as they
relate to matter.  I suppose matter + meaning might be one perspective on
mind.

>The concept of physical information is now very well established.  The famous
>bet between physicists Stephen Hawking and John Preskill that Hawking conceded
>heâ*™d lost in July 2004 concerned whether physical information is
>conserved in
>black holes.  (Preskill, 2004) Physical information is basically material
>form.
>The concept derives from C.E. Shannonâ*™s information theory (1948) and has no
>semantic component.  When this concept is taken to its logical conclusion, an
>energy flow becomes an information flow and an object becomes its own
>description.  The crucial distinction is between form and
>substance.  Dennettâ*™s physical stance could be renamed the
>â*œsubstantial stance,â* while I
>introduce an additional stance to account for information, called the
>â*œformal
>stance,â* in which we attend to form rather than substance.
 S: So, here we have reflected the Aristotelian causal anlaysis:
material cause (physical stance), formal cause (design stance).  For
completion we still want final cause -- directionality, which relates to
intentionality, and efficient cause, which determines 'when', or initiates
the moment to be consdered.

-snip-
> (The intentional stance actually implies the formal stance, as
>only information can be intentional.)
 S: This is to say that whatever happens does so in a context.
Contexts embody information, and select what among many possibilities will
occur.  So, you are saying that intentionality cannot exist outside of some
context of possible choices.

>To adopt Dennettâ*™s intentional stance toward an object is to suppose
>that the
>object encodes intentional information.
 S: That is to say, some directional take upon the formal setup,
pushing a final causality.

>To adopt his design stance is to view
>something as the product of an intentional information process.
 S: That would be to say that an existing situation has resulted from
past 'descisions' or initiations that, given past designs, resulted in the
present setup.

>Though the physical stance is very natural and practical in many contexts, the
>formal stance is superior in a certain sense: information is all that our
>senses convey, we do not experience matter directly, it can be considered a
>theoretical entity (or set of entities).
 S: The word "experience" here is critical.  Our experience (and
meanings) is engendered by our formal organization.  Matter is what is
organized, and so could not itself be the content of experience (or
meaning) even though it is the carrier (channel).

>A mind is a user or processor of intentional information.
 S: That is to say, it initiates finality.

 >Matter is a theoretical entity extrapolated from physical information.
 S: Presumably "physical information", then, relates to an array of
possibilities generated by a situation, from which the formal setup
(context) will select some given a nudge informed by an intentional
tendency.

>Meaning is intentional information (though multiple levels of en/decoding
>might
>be involved), and consciousness is the use or processing of
>intentional information.
 S: Again, then: mind = matter + meaning.

STAN

  Thus Dennettâ*™s prediction is fulfilled.
>
>References
>
>Daniel C.  Dennett.  The Intentional Stance.  MIT Press, Cambridge,
>Massachusetts, 1987.
>
>Daniel C.  Dennett and John Haugeland.  Intentionality.  In Gregory (1987).
>
>Richard L.  Gregory, editor.  The Oxford Companion to the Mind.  Oxford
>University Press, Oxford, 1987.
>
>John Preskill.  On Hawkings Concession.
>http://www.theory.caltech.edu/~preskill/jp_24jul04.html, 2004.  Accessed 12
>February 2007.
>
>C.E.  Shannon.  A mathematical theory of communication.  Bell System Technical
>Journal, 27:379-423,623-656, 1948.
>
>
>Ludwig Wittgenstein.  Philosophical Investigations.  Blackwell, Oxford, 1972.
>Translated by G.E.M.  Anscombe.  First published in 1953.
>
>--
>Robin Faichney
>
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Mind, matter, meaning and information

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Continuing with Robin --

>Thursday, March 15, 2007, 7:46:47 PM, Stanley wrote:
>
>> Commenting on Robin's text, he said:
>
>>>In this paper I combine and extend some ideas of Daniel Dennett with
>>>one from Wittgenstein and another from physics. Dennett introduced the
>>>concepts of the physical, design and intentional stances (1987), and
>>>has suggested (with John Haugeland) that â*?some concept of INFORMATION
>>>could serve eventually to unify mind, matter, and meaning in a single
>>>theory.â* (Dennett and Haugeland, 1987, emphasis in the original)
>>  S: I'm not sure I see a distinction between meaning and mind as they
>> relate to matter.  I suppose matter + meaning might be one perspective on
>> mind.
>
>I think the quoted statement is perfectly reasonable, because the
>common concepts of mind and meaning are distinct, while unification
>is, in fact, what is being proposed.
 SS: Well, one might still note that meaning and mind are processual
relations, while matter is, in relation to that, just stuff.  Then, while
meaning could be said to be unlocated or dispersed, minds are tied to
locales by being linked to matter.  Meanings can drift and spread, while
minds are points of contact between them and matter.

>>>The concept of physical information is now very well established.  The
>>>famous
>>>bet between physicists Stephen Hawking and John Preskill that Hawking
>>>conceded
>>>heâ*?d lost in July 2004 concerned whether physical information is
>>>conserved in
>>>black holes.  (Preskill, 2004) Physical information is basically material
>>>form.
>>>The concept derives from C.E. Shannonâ*?s information theory (1948) and
>>>has no
>>>semantic component.  When this concept is taken to its logical
>>>conclusion, an
>>>energy flow becomes an information flow and an object becomes its own
>>>description.  The crucial distinction is between form and
>>>substance.  Dennettâ*?s physical stance could be renamed the
>>>â*?substantial stance,â* while I
>>>introduce an additional stance to account for information, called the
>>>â*?formal
>>>stance,â* in which we attend to form rather than substance.
>>  S: So, here we have reflected the Aristotelian causal anlaysis:
>> material cause (physical stance), formal cause (design stance).  For
>> completion we still want final cause -- directionality, which relates to
>> intentionality, and efficient cause, which determines 'when', or initiates
>> the moment to be considered.
>
>I do not believe that my formal stance is related to Aristotle's
>formal cause except in the sense that both relate to the concept of
>form. My account is not primarily about causation, though that comes
>into it. You've perhaps been mislead by the terminology, and I'm
>afraid you'll have to forget Aristotle altogether if you want to take
>my ideas onboard. All I'm saying there (besides the fact that the
>concept of physical information is well established in physics) is
>that sometimes we focus on form rather than substance, that this
>accounts for the concept (in fact all the concepts) of information,
>and that we can call that focus "the formal stance". I hope I don't
>have to change my terminology.
  SS: I shouldn't think so -- but, using it, you do invite some causal
obligato to your concepts.  In the face of complexity, causal analysis can
never "forget Aristotle", whose (updated) views on causality are the only
causal framework up to dealing fully with complexity.  In that context,
your "stances" seem to be formal frameworks.  Recognizing that, causality
necessarily intrudes.

>> -snip-
>>> (The intentional stance actually implies the formal stance, as
>>>only information can be intentional.)
>>  S: This is to say that whatever happens does so in a context.
>
>I don't think so. This is not about "whatever happens", because most
>of what happens has no intentional aspect. Only when sentience comes
>into the picture does that arise.
 SS:  Well, then you are just refusing to generalize.  If we have
intentionality, the evolutionary perspective will insist that it had to
evolve from something more general(ly present in nature) -- nothing comes
from nothing.  In my analysis intentionality can be derived from
functionality, and that from physical tendency (like the Second Law, or any
variational principle).  Thus, {teleomaty -> {teleonomy ->  {teleology}}}.

>> Contexts embody information, and select what among many possibilities will
>> occur.
>
>Yes, but everything embodies information, and the "selection" can be
>considered either a physical process (from the physical stance) or an
>information process (from the formal stance).
 SS: Yes.  Then we have {physical stance {design stance {intentional
stance}}}.

>> So, you are saying that intentionality cannot exist outside of some
>> context of possible choices.
>
>That might be true but it's not what I intended to say. It would
>certainly be useful to tie free will in with intentionality.
 SS: Ah, 'free will'!  Fo

Re: [Fis] Bob Logan's introduction to the FIS list

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Replying to Pedro's query about intellectual tourism, I guess I have done
some touring myself.  After a few years on this list, I guess this is a
good opportunity to introduce myself.

I began by studying art, and have episodially pursued painting, sculpture,
pottery, and most recently, rug weaving.  My masterpiece is a prayer rug
from the late 1980's.  I have also written poetry, with one self-published
chapbook coming from that (a copy to anyone who asks!).  For many years I
kept a haiku diary.

Professionally, I moved from herpetology to evolutionary biology (a
textbook in1972) to systems science and semiotics.  In the science realm I
became opposed to neoDarwinian evolutionary biology back in the early
'80's, and I am glad to see that such opposition is growing.  My major
critique, both polemical and technical, is found in my pages at
www.nbi.dk/~natphil/salthe/.  In systems science I have developed hierarchy
theory, with a book in 1985, and a chapter in my last book in 1993, as well
as continuing papers (latest 2004).  Most recenty I have taken up
thermodynamics, and champion the Maximum Entropy prodction principle (MEP)
as a way of looking at the complex world in general.

In the general intellectual realm, I picked up an interest in 'internalism'
from our colleague Koichiro Matsuno, and in this connection, I have been
proposing that in order to get a new handle on complexity we need to
develop an understanding of vagueness.  While the World is to some degree
vague, Nature, our model of it, is fully explicit and crisp.  This alone
generates complexity!

STAN SALTHE


>  Dear Bob and colleagues,
>
> Many thanks for your Introduction. It is an honor for FIS parties
>exchanging with a pioneer in such a number of informational themes ---and
>a colaborator of Marshall McLuhan. Though this author is not so
>fashionable nowadays (at least in comparison with the enormous cultural
>impact he produced in the 60's and 70's) we can contemplate him as The
>forerunner of contemporary new approaches to "meaningful" information.
>Given that our plans for future fis sessions include, first of all, an
>approach to INFORMATION AND MEANING (early-middle September, co-chaired by
>Bob himself and our veteran FIS colleague, Soeren Brier), I leave
>untouched the brief, intense comments on info relativity and the meaning
>of life (below) --but, aren't they a crucial discussion? Rather, I would
>like to deal with the "intellectual tourism" aspect. There is a small but
>quite creative community of artists at fis, but up to now we have not
>attempted any specific discussion "tourism"  on the humanities and the
>arts territory (except on information and music, years ago). The promise
>by the arrival of Bob and some other new parties (kindly invited to
>self-introduce during these vacation weeks too) is but the anticipation of
>exciting rewards.
>
> welcome,
>
> Pedro
>
> At 17:08 03/07/2007, you wrote:
>
>
>From: bob logan < [EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Date: June 30, 2007 8:48:19 AM EDT (CA)
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: Bob Logan's introduction to the FIS list
>
>
> Dear, Cher, Caro, Liebe Colleagues
>
> I am honoured to have been invited to this list and look forward to our
>discussions. I was trained as an elementary particle physicist at MIT and
>contributed to that field for a number of years. My most memorable result
>was to show that elementary particles behave as Regee poles, i.e. they
>have complex values of spin when the are exchanged virtually (1965). I
>became a physics prof at the U. of Toronto 1968 where in 1971 I introduced
>a course that I teach today called the Poetry of Physics and the Physics
>of Poetry teaching physics without math and studying literature and art
>related to science. It was then I began my career as an "intellectual
>tourists" exploring the relationship of science and the humanities and the
>social sciences. My journey has taken me into many different academic and
>practical territories. My Poetry of Physics course caught the attention of
>Marshall McLuhan with whom I collaborated for 6 exciting years researching
>the impact of media of communications. This study led me to study the
>impact of alphabetic writing on the development of Western culture, the
>origin and evolution of language including speech, writing, math, science,
>computing and the Internet. I also wandered into future studies, knowledge
>management, collaboration studies, industrial design and systems biology.
>I founded and operated with a spouse a company that engaged in computer
>training, Web development and knowledge management consulting 1982 to
>2000. Along the way I became involved in Canadian politics as a policy
>advisor to Prime Minister Trudeau and several cabinet ministers. I am
>currently a professor emeritus, teaching one semester per year and
>actively pursuing my interests all of which are consistent with the FIS
>project. I am interested in the meaning 

Re: [Fis] More introductions to the FIS list

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Pedro said --
>Dear FIS colleagues,
>
>It was nice seeing these artistic oriented presentations (including Stan's!
>--I sort of remember having read a few years ago an elegant poem of him on
>entropy... am I right?).



  et puis,

  je hésite --

  je refuse

  d'avoir force,

  de prendre la vitesse,

  de fendre la vue.

  Je refuse mon Maîtresse,

  la Loi Seconde

  une fois

  (peut-être)

STAN








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[Fis] Info & meaning

[Stanley N. Salthe]

First I comment on Pedro's:

>The "information overload" theme (in the evolution of social modes of
>communication), is really intriguing. >Should we take it, say, in its
>prima facie? I am inclined to put it into question, at least to have an
>excuse and try to >unturn that pretty stone...

The question of information overload connects with my theory of senescence
(1993 book Development & Evolution: Complexity and Change in Biology),
which is that it results from the continual taking in of information after
a system has become definitive (all material systems necessarily continue
to get marked), while at the same time there is less loss of information
(matter is 'sticky').  The result is that a system becomes slower to
respond to perturbations, atr least because lag times increase as a result
of a multiplication of channels (increased informational friction), and
because some channels effect responses at cross purposes.


and then
Walter's:

>(2) In the same way: how can arise the 'meaning' In naturalist terms or
>imposed by us?

I have recently concluded that meaning can be naturalized by aligning it
with finality in the Aristotelian causal analysis (material/formal,
efficient/final).  I assert that final cause has not really been eliminated
from physics and other sciences, but has been embodied in variatinal
principles like the Second Law of thermodynamics, and in evolutionary
theory - in Fisher's fundamental theorem of natural selection, as well as
in some interpetations of the 'collapse of the wave function' in QM.

STAN


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[Fis] Re: Logan's 9-21 info & meaning

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Interleaving comments in Bob's introduction --

-snip-

>We next review the work of Propagating Organization: An Enquiry (POE)
>(Kauffman, Logan et al. 2007) in which it is shown that Shannon
>information cannot describe a biotic system. The core argument of POE was
>that Shannon information "does not apply to the evolution of the
>biosphere" because Darwinian preadaptations cannot be predicted and as a
>consequence "the ensemble of possibilities and their entropy cannot be
>calculated. Instead of Shannon information we defined a new form of
>information, which we called instructional or biotic information, not with
>Shannon, but with constraints or boundary conditions. The amount of
>information will be related to the diversity of constraints and the
>diversity of processes that they can partially cause to occur.
  S: I have previously suggested that there are three aspects of
information that have appeared in discourse about it: (1) A reduction in
possibilities, (2) functioning as a constraint on entropy production, (3),
which makes a difference to the informed system.
(1) Is perfectly general outside of information theory.  It is always the
case that whatever appears was only one of several to many possibilities,
but, as Bob notes with biology, it is almost never possible in complex
material systems to assess the prior possibilities (and/or probabiliities)
to get a measure. (Incidentally, preadaptations are not particularly
'Darwinian', but belong to organic evolution discourse more generally than
just in neoDarwinian theory, where I'd be surprised to see it mentioned
ever)
(2)  I use entropy production as the general key here because whatever
happens produces entropy, and all configurations will constrain this
production to less than that which would be produced in an explosion of the
same energy gradient.  Thus, any reduction in informational entropy in a
given system has the effect of reducing the rate of physical entropy
production by that system relative to what would be the case if the
constraints had not appeared.  However, the maximum entropy production
princple (MEP) suggests that constraints will tend to apear that will allow
the greatest physical entropy production consistent with the integrity of
the system.
(3) Focuses on particular systems as those informed and/or affected by the
information in place.
 


>The Relativity of Information
> 
>In POE we associated biotic or instructional information with the
>organization that a biotic agent is able to propagate. This contradicts
>Shannon's definition of information and the notion that a random set or
>soup of organic chemicals has more Shannon information than a structured
>and organized set of organic chemicals found in a living organism.
S:  This 'notion' would be valid IF the comparison was strictly between
a soup of subatomic particles and the arrangement of subatomic particles
entrained by a biotic organization.



>This argument completely contradicts the notion of information of a system
>biologist who would argue that a biological organism contains information.
 S: That is true because the systems biologist talks about
macromolecules and the cellular configurations constrainig them.



>This argument contradicts the notion that information is an invariant like
>the speed of light, the same in all frames of reference.
 S: As above, a material system exists at several scales, and
information at one scale can have no meaning, as such, at another scale.



>Shannon information and biotic or instructional information are quite
>different. Information is a tool and as such it comes in different forms
>just as screwdrivers are not all the same. They come in different forms,
>slot, square, and Philips---depending in what screw environment they are
>to operate. The same may be said of information.
> 
>Another distinction between Shannon information and biotic or
>instructional information as defined in POE is that with Shannon there is
>no explanation as to where information comes from and how it came into
>being. Information in Shannon's theory arrives deus ex machina, whereas
>biotic information as described in POE arises from the constraints that
>allow a living organism to harness free energy and turn it into work so
>that it can carry out its metabolism and replicate its organization.
>Kauffman (2000) has described how this organization emerges through
>autocatalysis as an emergent phenomenon with properties that cannot be
>derived from, predicted from or reduced to the properties of the
>biomolecules of which the living organism is composed and hence provides
>an explanation of where biotic information comes from.
> 
>
>Information and Its Relationship to Materiality
> 
>"Shannon's theory defines information as a probability function with no
>dimension, no materiality, and no necessary connection with meaning. It is
>a pattern not a presence (Hayles 1999a, p. 18)." The lack of a necessary
>connection to meaning of Shannon

Re: [Fis] info & meaning

[Stanley N. Salthe]

I comment on Walter's remark concerning my posting
>Dear FIS colleagues,
-snip-
>
>I can’t see the appropriateness to reinsert the teleological language.
>Moreover, it seems to me that with these reinsertions we could lose, at
>certain degrees, the rational and scientific >enterprise.
>
>Also, indirectly it is given material for the “intelligent-design” people.

S: Since final causes have been present in variational principles for a
long time without destroying the scientific enterprise, or its usefulness
in technoloical support, I cannot see the point of this comment against
finality.

As for the connection to ID, this ststement of Walter's presupposes that
finality can only be associated to intentionality.  This has long been
known to be untrue.  To whit: purpose has been generalized to function in
biology, and has been still further been generalized to physical propensity
in the physico-chemical realm.  Thus, we have {physical propensity {
function {purpose}}}, or {teleomaty {teleonomy {teleology}}}.

As well, concerning Loet's
>I would go there with  Maturana, for example, on the point that living
>systems communicate in terms of  >molecules, while molecules, for example,
>communicate in terms of atoms (in a  chemical evolution), etc.  There >can
>be a lot of information which is meaningless  (e.g., noise) and in very
>meaninful configuration there may be >little  communication of information
>ongoing.

 S: This relates to the Scale Hierarchy, e.g., [organism [cell
[macromolecule]]], as explored in detail in my 1985 book, Evolving
Hierarchical Systems, and some subsequent texts.  As I mention in my
comments on Bob's text, information at any scale is meaningless, AS SUCH,
at different scales, but may be detected indirectly inasmuch as these
meanings at other scales were involved in generating boundary conditions
from higher scalar levels and initiating conditions from lower scalar
levels upon the scale in focus.

STAN




>Sincerely,
>
>
>Walter
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Re: info & meaning

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Here I react to Guy's

> Greetings All,
>
> In my view  meaning  exists (or not) exclusively within systems.  It
>exists to the extent that inputs (incoming information) resonate within
>the structure of the system.  The resonance can either reinforce the
>existing architecture (confirmation), destabilize it (e.g., cognitive
>disequilibrium), or construct new features of the architecture (e.g.,
>learning).  Social communication often involves the goal of
>re-constructing architectural elements present in the mind of one agent by
>another agent.  I am using highly metaphorical language here, but a very
>straightforward example of this at the molecular level is the transfer of
>structural information between prions and similar proteins folded in
>ordinary  ways.  In this sense, meaning itself cannot be transferred
>between agents; although a new instance of meaning can be constructed.
> This is essentially the idea behind the Dawkins model of populations of
>memes (concept analogs of genes).
 S:  This is placing meaning in the mode of formal causation.  I have
argued that if we are to generalize meaning into nature generally, we need
to locate it in causality.  So far we're in agreement.  But I have further
suggested that meaning inheres in final causation, and in particuar NOT in
formal causation.  The architecture of a system is its own form -- that
which acts.  These acts are directed at goals (finalities as projects) --
are meaningful to the system as separate from it own being.  Now, if
resonant inputs to a system are nonreinforcing, they contradict a system's
finalities, and will then elicit learning or avoidance.

> >From this point of view, the  exactness  of a meaning doesn t seem to
>make sense.  A meaning defines itself without error.  It would make sense,
>however, to talk about the degree of similarity between meanings when the
>social goal was to replicate a particular instance of meaning.
  S: Here Guy approaches finality.

>Perhaps this is what Jerry meant and I have over-analyzed the idea here,
>but if this is a novel or erroneous perspective I would like to see some
>discussion of it.  I guess my main point here is to separate the notion of
>meaningfulness from the social context that demands the sharing of
>meanings and constrains the construction of meanings to resonate at the
>level of the social network.
  S: Here Guy separates meaning from formality (the social context),
and this seems to implicitly place it , in agreement with me, in finality
(efficient causes and material causes would not be involved in meaning).

STAN

>
> Regards,
>
> Guy Hoelzer
>
>
> on 10/2/07 3:24 AM, Pedro Marijuan at [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>
>
>Dear colleagues,
>
> Answering to a couple of Jerry's questions,
>
>
>
>
>Under what circumstances can the speaker's meaning or the writer's meaning
>be _exact_?
>
> Is _meaning_ a momentary impulse with potential for settling into a local
>minimum in the biochemical dynamic?
>
>
>
> A previous point could be---what entities are capable of elaborating that
>obscure item we call "meaning"? Just anything (eg, some parties have
>stated that molecules or atoms may communicate), or only the living
>beings?
>
> My understanding of what Bob has proposed along the POE guideliness is
>that only the living cell would be capable --and of course, all the
>further more complex organisms.  This point is of some relevance.
>
>
>
>After decoding and interpretation of the organic codes, the meaning of my
>message about meaning and information may have meaning to you.
>
>
>
> Maybe. But I suffer some information overload (perhaps "overload" is just
>the incapablity to elaborate meaning under the present channels or means
>of communication).
>
> best
>
> Pedro
> =
> Pedro C. Marijun
> Ctedra SAMCA
> Institute of Engineering Research of Aragon (I3A)
> Maria de Luna, 3. CPS, Univ. of Zaragoza
> 50018 Zaragoza, Spain
> TEL. (34) 976 762761 and 762707, FAX (34) 976 762043
> email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> =
>
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>listinfo/fis
>
>
>
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Re: FW: SV: [Fis] info & meaning

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Reacting to Christophe's statement:

>But I'm afraid I disagree with your point regarding first person
>consciousness as not representing anything real, >as just being a
>bio-cultural artefact as you say. I take human consciousness as being a
>reality resulting from an >evolution of representations. But this is not
>our today subject.

S: Ths was actually the subject of a past fis discussion, on 'Internalism'.
For those who may not recall it, internalism is an emerging perspective in
science (e.g. endophysics) and was preceded by viewpoints like the famous
'autopoiesis'.  Basically it is the attempt to model a system as if from
the inside, using first person, present progressive modes of description.
Cosmology ought to be internalist, but cosmologists have contrived to talk
about the universe they are viewing from within AS IF they were seeing it
from outside.

Later Christophe said:

>With this background, we can consider that a meaningful information (a
>meaning) does not exist per se but comes >from a system submitted to a
>constraint that has generated the meaning in order to satisfy the
>constraint. (stay >alive for an organism, valorize ego for a human  &). A
>meaning can be defined only when a system submitted to a >constraint is in
>relation with its environment.
 S: This invokes Peircean semiotics, which is triadic, instead of the
erstwhile dyadic discourse of science.  That is, interpretation is inserted
between input and output, and it is a 'system of interpretance' that
accomplished this, which Loet refers to in
>The expression of Bateson "A difference which makes a  difference"
>presumes that there is a system or a series of >events for which the
>differences can make a difference.

Then Søren says:
>First person meaningful consciousness is
>a bio-cultural artifact useful for the construction of life and culture, but
>it is not an image of anything real.
  S: This is interesting in regard to the above.  It is basically a
statement denying the possibility of 'pansemiosis' -- that is, that a
semiotic reworking of all of science may be a possibility, or, that all of
nature is characterized by semiosis.  I would take 'First person meaningful
consciousness' to be a highly evolved phenomenon based on a more primitive
semiosis in nature.  Thus: {vague proto-consciousness {First person
meaningful consciousness}} is showing the evolutionary relationship.

STAN







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Re: [Fis] Info & meaning

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Bob said:

>Hi Stan - interesting ideas - I resonate with the thought that the
>meaning of info is associated with  Aritostle's final cause - cheers Bob

Here I follow up with an extract from a text I am working on at present,
just to amplify this a bit more:

 Finally, what is the justification for considering meaning generally to be
associated to finality?  Why not formal causes as well?  Final cause is the
'why' of events, while formal causes carry the 'how' and 'where', material
causes the local 'readiness', and efficient cause the 'when' (Salthe,
2005).  It seems clear when choosing among these, that the meaning
(significance, purport, import, aim -- Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary)
of an event must be assigned to its final causes.  Formal and material
causes are merely enabling, while efficient cause only forces or triggers.
The example of a New Yorker cartoon captures some of my meaning here.  Two
Aliens are standing outside of their spaceship, which has apparently landed
on Earth, as we see spruce trees burning all around them in a fire that we
infer was triggered by their landing. One them says: "I know what caused it
-- there's oxygen on this planet".  If we think that is amusing, we know
implicitly why formality cannot carry the meaning of an event.  In natural
science formality has been used to model the structure of an investigated
system, and so is not suited to carrying its teleo tendencies as well.
Formality marks what will happen where, but not also 'why' it happens. The
causal approach itself is required if we are trying to extend semiosis
pansemiotically to nature in general. Natural science discourse is built
around causality, and so attempts to import meaning into it requires it to
be assimilated to causation.

Later, Bob asked:
>On Oct 2 Guy Hoelzer wrote:In my view meaning exists (or not) exclusively
>within systems.Ý It existsto the extent that inputs (incoming information)
>resonate within thestructure of the system.Ý The resonance can either
>reinforce the existingarchitecture (confirmation), destabilize it (e.g.,
>cognitivedisequilibrium), or construct new features of the architecture
>(e.g.,learning).I like this contribution and the comments made by Stan
>Salthe also on Oct 2Ý - they parallel Fredkins idea:Ý
>"The meaning of information is given by the processes that interpret it."Ý
>Would you agree Guy and Stan?
 S:  Yes, this is basic to semiotic approach.  It can, of course, at
the same time be context dependent.

Then Bob said:
>I agree it is only living and perhaps prebiotic things that have
>processes, namely propagating their organization and are therefore capable
>of interpreting information and hence according to Fredkin providing it
>with meaning. When a rock is acted upon by earth's gravity it does not
>have to interpret because it has no options it can only behave as
>causality demands.
 S: This statement is characterisically (not of Bob!) misleading. No
pansemiotician would suppose that a rock, per se, can be a system of
interpretance.  As with thermodynamics, meaning generation requires a
'correct' identification of the system being interrogated.  I am not
capable of saying here and now what the appropriate semiotic system would
be in the case of this rock, but taking the semiotic approach allows us to
search or it.

>Living things make choices - Bacteria decide to swim towards or away from
>a substance depending on their interpretation of whether it is food or
>toxin. The meaning of a glucose gradient to a bacteria is food, survival,
>I want it.
  S: In these cases the work of searching for the system was easy
enough. It is with abiotic systems, including (incidentally) species and
ecosystems (not themselves living), that the search for semiosis is more
difficult.

>Living things have agency whereas non-living things do not. As for
>pre-biotics I do not know enough biology or pre-biology to comment but
>obviously there is going to be a boundary between animate and inanimate
>matter and I do not know how sharp that boundary is.
 S: There are such boundaries, but we do not know if semiosis is one of
them.

Steven said
>My apparently simplistic proposal, that "meaning" refer to the
>behavior that is the product of a communication, should be seen in
>this context. It, in fact, applies at all scales. It may not be
>immediately apparent to you that it applies in the case of complex
>organisms like ourselves, but it does. The behavioral complex of our
>physiology produces a variety of small and potentially large
>behavioral changes on the receipt of information, for example in the
>complex assessment of what is benign and what is a threat, and in how
>to deal with information overload and how to deal with limited
>information.
  S: This matter of 'all scales' continues my above thought.  With
systems of scale larger than our observation scale, it is not easy to
identify the 'system' or to find the 'product of communication' in many
cases.

Concern

Re: [Fis] info & meaning

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Bob --

>Hi Stan - once again I enjoyed your remarks amplifying your original
>comment. I would like to add that science only deals with formal cause and
>not final cause. Final cause is for philosophers, social critics and
>theologians.

 S: Well, Bob, I will disagree with this.  I think finalities have been
subrosa AS such.  It seems to me that variational principles erect
finalities, in two senses.
(1) Where some value must increase or decrease with any transaction, as
with increase in entropy, or positive entropy production, in accordance
with the Second Law of thermodynamics, or, in evolutionary biology,
increase in fitness in Fisher's fundamental theorem of natural selection.
(I will leave out certain interpretations of QM, because I don't understand
them well enough.)
  To see in a stonger sense why the Second Law is finalistic, we place
it in the context of the Big Bang.  This ongoing event has created a
thermodynamically nonequilibrium world (for this view we need the plausible
supposition that the universe is an isolated system). Its tendency to gain
equilibrium is the Second Law.  This allows us to view the spontaneous
dissipation of energy gradients as finalistic.  Next, in order to see how
dissipative structures, including the living, are involved in this
finality, we note the critical fact of the poor energy efficiency of
natural work with effective work loads -- somewhere around 50%.  That is,
work serving the creation and maintenance of such systems is about equally
in the service of the Second Law.  Thus, as I type this message, I try to
communicate, but I am also contributing my share to Universal
equilibration.  Thus, two facts: the manifest disequilibrium partout, and
the poor energy efficiency of work, allow us to find finality in the Second
Law..

(2) Where some equation descriptive of a system cannot be solved unless a
parameter is minimized or maximized.  Here the finality is erected by the
observer, but the observed could not be known without it.  It is therefore
only known by way of a portal through final cause, which in this case might
be said to be virtual in Nature as known through science. It needs to be
realized that Nature is known ONLY through its observers.  That is to say,
the observer's properties mingle with Nature's.

STAN






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[Fis] info & meaning

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Referring to Bob's, John's, Loet's, Guy's, Beth's and Marcin's
Bob Logan said:

>>>BL: The Relativity of Information
>>>In POE we associated biotic or instructional information with the
>>>organization that a biotic agent is able to propagate. This contradicts
>>>Shannon's definition of information and the notion that a random set or
>>>soup of organic chemicals has more Shannon information than a structured
>>>and organized set of organic chemicals found in a living organism.
>>S: This 'notion' would be valid IF the comparison was strictly between a
>>soup of subatomic particles and the arrangement of subatomic particles
>>entrained by a biotic organization.
>BL: The point I am making is that [biological] organization is a form of
>information not taken into account by Shannon
 S: But, this organization has its own behavioral variety at a larger
scale than the soup of organic chemicals entrained by this organization.
The chemicals' variety of positions and conformations at the smaller scale
would be constrained within the biological system, but that system itself
could be subject to analysis of its number of (in this case meaningful)
'complexions'. (As John points out, the meaningfulness results from
interpretation, or by way of Loet's 'system of reference'.)  I suppose this
is referred to in Loet's

>In the case of the random soup of organic chemicals, the maximum
>entropy of the systems is set by the number of chemicals involved (N).
>The maximum entropy is therefore log(N). (Because of the randomness of
>the soup , the Shannon entropy will not be much lower.)
>
>If a grouping variable with M categories is added the maximum entropy
>is log(N * M). Ceteris paribus, the redundancy in the system increases
>and the Shannon entropy can be expected to decrease.
  S: But suppose that the number of M categories is very large?
Consider how many conformations a human being could assume, then observe a
population, recording from the outside ithe positions and conformations of
its members.  Even if we did not know the meanings, we could in principle
make a Shannon type analysis.  This is allowed, I think because there is no
logical way to distinguish from the outside between a random event and an
arbitrary act (Whitehead).  Thus, we could calculate the system's
information carrying capacity without knowing the various meanings being
conveyed, which would appear random to us.  Or, if we knew the meanings
that the system generated by way of interpretation, we could calculate this
lower carrying capacity as well.

Bob further said:

>Loet et al - I guess I am not convinced that information and entropy
>are connected. Entropy in physics has the dimension of energy divided
>by temperature. Shannon entropy has no physical dimension - it is
>missing the Boltzman constant. Therefore how can entropy and shannon
>entropy be compared yet alone connected?
 S: The relations here are {Shannon {Boltzmann}}.  That is,
conceptually, Boltzmann is logically a refinement of Shannon, which is a
generalized Boltzmann.

>I am talking about information not entropy - an organized collection
>of organic chemicals must have more meaningful info than an
>unorganized collection of the same chemicals.
  S:  Both the unorganized ensemble and an organized ensemble at a
different scale would have an information carrying capacity (informational
entropy), H.  This is what I think Guy refers to in his 'commonality' --
>I think that many of us suspect that this is the case and we are striving
>to understand and articulate (model) the >fundamental commonality.
I don't know which would be greater (Loet may tell us), but it could in
principle be calculated on either one.  AND, one could try to calculate the
number of MEANINGFUL conformations the organized kinds would be producing
if we knew the interpretive scheme.

Returning to finalities, Beth said:
>Part of what makes a story engaging are these novel,
>"non-reinforcing" elements. This relates to Stan's comment:
>>If resonant inputs to a system are nonreinforcing, they contradict
>>a system's finalities, and will then elicit learning or avoidance.
 S:  Note that the finalities are, however, not negated (transcended).
Contradiction might even highlight or reinforce whatever finalities are at
play.
 With respect to the kinds of meanings Beth refers to, we could
consider modern poetry (e.g. Mallarme, Eliot), where meanings are vague and
allusive, implied and polysemic.  I myself played this game for while, and
I can say that the words per se were not relied upon to convey meaning, but
I also used dissonance, rhythm, internal rhyming, punning, archaeisms,
sudden changes in scale and gender -- tools that have been despised in
contempoary poetry.   In this realm Shannon is completely defeated.

Marcin said:
>If information is not physical, and therefore governed by physical
>principles, then what is its ontological status?
 I would attempt to answer this by way of a hierarchy of l

Re: [Fis] definitions of information

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Commenting upon Pedro's"

>Dear FIS colleagues,
>
>Sorry that I could barely follow and participate in the recent exchanges
>(bureaucratic work overload). I was very interested in all the exchanges,
>particularly in the early stages of the discussion. Notwithstanding the
>high quality of the postings maybe we have a natural proclivity in this
>list --the trend of looking for and discussing about  those places where
>there is light, evitating the obscure ones (as the joke of the theoretical
>physicist looking for the lost keys of his car the closest possible to the
>street lamp, and far from the very place he had lost them, "searching where
>there is light!").
>
>Thus, I come back to meaning, helas, to do the same than the theoretical
>physicist, but in the province of biology. The following 10 points could be
>defended:
>
>1. Meaning is built molecularly, by the living cell.
  S: This is the position of the biosemiotics community (Semiotiics -
the study of meaning construction).  With a nod to Loet, the procedure is
to begin with the most highly developed example of semiosis that we know of
-- human discourse -- to derive the necessary categories (induction, etc.),
which are then generalized in the spirit of systems science, so as to apply
them to biosemiosis, and all the way to pansemiosis if we like.

>2. The self construction machinery of the cell is susceptible of being
>guided by external signals evolutionarily "afforded" (converged upon).
>
>3.  Metabolic networks, signaling networks, gene networks, degradation
>networks ---make sense overall, and together they provide the molecular
>signature of meaning.
 S: Or the molecular machiney for meaning construction.

>4. A very special organization is formed, with formal properties not well
>explained yet, that provides attractors, amplification, robustness,
>resilience, stability, etc. involving the whole cellular system. See the
>contemporary problems of "System Biology" (or those of the old, outdated
>notion of "autopoiesis").
 S: The formal properties will necessarily be derived from human
discourse, and imposed upon the cellular system.

>5. When eukaryotic multicellularity emerges, the above (4) becomes an even
>more fascinating set, where some of the mathematical-
>statistical-computational properties, converging in a controlled life
>cycle, become paradoxically more susceptible of formal approaches.
  S: Likely because our semiotic categories can more easily be
visualized as being operative here.

>6. Nervous systems adopt the specialized function of putting in
>"electro-molecular" terms the computational task of guiding the whole
>multicellular organism along the implementation of its fitness in an open
>ended environment.
>
>7. Self-reference is an important aspect, both cellular-molecularly and
>also for nervous systems.
 And, as Loet has ben telling us, understanding this has been derived
from study of human discourse.

>8. Any social, cultural, individual, neuronal, etc., visions or
>acceptations of meaning finally conduce to life cycles in-the-making and
>confronting an open ended environment.
>
>9. Meaning can only be about life, around the multiple dimensions of fitness.
 S: In my (NSH) opinion, meaning can be extended to all dissipative
structures.  From an evolutionary viewpoint, nothing comes from nothing.
If we have meaning, it must have a precursor in simpler sysems.  After all,
e.g., hot air rising has great meaning to an individual nascent hurricane!

>10. The informational philosophy of the above points could be put in
>congruence with some new information-physics approaches ("generatitivity"
>of the vacuum).
 S: A task for pensemiotics!

STAN
>
>Thanks for the patience.
>
>Pedro
>
>
>
>=
>Pedro C. Marijuán
>Cátedra SAMCA
>Institute of Engineering Research of Aragon (I3A)
>Maria de Luna, 3. CPS, Univ. of Zaragoza
>50018 Zaragoza, Spain
>TEL. (34) 976 762761 and 762707, FAX (34) 976 762043
>email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>=
>
>
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Re: [Fis] more thoughts about Shannon info

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Commenting first on Bob's and then on Karl's:

Bob said--

>Dear colleagues - please forgive my lapse in communications. I have been
>studying the question of Shannon info and have come up with the following
>thoughts I want to share with you. As always comments are solicited.
>Rather than answering each point raised in our recent email exchanges l
>decided to do some research and try to answer a number inquiries all at
>once.
>
>The inspiration for adopting the word entropy in information theory comes
>from the close resemblance between Shannon's formula and the very
>similar¬Ý formula from thermodynamics:¬ÝS = -k ’àë pi ln pi¬Ý.¬Ý ¬ÝEntropy
>is related to the second law of thermodynamics that states that:
 S: Boltzmann's physical entropy (S) is formally a refinement of
Shannon's informational entropy (H) - that is, {H {S}}.

>Energy spontaneously tends to flow only from being concentrated in one
>place ’Ä®to becoming diffused or dispersed and spread out. And energy is
>governed by the first law of thermodynamics that states that energy cannot
>be destroyed or created.
>
>
>Is there an equivalent 1st and¬Ý 2nd law for information?
 S: There is.  In an expanding system (such as the universe) H must
increase (as a kind of 'Second Law' for information) along with S, even as
information itself increases.  Papers on this were published by
cosmologists David Layzer and Steven Frautschi, and physicist P.T.
Landsberg.  As to whether there is a first law for information, ths is not
clear.   Universal expansion delivers new matter, and so it would seem to
deliver new informational constraints.

>Entropy is used to describe systems that are undergoing dynamic
>interactions like the molecules in a gas. What is the analogy with Shannon
>entropy or information?
 S: Informational entropy (H) inceases as new information enters the
system and old information 'mutates'.

>Is Shannon’Äôs formula really the basis for a theory of information or is
>it merely a theory of signal transmission?
 S: Of the three common definitions of information, it refers only to
information as a decrease in uncertainty (H).

>Thermodynamic entropy involves temperature and energy in the form of heat,
>which is constantly spreading out. Entropy S¬Ý is defined as ’àÜQ/T. What
>are the analogies for Shannon entropy?¬Ý
 S: Expansion, or growth, of a system generates new information, which
quickly modulates to informational entropy as uncertainty and contingency
creeps in.

>There is the flow of energy in thermodynamic entropy but energy is
>conserved, i.e. it cannot be destroyed or created.
  S: There may not be a First Law for information.  There may also not
be a very important role for the First Law of thermodynamics in natural
(local, nonequilibrium) systems.

>There is the flow of information in Shannon entropy but is information
>something that cannot be destroyed or created as is the case with energy?
>Is it conserved? I do not think so because when I share my information
>with you I do not lose information but you gain it and hence information
>is created. Are not these thoughts that I am sharing with you, my readers,
>information that I have created?
  S: Agreed. Information in a growing system continues to increase.  No
limit is known (although the pattern is likely mostly symptotic) -- unless
there could be some limit to the amount of uncertainty that a system can
bear.

>Shannon entropy quantifies the information contained in a piece of data:
>it is the minimum average message length, in bits. Shannon information as
>the minimum number of bits needed to represent it is similar to the
>formulations of Chaitin information or Kolomogorov information. Shannon
>information has functionality for engineering purposes but since this is
>information without meaning it is better described as the measure of the
>amount and variety of the signal that is transmitted and not described as
>information. Shannon information theory is really signal transmission
>theory. Signal transmission is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
>for communications. There is no way to formulate the semantics, syntax or
>pragmatics of language within the Shannon framework.
 S: What is missing is semiotics!

And here I reply to Karl
>Commenting upon Pedro's and Stan's:
>
>>Thus, I come back to meaning, helas, to do the same than the theoretical
>>physicist, but in the province of biology. The following 10 points could be
>>defended:
>>
>>1. Meaning is built molecularly, by the living cell.
> S: This is the position of the biosemiotics community (Semiotiics -
>the study of meaning construction). With a nod to Loet, the procedure is
>to begin with the most highly developed example of semiosis that we know of
>-- human discourse -- to derive the necessary categories (induction, etc.),
>which are then generalized in the spirit of systems science, so as to apply
>them to biosemiosis, and all the way to pansemiosis if we like.
>
>   K: We 

RE: [Fis] definitions of information

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Pedro said --

>  Dear FIS colleagues,
>
> Adding to Bob's and Karl's on Shannonian info, I am still under the
>influence of Seth Lloyd (one of the founders of quantum computation)
>insights about inf physics. For him, the second law is but a statement
>about information processing, how the underlying physical dynamic laws of
>the universe "preserve bits and prevent their number for decreasing".
>Landauer's principle connect it with erasure... (and temperature becomes
>energy per bit). Anyhow, some of Karl's releted statements should be put
>into test --first, by establishing empirically the number of
>multidimensional partitions, a crucial point in my view).
>
> Then, on Stan & Loet about semiosis, I civilizedly disagree. Perhaps I
>should have written my ten points more universally (they were put mainly
>around the "street lamp" of biology), but the central argument  is clear:
>in which place there is more generality concerning wholistic information
>(which for instance comprises: generation, coding, emision, communication
>channel, reception, decoding, meaningful interpretation, etc.), either in
>"human language" or in the "bioinformational realm"?
 S: In my view the situation is quite clear, given that the human
(sociocultura)l realm developed out of the biological realm.  From that
point of view, human semiosis must be a later development in the universe
than biosemiosis.  Thus, biosemiosis is more generally present throughout
nature than human semiosis.  Then, since we discover our semiotic
principles by studying human semiosis, it is natural to view biosemiosis as
a generalization of human semiosis.  Thus, I do not see any disagreement
with Pedro when he continues:.

> That's the question. Very shortly, I would bring three arguments on the
>primacy of the latter: evolutionary (real origins), ontogenetic
>(developmental process), and formal (Robert Rosen's train of thought about
>physical/biological systems and degeneracy in "Life itself" ).
 but then Pedro continues:
> Otherwise, by straitjacketing the global discussion of info into some
>particular semiotic or pansemiotic school, we are lead into cul-de-sacs
>with different decorations.  As often stated in this list, we need new
>thought, a new info synthesis.
 S: Now here Pedro seems to be rejecting the particular semiotic
theoretical framework that most semioticians (and particularly all
biosemiotians) use -- the Peircean triadic framework.  This rejection may
be justified, but it would be nice to know what is being suggested as a
framework instead.  It can be said (I think -- maybe I'm wrong) that
Peircean semiotics has not yet been integrated with information theory.  I
think the relations here would likely be {information theory {Peircean
semiotics}}, with a reformulation of semiotics under the general rules of
informatoin theory.

STAN

> best regards
>
> Pedro
>
> PS. By the way, a famous paper (a talk initially) by Lloyd on "31
>Measures of Complexity" may be a good idea for our info field too. This is
>a suggestion addressed to Dail and other collegues of the nascent info
>institute.
>
>
>
> = Pedro C. Marijuán Cátedra
>SAMCA Institute of Engineering Research of Aragon (I3A) Maria de Luna, 3.
>CPS, Univ. of Zaragoza 50018 Zaragoza, Spain TEL. (34) 976 762761 and
>762707, FAX (34) 976 762043 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>=
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RE: [Fis] more thoughts about Shannon info

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Replying to Loet, Rafael

Loet said:

>The analogy with the Shannon entropy is strictly formal.  Shannon's is a
>mathematical theory; bits of information are dimensionless. The
>Boltzman-constant (k(B)) provides dimensionality to S. Thermodynamic
>entropy  can be considered as a special case of Shannon entropy, from this
>perspective. Thermodynamics can thus be considered as a special case of
>non-linear dynamics from this perspective. One needs physics as a special
>theory  for its specification. 
 S: Agreed.  There is, however, an interesting further recent viewpoint
in physics (e.g., Dewar, R.C., 2005.  Maximum entropy production and the
fluctuation theorem.  J. Phys. A, Math. & General 38: L371-L381), which
pulls together the Shannon type entropy (variety) and physical entropy
production.  The idea here is referred to as the maimum entropy production
principle (MEP).  Dewar has shown that a system that can assume many
different conformations will tend to tend to take up one that maximizes its
entropy production.  Thus, maximum entropy (H) (MaxEnt) facilitates
maximizing entropy (S) production (MEP).  And so, the connection is that if
a system has greater behavioral entropy (H), it will better be able to
further increase its entropy production.  So, not only is S a refinement of
H -- {H {S}} -- it will also be produced more by a system with larger
behavioral H.

Replying to Rafael --

>Stanley
>
>I think this is less a question of "grand theories" than of persons and
>interests. In this list the natural scientists are in the majority (?)
>and they have their special interests and "blind spots" (like everybody
>too).
>
>When the discussion turns to other themes as, say, atoms and cells
>into, say, culture or economics or a specific historical event or a
>piece of art or..., then there is (almost) no more interest in a
>"discussion" and the possibility of explaining (also in a Peircean
>framework) say Shakespeare's "Machbeth" out of the interaction
>of neurons becomes absurd not just because such an "explanation"
>would never explain what "Machbeth" is all about but also because
>the endless chain of causes and effects could never be discovered
>and if it is discovered it does not reach "Macbeth" but "just" the
>process leading to it.
  S: I agree with Rafael here.  And it goes beyond 'Macbeth'!  Any
actual occasion will be largely historically determined -- the writing of a
play, a particular performance of a play, and so on -- including a
thunderstorm, or the death of a last member of a species.  Science deals
only in repeatable observables, with what occasions have in common.  The
informational constraints bearing upon any event will all have been
historically constituted.  Thus, take Y = aXpower b.  The relationship here
may have been scientifically determined, and found to be robust from one
instance to another, but the actual values of the informational
constraints, a and b, are unique, and were the results of historical
contingencies.  Science cannot 'understand' them, only discover and use
them.  The subject matter of much of humanities studies concern events such
as those that led to setting such values, or to examining the settings in
detail, all of which goes beyomd the interest and competence of science.

>This is not a plea for "defaitism" but just trying not to lie ourselves
>when we speak about "interdisciplinarity" and the like. Such a
>dialogue is only possible if there is a common phenomenon we
>can address from different perspectives and...a common interest
>in doing this.
 S: Consider the equation above.  Science would try to understand why X
relates to Y in a certain way, humanities might try to understand why the
informational values of a and b are exactly as they are.

>The case of "information" is clearly only apparently
>such a common phenomenon. Why? because information is not
>a thing or a property of things but a second order category (agree with
>Peirce).
>The best we can achieve in this regard is to compare (in some way)
>information (and communication) phenomena in, say, the cell
>or in society. But such a comparison is probably in many cases
>not very attractive to persons interested only or mainly in studying
>one phenomenon and not the other. Most of the time the discussions
>are frustrating for both sides.
  S: Ah, yes.  You have pointed to a reason why (in the US at least)
disciplines such as Systems Science and Semiotics have had little success
in Academia.  They are transdisciplinary or metadisciplinary.  They are
extremely abstract.  This appeals evidently to few minds, and, I susect, it
has not et been imagined how to USE them to further economic growth.

STAN

STAN



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RE: [Fis] more thoughts about Shannon info

[Stanley N. Salthe]

Repsonding to John --

> At 10:01 PM 2007/11/14, Stanley N. Salthe wrote:
>Replying to Loet, Rafael
> Loet said:
>
> >LL: The analogy with the Shannon entropy is strictly formal.  Shannon's is a
> >mathematical theory; bits of information are dimensionless.
> >The Boltzman-constant (k(B)) provides dimensionality to S.
>
> JC: Oh, not this canard again. S has units of energy over temperature.
> deltaQ/T.  T is energy per degree of freedom. K/M, where M is multiplicity.
> So S units are proportional to E units, and inversely to E units proportioned
> to M.  I am ignoring anything but the dimensionality here. So entropy has
>units of
> degrees of freedom. As I pointed out in some detail in a previous post, this
> is not an unreasonable unit for information.
  S: Degrees of freedom is appropriate for entropy taken as
disorder/uncertainty.  As a diminution of uncertainty, information could
then also be in degrees of freedom, but it would be nice to have in it a
measure of how much this is a decrease from before we had the information.
I = Hmax - Hactual. (Alas, Hmax is seldom available in natural sysems.)

> JC: The two concepts are commensurate in units. Sometimes entropy is
> described in terms of dimensionless entropy units by knowledgeable
> physicists, as the measure has no dimension, but it is useful to identify
> the application to physical cases. However the same measure can be
> used for any case as long as we keep macrostates and microsteates
> properly defined. See my papers:
> <http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/entev.pdf>Entropy in
>Evolution (1986)
> <http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/entev.pdf>
>http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/entev.pdf
> and
> <http://www.mdpi.org/entropy/papers/e5020100.pdf>Hierarchical Dynamical
>Information Systems With a Focus on Biology (Entropy 2003)
> <http://www.mdpi.org/entropy/papers/e5020100.pdf>
>http://www.mdpi.org/entropy/papers/e5020100.pdf
> for details that dot the i's and cross the t's.
>
>>LL: Thermodynamic entropy can be considered as a special case of Shannon
>>entropy,
>>from this perspective. Thermodynamics can thus be considered as a special
>>case of
> >non-linear dynamics from this perspective. One needs physics as a
>special theory
>> for its specification.
>
> JC: This is true. However any theory that is not consistent with physics
>is in
> LaLa Land as far as I am concerned. If you have a good argument why this
> is not reasonable, I would like to know.
> It should be noted, however, that Shannon information
 S: I presume Shannon information means H, information carrying capacity.

> can increase with
> a passive filter. In fact this is the case unless it is a measure of the
> information in the microstate of a system, which is generally not
> accessible to direct measurement or manipulation. What we can
> directly manipulate and measure is the complement of this information,
> and it is typically called negentropy. We can define the negentropy of
> a system rigorously as the difference between its actual entropy (which
> depends on M above, which depends on which degrees of freedom
> are accessible) and the entropy the system would have if all constraints
> internal to the system are relaxed (it is a theorem of classical
> thermodynamics without any assumption of equilibrium that this
> is unique -- the theorem can be used as the central postulate of
> thermodynamics -- see Carathéodory, also Kestin).
 S: So, again:  I (negentropy) = Hmax - Hactual

>JC: We have to
> have negentropy for Shannon information, if we are to use the
> information to communicate or to control things. Personally, I
> think that Shannon was talking only about this, and to call the
> more general property Shannon entropy is very misleading. It
> can't be false, because definitions are not true or false.
 S: Well, I think it deplorable to call information carrying capacity
(H) Shannon information (Hmax-Hactual) (if that is what is being done here).

>JC:  So if we get down to details, Shannon theory and statistical mechanics
> are really parts of the same, more general theory. I prefer to call it
> statistical mechanics, or statistical dynamics, or something like that,
> as it applies to all dynamical systems pretty much a priori. The
> empirical part is in identifying the dynamical parametres properly,
> and the subsystems that are stable enough to treat as objects
> to be quantified over in the formal representation of the theory.
>
> AGAIN >>LL: Thermodynamic entropy can be considered as a special case of
>Shannon entropy,
>>from this perspective. Thermodynamics can thus be considered as a special
>>case of
> >

Re: [Fis] On the Origin of Gravity and the Laws of Newton

[Stanley N Salthe]

Steven --

>
>
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: Steven Ericsson Zenith 
> Date: Tue, Jul 13, 2010 at 2:56 PM
> Subject: [Fis] On the Origin of Gravity and the Laws of Newton
> To: Foundations of Information Science Information Science <
> fis@listas.unizar.es>
>
> Dear List,
>
> I bring Erik Verlinde's recent paper to your attention because it
> highlights some foundational issues in Information Science and the general
> use of the notion of "Information" in physics.
>
> Here is the paper:
>
> On the Origin of Gravity and the Laws of Newton
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0785
>
> The paper has attracted a lot of attention and Lee Smolin's response, also
> on arvix, is really what made me begin to look at this question seriously.
> Though various people have been bringing the paper to my attention since it
> was first published in January.
>
> Verlinde appeals to a notion of an "entropic force" associated with a
> conception of information and frankly I'm puzzled by it. What, exactly, does
> he refer to I wonder and how does it relate to Shannon, if at all?
>

  One perspective on this might be found in:
Frautschi, S. (1982) “Entropy in an expanding universe”.  Science 217,
593-599.
Frautschi, S. (1988) “Entropy in an expanding universe.” in B.H. Weber, D.J.
Depew  and J.D. Smith, eds.  Entropy, Information and Evolution.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
And
Landsberg, P.T. (1984)  Can entropy and “order” increase together?  Physics
 Letters 102A, 171-173.
And
Layzer, D. 1977. Information in cosmology, physics and biology. International
Journal of Quantum Chemistry 12 (supplement 1) 185-195.

 Basically, in an expanding or growing system much entropy production is
mediated by information AND creates more information while doing it.

STAN


> My initial view is to suspect that the paper is a work of pure metaphysics
> and not physics at all. But then I ask myself to what degree it is less
> metaphysical than anything else we see in physics today. So I reserve
> judgement until I have given the matter more consideration.
>
> Anyone else concerned by this?
>
> With respect,
> Steven
>
>
> --
>Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
>http://iase.info
>http://senses.info
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Curious chronicle

[Stanley N Salthe]

Has anyone suggested the function of contact sports to be the 'moral
equivalent' of war.  Many young men requires this kind of excitement because
of their hormone mix.

STAN

On Mon, Jul 19, 2010 at 10:55 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

>  Dear FISers,
>
> Looking for an informational explanation of soccer, or other sports, as was
> asking Joseph, one can look at the internal side of the event. Then, as
> Jorge and Bob have done, one can discuss about the panorama of networking
> relationships or the "ascendancy" of the different elements. While agreeing
> with the interest of these approaches, one can also look towards the outside
> and ask about the social importance attributed to such type of spectacles.
> It is interesting that today a lot of economic activities, like sports, may
> be ascribed  to ephemeral "information production" --think of entertainment,
> news, fashions, e-networks, communications, tourism, etc. Maybe this is the
> fastest growing segment, even in spite of the global crisis. Why the
> increasing predominance of "panem et circenses"?
> An speculative point may be that complex societies are caught into a
> information paradox. The higher they grow in their aggregate complexity the
> lower the structure of basic social relations (and interesting information)
> around the individual. According to Dunbar's "social brain hypothesis",
> these complex societies deviate progressively from the evolutionary
> networking structure of our species. Thus "info" surrogates of whatever type
> are more and more necessary for the individual and for the society as a
> whole, although probably they are working worse and worse. If this is so, it
> makes sense that in the "information era" depression has become the first
> incapacitating pathology (above flu).
>
> Unfortunately, the victory at the world championship has been so ephemeral!
>
> best wishes
>
> Pedro
> PS. As a question to Karl: in what extent are directed graphs (or generic
> networks) equivalent to multidimensional partitions? Would it make sense the
> description of "ascendancy" in terms of partitions?
>
>
> Robert Ulanowicz escribió:
>
> Dear Jorge and Fis members:
>
> The method is intriguing, but rather ad-hoc.
>
> I and colleagues in marine science have directly used
> information-theoretic indexes to evaluate the dynamically most
> important nodes and links in a quantified network. I'm convinced it
> could be applied as well to players on a team:
>
> Ulanowicz, R.E. and D. Baird. 1999. Nutrient controls on ecosystem
>dynamics:  The Chesapeake mesohaline community.  J.  Mar.
>Sys. 19:159-172
>
> The best,
> Bob Ulanowicz
>
>
> -
> Robert E. Ulanowicz|  Tel: +1-352-378-7355
> Arthur R. Marshall Laboratory  |  FAX: +1-352-392-3704
> Department of Biology  |  Emeritus, Chesapeake Biol. Lab
> Bartram Hall 110   |  University of Maryland
> University of Florida  |  Email  
> 
> Gainesville, FL 32611-8525 USA |  Web  
> 
> --
>
>
> Quoting Jorge Navarro López  
> :
>
>
>
>  Dear FIS collegaes,
>
> Hi!  This is my first posting in the list. My name is Jorge Navarro
> and I am working with Pedro on Systems Biology and Network Science.
> Following with Joseph proposal I have found an interesting paper
> about a satisfactory theory of information  applicable to  teamwork
> sports:
>
> *Quantifying the Performance of Individual Players in a Team Activity*
> http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0010937
>
>
> I think that formally one can say  a lot about what teamship
> activities become interesting and exciting to watch, and what other
> activities are dull and boring.
> I was playing soccer myself until a few years ago (forward), like
> Villa :-), and I am very interested in the informational side of
> sports, soccer of course.
>
> VIVA ESPAÑA!!!
>
> Kind Regards
>
> Jorge
>
>
> --
>
>
>
>  ___
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>
>
> --
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Telf: 34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 
> 5554pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.eshttp://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Curious chronicle

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro -- This sentiment seems odd to me.  This is because I have retired to
an out-of-the-way rural area and no longer travel to conferences, and so my
only contact with other than family members is through e-mail, including
lists. And my wife does all our communications with the locals.  I do NOT
feel lonely, etc. at all. It seems like the perfect setup to me!  Every day
I find new messages from all over the world.  In what way is my situation
different from all those lonely persons?  Could it be my 'cold' Scandinavian
genome?  Or simply my age?

STAN

On Thu, Jul 22, 2010 at 11:10 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

>  Dear Wolfgang, Rafael, Joseph... and FIS Collegues,
>
> Very briefly, as I am incurring in a forbidden "three" per week, I see the
> general problem with ICT & social networks as an "information glut". It is
> very similar to the parallel epidemics of obesity in affluent contemporary
> societies. In the same way that our bodies are not very well equipped for
> the sedentary life style and the overconsumption of food --and this is
> clearly written in the genes selected during our long history as
> hunter-gatherers-- we are also ill-equipped to deal with the diminishing
> structure of meaningful social bonds around us and the increase of "junk"
> information.  Parallel to obesity, there is a current, silent epidemics of
> loneliness, depression, psychogenic pain, suicide... How to counter that?
> Very difficult problem, but knowing better what is the "sociotype", or say
> the ranges of social structures akin to our genetic inheritance, would help
> to identify better cultural alternatives and lifestyles, including better
> uses for ICT presumably.
>
> A careful discussion should involve social networks (network science),
> social brain hypothesis, evolutionary paleoanthropology, neuroscience, ICT,
> cultural analysis, etc., and above all and a nice information science
> integration. We are far from knowing *Homo informationalis!
>
> *best *
>
> Pedro
>
> *
> Wolfgang Hofkirchner escribió:
>
> dear pedro,
>
> what you mention here is just what bothers me since long. in the scientific
> literature about the internet (both empirical and kind of philosophical)
> there are two positions to be found:
>
> the first position is the optimistic one in which the potentialities of the
> new media are praised and the technical support for establishing new ties
> (bonds with people) are appreciated. the second position is rather
> cultural-critical and bemoans the rubbish that is multiplied by the net and
> the gadgets that mediate that.
>
> i, for my part, guess, the truth is a little bit more complicated. the new
> ties you can establish are not only strong ties that you strengthen by
> technology (e.g. when i was abroad i skyped with my family) but also and
> predominantly weak ties that promote a kind of irresponsibility because you
> can enter a "community" and – that's more important – leave it whenever you
> want without sanctions being there. thus my research question: how can we
> shape icts in order to foster real communities?
>
> wolfgang
>
> http://hofkirchner.uti.at/
>
> Am 21.07.2010 um 12:10 schrieb Pedro C. Marijuan:
>
> Dear Rafael, Bob, and FIS Colleagues
>
> Thanks a lot for the erudite comment and the elegant Latin. I quite
> agree about that challenging aspect. However, I keep thinking that the
> whole new communication technologies are adding to the decreasing
> "sociotype" of individuals in todays' society. Like TV in the previous
> generation, they provide an easy amusement but at the cost of a tighter
> budget in the daily time needed for socialization. Like other
> Anthropoids (following the "Social Brain Hypothesis") we need around 20
> % of time devoted to social "grooming", to languaging, laughing etc. in
> a variety of social groups. Do not paying on a daily basis this
> evolutionary debt conduces to disappointment, frustration, depression,
> unhappiness... My point is that the whole ITC are bringing extra
> opportunities for a variety of e-contacts but at the same time are
> diminishing the "social grooming". This could be searched out throughout
> the notion of "sociotype" summarizing the connective structure around
> the individual, and  would need specific inter-multi-cultural
> researches, and above all achieving more concretion around a series of
> indicators.
>
> Bob's very positive comments about "ascendancy" in weighed graphs are
> much appreciated. In next exchanges I would like to introduce some
> further ideas. Maybe human social networks as gauged by the sociotype
> could also benefit of the ascendancy approach (metrics abouts
> parenthood, relatives, friendships, acquaintances, etc.) Who knows.
>
> About sports and wars, I think Tom Stonier had already published in this
> very list about the subject (1997-98?), or was it in some FIS Proceedings?
>
> all the best
>
> Pedro
>
> Rafael Capurro escribió:
>
> Dear Pedro and all,
>
> in an arti

Re: [Fis] Beijing FIS Group

[Stanley N Salthe]

On Mon, Sep 20, 2010 at 9:26 AM, Stanley N Salthe wrote:

> Regarding the question:  What is your
>
> opinion about Leroy E. Hood' words: "Biology Is an
> Informational Science"?
>
> In a general sense the meaning is that, although every locale in the world
> is mediated by history -- requiring information to be understand beyond
> knowledge of physical and material laws -- biological systems have
> internalized and replicate the results of historical accident as preserved
> in the information in the genetic system.  In general, history passes away,
> but biological systems capture some of it in the form of species and variety
> differences.
>
> STAN
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 20, 2010 at 8:26 AM, Jorge Navarro López <
> jnavarro.i...@aragon.es> wrote:
>
>>  Dear Xueshan,
>>
>>  Is the creation of Systems Biology related to Genomics,
>> Proteomics, Transcriptomics, Glycomics, and many many other
>> "-mics"? If so, what is the relationship between the Systems
>> Biology and information from the x-mics angle?
>>
>>  It is a very good question. In my practical experience, the "omic"
>> disciplines provide a lot of data, usually compiled into data-bases, so that
>> one can obtain many "lists of parts" about most processes and cellular
>> subsystems. But in many cases that info is insufficient. For instance I am
>> working in the signaling system of *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* and, if I
>> go to the "tuberculist" data base, I can obtain more than two hundred
>> transcriptional factors presumably related to signaling functions (belonging
>> either to the "one, two or three-component systems"), however the true
>> signaling function of each component is very difficult to obtain (a painful
>> task one-by-one, searching at the literature). Thus I have to spent a lot of
>> time to get a systemic  or general approach, and even more if I want to
>> build some models...
>> Systems Biology is like ecology, that has to deal with the integration of
>> a lot of partial  specialized information from many other disciplines.
>>
>> What is your
>> opinion about Leroy E. Hood' words: "Biology Is an
>> Informational Science".
>>
>>
>> I think (it is a very personal opinion!, obviously influenced by Pedro)
>> that the leaders of Bioinformatic and Systems Biology (Gilbert, Hood,
>> Brenner, Kitano, etc.) are not very serious in that type of statements. What
>> they mean is that biology and molecular biology are becoming not really
>> information sciences but intensive "computer science users". Usually one
>> doesn´t find very deep theoretical reflexion in these guys although their
>> works are very good from the technical point of view.
>>
>>
>>  Are there any difference between transmitter in Neuroscience
>> and hormone in Endocrinology from the viewpoint of
>> information transmission and communication ?
>>
>>
>>
>>  Neurobiology is not my turf. Raquel will answer you  very soon about
>> that.
>>
>> By the way, do you know anyone working on Systems Biology in your
>> University?
>>
>> Nice to talk to you!
>>
>> Jorge
>>
>>
>>
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>>
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Re: [Fis] Revisiting the Fluctuon Model

[Stanley N Salthe]

Folks --

Comments upon Kirby’s & Brenner’s ‘Opening Remarks’



(1) I used Conrad’s early information-based work in developing my conception
of the scale/compositional hierarchy as applied to material systems.  As a
materialist, I may have ‘mis-read’ his work.  I think this now, upon
glimpsing this ‘fluctuon theory’, which is clearly not a materialist
construct.  Rather, it seems to lie in the realm of mathematical idealism.



Admittedly, materialism may turn out to have been a ‘wrong turn’ in our
attempts to understand the universe.  Information itself may not be a
materialist proposition!  My own thinking is really ‘bit’ from ‘it’!  Then,
fluctuons may really be ‘its’, and not ‘bits’!  Surely ‘bits’ emerged into
the world with information theory, crisp as that is.  I argue that any
development must go from vaguer to more definite, as with any embryo.  Bits
ain’t vague.  Or, tell me HOW they are vague.  Fluctuons as limned here seem
pretty vague to me – perhaps because language cannot reach their
mathematical crispness!



We do not yet have a fuzzy version of cosmology, I suppose.



“Vertical flows” directly “up and down” the scale hierarchy contradicts one
of the principles of that hierarchy in application, which requires
transduction of information in order to cross scales (example: a higher
level constructs statistical representations of lower level dynamics).  That,
of course would be in the ‘manifest, material world’.  And it is precisely
‘information flows’ that would be interdicted at scale changes.



“Percolation networks” to foster a “logical approach” to information flows
across hierarchically organized compartments may seem OK in math.



“Interaction” between manifest organisms and the “unmanifest vacuum” is
tantalizing, but… in information theory?  “Fascinating and rich”, yes.



That these unmanifest communications are “not susceptible to being washed
out by thermal fluctuations”, I suppose follows from the definition of
‘unmanifest’, but organisms seem to be manifest.  What are we reaching for
here?  Transcendence of material limitations as the world goes sour on us?



STAN

Let me add that in my evening musings, I do entertain thoughts that might
well be more crisply informed by fluctuon theory!

On Fri, Sep 24, 2010 at 7:49 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> (The previous message was truncated, sorry. I am sending it again. ---P.)
>
>
>
>
> *THE NATURE OF MICROPHYSICAL INFORMATION:*
>
> *REVISITING THE FLUCTUON MODEL*
>
>
> *Kevin G. Kirby
> *Department of Computer Science
> Northern Kentucky University (US)
>
> *Joseph Brenner*
> International Center for Transdisciplinary Research
> Paris (France)
>
>
>
> 1. OPENING REMARKS
> (Kevin Kirby)
>
>  In the standard view, taken for granted so completely it is rarely
> articulated, the fundamental physics of particles and fields is a mere
> "platform" for life. Physics and biology are surely deeply different: the
> extreme ends of the scales simply don't match up.  For example, the notion
> that somehow the incompatibility of general relativity with quantum physics
> has some relevance for life seems nonsensical.
>
> But is it? In a series of papers published throughout the 1990s, Michael
> Conrad put together a theory in which life was, as he often put it, an image
> of the underlying physics of the universe. The mere title of one of the
> final papers in the series, and the title of the book he wanted to write,
> "Quantum Gravity and Life," seems almost like a non sequitur. And indeed,
> the theory he put forth was difficult. But the claim I would like to put
> forward is that there are deep ideas here that -- even if the full details
> of the theory are not correct or not well-defined-- help us reach a more
> satisfying theory of information in the natural world.
>
> Tragically, Conrad passed away in 2001, and was unable to complete his
> book. Yet a very thorough description remains of his ideas in a series of
> sixteen papers from 1989 through 1998.  This work centered on what he
> called fluctuon theory. The main exposition was in a series of papers
> "Fluctuons I,II, III" published in Chaos, Solitons and Fractals during
> 1993-1996.  For the purposes of this discussion, two briefer papers can be
> recommended as providing good summaries of his ideas here:
>
> * Conrad, M., 1995, Multiscale synergy in biological information
> processing. Optical Memory and Neural Networks 4(2), 89-98.
>
> * Conrad, M., 1998, Quantum gravity and life, BioSystems 46, 29-39.
>
> The fluctuon theory asserts that the universe is a kind of giant homeostat,
> but one in which the ground state is always in flight. The universe slides
> in and out of consistency.  His starting point was the Dirac sea of
> negative energy particles: his vacuum was a plenum.  There was more than
> one sea. One was of electrons and positrons, where photons are chains of
> such pairs. The gluons of the strong nuclear force were to be chains in a
> quark

[Fis] replies

[Stanley N Salthe]

JOSEPH:  If the principle of scale hierarchy says that information flows are
not possible across scales, perhaps we need to take another look at that
principle ;-).


S: Let me be more specific; no information flows UNMEDIATED across
levels whose changes occur at different scales.  Example: molecular dynamics
register as temperature at a higher level.  Individuals and ensembles of
them ‘speak’ different ‘languages’.


If there is no exchange between the unmanifest world and the manifest one,
and change, randomness, etc. are totally different in the unmanifest world,
this might tend to confirm it. However, I feel the differences between the
two are not only of scale.


S:  I would suppose that ‘scale’ has no meaning in the unmanifest world.


GORDANA: Could it be the case that on the very fundamental level, “it” and
“bit” cannot be distinguished at all?

They simply are an “it-bit” like in Informational Structural Realism of
Floridi who (using different reasoning) argues that reality is an
informational structure.

 Fluctuons being quantum-mechanical phenomena have already dual
wave-particle nature.
Why cannot they be “it-bit” as well?


 S: At the most basic level fermions can intertransform with bosons, but
this is because matter is energy in a quiet form.  Both are ‘its’.  Now, if
we take ‘bits’ to be positions of on/off switches, then they are matter as
well. The meaning of arrays of such switches arises from semiosis, which is
a triadic configuration of relations resolving some local tension, and
fulfilling as well more general tendencies like the Second Law.  Semiosis,
as pragmatic, must be ‘it’ as well.  But meaning... is an entrainment, which
affects ‘its’, presumably bosonically.

My question now is : are fluctuons physically just bosonic/fermionic
transformations?


LOET:  Shannon-type information measures only variation/uncertainty.


 S: It seems to me that uncertainty is a key aspect of materiality, of
‘itness’.

Thus, it seems to me difficult to escape from a monistic philosophy.  Yet
some -- note David Abel -- insist upon a dualist metaphysics.  His argument
boils down to the demand to demonstrate that arrangements of ‘its’s’ can
give rise to genetic information.


STAN
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[Fis] replying to Kevin and to Joseph

[Stanley N Salthe]

Replying to Kevin --


On Tuesday, Sep 28, 2010 at 6:29 PM, Kevin Kirby  wrote:


-snip-



On flows across scales, this itself need not be mysterious. Take a single
photon hitting a rhodopsin molecule in the retina of a vertebrate then
[...long chain here...] triggering a fight-or-flight response. Is that a
flow across scales? Sure.


   No!  Are you asserting that a brain will respond to a single tickled
rhodopsin molecule? The retina needs to be regaled with more than that in
order to trigger a biological response.  The rhodopsin molecule exists at
the chemical level in nature's hierarchy, and at that level electrons /
photons (IN plural) can have effects because of the chemical organization,
and so, these are not direct, unmediated effects.  Biological synthesis
mediates between these effects and consciousness.  Put otherwise, a single
photon carries no information for biology.  The statement I defend is that
‘no information transits unmediated across scales’. The hierarchy in this
case can be viewed either as [cell [rhodopsin [photonS]]] or as {energy flow
{chemical reaction { biological organization}}}.  Curiously, I am getting
the feeling that hierarchy, after being ignored for decades, is now being
taken as 'ho-hum' -- old hat!


Replying to Joe --


On Wed, Sep 29, 2010 at 11:05 AM, Joseph Brenner 
wrote:

Dear Gordana and All,



-snip-



2. This judgment is confirmed :-) by the citations: a) One can agree (I do)
with Floridi's interpretation of reality as the totality of structures
interacting with one another, but we still do not know what a structure is,
ontologically, and there is a *caesura *with the implication for
information; b) Referring to "physicists who say that reality is
fundamentally informational" is begging the question at issue.



3. It is not quite accurate to say that Floridi's Levels of Organization
(LoOs) give access to an "ontological side" that will enable us to see an
informational reality for two reasons: a) we have not established that
reality is primarily informational nor what this might mean (see above); b)
LoOs, to quote Floridi do "support an ontological approach, according to
which systems *for analysis *(my emphasis) are supposed to have a
structure in themselves *de re*, which is allegedly captured and uncovered
by its description. For example, levels of communication, of decision
processing and of information flow can all be presented as specific
instances that can be analyzed in terms of LoOs." However, I submit that we
are still dealing, here, with epistemological constructions.


 S: LoOs are hierarchical structures, are in fact compositional
hierarchies (the ones that interdict unmediated information flow across
levels separated by scale).  Hierarchies are conceptual tools, allowing us
to simplify our models of the world -- levels of OBSERVATION are obviously
epistemological tools (he also uses "levels of abstraction"). No one can
assert that the world itself has this kind of structure (though it does seem
to in many aspects).



-snip-



5. On the question of "it 'or' bit", I suggest that bits are the simplest,
most abstract elements of information, constitutive of its lowest semantic
level. Its are something more, for example, as Kevin Kirby said,
fluctuons can perfectly well be looked at as "its", given their apparent
interactive characteristics. Understanding the relationship (one or more ?)
between information and matter/energy may be easier if we consider that we
might be talking about the same thing from two perspectives.


  S: From a developmental point of view, 'bits', being crisp and
digital, would be end points of material evolution, which could be modeled
thus (using a subsumptive hierarchy): {vagueness -> {fuzziness ->
{crispness}}}  One could say that only some parts of the world could be
modeled as fuzzy, and even fewer as crisp.
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Re: [Fis] replying to Kevin and to Joseph

[Stanley N Salthe]

Guy -- This is a key idea. 'Mediation' refers to the transformation /
transduction of signals at a boundary (in general it refers to no direct
transfer across boundaries).  In the case before us, that boundary is
between systems that exist / function at different scales.  Note, then, that
a photon impact upon a rhodopsin molecule in a retina is not, AS SUCH,
information to the owner of the retina, but many simultaneous photon impacts
would be transformed into neuron depolarizations, which, in the aggregate,
can activate an awareness of brightness, color, whatever, in the brain. This
creates meaning by / for the larger organization. All of this depends upon
the organization of the system.  In a simpler example, photons can have
unmediated action upon, say, minerals in a rock, with no immediate effect
upon the general shape of the rock at a larger scale, or on its part in a
landscape at a still larger scale.  The photon 'information' did not get
mediated to those levels.


So, yes, information -- transformed at every boundary -- can "percolate
across levels", but it is not SAME information, AS information, at the upper
level that it might be at the lower.  Each level creates its own version of
the original signal.  You could say that each level has its own 'language'.
(For examples, organisms can't do what we call 'evolve', species cannot do
what we call 'develop'.)  In the case in point, rhodopsin can change
conformation, but it cannot have increased blood flow (as in the brain).
This is important because it shows the necessity for such transformations to
be constructed in order for evolution to create higher level -- here larger
scale -- entities that are still in contact with the world in general, as
represented in {physicomaterial world {biological world}}.  Biology, and
even molecular biology, exists at a larger scale than fermion <-> boson
transformations.


As you can see, there is nothing 'new' here, except sensitivity to the
details of system organization. Acknowledging the discontinuities in a
system can only give our models greater verity.


STAN


On Fri, Oct 1, 2010 at 4:46 PM, Guy A Hoelzer  wrote:

Hi Stan,


I don’t understand your notion of “mediated” information flow across levels
of organization.  What do you mean by mediation, and what difference does it
make in the current context?  Isn’t the important thing that information
often does percolate across levels?


Regards,


Guy

On Fri, Oct 1, 2010 at 4:46 PM, Guy A Hoelzer  wrote:

> Hi Stan,
>
> I don’t understand your notion of “mediated” information flow across levels
> of organization.  What do you mean by mediation, and what difference does it
> make in the current context?  Isn’t the important thing that information
> often does percolate across levels?
>
> Regards,
>
> Guy
>
>
> On 10/1/10 1:23 PM, "Stanley N. Salthe"  wrote:
>
> Replying to Kevin --
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, Sep 28, 2010 at 6:29 PM, Kevin Kirby  ki...@nku.edu> > wrote:
>
>
>
> -snip-
>
>
>
> On flows across scales, this itself need not be mysterious. Take a single
> photon hitting a rhodopsin molecule in the retina of a vertebrate then
> [...long chain here...] triggering a fight-or-flight response. Is that a
> flow across scales? Sure.
>
>
>
>   No!  Are you asserting that a brain will respond to a single tickled
> rhodopsin molecule? The retina needs to be regaled with more than that in
> order to trigger a biological response.  The rhodopsin molecule exists at
> the chemical level in nature's hierarchy, and at that level electrons /
> photons (IN plural) can have effects because of the chemical organization,
> and so, these are not direct, unmediated effects.  Biological synthesis
> mediates between these effects and consciousness.  Put otherwise, a single
> photon carries no information for biology.  The statement I defend is that
> ‘no information transits unmediated across scales’. The hierarchy in this
> case can be viewed either as [cell [rhodopsin [photonS]]] or as {energy flow
> {chemical reaction { biological organization}}}.  Curiously, I am getting
> the feeling that hierarchy, after being ignored for decades, is now being
> taken as 'ho-hum' -- old hat!
>
>
>
> Replying to Joe --
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 29, 2010 at 11:05 AM, Joseph Brenner 
>  joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> > wrote:
>
> Dear Gordana and All,
>
>
>
> -snip-
>
>
>
> 2. This judgment is confirmed :-) by the citations: a) One can agree (I do)
> with Floridi's interpretation of reality as the totality of structures
> interacting with one another, but we still do not know what a structure is,
> ontologically, and there is a caesura with the implication for information;
>

Re: [Fis] [Fwd: physics and information]-From Jacob Lee

[Stanley N Salthe]

Replying to Guy --


You are right.  My favorite examples of signals moving across scales
(e.g.,direct interactions) are (a) lightning, where a signal from the planet
scale system directly contacts an organism at a lower scale, and (b) cancer,
where a single cell can destroy a multicellular organism at a higher scale.
 But it can't do this without first growing a population, increasing its
scale.  So, such instances of cross scale signal transitions tend to be
disruptive.  As Simon proposed, the stability of the world depends to some
extent on its being layered into different-scale domains.


Replying to Pedro --


What you are asking for -- a "physics-neutral" theory of information is, I
think not possible in our culture.  Science is our dominant conceptual
institution, and physics is its basis (with logic as ITS foundation).  The
sciences can be displayed thus, in a subsumptive hierarchy: {logic {physics
{chemistry {biology {psychology {sociology}}, with the last two possibly
reversed.  There can be no statement in any science that would be
incompatible with physics.  Having said that, we can see that physics has
been trying to broaden itself via quantum mechanics.  But note the tern
'mechanics' here.  Our culture is predisposed to mechanistic models.  But
every day we experience 'qualia', and these do not seem to be involved with
anything in that hierarchy. Hence we have radical dualisms -- the epistemic
cut, mind / matter, map / territory, OR, internalism / externalism.


STAN

On Wed, Oct 6, 2010 at 4:18 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan  wrote:

>
>
>  Mensaje original   Asunto: physics and information  Fecha:
> Tue, 05 Oct 2010 19:23:34 -0700 (PDT)  De: Jacob I Lee
>Para: Pedro C. Marijuan
>CC:
> fis@listas.unizar.es
>
>
> Hello,
>
> The recent discussion of the fluctuon model has made me curious about how
> closely a theory of information must be wedded to physics. I want to think
> of a theory of information that is independent of any particular model of
> physics, but this seems perilous when, for example, such things as the
> simultaneity of events across frames of reference may have at one time been
> taken as axiomatic. At some level of abstraction is there a
> physics-neutral theory of information universally applicable to any possible
> physics?
>
> My questions are assuredly naive, but naivety is the source of all
> questions.
>
> Best,
>
> Jacob
> www.jacoblee.net
>
>
>
>  --
>
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Recapping the discussion? Joseph's Recap

[Stanley N Salthe]

I am glad to find that Koichiro's statement here corroborates my suspicion
as to what fluctuons were intended to do.  I see the framework here to be
'internalism'.  On the fluctuon idea, supposed material operations from
moment to moment at the fermion/boson level in one locale, which cannot be
observed -- as opposed to, on a common QM perspective, the observer being
part of these interactions inasmuch as the results cannot be detected
without clever constructions internally within the discipline of physics.
 We then have a compositional hierarchy:  [physical laboratory [macroscopic
manipulations [perturbed quark-gluon plasma]]]. Here we have internalities
within internalities.  This Copenhagen-kind of view is, in effect,
postmodern -- a category that most natural scientists abhor.  Then, Conrad
can be seen to have been working to try to rescue microscopic physics from
those maintaining that there cannot be a view from anywhere; that all views
are by someone located in time and space, and so, in effect, cannot be
objective.

STAN

On Wed, Oct 13, 2010 at 5:41 AM, Koichiro Matsuno wrote:

> Folks,
>
>   Joseph wrote:
>
> >my and Kevin K.'s basic question of whether /new evidence exists of any
> interaction between the
> world modeled by fluctuons and the thermodynamic world/ has in my opinion
> not been answered.
>
>   Evidence is very old.
>
>   In a nutshell, mechanics is about the equality of quantities of the same
> quality, e.g., three
> laws of motion in Newtonian mechanics. The quality of motion remains
> invariable in mechanics. In
> contrast, thermodynamics is about the equality of quantities of the
> different qualities, as revealed
> in the first law of thermodynamics presiding over the conservation of
> energy while allowing for the
> transformation of its quality. What is unique to thermodynamics is the
> participation of an internal
> agency being capable of identifying and processing the difference of
> qualities.
>
>   The apparatus James Prescott Joule reported in 1843 demonstrated that the
> gravitational potential
> energy lost by the weight attached to a string causing a paddle immersed in
> water to rotate was
> equal to the heat energy gained by the water by friction with the paddle.
> It was not the physicist
> (or former brewer) Joule himself, but was the internal agency of material
> origin that was
> responsible for keeping the relationship between heat, the current, which
> generates it, and the
> conductor through which it passes. Somewhere right in the middle of the
> energy transformation
> changing its quality from the potential to the heat energy, some ambivalent
> situation would
> inevitably arise such that a residual amount of energy is not clear whether
> it may belong to the
> potential or to the heat energy, or to neither. Nonetheless, the
> conservation of energy must be
> observed in the finished record. Thermodynamics leaves conservation laws as
> being consequential upon
> the more fundamental motion of material origin, though such a feat is
> totally inconceivable in
> mechanics.
>
>   It was regrettable to see that the subsequent takeover of thermodynamics
> by atomic physics which
> duly and triumphantly dismissed any chances for an agency of material
> origin other than the
> physicists themselves. However, a mere dismissal by a decree is not all
> that powerful. A touchstone
> is to see any likelihood of the motion of material origin for the sake of
> the conservation of
> energy, rather than on the conservation already guaranteed. The Fluctuon
> model of Michael Conrad is
> one attempt for appreciating the motion for the sake of meeting the
> conservation laws from within
> like thermodynamics does.
>
>   Best,
>   Koichiro
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Recapping the discussion? Joseph's Recap

[Stanley N Salthe]

I would like to comment upon Conrad's statement:

"When we look at a biological system we are looking at the face of the
> underlying physics of the universe... The picture is not one of
> simple upscale percolation. The higher levels act down scale on the
> lower levels to redefine their fundamental characteristics... the flow

of influence is thus circular as well as vertical, with multiple inner

> loops. The circularity is imperfect; complete self-consistency is never
> attainable..."
> This appears in Conrad (1996, BioSystems vol. 38 p. 108).
>

  This message has been advanced in more detail in my own studies,
published in:

1986.  Evolving Hierarchical Systems. Columbia University Press (Conrad;'s
work up to then informed this book)
1993.  Development and Evolution. MIT Press (Chapter 3)
2002.  Summary of the principles of hierarchy theory.  General Systems
Bulletin 31: 13-17. (I am updating this paper, and am willing to send a copy
to anyone who requests it.)

  The 'devil is in the details' as they say.  From that point of view,
Conrad's "the flow of influence is thus circular as well as vertical, with
multiple inner loops." requires a lot of work, which I have laid some
groundwork for in the above listed texts.

STAN

>
>
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Telf: 34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
>
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Re: [Fis] Recapping the discussion? Joseph's Recap

[Stanley N Salthe]

o, descipio suscipiendo? Nothing
> but uncertainty; if order emerges, selection mechanisms must have been
> specified.
>

 If uncertainty emerges, particular choices must have been specified.


> (That is an epistemological assumption.) However, these selection
> mechanisms are not given. Who would have been the One who could have given
> them to us other than our various intellects and their interacting
> discourses?
>

  Just so!

>
>
> Fortunately, I don’t send this on a Sunday morning. J
>

 Fear not!  I would suppose that you have been absolved by your own
intellect.

STAN

>
>
> With best wishes for a nice Saturday,
>
>
>
> Loet
>
>
> --
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
>
> Professor, University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),
> Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
> Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
>
>
>
> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *On Behalf Of *Stanley N Salthe
> *Sent:* Friday, October 15, 2010 3:35 PM
> *To:* fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Recapping the discussion? Joseph's Recap
>
>
>
> I would like to comment upon Conrad's statement:
>
> "When we look at a biological system we are looking at the face of the
> underlying physics of the universe... The picture is not one of
> simple upscale percolation. The higher levels act down scale on the
> lower levels to redefine their fundamental characteristics... the flow
>
> of influence is thus circular as well as vertical, with multiple inner
>
> loops. The circularity is imperfect; complete self-consistency is never
> attainable..."
> This appears in Conrad (1996, BioSystems vol. 38 p. 108).
>
>
>
>   This message has been advanced in more detail in my own studies,
> published in:
>
>
>
> 1986.  Evolving Hierarchical Systems. Columbia University Press (Conrad;'s
> work up to then informed this book)
>
> 1993.  Development and Evolution. MIT Press (Chapter 3)
>
> 2002.  Summary of the principles of hierarchy theory.  General Systems
> Bulletin 31: 13-17. (I am updating this paper, and am willing to send a copy
> to anyone who requests it.)
>
>
>
>   The 'devil is in the details' as they say.  From that point of view,
> Conrad's "the flow of influence is thus circular as well as vertical, with
> multiple inner loops." requires a lot of work, which I have laid some
> groundwork for in the above listed texts.
>
>
>
> STAN
>
>
>
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Telf: 34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
>
>
> ___
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>
>
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[Fis] Stan to Loet

[Stanley N Salthe]

Loet --


On Sun, Oct 17, 2010 at 1:43 PM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

Dear Stan,

Wasn’t it Tycho Brahe’s suscipio descipiendo, descipio suscipiendo? Nothing
but uncertainty; if order emerges, selection mechanisms must have been
specified.



 S: If uncertainty emerges, particular choices must have been specified.



I hesitate: it seems to me that randomness (maximal uncertainty) is the
basic assumption and that order needs to be explained.


   I should explain a bit more fully.  By 'uncertainty', I was using
this term to label the situation where definite choices appear to an agent
that must choose a path or action.  So, my view implies an ordered (First
Person) agency. This agency could be as simple as an abiotic dissipative
structure.  So, I see that an ordered agency needs to accompany uncertainty,
and, indeed, helps to locate the situation of any such agent.  If we go to a
more primitive (purely physical, or Peircean 'tychastic') situation, without
any agents, this is where I would say there can be no uncertainty -- unless
a Third Person (another agent) is observing that physical situation. So, if
you can "explain order" you will have implicitly explained uncertainty as
well. Thus, we could parse the evolutionary situation as {Gaussian physical
locale -> {added bounding constraints -> {emerged agency}}}, with
uncertainty coming in in the innermost subclass.


STAN




Otherwise, I agree with most of your points. We should not move too easily
from probability functions to (continuous) probability density functions.
The Shannon formulas provide us with a calculus in the discrete domain, that
is, the one where differences prevail.



Best wishes,

Loet


In reply to the above, Loet added:



My reply was not based on assuming agency, but on Shannon-type information.
Observed information (by an agent) should be distinguished from expected
information.


  It was my point that there could not be expectation unless there was
an observer, even if that observer was of the most general kind.  That is,
both expectation and observer would have to have been the products of
evolution.



Perhaps, you can appreciate this difference in our assumptions in your reply
to the list?


  If one assumes that our physical (mathematical) constructs predate the
origin of Western-style science, then your point is well-taken.


STAN



Best wishes,



Loet
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Re: [Fis] Tactilizing processing

[Stanley N Salthe]

Jorge -- Then, it is hard to get away from the model where, in 'downward
causation', large scale signals impact simultaneously many small scale
processes, while in upward causation, small scale signals need to accumulate
into some kind of ensemble message.  But Conrad 'fluctuons' seem to be
trying to get beyond this 'standard physical model'.  In a paper :

Salthe, S.N., 2005,b.  Asymmetry and self-organization.  Symmetry, Culture
and Science 16: 71-90.

I suggested that a single small scale fluctuation near thermodynamic
equilibrium might have an upscale effect if a larger scale configuration was
in place (perhaps by way of a larger scale fluctuation) that was able to be
impacted by that fluctuation in such a way as to alter its configuration in
a way that would be preserved long enough for it to be detected by a still
larger scale configuration, thus letting one signal go from micro through
meso to macro.  But, for this to be other than a passing event, this would
require some kind of system for which such information might be adaptive,
and so it would be specially organized in such a way as to play this game
rather than being limited to the well-known physical model of ensemble
detection of lower scale events.  Or it would just be a passing accidental
synchronization of fluctuations at different scales.

STAN

On Fri, Oct 29, 2010 at 8:19 AM, Jorge Navarro López <
jnavarro.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

>  Dear Stan & Joseph,
>
> Many thanks for your responses and for your interest in my naive comments.
> My interpretation of M. Conrad views in that wonderful abstract is that most
> molecular recognition events are per se isolated or followed by some very
> specific pathway. Then in many cases an accessory tool is needed to
> integrate their specific molecular work into the general cellular processes.
> In that sense, second messengers are reading and measuring the outcome of
> quite many microscopy happenstances and driving to a mesoscopic, highly
> amplified value of their own concentrations (e.g., calcium ions, AMP-cyclic,
> glycerol... ). This mesoscopic value  is broadcast then through Brownian
> motion to a variety of targets, putting into action other microscopic and
> mesoscopic processes, etc.
> In summary, my view  is that second messengers represent the transition
> from many micro- to a meso- and then to many other micro- and so on, in this
> way driving the general percolation of information flows (Pedro has also
> written about the measurement roles of second messenger within signaling
> systems of eukaryotes): I am more interested in the prokaryotes and I am
> currently working in the signalome of *M. tuberculosis* (any help will be
> welcome!! it is awfully complex).
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Jorge
>
>
> --
>
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Tactilizing processing

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bob --

On Fri, Oct 29, 2010 at 3:14 PM, Robert Ulanowicz  wrote
>
>
>  Subject: Re: [Fis] Tactilizing processing
>  To: Stanley N Salthe 
>  Cc: u...@cbl.umces.edu
>
>
> Quoting Stanley N Salthe :
>
>  I suggested that a single small scale fluctuation near thermodynamic
>> equilibrium might have an upscale effect if a larger scale configuration
>> was
>> in place (perhaps by way of a larger scale fluctuation) that was able to
>> be
>> impacted by that fluctuation in such a way as to alter its configuration
>> in
>> a way that would be preserved long enough for it to be detected by a still
>> larger scale configuration, thus letting one signal go from micro through
>> meso to macro.  But, for this to be other than a passing event, this would
>> require some kind of system for which such information might be adaptive,
>> and so it would be specially organized in such a way as to play this game
>> rather than being limited to the well-known physical model of ensemble
>> detection of lower scale events.  Or it would just be a passing accidental
>> synchronization of fluctuations at different scales.
>>
>
> Stan, Isn't the upward propagation of a small event to the next level
> Prigogine's "order through fluctuations"? (Not across two levels though.)
> Bob
>

   The Prigogine model is part of the background of my statement above.
 In the Prigogine case, the process of self-organization is pulled by
entropy production intensification as a result of a particular level of
available free energy (more than could be dissipated by conduction, and not
so much as to result in turbulence).  The experimental setup is organized so
as to obtain the resulting dissipative structure.  As well, the energy flows
in this case of 'order through fluctuations' are not individual molecule
fluctuations at the lower level being propagated to the higher level as
seemingly suggested by Conrad's thinking, but a simultaneous reorganization
of the whole system of flow from disorganized to organized.  I don't THINK
that anyone has suggested that this transition is seeded by the fluctuation
of a single molecule in the fluid.  The fluctuations Prigogine had in mind
were, I think, manifest at the scale of the flow itself, which 'searches'
through various configurations to find the one that is stable at the given
flow level in the given set of boundary conditions.  Are you aware of any
suggestion that these variations are seeded by individual fluid molecules
and then amplified upscale?

STAN

>
>
> - End forwarded message -
>
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Tactilizing processing

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bob -- I think that 'coupling over such a disparity in scale' is not really
going on differently in biology either.  The only messages that could
'percolate upwards' in a material system would be those the higher level(s)
are prepared to receive, in all cases.  This might allow information from
smaller populations of lower scale entities to be detected.  But it would
always be the larger scale system constructing some kind of ensemble
information, or it would be ... magic!  Biology manages to get a greater
uniformity (via genetic controls) of smaller scale populations, thus
increasing the precision or definiteness of the lower scale 'messages',
which are still a kind of 'mass action', but with clearer, more reliable and
less muddy, 'colors'.

STAN

On Sat, Oct 30, 2010 at 5:43 PM, Robert Ulanowicz  wrote:

> Quoting Stanley N Salthe :
>
>>
>>   The Prigogine model is part of the background of my statement above.
>>  In the Prigogine case, the process of self-organization is pulled by
>> entropy production intensification as a result of a particular level of
>> available free energy (more than could be dissipated by conduction, and
>> not
>> so much as to result in turbulence).  The experimental setup is organized
>> so
>> as to obtain the resulting dissipative structure.  As well, the energy
>> flows
>> in this case of 'order through fluctuations' are not individual molecule
>> fluctuations at the lower level being propagated to the higher level as
>> seemingly suggested by Conrad's thinking, but a simultaneous
>> reorganization
>> of the whole system of flow from disorganized to organized.  I don't THINK
>> that anyone has suggested that this transition is seeded by the
>> fluctuation
>> of a single molecule in the fluid.  The fluctuations Prigogine had in mind
>> were, I think, manifest at the scale of the flow itself, which 'searches'
>> through various configurations to find the one that is stable at the given
>> flow level in the given set of boundary conditions.  Are you aware of any
>> suggestion that these variations are seeded by individual fluid molecules
>> and then amplified upscale?
>>
>> STAN
>>
>
> Stan, no, I am not aware of any. For that matter, the projection of
> molecular genetic codes to mesoscopic scales has always amazed me. Coupling
> over such a disparity in scale is a true rarity. Bob
>
>
>
>
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[Fis] Fwd: [Fwd: Discussion Colophon] From J.Brenner

[Stanley N Salthe]

-- Forwarded message --
From: Stanley N Salthe 
Date: Thu, Nov 4, 2010 at 10:03 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Discussion Colophon] From J.Brenner
To: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 


A comment on Joseph's concluding statement:  It seems clear to me that there
is a world of qualia (spiritual realm, sentience, Peirce's 'universal mind',
whatever).  I believe that the connection between this and the
physical/material world has increased in sharpness/definiteness at certain
locales (like the earth) during the development of the universe.  It does
not, however, seem plausible that this connection is made 'from the bottom
up' via the QM realm, as in Conrad's 'fluctuons'.  The glut of levels in the
material world just presents too many barriers for that to be the case.
 Development generally goes from vaguer to increasingly more definite, and
our awareness of qualia likely has had that kind of development,
individually during our ontogeny.

STAN

On Thu, Nov 4, 2010 at 6:24 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan  wrote:

>  (For unknown reasons this message didn't went through last Tuesday---P.)
>
>  Mensaje original   Asunto: The Fluctuon Model; Colophon  
> Fecha:
> Tue, 02 Nov 2010 12:44:48 +0100  De: Joseph Brenner
>Responder a: Joseph
> BrennerPara: Pedro C.
> Marijuan  , fis
>  
>
>  Dear All,
>
> Pedro has asked me to renew with an earlier FIS Group practice and write a
> colophon for our discussion of the fluctuon model of Michael Conrad.
> Actually, not much has happened with regard to evidence for or against.
> There is a lot of information in the latest Stan<>Loet exchange, however,
> that has made the exercise worthwhile. There has also been a discussion of
> fluctuations, but essentially of fluctuations in *our* thermodynamic
> world. Most interesting, but of no direct help with the original task.
>
> I therefore now exercise my editorial authority by offering, by way of
> colophon, and with his agreement, the notes of a discussion I had with Pedro
> in Beijing. They were not and are not proposed as science, information
> science or other; but I like to think they are more than just opinion. For
> people, and I assume that is some of us, who have ever pondered such "deep"
> issues, these notes may suggest some ideas and comments. For others, for
> whom talk of Being and Nothingness or Non-Being, *pace* Sartre, is pure
> nonsense, pure non-information, I have some sympathy. The only point I would
> take issue with is the "pure" . . .
>
> 1. We are aware of our atoms and molecules and those of others through our
> adjacencies to them. They have Being for us; they are "Being". The
> corresponding changes in their states constitute information at several
> levels.
>
>  2. Our atoms and molecules are composed of "strings" of which we are *not
> * aware. They have no Being for us, they are "Non-Being". Whether any
> fluctuations or changes in strings can constitute information is not clear.
>
> 3. Non-Being has been described both scientifically and traditionally, *
> e.g.* the "Mind of God", the quantum vacuum, "holomovement".
>
>  4. Spontaneity and indeterminism (randomness) are possible, but only in
> Non-Being. These are reflected in Being only in radioactive decay and
> in catastrophic cosmological phenomena (black holes).  The shifts of
> perspective in this note are non-random.
>
> 5. We in Being are aware of the existence of Non-Being, therefore, as
> something internal and external to us at the same time. The LIR Principle of
> Dynamic Opposition (PDO) describes this epistemological and ontological
> state-of-affairs as real and logical.
>
> 6. Non-Being is not and does not have to be aware of itself nor of us here
> in Being. We take care of that little function for it.
>
> 7. The influence of Non-Being and its changes, *e.g.*, in local
> information content. which are not perceived by nor interact with us in the
> usual manner, may be due to our awareness of Non-Being, which is a *kind*of 
> information about it, causally effective. Conrad claims that interactions
> with Non-Being (the unmanifest world) also exist and can influence
> biological states. These two perspectives may or may not converge.
>
> 8. In either case, the information content of vacuum fluctuations and the
> informational content of our awareness/understanding of it and them are, by
> the PDO, and at the current state of knowledge, the same and not the same.
>
> 9. The existence of a direct energetic (thermodynamic) relationship or
> information transfer between Being and Non-Being, as in the fluctuon
> model, below the 

Re: [Fis] Fwd: [Fwd: Discussion Colophon] From J.Brenner

[Stanley N Salthe]

Replying to Loet.  Well, I may or may not be be a nominalist (which kind?)
in the sense that I believe that qualia are actual as universals, and that
evolution has created entities -- us -- that can experience them, or focus
them, acutely.  This is the same as universals created by language -- such
as 'space', 'heat', etc., all of which do relate to experience but not to
specific objects.

However, I also believe that each species of sentient beings has its own
'take' on actuality, lives in its own 'umwelt', and so my sense of, for lack
of a better term, a 'numinous realm' may be conditioned by my own sense
organs, and further conditioned again by my cultural heritage.  Thus, I am
constructed as: {physico-chemical world {biology {primate {culture {my
experience}, showing the layers of information affording me.

STAN

On Thu, Nov 4, 2010 at 10:32 AM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> Dear Joe, Stan, and colleagues,
>
>
>
> It occurred to me that this is in a certain sense a repeat of the
> nominalism/realism discussion. With his heavy emphasis on being/not-being,
> Joe is on the realist side, while Stan’s qualia are nominalistic. I assume
> that they don’t dwell around like the Greek Gods, but are reflexive
> constructs shaped in scholarly discourse that clarifies them. This
> discussion makes also clear to me why Joe’s approach is called “Logic in
> Reality” and not “Reality in Logic”. Eventually, the grounding has a
> direction.
>
>
>
> I would consider the vagueness as tangential to the scholarly discourse;
> the external referent. The further specification – the updating of
> hypotheses – enables us to define new puzzles and thus perhaps to improve
> the specification. This reality (as cogitatum part of res cogitans) cannot
> be captured with derivatives from “esse”. One would need derivatives from
> “frangere” – fractals, fragments, fragile – for the understanding. The
> models remain volatile albeit more symbolically generalized than common
> language.
>
>
>
> With best wishes,
>
> Loet
>
>
> --
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
>
> Professor, University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),
> Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
> Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
>
>
>
> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *On Behalf Of *Stanley N Salthe
> *Sent:* Thursday, November 04, 2010 3:05 PM
> *To:* fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Subject:* [Fis] Fwd: [Fwd: Discussion Colophon] From J.Brenner
>
>
>
>
>
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: *Stanley N Salthe* 
> Date: Thu, Nov 4, 2010 at 10:03 AM
> Subject: Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Discussion Colophon] From J.Brenner
> To: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 
>
>
> A comment on Joseph's concluding statement:  It seems clear to me that
> there is a world of qualia (spiritual realm, sentience, Peirce's 'universal
> mind', whatever).  I believe that the connection between this and the
> physical/material world has increased in sharpness/definiteness at certain
> locales (like the earth) during the development of the universe.  It does
> not, however, seem plausible that this connection is made 'from the bottom
> up' via the QM realm, as in Conrad's 'fluctuons'.  The glut of levels in the
> material world just presents too many barriers for that to be the case.
>  Development generally goes from vaguer to increasingly more definite, and
> our awareness of qualia likely has had that kind of development,
> individually during our ontogeny.
>
>
>
> STAN
>
> On Thu, Nov 4, 2010 at 6:24 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:
>
> (For unknown reasons this message didn't went through last Tuesday---P.)
>
>  Mensaje original 
>
> *Asunto: *
>
> The Fluctuon Model; Colophon
>
> *Fecha: *
>
> Tue, 02 Nov 2010 12:44:48 +0100
>
> *De: *
>
> Joseph Brenner  
>
> *Responder a: *
>
> Joseph Brenner  
>
> *Para: *
>
> Pedro C. Marijuan  ,
> fis  
>
>
>
> Dear All,
>
>
>
> Pedro has asked me to renew with an earlier FIS Group practice and write a
> colophon for our discussion of the fluctuon model of Michael Conrad.
> Actually, not much has happened with regard to evidence for or against.
> There is a lot of information in the latest Stan<>Loet exchange, however,
> that has made the exercise worthwhile. There has also been a discussion of
> fluctuations, but essentially of fluctuations in *our* thermodynamic
> world. Most interesting, but of no direct

Re: [Fis] INTELLIGENCE & INFORMATION (by Y.X.Zhong)

[Stanley N Salthe]

Concerning:

>The minimal claim would be that there is no intelligence without
information. For an agent, intelligence is the ability to face the >world in
a meaningful way and it increases with the number of different ways an agent
is able to respond with.

  It seems to me that this implies, in any non-mechanistic system, semiosis
-- that is to say, a process of interpretation by the agent.  Thus,
intelligence would be related to the viewpoint of the agent, which would be
located by its needs.  Semioticians, however, have not been much engaged by
this concept.  Hoffmeyer claims that it is especially a social skill.

STAN




On Sat, Nov 13, 2010 at 4:18 PM, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic <
gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se> wrote:

> Dear Colleagues,
>
> Relating information with intelligence seems to me important for several
> reasons. I will try to suggest that intelligence might be a good conceptual
> tool if we want to anchor our understanding of information and knowledge in
> the natural world.
> Yixin mentions the problem of three approaches to AI which exist
> independently, based on the methodological doctrine of "divide and conquer".
> We agree that "divide and conquer" is just not enough, it is the movement in
> one direction, and what is needed is the full cycle -bottom up and top down
> - if we are to understand biological systems.
>
> The appropriate model should be generative - it should be able to produce
> the observed behaviors, such as done by Agent Based Models (ABM) which
> includes individual agents and their interactions, where the resulting
> global behavior in its turn affects agents' individual behavior. Unlike
> static objects that result from a "divide and conquer" approach, agents in
> ABM are dynamic. They allow for the influence from bottom up and back
> circularly. Central for living organisms is the dynamics of the
> relationships between the parts and the whole.
>
> Shannon's theory of communication is very successful in modeling
> communication between systems, but it is a theory that presupposes that
> communication exists and that mechanisms of communication are known. On the
> other hand if we want to answer the question why those systems communicate
> at all and what made them develop different mechanisms of communication we
> have to go to a more fundamental level of description where we find
> information processes and structures in biological systems. Natural
> computation such as described by Rozenberg and Kari in "The many facets of
> natural computing"
> http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~lila/Natural-Computing-Review.pdf includes
> information processing in living organisms.
>
> Generative models of intelligence may be based on info-computational
> approach to the evolution of living systems. Three basic steps in this
> construction are as follows:
> . The world on its basic level is potential information.
> (I agree with Guy on his information realism)
> . Dynamics of the world is computation which in general is information
> processing (natural computationalism or pancomputationalism)
> . Intelligence is a potential for (meaningful) action in the world. (I
> agree with Josph)
>
> The minimal claim would be that there is no intelligence without
> information. For an agent, intelligence is the ability to face the world in
> a meaningful way and it increases with the number of different ways an agent
> is able to respond with. (This is a statistical argument: in a dynamical
> world, ability of an agent to respond to a change in several different ways
> increases its chances for survival.)
> Back to the question of Raquel: can a simple organism be ascribed
> intelligence? - which Pedro suggests to answer in the positive by broadening
> the concept of intelligence. I agree with this proposed generalization for
> several reasons.
>
> Maturana and Varela conflate life itself with cognition (to be alive is to
> cognize). Similarly, we can connect the development of life (towards more
> and more complex organisms) with intelligence (if an organism acts
> meaningfully in the world, we say it acts intelligently; meaningfulness has
> degrees and so has intelligence). In that approach intelligence would be the
> property of an organism which gives it a potential to develop increasingly
> more complex informational structures and increasingly more complex
> (meaningful) responses to the environment. One can argue that increasing the
> repertoire of meaningful responses (interactions with the world) increases
> agents potential for survival and success.
>
> As a consequence this approach makes way for a basic quantitative measure
> of intelligence as a level of complexity of an organism providing the
> diversity of its responses.( Of course this measure of intelligence is not
> in the sense of IQ or specific individual's "smartness" but of the species
> increasing capability to flourish.)
>
> This view also agrees with the understanding that even in humans there are
> several different intelligen

Re: [Fis] INTELLIGENCE & INFORMATION (by Y.X.Zhong)

[Stanley N Salthe]

Gordana --

Interpretation of information builds more information, which again becomes
interpreted.  In living systems each generation makes a new interpretation
based upon changed conditions of life. But in this case there is not more
(genetic) information, but rather recently altered information -- history
rewritten according to the latest interpretation of recent conditions.  Some
might call this process 'intelligence'. This is the (neo)Darwinian
interpretation.  It does not address your point about "increasingly complex
patterns of information", which is indeed what appears in the fossil record
(as well as in human discourse).  To build more requires preservation and
interpretation. In the physical world, this image is captured in the
asteroid impacts on the moon, with subsequent hits deforming, but not
erasing, the original one.  Information here increases, but not, I think,
intelligence.  Intelligence, I think, lies more in reinterpretation than in
the building more that may follow upon it.

STAN
(Pedro -- this is a new week, so this is my first)

On Sat, Nov 13, 2010 at 5:28 PM, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic <
gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se> wrote:

>  I suppose semioticians are interested in an individual human’s
> sense-making in a context of human society.
>
> Or perhaps a social animal’s sense making.
>
> What I think about is how life forms organize to produce increasingly
> complex patterns of information processing.
>
> Gordana
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *On Behalf Of *Stanley N Salthe
> *Sent:* den 13 november 2010 23:03
>
> *To:* fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] INTELLIGENCE & INFORMATION (by Y.X.Zhong)
>
>
>
> Concerning:
>
>
>
> >The minimal claim would be that there is no intelligence without
> information. For an agent, intelligence is the ability to face the >world in
> a meaningful way and it increases with the number of different ways an agent
> is able to respond with.
>
>
>
>   It seems to me that this implies, in any non-mechanistic system, semiosis
> -- that is to say, a process of interpretation by the agent.  Thus,
> intelligence would be related to the viewpoint of the agent, which would be
> located by its needs.  Semioticians, however, have not been much engaged by
> this concept.  Hoffmeyer claims that it is especially a social skill.
>
>
>
> STAN
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Nov 13, 2010 at 4:18 PM, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic <
> gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se> wrote:
>
> Dear Colleagues,
>
> Relating information with intelligence seems to me important for several
> reasons. I will try to suggest that intelligence might be a good conceptual
> tool if we want to anchor our understanding of information and knowledge in
> the natural world.
> Yixin mentions the problem of three approaches to AI which exist
> independently, based on the methodological doctrine of "divide and conquer".
> We agree that "divide and conquer" is just not enough, it is the movement in
> one direction, and what is needed is the full cycle -bottom up and top down
> - if we are to understand biological systems.
>
> The appropriate model should be generative - it should be able to produce
> the observed behaviors, such as done by Agent Based Models (ABM) which
> includes individual agents and their interactions, where the resulting
> global behavior in its turn affects agents' individual behavior. Unlike
> static objects that result from a "divide and conquer" approach, agents in
> ABM are dynamic. They allow for the influence from bottom up and back
> circularly. Central for living organisms is the dynamics of the
> relationships between the parts and the whole.
>
> Shannon's theory of communication is very successful in modeling
> communication between systems, but it is a theory that presupposes that
> communication exists and that mechanisms of communication are known. On the
> other hand if we want to answer the question why those systems communicate
> at all and what made them develop different mechanisms of communication we
> have to go to a more fundamental level of description where we find
> information processes and structures in biological systems. Natural
> computation such as described by Rozenberg and Kari in "The many facets of
> natural computing"
> http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~lila/Natural-Computing-Review.pdf includes
> information processing in living organisms.
>
> Generative models of intelligence may be based on info-computational
> approach to the evolution of living systems. Three basic steps in this
> construction are as follows:
> . The world on its basic level is potent

[Fis] footnote to fluctuon discussion

[Stanley N Salthe]

Folks -- This cut is Figure 1 from

Sejnowsky, T., 2006.  The computational self. * Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences* 1001: 262-271.




Note that the levels are found to be orders of magnitude different in size.
 No change in any single unit at any level can have an effect at the next
upper level


STAN
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Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 543, Issue 19 (John Collier) and footnote to fluctuon discussion (Stanley N Salthe)

[Stanley N Salthe]

individuality is a gradually accumulating effect of historically
acquired (experienced) information as registered in the body (e.g., wounds),
including the brain (alterations of expectations as imprinted upon
continually cycling neuron 'circuits').  Here too, there is no question of
any fluctuations arising at low compositional levels being involved.  If
such would occur during neuron cycling in one cell, it would again be
swamped out at the levels of networks, or maps or higher systems. If one got
promoted to the level of consciousness, it might be experienced fleetingly
for the moment, then forgotten.

  The scientific facts support the conclusion that the reflexivity of a
human being is an emergent property of life, not mathe-magic or philo-magic.

"Reflexivity of a human being" seems like something more than the above
definition.  Experience may have a cumulative effect, of course, especially
if repeated, but none of it would, I think, be acquired by fluctuation in a
neuron (which would be non-repeatable).

STAN

Cheers

>
> Jerry, forever the realist.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Nov 20, 2010, at 12:00 PM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote:
>
> Send fis mailing list submissions to
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>   1. footnote to fluctuon discussion (Stanley N Salthe)
>
> *From: *Stanley N Salthe 
> *Date: *November 20, 2010 9:18:18 AM EST
> *To: *...@listas.unizar.es
> *Subject: **[Fis] footnote to fluctuon discussion*
>
>
> Folks -- This cut is Figure 1 from
>
> Sejnowsky, T., 2006.  The computational self. * Annals of the New York
> Academy of Sciences* 1001: 262-271.
>
>
>  Note that the levels are found to be orders of magnitude different in
> size.  No change in any single unit at any level can have an effect at the
> next upper level
>
>
>
> STAN
>
>
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[Fis] Fwd: Doctrine of Limitation

[Stanley N Salthe]

As my second posting for the week:

-- Forwarded message --
From: Stanley N Salthe 
Date: Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 9:47 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Doctrine of Limitation
To: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 


Replying to Pedro, who asked:

>Optimality principles can be discussed now, but limitation may be
easier. Why the cell, any cell, does not grow indefinitely its genome
(stock of knowledge) so to indefinitely increase its repertoire of
intelligent mechanisms? Why the proteins encoded in bacterial genomes,
the intracellular "intelligent" components or molecular agents, are not
far bigger and powerful? And why do they become substantially "smaller"
than their eukaryotic counterparts? Limitations of genome size, of
energetics of protein synthesis, and those due to the folding process
("problem") have to be invoked, among others.

I like to point out a limitation that faces all dissipative structures --
senescence.  Here again is the scheme:
---

IMMATURE STAGE

 Relatively high energy density (per unit mass) flow rate

 Relatively small size and/or gross mattergy throughput

 Rate of acquisition of informational constraints relatively high, along
with high growth rate

 Internal stability relatively low (it is changing fast), but dynamical
stability (persistence) is high

 Homeorhetic stability to same-scale perturbations relatively high

 MATURE STAGE (only in relatively very stable systems)

 Declining energy density flow rate is still sufficient for recovery
from perturbations

 Size and gross throughput is typical for the kind of system

 Form is definitive for the kind of system

 Internal stability adequate for system persistence

 Homeostatic stability to same-scale perturbations adequate for recovery

 SENESCENT STAGE

 Energy density flow rate gradually dropping below functional
requirements

 Gross mattergy throughput high but its increase is decelerating

 Form increasingly accumulates deforming marks as a result of
encounters, as part of individuation

 Internal stability of system becoming high to the point of
inflexibility

 Homeostatic stability to same-scale perturbations declining

 TABLE 1: Thermodynamic and informational criteria of the developmental
stages of dissipative structures. See Salthe (1989, 1993) for more details
and citations.

---
Combining this with the limitations on length of life and the Darwinian
postulate about the urgency to reproduce more rapidly than others in a
population, we can generate an argument that there would be no point to
elaboration beyond some basic minimum.  This is advanced upon the notion
that the purpose of living forms is simply to reproduce.

Adding to this general point, I would also cite a paper in *Science* (330:
920-921) 2010: "Irremedial Complexity" by Gray et al, which posits that cell
machinery -- like a Rube Goldberg machine -- is much more complicated than
it needs to be to perform its functions.

The more complicated a system is, the more there is that can go wrong.  This
principle adds to the senescence argument, urging that systems stay simple,
live fast, and die a multiple parent.

STAN


On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 8:05 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Dear FISers,
>
> Thanks to Christophe for his agents "narrative" and to Joseph for openly
> "buying" populational thinking and the doctrine of limitation. As for
> the narrative, I concur that the link between intelligence and info
> implies the introduction of some "agent" thinking --what kind of agent
> and scenario? Krassimir has attempted here some general-style option
> too. Murray Gell-Mann framed an interesting general description, about
> Information Gatherers and Information Utilizers or "Iguses" (in "the
> Quark and the Jaguar", 1995), which was accepted by quite many
> complexity scientists afterwards. The point is that knowledge gets
> introduced into a workable conceptual scheme together with information
> and intelligence.
>
> Let me try a different track. Starting with an ample conception of
> intelligence, for instance what Raquel and Jorge penned "the capability
> to process information for the purpose of adaptation or problem solving
> activities. In the case of cells, problems can be caused by the
> environment, extracellular aggressions, communications, etc." But an
> important aspect is missing here. If we see some biological entity
> regularly entering some metabolic inputs and processing some external
> signals, we do not get much attracted to ad the term intelligence
> (plants, for instance). Rather intelligence implies "the ability to
> manipulate the life stories (and evolution) of the living portions of
> the environment and to develop effi

[Fis] replies to Walter, loet & Joseph

[Stanley N Salthe]

Replying to Walter --


On Fri, Nov 26, 2010 at 8:41 PM,  wrote:

Dear Colleagues,





It seems that a good start point is to look at the “dissipative structures
world”.



And we could ask if in every dissipative structure it is possible to find
information

and/or computations and/or intelligence and/or the like…




Of course no in cyclones and hurricanes, neither in Bénard cells and
Belousov-Zhabotinsky reactions, but we would almost surely affirm the living
systems have these capacities.




At least, we can affirm it would be in animals and plants, but in archaea
and bacteria?


  Keep in mind that these microorganisms usually exist in multispecies
communities,like biofilms.  This makes them more less equivalent to simple
living tissues.



or, in prebiotic systems?


 As an evolutionist and materialist, I would expect that any property
higher living forms have would have had precursors in more primitive,
ancestral systems -- but, of course in more rudimentary form.




My bet is that there was a beginning from which we could talk about
information (with meaning)

and then, on natural computations and then, on behaviors and then, on
cognitive phenomena and then, on other more sophisticated phenomena and so
on…




This beginning was the one with “minimal complexity”.

A kind of molecular dissipative structure with processes behaving like
dynamic biological constraints: (1) a container made of amphiphilic
molecules and (2) a micro cycle, driving the protocell far away from
thermodynamic equilibrium, and with the basic properties of life: biological
information and biological functions…and then, we could talk on autonomous
agents…(Riofrio 2007).


  Could I have copy of this?  Thanks.




Nowadays, comparative genomics, metagenomics and system biology are
increasingly showing that natural selection is only one of the forces that
shape evolution, and even it is not quantitatively dominant. It happens that
non-adaptive processes are much more prominent than previously thought
(Kelley & Scott 2008; Koonin & Wolf 2009; Dhar & Giuliani 2010; Doolittle &
Zhaxybayeva 2010).




Perhaps, more than one of these forces shaped evolution before Darwinian
threshold was reached by protocells.


  Some think that self-organizing forces predominate in ontogenetic
development, and may be responsible to discovering new forms.




And this circumstance is owed to the fact that each new level of complexity
materializing in the universe implies, by necessity, the emergence of new
properties containing causal efficacy that will, in the end, produce new
events in our universe.




Moreover, we contend this prebiotic world might have been comprised by an
almost continuous series of systems, and when we talk about continuous, it
is in the sense that the most fundamental properties of these different
types of systems – behaving as the details of a specific, self-organizing
kind – would have been shared by all of them.




In consequence, it is possible that these molecular dynamics had provided
the conditions for the emergence of the first small world structures as core
characteristics to the way in which the biological realm computes.


  That looks promising.


Sincerely,

Walter


**Then, replying to Loet


On Sat, Nov 27, 2010 at 2:41 AM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

Dear Stan,



It seems to me that “senescence” applies to system components which are
continuously replaced (generationally) by the autopoietic or dissipative
system, while the system at this next-order level can be expected continue
to develop (or stagnate).


  For example, the clouds come and go, but the weather pattern is continued.
Of course, a systems level can itself be embedded in a next-order system and
thus be replaced, but at a much lower frequency level.


Yes, I would propose that all dissipative systems follow the 'canonical
developmental trajectory' shown in my posting.  So, what you say here could
be the case.  The 'next-order level' would itself necessarily senesce
eventually, but at a much slower rate.



Thus, we have to distinguish in terms of the vertical levels of the
hierarchy. J


As you know, this is of great interest to me!


**Then, replying to Joseph, who said:


One of the important aspects of Pedro's "limitations" as that they
themselves appear to me, at least, to be the resultant, the effect of some
kind of interactions, as well as have causal power for further development.
Thus Stan is

right in calling attention to "senescence", but "anti-senescence" also
exists and the 2nd Law alone (massive input of energy) is necessary but not
sufficient to explain it.


Anti-senescence is reproduction of new dissipative structures, as in weather
systems and living systems.  My point is that tis is the usual focus of
almost everyone in our growth-fascinated culture, while senescence is almost
always avoided as a topic of inquiry, except in medical circles.  As our
global society is enterig a pewriod of collapse, I th

[Fis] reply to Javorsky

[Stanley N Salthe]

*Replying to Karl, who said:*


one can use a stable model used by neurology and psychology to come closer
to understanding how our brain works. This can help to formulate the
thoughts Pedro mentioned being obscure.

One pictures the brain as a quasi-meteorological model of an extended world
containing among others swamp, savanna, arid zones. The dissipation of water
above these regions causes clouds to form and storms to discharge the vapor
within the clouds. The model observes the lightnings in the model and sets
them as an allegory to thoughts (these being electrical discharges) as
opposed to hormones (that are the fluids in the swamps). So there is an
assumed independence between the rainfall, the humidity of the ground, cloud
formation and lightnings. The real meteorologists would not agree with the
simplification that the lightning is the central idea of a rainfall, but
this is how the picture works (at present).

Why I offer these idle thoughts from the biologic sciences to FIS is that it
is now possible to make a model of these processes in an abstract, logical
fashion. The colleaugues in Fis are scientists in the rational tradition and
may find useful that a rational algorithm can be shown to allow simulating
the little tricks Nature appears to use.

Nature changes the form of the imbalance, once too many or too few
lightnings, once too much or lacking water - relative to the other
representation's stable state. There are TWO sets of reference. The
deviation between the two sets of references is what Nature uses in its
manifold activities.


  This model looks at the physical equivalences in two realms by
modeling in thermodynamics.  Today in thermodynamics we have an advancing
perspective known as the ‘Maximum Entropy Production Principle’ (MEPP) for
relatively simple systems like weather, or Maximum Energy Dispersal
Principle’ (MEDP) for complicated material systems like the brain.  In both
cases the dynamics are controlled by the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which
imposes that the available energy gradients will be dissipated in the least
possible time, taking the easiest routes available.  This becomes very
interesting in the brain, where the flow of depolarizations would then be
predicted to be biased in the direction of more habitual ‘thoughts’.  I
think that this prediction seems to be born out in our own experiences of
the frequent return of our attention to various insistent thoughts.  I
recommend that Karl inquire into MEPP.  For this purpose I paste in some
references.


STAN


MEPP related publications:


Annila, A. and S.N. Salthe, 2009.  Economies evolve by energy dispersal.
 Entropy, 2009, 11: 606-633.


Annila, A. and S.N. Salthe, 2010. Physical foundations of evolutionary
theory. Journal on Non-Equilibrium Thermodynamics 35: 301-321.


Annila, A. and S.N. Salthe, 2010.  Cultural naturalism.  Entropy, 2010, 12:
1325-1352.


Bejan, A. and S. Lorente, 2010.  The constructal law of design and evolution
in nature. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, B, 365:
1335-1347.


Brooks, D.R. and E.O. Wiley, 1988. Evolution As Entropy: Toward A Unified
Theory Of Biology (2nd. ed.) Chicago. University of Chicago Press.


Chaisson, E.J., 2008.  Long-term global heating from energy usage.  Eos,
Transactions of the American Geophysical Union 89: 353-255.


DeLong, J.P., J.G. Okie, M.E. Moses, R.M. Sibly and J.H. Brown, 2010. Shifts
in metabolic scaling, production, and efficiency across major evolutionary
transitions of life. Proceedings of the Natiional Academy of Sciences. Early
EDition


Dewar, R. C., 2003.  Information theory explanation of the fluctuation
theorem, maximum entropy production, and self-organized criticality in
non-equilibrium stationary states.  Journal of Physics, A  Mathematics and
General 36: L631-L641.


Dewar, R.C., 2005.  Maximum entropy production and the fluctuation theorem.
 Journal of Physics A Mathematics and General 38: L371-L381.


Dewar, R.C., 2009.  Maximum entropy production as an inference algorithm
that translates physical assumptions into macroscopic predictions: Don't
shoot the messenger.  Entropy 2009. 11: 931-944.


Dewar. R.C. and A. Porté, 2008.  Statistical mechanics unifies different
ecological patterns. Journal of Theoretical Biology 251:389-403.


Dyke, J. and A. Kleidon. 2010. The maximum entropy production principle: its
theoretical foundations and applications to the Earth system.  Entropy 2010,
12:613-630.


Herrmann-Pillath, C., 2010.  Entropy, function and evolution: naturalizing
Peircean semiosis.  Entropy 2010, 12: 197-242.


Kleidon, A. (2009): Non-equilibrium Thermodynamics and Maximum Entropy
Production in the Earth System: Applications and Implications,
Naturwissenschaften 96: 653-677.


Kleidon, A. (2010): Non-equilibrium Thermodynamics, Maximum Entropy
Production and Earth-system evolution, Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society A, 368: 181-196.


Kleidon, A. and R. Lorenz (eds) Non-equilibrium Thermodynamics an

Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) dualism

[Stanley N Salthe]

in my first for the week, Replying to Joseph:

Dealing as I do with hierarchies and thermodynamics, I have come to the
postmodern conclusion that our explicit scientific knowledge is a logical
construct -- unlike our intuitive 'knowledge' (viz. qualia) of the world we
are IMMERSED IN.  In these scientifically-based efforts we create a logical
simulacrum (which I call 'Nature') of The World.  Its basis is logic and
esthetic, but today it also passes through a pragmatic filter imposed by
those who pay for the science.  This latter bias works mostly in choice of
study objects.  Stepping back from active engagement in the process of
gaining primary knowledge in these ways, I feel that I am these days
engaging in a renewed Natural Philosophy -- an attempt to construct a
scientifically based 'mythology' for moderns, meant as an alternative to
religious myths.  These latter importantly have also engaged, via rituals,
the qualia we are immersed in.  Inasmuch as Natural Philosophy has no such
practices associated with it, the primary function of the emerging Nature is
to challenge the religiously based myths associated with the rituals in an
attempt to unseat the associated political establishments (Rome, the
Caliphate, the Republican Party, etc.) that enforce them.

On Thu, Dec 9, 2010 at 7:54 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

> Dear All,
>
> In agreeing with Bob, I would like to point out that his critique is not
> "theoretical philosophy". He is calling attention to something essential
> missing in the pictures and models of Stan and Karl, namely, 1) the "life
> and blood" of the world; 2) that that "life and blood" follows different
> rules than the entities in the models; 3) those rules are based on real
> dualities of equal ontological purport: order and disorder, continuity and
> discontinuity, entropy and negentropy; etc.; and 4) these dualities play
> out in real interactions in biology, cognition and society, for example
> in information and non-information.
>
> It is perfectly possible to see "grids" of numbers and levels or
> hierarchies
> in Nature as abstract structures - this is indeed Karl's word, as is his
> use
> of "independence" - but this is not going toward the world, but away from
> it. The world includes Karls and Stans and Josephs and Bobs, and I
> challenge
> anyone to propose a theory that insures that our "antagonisms", which are
> real, also receive some logical treatment.
>
> I for one do not know everything  about everything I'm made of (cf. our
> fluctuon discussion), but I have the feeling it is not abstractions or
> sequences of numbers. I mentioned string theory, but I am by no
> means pushing it as the full story.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Joseph
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Robert Ulanowicz" 
> To: 
> Sent: Friday, December 03, 2010 4:52 PM
> Subject: Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky
>
>
> Dear All:
>
> At the risk of being seen as the one who tries to throw a monkey
> wrench into the fine discussion you all are having, I would like to
> mention that the foregoing thread had focused entirely on alternatives
> among monist scenarios.
>
> I see the world as dual, not in the sense of Descartes, but of
> Heraclitus. If I am correct, then any strategy predicated on a monist
> principle is destined to lead to disaster. (Stan and I have gone round
> and round on this. I see entropy as double-sided and not simply as
> disorder. [Ecological Modelling 220 (2009) 1886-1892].)
>
> But I'm hardly the only one to warn against a monist view. Terry
> Deacon's model of self-organization, the "Autocell" acts similarly.
> The process starts by using up external gradients as quickly as
> possible, but gradually shuts down as the autocell nears
> self-completion. (Deacon, T.W. and J. Sherman. 2008. The Pattern Which
> Connects Pleroma to Creatura: The Autocell Bridge from Physics to
> Life. Biosemiotics 2:59-76.)
>
> The best to all,
> Bob
>
> -
> Robert E. Ulanowicz|  Tel: +1-352-378-7355
> Arthur R. Marshall Laboratory  |  FAX: +1-352-392-3704
> Department of Biology          |  Emeritus, Chesapeake Biol. Lab
> Bartram Hall 110   |  University of Maryland
> University of Florida  |  Email 
> Gainesville, FL 32611-8525 USA |  Web <http://www.cbl.umces.edu/~ulan>
> --
>
>
> Quoting Stanley N Salthe :
>
> > *Replying to Karl, who said:*
> >
> >
> > one can use a stable model used by neurology and psychology to come
> closer

Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism

[Stanley N Salthe]

icular disciplinary pathway. I have also argued that in different angles
> of that story, at least in Nature (cells, nervous systems, people), one has
> to re-enter populational thinking, optimality guidance, and the doctrine of
> limitation. The hierarchy/heterarchy theme is also of importance in the
> populational aspect (as what we see often is "nested agencies"), etc.
>
> My contention is that the general relationship between information &
> intelligence (and their respective disciplines) needs a new form of
> discourse. Whether the depicted scaffolding may be of interest or not, is
> highly debatable!
>
> best wishes
>
> Pedro
>
>
> Stanley N Salthe escribió:
>
> in my first for the week, Replying to Joseph:
>
>  Dealing as I do with hierarchies and thermodynamics, I have come to the
> postmodern conclusion that our explicit scientific knowledge is a logical
> construct -- unlike our intuitive 'knowledge' (viz. qualia) of the world we
> are IMMERSED IN.  In these scientifically-based efforts we create a logical
> simulacrum (which I call 'Nature') of The World.  Its basis is logic and
> esthetic, but today it also passes through a pragmatic filter imposed by
> those who pay for the science.  This latter bias works mostly in choice of
> study objects.  Stepping back from active engagement in the process of
> gaining primary knowledge in these ways, I feel that I am these days
> engaging in a renewed Natural Philosophy -- an attempt to construct a
> scientifically based 'mythology' for moderns, meant as an alternative to
> religious myths.  These latter importantly have also engaged, via rituals,
> the qualia we are immersed in.  Inasmuch as Natural Philosophy has no such
> practices associated with it, the primary function of the emerging Nature is
> to challenge the religiously based myths associated with the rituals in an
> attempt to unseat the associated political establishments (Rome, the
> Caliphate, the Republican Party, etc.) that enforce them.
>
> On Thu, Dec 9, 2010 at 7:54 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:
>
>> Dear All,
>>
>> In agreeing with Bob, I would like to point out that his critique is not
>> "theoretical philosophy". He is calling attention to something essential
>> missing in the pictures and models of Stan and Karl, namely, 1) the "life
>> and blood" of the world; 2) that that "life and blood" follows different
>> rules than the entities in the models; 3) those rules are based on real
>> dualities of equal ontological purport: order and disorder, continuity and
>> discontinuity, entropy and negentropy; etc.; and 4) these dualities play
>> out in real interactions in biology, cognition and society, for example
>> in information and non-information.
>>
>> It is perfectly possible to see "grids" of numbers and levels or
>> hierarchies
>> in Nature as abstract structures - this is indeed Karl's word, as is his
>> use
>> of "independence" - but this is not going toward the world, but away from
>> it. The world includes Karls and Stans and Josephs and Bobs, and I
>> challenge
>> anyone to propose a theory that insures that our "antagonisms", which are
>> real, also receive some logical treatment.
>>
>> I for one do not know everything  about everything I'm made of (cf. our
>> fluctuon discussion), but I have the feeling it is not abstractions or
>> sequences of numbers. I mentioned string theory, but I am by no
>> means pushing it as the full story.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Joseph
>>
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> From: "Robert Ulanowicz" 
>> To: 
>> Sent: Friday, December 03, 2010 4:52 PM
>> Subject: Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky
>>
>>
>> Dear All:
>>
>> At the risk of being seen as the one who tries to throw a monkey
>> wrench into the fine discussion you all are having, I would like to
>> mention that the foregoing thread had focused entirely on alternatives
>> among monist scenarios.
>>
>> I see the world as dual, not in the sense of Descartes, but of
>> Heraclitus. If I am correct, then any strategy predicated on a monist
>> principle is destined to lead to disaster. (Stan and I have gone round
>> and round on this. I see entropy as double-sided and not simply as
>> disorder. [Ecological Modelling 220 (2009) 1886-1892].)
>>
>> But I'm hardly the only one to warn against a monist view. Terry
>> Deacon's model of self-organization, the "Autocell" acts similarly.
>> The process starts by using up external gradi

[Fis] Replies to Walter & Loet

[Stanley N Salthe]

As my last for this week:

Replying to Walter --  The dark matter and dark energy examples are not very
strong as examples of demonstrating discoveries rather than invention!
 These are stand-ins, just names, for disparities between predictions and
observations.  They are provisionally (I hope!) accepted because they fit
into the current 'standard model'.  In my view, a much neater way to solve
the disparity leading to the dark matter idea would be too accept that the
gravitation constant, g, is not constant everywhere or at al times.  But
that would not fit well into the Standard Model, and would impair the
ability to do certain calculations because one needs some constants in order
to solve equations.


who replies:


Stan,



Your notes help me to make my point much clear, thanks.


 These cases are not truly adequate, I accept that, but they would if they
were actually confirmed.

 What I wanted to refer to is about the power of conditionals:

 “If dark matter and dark energy are not provisional, but becomes highly
confirmed then the Standard Model needs important revisions”



And also, I wanted to draw attention to the conceptual changes:

- One interesting example is the discovery that speed of light is a
fundamental constant of the universe and its impact in the way it produces a
change (from Newtonian to Relativity theories).

 - The case of second law of thermodynamics in times of Maxwell is an
interesting one.

 - Another is the case in times of Kepler: his elliptical orbits and the
conflict with the more accepted celestial circularity



I guess this capacity is inherent in science (to be open to changes
fundamentally by the discovery of new facts) it is certainly not the case in
other human activity.



 Sincerely,

 Walter




ORIGINAL MESSAGE:

On Sun, Dec 12, 2010 at 8:10 PM,  wrote:



Dear Loet, Stan, Pedro, colleagues,



 In these topics there are a number of different approaches but the central
issue is referred to on what could be a science (or a scientific discourse)
and what is not (and what are the criteria to discern between them).



In the human world we have many activities: ordinary activities, political
activities, sportive activities, religious activities, hobby activities,
and…..academic activities (one of them is the scientific activity).



It would be a “great confusion” (to say the least) display all the behaviors
associated with the religious activities in, for instance, a tennis match…



Accordingly, we have certain preliminary criteria that you are taking into
account in your notes --some internalist and some externalist--, referred to
the human scientific activity.



Our scientific products are “just stories” or “narratives”, equivalent to
the story about himself of a storyteller in the Nobel Banquet?



I suppose that many (if not all) of us have diverse reasons to answer with a
resounding negative response.



Although we can say that as all the other human activities that are also
constrained by our capacities and limitations, the scientific (and
philosophical) activities have the advantage that its products are under the
public scrutiny of people with very high academic abilities (and maybe with
a methodological skeptic view).



These people look at the rationale of the proposals and/or results of
scientific products and its consequences in reality.



The scientific activities aim to increase our knowledge of nature and about
ourselves --or I suppose that it is the ideal.



For instance, nobody could know around 1998 that almost five percent of the
universe is matter and energy and the rest something that we now call as
dark-matter and dark-energy…



How these *facts* would affect our theories and knowledge in physics and
chemistry?



What could be nowadays the epistemological and metaphysical status of “The
Universal”?



It seems that these kinds of questions not arise in other human activities…I
think…



 Sincerely,

 Walter


--



Replying to Loet --  I will post this to fis later in the week


Your distinction between the backward looking institutional viewpoint
and the forward looking evolutionary perspective is cogent, but it plays
down the fact that the evolutionary one is restrained by current hegemonies
of theory and interpretation, always linking new discoveries to the
already-accepted 'facts'.  So, I think that, for example, the parcelling of
energi expenditures between these viewpoints is rather something like 80%
institutional (including education in discovery techniques} and 20&%
evolutionary.



On Mon, Dec 13, 2010 at 4:20 AM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

Dear Stan and colleagues,



I agree with Joseph Brenner that we need both, but the status of the two
theories is different. Behavior of agents (scholars) and relations among
texts can be mapped. In this case, we use a theory of the measurement and
focus on the retention mechanism of the evolving science system. At the
substantive level, however, the science sy

Re: [Fis] Replies to Walter & Loet

[Stanley N Salthe]

Replying to Loet --

On Sun, Dec 19, 2010 at 1:59 AM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> Replying to Loet --
>
>
>
> Your distinction between the backward looking institutional viewpoint
> and the forward looking evolutionary perspective is cogent, but it plays
> down the fact that the evolutionary one is restrained by current hegemonies
> of theory and interpretation, always linking new discoveries to the
> already-accepted 'facts'.  So, I think that, for example, the parcelling of
> energy expenditures between these viewpoints is rather something like 80%
> institutional (including education in discovery techniques} and 20&%
> evolutionary.
>
>
>
> Dear Stan,
>
>
>
> In my opinion, this is the crucial parameter for measuring the extent to
> which a system has become knowledge-based. In a previous (for example,
> political) economy, the institutions can be expected to leave less room for
> the knowledge-based (sub)dynamics than in a knowledge-based economy. The
> latter reinforce the restructuring from the perspective of what is possible
> given the models. The models open up possibilities and thus the redundancy
> within the system can be increased.
>

  Original Stan: But all knowledge must in the end be a 'building upon'
previous knowledge.  On this account knowledge that implies completion, or
which is too detailed, will lead nowhere, for it leaves nothing left to do
but follow the institution. There has been a discussion of 'evolvability' in
the complexity sciences that relates to this issue.  From my own development
theory, we can see that continued development of a system leads to
increasingly trivial additions to an ascendent discourse ('normal science'),
a filling in of details.  This leads eventually to overthr

>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Loet
>

Then,

Replying to Loet on information:

I would say that there is a third major kind of information -- information
as constraint (on anything, therefore on entropy production).  This comes
out of Pattee's distinction between dynamics and non-holonomic constrain.
 Example: examine an equation, say simply Y = aX^b.   a and b are
functioning as information here.  This information is not uncertainty, and
it does not overtly imply an observer in the usual sense.  If we generalize
the observer, it might be said that a and b make a difference to ... ? ...

STAN

On Mon, Dec 20, 2010 at 11:31 AM, Loet Leydesdorff 
 wrote:

> "Information is the difference that makes the difference"
>
> Dear colleagues,
>


> It seems important to me to distinguish between two concepts of information
> because if we use the same word for two concepts this can be a source of
> confusion. Perhaps, I can reproduce the two character set in Chinese which
> Prof. Wu Yishan was once so kind to write for me in Chinese and which
> express these two meanings. Let me give it a try:
>


> Description: fig13_01
>
> The above one, ‘sjin sji’, corresponds to the mathe matical definition of
> informa tion as uncertainty.[1] The sec ond, ‘tsjin bao,’ means infor mation
> but also intelligence.[2] In other words, it means infor mation which
> informs us, and which is thus considered meaningful.


-snip-


>
>
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Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism

[Stanley N Salthe]

One of the most special properties of science -- indeed its core that
differentiates it from natural philosophy -- is the practice of testing
hypotheses.  Leaving aside the 'human' weaknesses involved here, there is,
however, the 'Duhem-Quine thesis' to be faced.  In order to test an
hypothesis, one must rig up some more or less elaborate set-up. This
involves various ancillary  assumptions, and even other hypotheses, that
enable the test, but that are not being tested themselves.  A failure to
corroborate an hypothesis does not automatically lead to rejection, because
some of these ancillary assumptions may have been inappropriate.  And so on.
 No single failure to corroborate can impugn an hypothesis, but the question
even is -- 'can anything at all be tested adequately?'.

This need not slow down a science.  For example take evolutionary biology
and its key hypothesis that natural selection is the mode by which
macroevolution (e.g., ape -> human) occurs.  Natural selection has been
tested adequately, and shown to operate to preserve the adaptedness of a
population, from one generation to the next.  But its application to
macroevolution has been testable (?) only in laboratory populations of
microorganisms.  Nevertheless natural selection remains the key ASSUMPTION
of all evolutionary thinking. Its role in macroevolution is NOT testable,
but is used to organize a major research program on the basis of its
plausibility.

STAN

On Thu, Jan 6, 2011 at 1:09 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> Dear John and colleagues,
>
>
>
> The idea that the rationality of science is in the specifics of its nature
> as an institution goes back at least to C.S. Peirce, and does not lie in the
> activities or reasoning of specific scientists. The the sociological
> approach misses the target completely, and is rather mundane and relatively
> uninteresting (to use Jim Brown's words). Science is, indeed, just another
> institution, but it has rather special properties that are missed when we
> focus on the activities and rationales of individuals within the
> institution.
>
> I would maintain that both the institutions and the individuals reflect
> developments in the communication of science at the global level. Thus they
> participate insofar as the communication can be understood and brought
> forward (reproduced and changed). The codes of communication are specific;
> the institutions follow historically; for example, in moving from academies
> to universities during the 19th century. Of course, institutions can last
> longer than  individuals.
>
>
>
> I am not pleading against ethnography and other forms of sociology of
> science. However, the core subject is our subject: how is scientific
> information communicated? And how is this communication system (including
> scholarly discourses) evolving? The study of institutions provides us with
> windows of instantiations which can be interesting in themselves (for
> example, national differences).
>
>
>
> Best wishes for a happy New Year,
>
> Loet
>
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Re: [Fis] Future discussions

[Stanley N Salthe]

Tagging on after Joseph --

On Tue, Jan 18, 2011 at 9:19 PM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch <
joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> wrote:

>  Dear Pedro and All,
>
> Thank you for your note and the ambitious program. My brief comments by
> theme:
>
>   --Theme 1: Historical Foundations of Modern Science.
>
> Sounds very interesting; the "Science and Society" aspect fits well with
> Theme 3.
>
> I hope it will discuss how science was taken over as (became limited to)
support for technology.

>
>
> -- Theme 2: On Information Theory.
>
> My hope is that this discussion will have a good deal to do with
> qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of information. Perhaps people
> should state clearly what the primary interests and objectives are of their
> remarks.
>
>
Maybe it could take up ostension?  This would bring in vagueness (or at
least fuzzy information theory)?

>
>
> -- Theme 3: Foundations of Social Information Science.
>
> This should be a fascinating occasion to evaluate different social models
> from an informational standpoint.
>
> Again, ostensible communication. Pointed absence of communication?

STAN

>
>
> Cheers,
>
> Joseph
>
>
>
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>
>
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Re: [Fis] Info Theory

[Stanley N Salthe]

It is interesting that you raise the power law in connection with
information.  Info theory presumably applies to everything and anything.  So
do power laws like Zipf's, WHEN data are examined as ranking by size or
importance.  How can this be?  Or, rather, 'what is this?'   The power law
is 'information' about EVERYTHING, when anything is so viewed.  The only
'discovery' is the value of the slope of the log/log relation, which does
differ between kinds of data (although, not in Zipf's case). That is, the
procedure of examining data in this way ALWAYS results in a power law.  Put
otherwise, does anyone know of data about natural things that would not
deliver a power law?  If not, then power laws must be a projection of the
observer. That is, they are a 'social construction, and the slope values
they deliver upon analysis are data 'relative to the observer only'.

I would guess that we would not find a single power law if we ranked sizes
of entities from the scale of cities down to that of fermions, because there
necessarily must be breaks of about order of magnitude here and there that
reflect hierarchical structure, which seems to be another fact about the
world.  But, within any scale level, I would suppose power laws would emerge
from our analysis.

STAN


On Sun, Jan 23, 2011 at 7:39 AM, Gavin Ritz  wrote:

> Are you saying Karl that Information theory is the glue that binds energy
> and entropy production?
> or the the fabric behind these two concept?
> If so what is the bridging qualitative and quantitative propositions and
> formulae for this binding?
>
> It's quite something to say this, because one of the qualitative
> foundations of information theory is word frequency of English from Zipfs
> law. John Pierce (Information Theory)
> Regards
> Gavin
>
>
> --
> *From:* "joe.bren...@bluewin.ch" 
> *To:* karl.javors...@gmail.com; Pedro C. Marijuan <
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>; fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Sent:* Sat, 22 January, 2011 7:32:24 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Info Theory
>
>  Dear Karl,
>
>
>
> The assumption I would like to check that we share is that existence and
> energy are primitive and numbers something derived. When one moves from the
> quantum vacuum or singularity into the thermodynamic world, as soon as
> change occurs, something is no longer totally itself; there is something new
> along side of it in 4D space-time. The number of entities has increased, and
> this is the situation is the reality of which addition is the model.
> Iteration, which also occurs in reality, does the rest. If I understand you
> correctly, you feel that numbers, once available and manipulated in more
> complex ways, can model many other things, especially, of course, aspects of
> information.
>
>
>
> If a numerical perspective is convenient and even necessary for an
> understanding of nature, I would still like to know if it is sufficient. Are
> you able to capture, in your information theory, for example, the
> informational processes involved in:
>
>
>
> · emotions
>
> · creativity
>
> · anti-social behavior (rational and irrational)
>
> · complex political processes
>
> · your own theory?
>
>
>
> I think it would make for a more interesting and productive discussion if
> you were to tell us where your theory does NOT apply, rather than let us
> raise naïve objections to which you already have clear answers. I would like
> to know, for example, which of several possible approaches to the definition
> of a "logical object" are involved; at what point the limitations of
> machines become determining; and under what conditions one should seek to
> maximize (because valuable) heterogeneity as opposed to homogeneity. Very
> interesting discussions can then be envisaged at the “boundaries” between
> different approaches.
>
>
>
> Thank you and best wishes,
>
>
>
> Joseph
>
>  Ursprüngliche Nachricht
> Von: karl.javors...@gmail.com
> Datum: 20.01.2011 21:03
> An: "Jerry Chandler", "Joseph Brenner"<
> joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>, "Pedro C. Marijuan"
> Betreff: Info Theory
>
> Hope that the FIS server will eventuially accept this, too.. For you,
> individually:
>
> Information Theory:
>
> Let me answer the points raised so far:
>
> Joe Brenner:
>
> My hope is that this discussion will have a good deal to do with
> qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of information. Perhaps people
> should state clearly what the primary interests and objectives are of their
> remarks.
>
>
>
>  Jerry Chandler:
>
> The unspoken premise of many discussants appears to me to be a view of
> information theory as a universal glue, a universal predicate, a universal
> code.
>
> The assertion is outspoken, explicit and apodictically declaratory: 
> information
> theory IS a universal glue, a universal predicate, a universal code
>
> Yet, any effort to use quantum logic to describe inheritance requires the
> construction of semantic bridges between messages before 

[Fis] Replies to Gavin & Jerry

[Stanley N Salthe]

Gavin --  I send this reply to you, but, since we on this list are allowed
only two messages per week, I will reserve sending it to the list until
later in the week.


On Mon, Jan 24, 2011 at 6:41 AM, Gavin Ritz  wrote:


Hi there Stan



SS: Info theory presumably applies to everything and anything.


GR: It was never intended to apply to anything but communication
instruments. That is sending English language down a pipe.


S: Since it was abstracted from human communication systems, it has taken on
a 'life of its own', as any abstraction has a right to do.


GR: In my opinion it still only does, I cant get my head around how say
information theory actually applies to direct human communication or organic
sensing systems.  All our sensing systems are energy transduction systems,
once inside the individual it 's moved via Na/K pumps aided by ADP to ATP
conversions to the brain all electrical, chemical energy. So in the
environment it's just a sound (phonon) or light (photon) or chemical or heat
energy where are the bits (information theory part) or markers. They are
just not there.


 Unless this information is what underlies energy and is what makes up the
rest of the universe including dark matter and dark energy. And is also what
underlies the theory of Geometricdynamics.(Relativity theory)..?? How so
I would not know.


S: As a materialist, I have sympathy with your view here.  I think the crux
of the matter is being examined right now -- is information ('bit') primal
or is stuff ('it') primal?  In my view there needs to be stuff in order for
there to be a perspective, and there needs to be a perspective before there
is anything to communicate.  But, given this, I go further and argue that
semiosis (as physiosemiosis) emerges simultaneously. I define semiosis as
reaction mediated by context.  Any perspective will have a context, and IF
that context has an effect on a locale's reaction (i.e., acts as a sign),
then that is ( at least proto) semiosis.  So:


Big Bang --> matter --> locales --> contextuality --> semiosis


On this view the Newtonian action <--> reaction is a debased, if not wholly
fictional construction.  Concerning 'dark things', in my view they are
mathematical variables.


STAN


Gavin --


On Mon, Jan 24, 2011 at 7:50 PM, Gavin Ritz  wrote:

Sure it can have a life on its own, but fundamentally human communication is
the integration of (sound) phonons and sight (photons) that is vibration of
matter across a wide frequency spectrum. There's no information there? I see
only energy. Language in my opinion is matter's desire to be be known.


Information is an abstraction related closely to form, which it is supposed
always could be translated to instructions in a computer, creating 'bits'
from inspection of 'its'.  Then the supposition is that The World also
reckons with information, leading to" 'its from 'bits' ".  This, to me, is
implausible.


STAN



Then, replying to Jerry --


On Mon, Jan 24, 2011 at 5:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
wrote:


List:

My responses to recent posts by Karl, Stan, Joe, Loet, Gavin, John, and Bob
by the number of the digest that I rec’d. I seek to address several basic
issues.

 -snip-

 Stan (545:10) *Re: [Fis] Ostension and the Chemical / Molecular Biological
Science*,   …It is this translation from material observations into logical
form, in particular into fully explicit, crisp logical form that I am
questioning.  Yes, it can lead to short term triumphs, via engineering,…

JLRC: Hu, I think you miss the point. The abstract symbol systems of
Dalton, Lavoisier, and Coulomb underly the foundations of thermodynamics as
well as the Shannon theory of information as well as our concept of such
abstractions as “energy” and “entropy.” These symbol systems are now firmly
embedded in the logic of scientific communications. Perhaps you wish to
infer that concept of ostension is not useful in the natural sciences?  Or,
is it that in your world view, “utility” is a bad word?

   Actually, yes, 'utility' IS a bad word in my view.  We have virtually
wrecked the world basing our actions almost solely on utility.  Peirce's
pragmaticism is a broader and philosophically more sophisticated notion than
pragmatism.  Then, The abstractions of physical science, deployed using
maths, have certainly been useful in the unfortunate ascendency of our
culture. Their use in natural settings is limited to (admittedly powerful)
generalities, as opposed to their detailed uses in engineered experiments.
They cannot be used to deal accurately with unforeseen and unforeseeable
contexts, which history continually generates in the world.  That said, I
greatly admire thermodynamics when deployed generally in philosophical
inquiry because it does relate to sensible general properties of the world
useful for understanding (as opposed to exploitation).



BTW, Lavoisier / Daltonian logical forms are not fully explicit in the usual
sense of mathematics. They are closer to codes with an exact 

Re: [Fis] On Stan's reply to Gavin

[Stanley N Salthe]

Robin --

On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 7:42 AM, Robin Faichney wrote:

> Saturday, January 29, 2011, 9:39:09 PM, Stanley wrote:
>
> > On Mon, Jan 24, 2011 at 6:41 AM, Gavin Ritz  wrote:
>
> > SS: Info theory presumably applies to everything and anything.
>
> > GR: It was never intended to apply to anything but communication
> > instruments. That is sending English language down a pipe.
>
> > S: Since it was abstracted from human communication systems, it has
> > taken on a 'life of its own', as any abstraction has a right to do.
>
> I   agree   with   this.  I'm no mathematician, but I believe that the
> broader  significance  of  Shannon's  work was a method of quantifying
> "pure  pattern".  This  was  then  adopted  by physicists who saw that
> material  form  can  be treated as pure patterns, and thus we get such
> concepts as the conservation of "information" in quantum mechanics and
> in  black  holes.


Are 'pure patterns' three dimensional?


>  "Conservation  of information" can be translated as
> meaning   that   physical   laws  do  not break down, and the state of
> affairs  at  one  time  can  be  considered  "encoded" in the state of
> affairs at another time. For instance, events within the event horizon
> of  a  black hole (or, on the holographic principle, on the surface of
> the  event  horizon) could, in principle, be determined by examination
> of the Hawking radiation that escapes as the hole diminishes.
>

Nice, clearly put!  Thanks.  Of course, this is a (necessary!) assumption.

>
> > I think
> > the crux of the matter is being examined right now -- is information
> > ('bit') primal or is stuff ('it') primal?  In my view there needs to
> > be stuff in order for there to be a perspective, and there needs to
> > be a perspective before there is anything to communicate.
>
> I  share  your  focus  on  perspective (and also context), but I'm not
> clear why perspective requires "stuff" -- but see below.
>

Because a perspective would require stability of locale.  I think that a
world of boson<->fermion transitions could have no specific locales.

>
> > Information is an abstraction related closely to form, which it is
> > supposed always could be translated to instructions in a computer,
> > creating 'bits' from inspection of 'its'.  Then the supposition is
> > that The World also reckons with information, leading to" 'its from
> > 'bits' ".  This, to me, is implausible.
>
> I tend to feel the same way about "it from bit", but I think it should
> perhaps  be  taken as implying that the idea of substance derives from
> form,  which to me is highly plausible.


So, "form" here is potentiality.  But where could this come from without
some constraints?


> We can take the view that form
> is  what  we encounter -- at all levels, personally and scientifically
> --  and  substance  a  theoretical entity or set of such. This view is
> related  to  philosophical  idealism,  and  is,  like that, I believe,
> strictly irrefutable. By the same token, being unverifiable, it has no
> practical  consequences. Which is more real, or which came first, form
> or substance? These questions are, strictly speaking, meaningless.
>

In a 'logical' sense, yes.  But metaphysics transcends logic, and treats of
its preconditions as well.  On 'verifiability', I'm afraid I have been
influenced by the Duhem-Quine thesis.



>
> Etymologically,  "information" is extremely closely related to "form",
>

Strongly agree. Its function then is to constrain entropy production.


> and  the  concept  of  information  used in physics simply IS material
> form,  where  that is generalised from shape to encompass all material
> properties.  Just as past and future states of affairs are encoded in
> the  present,


I suppose this takes into account historicity?  Via statistics?


>  so  genetic  information  is encoded in DNA. Biological
> information  is  just a subset of physical information. DNA molecules,
> like  all  physical  entities,  encode  the  outcomes  of all of their
> potential  interactions,  but  in  the  case  of  DNA the outcomes are
> constrained by the cellular context.
>

But we now know that there is a good deal of material manipulation and
modification in between DNA code and protein complexes.  You could say that
the DNA information is generic, while what emerges from metabolism is
particular.

>
> I'm  currently  working  on  a paper in which I argue that intentional
> information   --   using   "intentional"   in  Brentano's  sense,  and
> encompassing  meaning  and  all  mental  content -- is best considered
> encoded  in  physical/biological  information,  being  decoded in use.
>

But the DNA stuff is generic, use is particular.


> Perspective is obviously highly relevant here, but it seems to me that
> it  can  probably  be  explained  in  (literally)  formal  terms, that
> substance  as such need not enter the picture, but perhaps I'm missing
> something?
>

As I said above, I don't see how there can 

[Fis] replies to Gavin, Guy, Jerry

[Stanley N Salthe]

As u first for the week:



On Sun, Feb 6, 2011 at 5:04 PM, Gavin Ritz  wrote:

Hi Stan



Using my last message for the week,



Reacting to the below(s):  As a materialist, I see the deformations
initiated by Guy's propagated waves (e.g., as sensations) as forming the
basis for information, but, as emphasized in semiotics, this only becomes
information (e.g. perception) as a result of assimilation by the impacted
system.



Are you saying that perception is information?


Perception is a process of making sense of sensations.  The system will not
be 'informed' by impacts that are not assimilated by it (and may not even be
sensed), and so there is no point in assigning information to sensations
(impacts) as such.



 As a 'pansemiotician', I have no problem in formulating this in purely
physical systems as 'physiosemiosis', which is constructed whenever context
(in complex system this can be internal to the system) will affect the
effect of the impact.




I have no idea what this all means.


Ah, yes.  Well, semiotics is just now making its way into science. From your
point of view here, I am distinguishing Newtonian (dyadic) impacts from
interactions involving a third entity - a context.  This makes it triadic,
as in Peircean semiotics.  The impact of two entities will differ in
different contexts.  If not, then semiotics would be irrelevant.


STAN




Regards

Gavin




STAN

On Fri, Feb 4, 2011 at 7:22 PM, Gavin Ritz  wrote:

Hi there Guy

I'm at a loss still about information you mention below.

If one talks about waves, light, sound these are all energy (frequency)
concepts. Chemistry and physics are really only about energy, entropy and
transduction's and conversions of energy in one form or the other of matter.

Any flows of available energy are more than likely entropy production or
free energy. (Gibbs type free energy)

The only codes, and notations are the ones we give it, it is of our own
making, if information does have an existence then its more than likely
related to non baryonic matter.

After all we are making assumptions about a universe with only a less than
4% understanding of its contents.

Regards
Gavin



Reacting to Guy's posting ...

-Original Message-
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es
[mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf
Of Guy A Hoelzer
Sent: Saturday, 5 February 2011 1:53 p.m.
To: Foundations of Information Science Information Science
Subject: Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: [Fwd: Info Theory]--From John Collier



Hi Gavin,



I’m not quite sure how to respond as you didn’t ask a particular question.
Here are my thoughts about your points.



Waves are indeed about energy, which I think fits nicely into the scheme I
described regarding information.  I suggested a very simple definition of
information as a contrast.  Physical gradients provide a nice example of
contrast between different conditions on either side of a gradient.  Energy
generically fits this view whether you think about it in either particle
(e.g., photon) or wave form.  I am not a physicist, but I think energy
always exists as some sort of localized concentration with a gradient
between regions of higher energy and regions of lower energy.  In this
sense, energy can always be considered as a spatially configured pattern,
and thus as information.

So here you seem ready to invoke Bateson's 'difference that makes a
difference'. But I don't see here the system for which this difference is
made.  On my own definition of information -- any constraint on entropy
production -- I don't see that here either.  Shannon's view of information
as a reduction in uncertainty might be implicit because without any
constraints the system will rapidly go to local equilibrium. In all three of
these views of information an observing or participating system is implicit.



I also agree that flows are about entropy production, and they must always
be channeled in a way that requires a structural configuration.   This is
how I think about self-organizing dissipative systems.  Flows cross
gradients and dissipate those gradients in the process, which diminishes the
contrast and thus the amount of information exhibited by the gradient.  I
would describe the emergent structure of such systems as information
captured by the system, or transferred to the system, as the gradient is
diminished.

An intriguing suggestion.

  I see this as an alternative way to say that the system captures free
energy from the flow and uses it to construct itself.  I generally see
information as the inverse of entropy, so the existence of information goes
hand-in-hand with the existence of entropy.  Whether information/entropy
exist or are just heuristic concepts is an issue for others to debate.  I do
think, though, that it IS related to baryonic matter.


Agreed on all of these.


Replying to Jerry --


Stan:


  The issue of ostension remains high on my agenda. The individual sciences
progress along individual paths, each asserting new knowledge, oft

[Fis] Fwd: [ Re: please correct]--From Karl Javorszky

[Stanley N Salthe]

-- Forwarded message --
From: Stanley N Salthe 
Date: Tue, Mar 1, 2011 at 9:25 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] [ Re: please correct]--From Karl Javorszky
To: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 


Regarding:

1) Your basic - axiomatic - set of different facts, which you describe as
"... properties of things, irrefutable and objective, which have nothing to
do with any expressive way related to the thing ..." would be the basic set
of arguments {1,1,...,1,2,2,...,16}.
2) Your set of primary relations is built on this basic set. You describe it
as "... some attributes of things that someone can find... ...Among which
some are true to the facts, but some are incompletely, while others are not
in any way."

All properties of things are mediated by observer's biological senses, as
well as by observer's cultural equipment.  There ARE NO "properties of
things" unmediated by biology and culture.  Consider that while we have
three-color detection in our visual system, birds have four, and so the
colors we and birds see will be completely different.  Consider also that
the light spectrum is divided in different ways in different cultures.  The
Western scientific attitude supposes that it is detecting and describing the
world as it is even if there were no observer. A more moderate opinion was
advanced by Percy Bidgman with his 'instrumentalism'.

STAN

On Tue, Mar 1, 2011 at 5:26 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan  wrote:

>  Message from Karl Javorszky
>
> --
>
> Dear Qiao Tian-qing,
>
> thank you for inviting my opinion in your viewpoints re information.
>
> To the cultural embedding of the term "information": this cannot be
> otherwise. If we had a clear and precise definition of any one logical term,
> we would posses that fixed point that Archimedes has looked for in order to
> displace the Earth from. All logical terms are interdependent and
> give/receive their meaning by their relations to other logical terms. Which
> perspective a culture takes while regarding the interdependences determines,
> which aspects are relevant for the definition.
>
> Your idea that  "...information is the collection of three kinds of
> things´ attributes: things themselves (including cause or effect formed
> through their interaction), the attributes of things that someone thinks and
> simulates, and the attributes of tools someone or something uses when
> considers, expresses, or simulates something. " can be found in that
> system of references that is coming from a+b=c in the following ways:
>
> 1) Your basic - axiomatic - set of different facts, which you describe as
> "... properties of things, irrefutable and objective, which have nothing
> to do with any expressive way related to the thing ..." would be the basic
> set of arguments {1,1,...,1,2,2,...,16}.
> 2) Your set of primary relations is built on this basic set. You describe
> it as "... some attributes of things that someone can find... ...Among
> which some are true to the facts, but some are incompletely, while others
> are not in any way."   The attributes of things that someone can find are
> here distinguished from the things. (This goes slightly against
> Wittgenstein, who says that "the thing is the collection of the
> possibilities of being included in a relation", so he thinks there is no
> real difference between the mental image of a number and that of what
> additions this number can take place in.) In actual fact, it may be that you
> are more profound than Wittgenstein, because:
> the additive model makes a difference between the numbers that are sorted
> and the sorting order, and - more importantly - among different sorting
> orders among each other. The orders are in a different way distinct to each
> other than the numbers.
> Also, order concepts mirror your idea very well, that some orders are
> congruent - even identical -, while some are only partly, and under some
> specific circumstances, congruent with each other, while there are
> collections of order concepts that are contradictory and cannot yield an
> existing result. This is mirrored exactly in the numbers.
> 3)  Your set of meta-orders you describe as: "... attributes of tools used
> by someone." The tools are the order concepts by means of which [the
> matches between place and amount being the result of an order concept being
> relevant, that is, in existence] the facts become visible as true or false
> (congruent or contradictory). We choose an order concept by which we try to
> explain the world. (We have a geographical, a sociological, an economical
> way of explaining some parts of History, and the explaining perspectives do
> not contradict, rather extend the other way of ordering th

[Fis] Reply to Jerry

[Stanley N Salthe]

Replying to Jerry (with implications for the postings of our Chinese
members) --


On Tue, Mar 1, 2011 at 9:43 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
wrote:


(Pedro: Please Post to FIS)


James Hannam, Stan, Pedro, List:



Thank you for taking the time to express your point of view.  For several
years now, I have been studying the origins of molecular biology, seeking a
coherent explanation for the meaning for its predictive powers and the
methods which lead to scientific predictions. I certainly do not speak for
the metaphysics of the physical information theorists, who, perhaps, may be
more persuaded by your style than I.



Your assertion that:

“I sense some scepticism about my contentions that ancient science could
never have developed into what we call modern science. “

is simply illogical and necessarily false.



Why do I confront your logic?

The simple facts are that the basic ideas of Aristotle remain the
foundations of Western science.  The developments from Aristotle to the
present day can be traced step-by-step.

By the basic ideas of Aristotle, I mean five specific notions that Aristotle
wrote of:

1. Rules of thought [identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle]

2. Categories [substance, quality, quantity, relation, time, place,
situation, condition, action and passion]

3. Causality [formal, material efficient, telos]

4. Logic of premises (sorites, pathways of statements from antecedents to
consequences, graph theory, theory of categories]

5. hierarchy  [individual, species, genera, alone with ostension to greater
levels]

During the intervening 23 Centuries, our notions of all these terms have
changed substantially. Our very notion of language itself, as well as our
notion of symbol systems, especially mathematics and chemistry has greatly
improved our ability to be specific. Nevertheless, modern science developed
directly from these few simple concepts, particularly of the concept of
identity. The scientific terms of Aristotle continue to serve the sciences
well and continue to be discussed routinely in both the theory and in
practice of modern science.



If Western science did not develop from these Aristotelian concepts, what
concepts did modern science develop from?



Your focus on motion, as an example, is, in my opinion, ill-advised for your
thesis. The philosophy of physics continues to churn, century after century,
it remains unsettled today. Personally, I smile a wide grin whenever a
physicist announces once again that the foundations of physics must be
revised. As one of my friends loves to say, physics is the only metaphysics
we (“modern science”) have. The other sciences, intimately associated with
the logic of calculus, thrive on the correspondence between observations and
predictions.



Is it possible, James, that your training has embedded your thinking so
deeply in the logic of language that the historical role of the logic of
calculus in the development of science is submerged in your writings?


Nice statement.  I agree with this.





Stan:

Two ideas are at issue:

1. The first is your most recent post on the role of the term, “properties.”

“There ARE NO "properties of things" unmediated by biology and culture.” The
concept of properties is, of course, the bedrock of predicate logic and the
grammar of physics. If you deny the existence of properties in your
ontology, your metaphysics becomes much clearer.


Clarifying more:  There can be no 'objective' knowledge of properties
outside the material abilities of the knower.  Bridgman was the most honest
physicist! And von Uexküll was the best psychologist.  There is no knowledge
outside the knower.  All is 'local knowledge' only.  Yes, this is
postmodernism.  However, even with this viewpoint as a standpoint, one can
proceed to do standard theoretical and philosophical work because, for
example, the universe IS one of our equations!  In postmodernism, scientific
theory and philosophy become artistic achievements for their own sake,
expressing humanity's, and more particularly Western Culture's imagination.
The difference, then, is that in the postmodern view, there might be other
perspectives, while in the standard scientific view there is only one true
perspective, which frequently gets locked into repressive ‘bandwagons’ (as
in Darwinian evolutionary biology, or general relativity cosmology).






1. Secondly, the notion of the term, “ostensive””.  What is it?

The Latin roots suggests the meaning

 “stretch out to view”,

 that is, demonstrable. In particular, are you using this term as if it is
unrelated to the concept extension that merely stretches a concept out?


I mean ‘defining by pointing to’.  It means communication unmediated by
verbal language.


STAN
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[Fis] replies to Steven and James

[Stanley N Salthe]

As my second posting for the week:

Replying to Steven and James --


On Sun, Mar 6, 2011 at 6:46 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith 
wrote:

Dear Stan,


You wrote:


On Mar 6, 2011, at 12:42 PM, Stanley N Salthe wrote:


>

> ... There can be no 'objective' knowledge of properties outside the
material abilities of the knower.  Bridgman was the most honest physicist!
And von Uexküll was the best psychologist.  There is no knowledge outside
the knower.  All is 'local knowledge' only.  Yes, this is postmodernism.
 However, even with this viewpoint as a standpoint, one can proceed to do
standard theoretical and philosophical work because, for example, the
universe IS one of our equations!  In postmodernism, scientific theory and
philosophy become artistic achievements for their own sake, expressing
humanity's, and more particularly Western Culture's imagination.  The
difference, then, is that in the postmodern view, there might be other
perspectives, while in the standard scientific view there is only one true
perspective, which frequently gets locked into repressive ‘bandwagons’ (as
in Darwinian evolutionary biology, or general relativity cosmology).



Excepting for some complaint concerning the labels you choose (I don't see
the point of calling this fact "post modernism" or referring to scientific
theory as "artistic achievements"), and if I understand you correctly, I
agree with that there is "no knowledge outside the knower."


However, that does not avoid the fact that the universe is profoundly
uniform and it is that uniformity upon which we rely.


Well, if by 'uniformity' you mean that the results of our activities have
some predictability, I would say that what this actually refers to is that
our conceptual tools (laws, expectations, etc.) are usually successful in
aiding our projects. That is a great intellectual achievement.  But as to a
supposed actual uniformity (?statistical) of the universe, that is a product
of, and exists in, our discourses.


At core, accepting potential refinement of the scientific method, I can't
imagine what "other perspectives" are allowed ... but, perhaps, that is my
own (positivist) intellectual investment. Your sociological comments do not
persuade me that there are alternatives.


Well, there have been prior successful cultures (now defunct), who created
some respectable objects outside of Western culture.  But in our culture,
now, I am at a loss.  But for all that, I think it prudent to always have
some reservations about the efficacy of our conceptual biases -- in
particular, toward the definite (how about some fuzziness in scientific
logic?), toward focusing in on problems (complexity clearly has vitiated
this tendency), toward calculating returns (narrowness of focus limiting our
wisdom), and so on.


With respect,

Steven


Ten, James --


On Mon, Mar 7, 2011 at 3:54 PM, James Hannam  wrote:

Dear Steven,


I agree that science has forced us to accept that the universe is an

objective reality.  It stands as an unforgiving test of our theories which

must be judged accordingly.  Although we cannot say that the “scientific

method” is certainly the best way to investigate nature, we can be fairly

sure that it is the best way discovered so far.


I think this will depend upon whether or not our culture survives any better
than previous ones.  Right now I would not bet on it.


Knowledge of the universe, of course, is not the same thing as the universe

itself and does require a knower.  However, it must have some correspondence

to the universe in order to qualify as something which we know – what Plato

called justified true beliefs.


Let us consider briefly the world as known by octopi.  They are pretty
clever.  The question is, would they corroborate our own understanding of
the universe?  (My background for this attitude is Jacob von Uexküll’s
Theoretical Biology.)



 Thus, as a historian of science, I

completely accept that my subject is a story of how we discovered knowledge

that corresponds to the universe and rejected those theories that do not.

But neither do I want to err in the opposite direction.  False theories can

nevertheless be useful; true theories can be generated in irrational ways;


How to recognize these?  By their efficacy in some small project of
humanity?


STAN



intuition can be a powerful theory builder; not all dead ends are blind

alleys.  So I think we can take a mildly positivist slant on the history of

science while still taking on board the lessons of what Jerry and Stan calls

postmodernism.


Best wishes

James




Then, to Steven again:


I still do not understand the appeal to postmodernism. There does not seem
to me to be anything postmodern about "no knowledge outside the knower."
Indeed, it is a modern idea developed by logicians of the modern era.


I think this view, given the obtuse attitudes of most academic 

[Fis] replies to Steven, Gary, and Jerry

[Stanley N Salthe]

As my first posting for this week --


Replying to Steven --


On Sun, Mar 13, 2011 at 6:27 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith <
ste...@semeiosis.org> wrote:


On Mar 12, 2011, at 5:52 AM, Stanley N Salthe wrote:


> ...

>

>> On Sun, Mar 6, 2011 at 6:46 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith <
ste...@semeiosis.org> wrote:

>>

>> ... I agree with that there is "no knowledge outside the knower."

>>

>> However, that does not avoid the fact that the universe is profoundly
uniform and it is that uniformity upon which we rely.

>

> Well, if by 'uniformity' you mean that the results of our activities have
some predictability, I would say that what this actually refers to is that
our conceptual tools (laws, expectations, etc.) are usually successful in
aiding our projects. That is a great intellectual achievement.  But as to a
supposed actual uniformity (?statistical) of the universe, that is a product
of, and exists in, our discourses.

>


No, this is not what I am trying to convey.


My assertion is an existential one not an epistemological one. The universe,
independent of any conception, is profoundly uniform and it is this
uniformity that is the basis of perceived universals. Our conceptions can
have no intrinsic uniformity unless they are founded upon this profound
feature of the world.


Nor am I referring to statistical uniformity. Again, I make an existential
statement, not an epistemological one. I refer only to uniformity that
underlies the laws and principles of our observations; it is the scientific
assertion that the determinant features of the world, apprehended as laws
and principles, are everywhere the same.


This, of course, is the position of most scientists. It makes sense of their
activities.  I know of only one corroboration of this position outside of
the scientific community -- the technological / industrial /business
community -- which pays for the research.  But this really makes up only a
single intellectual community.



> Then, to Steven again:

>

>

>> I still do not understand the appeal to postmodernism. There does not
seem to me to be anything postmodern about "no knowledge outside the
knower." Indeed, it is a modern idea developed by logicians of the modern
era.

> I think this view, given the obtuse attitudes of most academic scientists,
requires a label, preferably one that shocks.  Yes, this view was prefigured
by logicians, and as well, most forcefully in my view, by Jacob von
Uexküll's 'Theoretical Biology'.  In any case, most generally, the
postmodern view is anti-modern in that it eschews any supposedly universal
understanding, which modern science implicitly pretends to.  Within science,
the famous incongruity between general relativity and quantum mechanics
might have engendered a kind of postmodernism.  Instead, it has sent many
brilliant minds upon the evidently thankless task of trying to ‘square the
circle’!

>


I doubt your view warrants the term "postmodernism" for the reasons I have
already stated.


Your claim that "modern science implicitly pretends to" a "supposedly
universal understanding" misses the point made in the above comments. If
there is an unspoken dependence then this is it.


A view that "eschews any supposed universal understanding," simply cannot be
scientific. It is the view of disenchanted sociologists, philosophers or
diplomats, perhaps.


And their kinds of knowledge are to be eschewed as ... what? ... unuseful?
 To what projects?  Incorrect?  Judged from what vantage point?


The profound existential uniformity that I refer to is the necessary basis
of scientific knowledge, without it all bets are off. It is certainly a
conjecture, both verifiable and fallible, but without it there can be no
science.


I think this raises the issue of what science is for.  I will suggest that
it is for the purpose of furthering technology.  That pragmatic role has
not, I think,  much value in the search for 'truth'!


As to the famous incongruity between GR and QM, each focus upon distinct
aspects of nature. Our failure, so far, to have a unified view of these
evident aspects of the world is simply an indicator that there is work to
do. If it has engendered anything it is a literal mindedness that has closed
minds to the revisions necessary and thus we have stalled. "To the man with
a hammer, everything is a nail." I take it to be a warning that we must be
more rigorous, not less.


Supposing the incongruity to lie in discourse rather than in the World, then
it seems there is warrant to question the validity of these ideas.  Are they
really any better than those of "disenchanted sociologists, philosophers or
diplomats"?  The world of the 'small' is a mechanical (experimental)
construction, while the world of the large is a mathematical construction.  It
is true t

[Fis] replying to Joseph, Loet

[Stanley N Salthe]

Replying to Joseph --


On Sun, Mar 20, 2011 at 7:18 PM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch <
joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> wrote:

Dear John, Pedro, Jerry and All,


-snip-


In my view, this simply displaces the problem further, since the Peircean
categories themselves are derivative, epistemological constructions which
'mirror', literally and figuratively, the underlying dynamic structure of
the universe as Peirce saw it. The processes referred to by Q, E and EH are
indeed interpreter-dependent objective processes, but they admit that they
cannot be dissociated from the notion of a situated agent.

Here, we have gone outside Peirce, since the discussion of the "agent" and
his/her interactions requires a physical dialectics and logic that is absent
in Peirce.


I have suggested that triadic abiotic semiosis (Deely's 'physiosemiosis')
will synthesize an agent on the spot.  That is, when the triadic situation
appears willy-nilly in nature, a (usually fleeting!) agent emerges there and
then.


-snip


Then, replying to Loet


On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 3:04 AM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

To paraphrase Antonio Salieri's famous *"Prima la musica, dopo le parole*",
I say "first reality, then the signs".



Dear Joseph: “allegro, ma non troppo”!



In the 18th century, “nature” is still considered as God’s creation and
therefore has priority to our (human) wordings and signings. Thus, one was
interested in “natural philosophy” and “natural law” as manifestations.
However, this has eroded. Nowadays, the possibility of theory-free
observations – e.g., Carnap – is much more doubtful. Most of us will have
given up on this “realistic” position. One would also wonder whether animals
without language, would have the possibility to compose and perform music
(without human orchestration).



It seems important to me to distinguish between the order in which things
are historically generated (although we have no access to this process than
by reconstructing this order) and the evolutionary order of control. The
latter system emerges from the former: order is constructed bottom-up, but
control is increasingly top-down. The control arrow feeds back on the
historical arrow and from this perspective the signs come first.


This can be neatly shown succinctly using a subsumptive hierarchy:


{prior conditions -> {newer realms -> {the present}}}   or


{physicochemical world -> {biological world -> {sociopolitical world}}}


modeling:   {subsumption --> <-- { integration}}

Integration = locally regulating, controlling, interpreting, harnessing,
etc.


Which then implies lots of things about these relationships.


STAN
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[Fis] replying to James, Jerry

[Stanley N Salthe]

As my last posting for this week:


reacting to James' fine summary --


On Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 7:02 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:


-snip-



A second, smaller camp of historians of science where I have pitched my own
tent want to know what caused modern science.  They recognise the enormous
utility of scientific discovery and seek to explain how mankind came by this
wonderful tool.


What comes to mind here devolves from the word 'tool'  The view of science
as a handmaid to technology certainly describes its present and recent past
(since the Nineteenth Century).  In my view this tool is what has allowed us
to deliver ourselves into the present seeming 'end game' of our culture.
 Will this tool serve us after our primary energy sources have been
depleted?  How much of it will still be useful without massive amounts of
electricity?  Note that I am not dissing scientific inquiry per se -- e.g.,
the Galilel model of systematic curiosity for its own sake.  I am
questioning the idea that science is primarily a 'tool' for conquering the
world.



Then, addressing Jerry --


This exchange between Jerry and Steven has enlightened me about Jerry's
project, which I have not until now clearly understood.  Now I can see it as
a materialist attack upon a reputedly idealistic physicalist approach to
nature.  Can all matter be generalized to mass? I think this must depend
upon the aim of an investigation.  On this ground, I can then ask Jerry to
give us an example where using mass for all matter actually gives a
misleading result.


STAN



On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 4:55 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith <
ste...@semeiosis.org> wrote:


On Mar 15, 2011, at 7:47 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:


>

> v.547.8  Steven writes:

>

> "However, that does not avoid the fact that the universe is profoundly

> uniform and it is that uniformity upon which we rely."

>

> I disagree.

> for reasoning see comment to v547.12

>

>

> v547.12 Steven writes:

> The universe, independent of any conception, is profoundly uniform and it
is this uniformity that is the basis of perceived universals. Our
conceptions can have no intrinsic uniformity unless they are founded upon
this profound feature of the world.

>

> I find Steven's statement of principle to be exact.

> Of, course, this line of reasoning explains virtually nothing.

> With the conceptualization of "mass", nature is striped of her identities.

> In my view, the only intrinsic uniformity is of space and time.

> The twisting of the remainder of reality to fit into the uniformity
prison, distorts  the truth of matter and the truth of matters.

> This line of reasoning perfectly excluded the mental, bilogical and
chemical sciences because of the necessity for irregular extension. The
essence of the distortion of universality begins with the effort to strip
 the atomic numbers of their individuality. The other consequences follow
from this antecedent.


Dear Jerry,


I elaborated on my earlier post on my blog at:


   http://stevenzenith.info/the-profound-uniformity-of-the-world


I am not convinced by your contention that there is a "necessity for
irregular extension" that invalidates the conjecture of uniformity and ask
you to substantiate that claim.


This is not to say that there are not such extensions and that they are not
necessary for the refinement of ideas. Surely they are. But from a strictly
epistemological point of view they are indicators, pragmatic and temporary
aberrations that are ultimately resolvable by applying the necessary
uniformity conjecture.


As I note often: if a logical reduction fails it is never an indicator of
the supernatural or a justification for metaphysics. It is an indicator that
we must, of necessity, review the logical construction that failed and
ultimately revise it.


The central point of my argument is that no scientific epistemology is
possible without this conjecture of profound uniformity. If we reject it or
worse, if we find evidence that the universe is not uniform in this way, by
finding a galaxy that does not conform to the laws observed in the others
for example, then all bets are off and no scientific epistemology is
possible.


Since I take space and time to be merely a way of speaking about
mass/energy, as did Einstein, its uniformity or not is a matter of
conception alone. If you disagree then you essentially affirm the case I
make since space and time would characterize all structure in such a system
and the uniform laws and principles would be laws and principles of space
and time.


Incidentally, for me "explanation" is the identification of causes. The
notion of profound uniformity identifies the casual basis, the functional
dependence, of all scientific knowledge; as such it is an explanation of why
such a system works.


With respect,

Steven
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Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles

[Stanley N Salthe]

It seems obvious to me that any property held by a very complex entity
(e.g., human being), IF it can be modeled, then that model can be used to
generalize that property ANYWHERE we wish to.  On these grounds I have been
busy working on 'physiosemiosis' using the triadic formulation of semiosis
of Charles Peirce.  I have proposed that the 'sign' emerges from the context
of an interaction between object and system.  If context has no effect on
the interaction, there is no semiosis.  If, on the contrary, context affects
the interaction, then we have semiosis, even in a pond.

The key is whether the trait involved can be modeled; on these grounds it
has not yet been shown that 'qualia' can be generalized beyond the human
experience, yet even a child can see, for example, that a mother hen is very
unhappy when her chicks are threatened.

STAN

On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 3:04 PM, Pridi Siregar <
pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.com> wrote:

> Hi all !
>
>
>
> Maybe the term « observer » in Pedro’s « non-human observer » term is what
> bugs some of you because it seems to imply some “non-human cogitum” that by
> habit we may want to equate to human thinking. Of course trying to
> understand the “psychology” of a bacteria may be a bit hard for humans so
> perhaps the term “observer” should be given a broader meaning and the
> challenge would be to define the nature/ boundaries/mechanics of this
> semantic extension/redefinition. The same may hold for defining “language”
>  and “meaning”… But for lack of time I really haven’t followed all the
> debates and I’m no philosopher.  As a business person I am much more
> practical and I do have one practical concern/question: are we trying to lay
> down a new theory of living systems or are we going (in some not too distant
> future) towards devising a computational framework that (even modestly) may
> go beyond projects such as the VHP?Sorry to be so down to earth but I
> suppose that in this forum everyone is allowed to express himself/herself…
> J
>
>
>
> Pridi
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *De :* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *De la part de* joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
> *Envoyé :* vendredi 1 avril 2011 19:38
> *À :* l...@leydesdorff.net; 'Pedro C. Marijuan'; fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Objet :* Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering
> Principles
>
>
>
> Dear Pedro,
>
>
>
> I do not quite recognize myself in the statement:
>
>
>
> Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract,
> disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a
> Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder.
>
>
>
> I thought my implicit observer was very much real, embodied and
> non-classical, fully participating (and in part constituting) the "order and
> disorder".
>
>
>
> However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois'
> models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The
> models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not
> define the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of
> models and what is being modeled as processes.
>
>
>
> I have never understood why Maturana had to say that observers are
> operationally generated when it seems obvious that they exist, albeit at
> different levels of complexity and (and here we agree) capability of
> recursiveness. As I have said previously, autopoiesis, like spontaneity
> and self-organization are concepts that are very useful, but cannot be taken
> to describe, as fully as I anyway would like, the dynamics of the cognitive
> processes necessary for an understanding of information and meaning.
>
>
>
> The above notwithstanding, I then have a problem with your, Pedro,
> formulation of the capabilities of "non-human" observers. Here, I agree with
> the principle expressed by Loet that the examples of the entities you
> mentioned lack the necessary cognitive abilities, although I focus on
> aspects of them other than model-related.
>
>
>
> A theory in which NOTHING previous is taken as entirely satisfactory seems
> more and more necessary . . .
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
>
>
> Joseph
>
>
>
> Ursprüngliche Nachricht
> Von: l...@leydesdorff.net
> Datum: 01.04.2011 12:14
> An: "'Pedro C. Marijuan'", <
> fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering
> Principles
>
> Dear Pedro,
>
> I understand that you have some problems with my epistemic stance. Let me
> try to clarify.
>
> Let me go back to Maturana (1978) "The Biology of Language ..."
> On p. 49, he formulated: " ... so that the relations of neuronal activity
> generated under consensual behavior become perturbations and components to
> further consensual behavior, an observer is operationally generated." And
> furthermore (at this same page): " ... the second-order consensual domain
> that it establishes with other organisms becomes indistinguishable from a
> sema

[Fis] exchanges with Gordana

[Stanley N Salthe]

On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 4:12 PM, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic <
gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se> wrote:

Dear Stan,





Ø  The key is whether the trait involved can be modeled; on these grounds it
has not yet been shown that 'qualia' can be generalized beyond the human
experience, yet even > a child can see, for example, that a mother hen is
very unhappy when her chicks are threatened.



Being a computer scientist I don’t really know enough about qualia, so I
checked Wiki and read:



“Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the
experience of taking a recreational drug, or the redness of an evening sky.”



I believe that hen and other animals have some sort of qualia, of course not
human qualia, but their own, animal qualia.



Am I wrong in my believe that animals can feel pain, have headache, feel
taste of drink and food, can see colors and can even get drunk (Animals Are
Beautiful People,

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDknJ6KPLxc ) and that pain, headache etc.
that they experience represent their qualia?



With best regards,

Gordana


Gordana -- Of course, you are right.  My point is only that, while we can
intuit that other animals have feelings insofar as they have nerves, my
position, using Peirce's idea of Firstness, is that it is the simplest
hypothesis to suppose that all dissipative structures (storms, etc.,
including the living) have all that we have.  So a cyclone, a tree, must be
supposed to have at least what we would feel when, for example, we meditate
-- no thoughts, no special feelings, just beingness.  BUT, as we have no
model for this, so we are not entitled, as scientists or even philosophers,
to pretend to KNOW in some verbal or mathematical fashion what qualia are.
(I may send this to the list tomorrow)


Best


STAN



Gordana --


On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 5:04 PM, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic <
gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se> wrote:

Stan, thanks for your quick reply and explanation.

I risk to discuss things above my head, but I agree with Maturana that life
and cognition coincide.

So I don’t see why would  we ascribe any cognitive functions to non-living
nature.


"Cognitive" is too 'rich'.  I would see {mind {cognition}}.  Cognition comes
in with the nervous system, but mind is more general, not requiring
cognition to be in effect.  So, a tree may have some manifestation of mind,
but not (seemingly!) cognition. (This example is tricky because a tree
obviously lives its life at a scale much larger than ours, and so one of its
moments might have a duration of some of our hours).



I guess that cyclone does not possess minimum of self-star properties that
we would expect from something living.


This is the main point I have been trying to insist upon so far.  Nature is
one.  The dissipative structure concept is he unifying one here.




If we would generalize qualia to organisms that do not possess nervous
system, what would that be?


I try to visualize it as what we feel in deep meditation -- no thoughts, no
emotion. No information at all.



Would plants be qualified to have qualia? Hard to imagine.


See above on the tree. I love plants, and I suppose this makes me a bit
crazy, but they do have sly behaviors.  More to the point they do have
organized chemical activities; our brains have organized chemical
activities  The organization is different, yes.  But qualia are SO
general and indiscribable ...


But cognition and even intelligence according to my understanding could be
defined without reference to subjective feeling of an organism,

and thus could be generalized to any living organism. Is that correct?


If you have an explicit model of it, then it must be able to be generalized,
by removing constraints.


STAN



Best

Gordana



Gordana --


On Sat, Apr 2, 2011 at 3:59 AM, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic <
gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se> wrote:

Stan,



I used my two posts in the FIS, so I reply off-list.



Thank you very much for your valuable comments.



I continued thinking yesterday evening about what I wrote to you and I also
concluded that my skepticism about plants having qualia was not well
grounded.

I agree with you and especially concerning the fact that we have different
time scales, that human perception is  not well  attuned to recognizing such
slow and incremental changes. Plants are adaptive systems and they certainly
communicate with the world and with us. I also love plants and remember a
performance many years ago at Zagreb Musical Biennale. They connected
several plants with sensors that measured pressure, temperature and chemical
concentrations and those signals were allowed to impact on some Mozart music
piece which was played in the background.

As the public would approach the plant, Mozart music would change in
different ways, but you could hear quite quickly in fact how plant was
affected in different way as you touched them. It was a good demonstration
that plants were alive and that they obviously register inputs.


!! Wonderfu

Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin

[Stanley N Salthe]

Replying to Gavin -- I think you make the 'error of misplaced concreteness'.
 Information theory -- and all theories and laws are modeling tools, not
actual phenomena.  So, it is also true that when an apple falls it is not
being pulled by gravitation.  Gravitation is our way of understanding the
falling.  We all know these things, so it seems to me that there is no need
to point this out.

STAN

On Sat, Apr 9, 2011 at 11:45 PM, Gavin Ritz  wrote:

> Ted
>
>
> Thank you Mark. This promises to be interesting.
>
> My view may best be introduced by stating that I believe we are in the
> business of creating a new science that will depend on new abstractions.
> These abstractions will extend from the notion of "information" as a first
> class citizen, as opposed to our default, the "particle." The latter has
> qualities that can be measured and in fact the very idea of metrics is
> bound
> to this notion of thingness.
>
> GR: I just can't see the evidence that information has anything to do with
> living organisms.
>
>
>
> Much of the dialog here works with the problem of naming what that it is.
>
> GR: They look more like logical operators, such as Imperative logic,
> declarative logic and interrogative logic.
>
>
>
> Having said that...
>
> > 1.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict
> distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures as
> quantitative or qualitative characteristics of information?
>
> I am rather certain that there is a very real distinction, because of how
> we
> define the problem. After all, we are not asking how do information and
> information metrics fit within the confines of rather limited abstractions.
> At least I am not. But the distinction does not allow for full
> orthogonality
> from set theory (the formalism of things), because we want to be able to
> model and engineer observable phenomenon in a cleaner way. This should be
> the test of any serious proposal, in my view.
>
> This requirement is why discussion on these matters often moves into
> category theory,
>
> GR: It moves into Category theory and Topos my guess is because it's the
> very basic framework of logic.
>
>
> > 2.Are there types or kinds of information that are not
> encompassed by the general theory of information (GTI)?
>
> GR: for one no living organism uses Information theory constructs to
> communicate with each other. ie direct languaging.
>
> GR: Information theory is a construct used by our society to control
> machines.
>
>
> > 3.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction
> between information and an information carrier?
>
> GR: Only if we can find direct scientific evidence that organisms use
> information theory constructs to communicate directly. So far none has been
> found.
>
>
>
> Clearly there is a system-level conveyance of information
>
> GR: It's not so clear. If I can be pointed to one experiment that proves
> there is such a thing as information theory constructs within living
> organism I will be very excited.
>
>
> that "carries" an organizational imperative.
>
>
> GR: More like DNA is an Imperative logical operator.
>
>
> I am intrigued by the notion introduced here recently that suggests
> "intelligence" as inhabiting this new, non-parametrizable space.
>
> GR: oops.
>
> Regards
> Gavin
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
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[Fis] Fwd: ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin

[Stanley N Salthe]

-- Forwarded message --
From: Stanley N Salthe 
Date: Fri, Apr 15, 2011 at 4:25 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin
To: Loet Leydesdorff 


Here I paste in a diagram I made some years ago illustrating the point made
by Loet in his second paragraph. (The application was to cosmology, but the
form is general)

STAN



  Loet Leydesdorff to joe.brenner, bethcardier, fis
 show details 2:57 PM (1 hour ago)

Dear Joe, Beth, and colleagues,

It seems to me that the “phenomenological elements” can be considered (and
perhaps measured) as redundancies. When meaning is provided to events a
reference to horizons of meaning – that is, other possible meanings – is
made intentionally. These other possible meanings are based on the exchange
of meaning possible in interhuman communication. The proliferation of these
other options is extremely fast in wishes and fantasies. Thus, our
communication of meaning – be it within one’s mind or between us in
exchanges – generate redundancy more than probabilistic entropy. Of course,
this remains structurally coupled to the dissipation in the underlying
systems (e.g., our material presence in human bodies) which follow the
entropy law.

>
>
> Brooks & Wiley (“Evolution as Entropy”, 1986) penciled curves in which they
> showed that if the maximum entropy increases faster than the entropy,
> redundancy is generated. This biological process is reinforced by cultural
> processes because the redundancy generation of alternative options is much
> faster. Whereas biological systems can contain semantic domains, human
> language enable us not only to show “linguistic behavior” (Maturana), but to
> use language for the exchange of both uncertainty and meaning. Entertaining
> models in scholarly communication further codifies meanings and thereby
> reinforces this process. This can be modeled using the theory and
> computation of anticipatory systems and the imprint of the redundancy
> generation on the entropy production can be measured as reduction of
> uncertainty (or synergy).
>
>
>
> With best wishes,
>
> Loet
>
>
> --
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
>
> Professor, University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),
> Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
> Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
>
>
>
> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *On Behalf Of *joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
> *Sent:* Thursday, April 14, 2011 7:32 PM
> *To:* bethcard...@hotmail.com; fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin
>
>
>
> Beth,
>
>
>
> I like your summary. I see throughout it reference to the "space of
> mystery" as something not actual, but that "needs to be filled". You also
> refer to the virtual and "virtual entities" and "non-represented
> phenomenological elements".
>
>
>
> My suggestion is to that the essential, causally necessary virtual entities
> are the potentialities that accompany the "actual" structures that become
> actualized in the narrative or other informational process. Alone, this
> formulation simply restates what you said. Seen, as I would like it to be,
> as another example of the underlying dynamic antagonism in natural, physical
> processes, I suggest that it is on firmer ontological foundations.
>
>
>
> Thus, that "collective, projected information structures of the emerging
> tale CAN exert a pull over its explicit elements, as they are forming, and
> also causing them to form", is not to be taken as a metaphor, but as a real
> "pull".
>
>
>
> Maybe it's not so mysterious, after all?
>
> Cheers,
>
>
>
> Joseph
>
> Ursprüngliche Nachricht
> Von: bethcard...@hotmail.com
> Datum: 11.04.2011 03:22
> An: 
> Betreff: Re: [Fis] ON INFORMATION THEORY--Mark Burgin
>
> Mark, thanks for starting an interesting topic.
>
>
>
> I'd like to highlight a connection between question 2, and the title of
> this session, and some dynamics of story formation.
>
>
>
> > 2. Are there types or kinds of information that are not
>
> > encompassed by the general theory of information (GTI)?
>
>
>
> If you're referring to your specific theory, its ontology seems promising,
> from the perspective of narrative mechanisms. In a story, similar to your
> GTI model, the representable elements are only a portion of the whole
> phenomenological system (your principle 4, I think). Also important to
> narrative is the impetus and ability to transform, in the manner you
> describe (principle 2).

[Fis] reply to Gavin

[Stanley N Salthe]

s my last or the week:

Replying to Gavin -- I think you make the 'error of misplaced concreteness'.
 Information theory -- and all theories and laws are modeling tools, not
actual phenomena.  So, it is also true that when an apple falls it is not
being pulled by gravitation  Gravitation is our way of understanding the
falling.  We all know these things, so there is no need to point this out.


STAN


On Sat, Apr 9, 2011 at 11:45 PM, Gavin Ritz  wrote:

Ted



Thank you Mark. This promises to be interesting.


My view may best be introduced by stating that I believe we are in the

business of creating a new science that will depend on new abstractions.

These abstractions will extend from the notion of "information" as a first

class citizen, as opposed to our default, the "particle." The latter has

qualities that can be measured and in fact the very idea of metrics is bound

to this notion of thingness.


GR: I just can't see the evidence that information has anything to do with

living organisms.




Much of the dialog here works with the problem of naming what that it is.


GR: They look more like logical operators, such as Imperative logic,

declarative logic and interrogative logic.




Having said that...


> 1.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict

distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures as

quantitative or qualitative characteristics of information?




Thank you Mark. This promises to be interesting.


My view may best be introduced by stating that I believe we are in the
business of creating a new science that will depend on new abstractions.
These abstractions will extend from the notion of "information" as a first
class citizen, as opposed to our default, the "particle." The latter has
qualities that can be measured and in fact the very idea of metrics is bound
to this notion of thingness.


Because we will not leave existing theoretical tools behind, we need a
bridge between the abstractions of "effect" in the particle model (fields
and forces) and the corresponding "effect" in the information model. I am
fine with extending the metaphor far enough to say that we need something
like parametrics in our new science of information. But I really balk at
using the notion from one system in another without some sort of morphism.


Much of the dialog here works with the problem of naming what that it is.
Unfortunately, the abstractions of fields and forces are a very poor formal
model, because they are defined not by their essence but by their metrics.


Having said that...


> 1.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict
distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures as
quantitative or qualitative characteristics of information?


I am rather certain that there is a very real distinction, because of how we
define the problem. After all, we are not asking how do information and
information metrics fit within the confines of rather limited abstractions.
At least I am not. But the distinction does not allow for full orthogonality
from set theory (the formalism of things), because we want to be able to
model and engineer observable phenomenon in a cleaner way. This should be
the test of any serious proposal, in my view.


This requirement is why discussion on these matters often moves into
category theory, after the fashion of Barwise and others. A spanning
morphism can extend the notion of parameters to information space, but only
when considered in the situation of that origin (meaning measurable space in
the traditional sense).


> 2.Are there types or kinds of information that are not
encompassed by the general theory of information (GTI)?


I believe so. Some types clearly have laws that affect the world, which is
how you scope the types covered by GTI. But just as particle physics finds
it handy to have virtual particles and transcendent symmetries over them, so
will we have information types that do not touch the world in an observable
way; these will be required to support clean laws of behavior, yet to be
convincingly proposed.


> 3.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction
between information and an information carrier?


I suppose you will get universal agreement on this, at least here. But...


I was just at NIH at a rather introspective conference on structural
biology, which assumes that the form of the carriers collectively forms the
code of the system. They have dropped billions (quite literally) into
metrics associated with these laws of information form but are ready to
abandon the concept as a key technique. Clearly there is a system-level
conveyance of information that "carries" an organizational imperative. If
these can be said to be supported with the metaphoric virtual particle with
the local interaction governed by the form of the carrier, then the answer
is both yes and no.


I am intrigued by the notion introduced here r

Re: [Fis] Discussion session on information theory (Igor's thread)

[Stanley N Salthe]

Igor said --



IG: I suggested this definition (Gurevich, 1989). “Information is
heterogeneity, stable for some definite time”. Regardless of the nature of
heterogeneity, would be it letters, words, phrases or - elementary
particles, atoms, molecules, or - people, groups, societies, etc.



Gurevich I.M. (1989). Law of informatics - a basis of researches and
designing of complex communication and management systems. (In Russian).
«Ecos». Moscow 60 p.


SS: I would point out that this is, rather, information carrying capacity.
 Information results from its reduction.


STAN

On Sat, Apr 23, 2011 at 1:34 AM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch <
joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> wrote:

> Dear Igor, Dear Pedro and Colleagues,
>
>
>
> When someone has spent as much time and effort as Igor has on developing
> and presenting a concept of information, the least one can do is study and
> comment on it carefully. Now, I happen to disagree with Igor on some pretty
> fundamental issues, but I believe my critique, and the response from him I
> hope we will all see, may suggest new ways of approaching our favorite
> topic. I take as references both his long note of 20 December 2010, to which
> Pedro referred, and his summary of it 19 April 2011.
>
>
>
> 1. General Remark
>
> The key ontological property for Igor is identity: he thinks
> that a “Science of Information” must use a single, unified unique definition
> of information. On the other hand “information is a continuous evolving
> process” that exists in both simple and complex forms. It is not clear why,
> except from a kind of habit, one needs to have a single, static definition
> for an evolving process. But, you and he will say, he states that
> information is heterogeneity! Yes, but it is heterogeneity to the exclusion
> of homogeneity, which for anything real is an abstraction. It is the
> identity of exclusion (please see next point).
>
>
>
> 2. The Definitions of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity
>
> Igor’s definitions are a restatement of the principle of
> exclusivity in standard set theory and the standard concept of similarity
> and difference. This makes his definitions of homo- and heterogeneity fully
> equivalent to elements of classical bivalent propositional logic. In my
> opinion, it is impossible for such a logic and such definitions to apply to
> information as a process, moving as it does between partially homogeneous
> and heterogeneous elements.
>
>
>
> 3. Information-as-Heterogeneity
>
> Igor states that his definition of
> information-as-heterogeneity, stable for a finite time, “can describe
> information (heterogeneity) of any nature”. This statement perhaps
> anticipates the subsequent discussion, but it is not clear as it stands. In
> the complete note it is stated that “the measure of the degree of
> heterogeneity or information is Shannon’s information entropy *and other
> information characteristics (information divergence, joint entropy,
> communication information)*”. However, these “other information
> characteristics”, which in my view may be the most significant ones for
> further discussion, are not indicated, nor is if and how they function in
> measurement.
>
>
>
> 4. Information and Observers
>
> Igor is of course correct when he observes (sorry) that the
> advent of Observers results in new levels of complexity (or hierarchies) of
> information, limited by the informational characteristics of the “lowest
> level”, that is the physics and chemistry of our world. I also agree that it
> is most useful to see information as a universal property or process
> component of the world.
>
> However, I would like to call attention to the most
> interesting citation Igor makes in his April, 2011 note from the work of A.
> D. Ursul to the effect that “information is a variety which one object
> contains about the other (in the process of their interaction (which can
> also be self-referential))”.
>
> This for me is an essential point: we do not need to make
> absolute separations between observer and observed, Observer 1 and Observer
> 2 (both “objects” and “subjects”) and the information, in slightly different
> words, that is a product of their interaction, the interactive process. I am
> not convinced, then, that the standards and definitions of each Observer
> will be totally disjoint. Rather (with some good will), some partially if
> not completely compatible interpretations of information will be possible.
>
>
>
> 5. Perception and Thinking
>
> As a final point, I note Igor’s statement that “the concept of
> information reflects … also the *property* of perception and thinking, as
> well as the “objectively real property of inanimate and animate objects of
> nature and society”. I would argue that the use of “objectively” here
> diminishes the value of the qualitative features of information that the
> simple definition of it as heterogeneity cannot provide, but that we s

[Fis] replies to Quiao, Pedro, Krassimir & Loet

[Stanley N Salthe]

(1) Replying Quiao --


On Mon, Apr 25, 2011 at 7:15 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

Message from Qiao Tian-qing


--


 Dear FISers

There is another general theory of information (GTIA).

I consider,

The customarily named information is the collection of three kinds of
things´ attributes: things themselves (including cause or effect formed
through their interaction), the attributes of things that someone thinks and
simulates, and the attributes of tools someone or something uses when
considers, expresses, or simulates something. The first kind of attributes
of things is based on facts, for example, the three states of water, someone
is swimming. This are physical, chemical, biological, social or any other
properties of things, irrefutable and objective, which have nothing to do
with any expressive way related to the thing (such spoken and written
languages, music or pictures).


This relates to the semiotic work of  Jacob von Uexküll ('Biological
Theory', 1925), who suggested that each species has its own sensory
equipment, and finds/ lives in a different world from other species.  It
could be said that this was an early postmodern text.   It is now in the
standard (Peircean) background of semiotics.


The second kind is related with the inner thoughts, or expressions through
talk, or sentence, namely, some attributes of things that someone can find;
or the attributes of things that could be simulate according to science and
technology.


 Here we find Bidgman's 'operationalism' in his 1927 'The Logic of Modern
Physics'.


The third kind is the attributes of tools used by someone (or something)
when he himself thinks, or expresses, or simulates something, i.e. the state
of brain neurons when he thinks, the line trend of words when writes, the
vibration frequency and intensity of sound when speaks, the bit of circuit
devices in a computer, or the models of devices used in an experiment, etc.


This again relates to the above.

---



(2) Then to Pedro, Krassimir and Loet:


Pedro Says:


But a new framework (way of thinking) is needed where we somehow
de-anthropogenize the field, getting it partially free of the above
circularity: "because I am philososphically or disciplinarily configured
that way, info is this and that for me". My usual argument in this list has
been that a few "informational entities" have to be taken as model systems,
and then a comparative study undertaken. Now what I would ad is that a
previous new "theory of mind" has to be advanced, a little bit at least.


And Krassimir says:


What we may do is to invite everybody to present from his/her point of view
one or more (own or not) information theories. The texts we will organize in
a book for free access from all over the world.


Loet says:


The need for a general theory of information can therefore be understood
psychologically, but this is itself a special subject of possible
theorizing. J The inference to a general theory is not warranted by this
(empirical) philosophy of science.


I have just completed an attempt to sketch of a very general theory of
information written for a special issue of the new journal "Information"
based on the FIS 2010 Beijing conference.  In this paper I suggest that
semiotics is subsumed by information theory and that this in turn is
subsumed by thermodynamics.  Thus -- {thermodynamics {information theory
{semiotics}}}


This is based on my generalization of the Shannon definition of information,
as:

information is a reduction in uncertainty = choosing;


Bateson: information is a difference that makes a difference (to an
interpreting system)


Thermodynamic: information is any constraint on entropy production


STAN
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[Fis] replies to several

[Stanley N Salthe]

Replying to Raphael, Joseph, and Loet -

**

*Rafael Capurro* to Robert, fis

show details 10:13 AM (4 hours ago)


well... not exactly. This is the way Hegel (and others) looked at it,

discarding the 'singulars' or including them into the particulars and so

creating a dialectics of the universal and the particular. Kierkegaard

was not at all happy with this. What I am trying to say (quoting Octavio

Paz) is nothing mystical or singular in the sense that might be part of

the process of questioning ("falsifying") theories and the like. It is

surely not against scientific method (fallibilistic or not) and it is

not mystical (a word used by Wittgenstein as you know). Trees are trees,

not signs. As simple as this. Best. Rafael


Trees vary according species and cultures, each of which has evolved signs
to negotiate with them.  ‘Trees as trees’ are a ‘scientific’ fiction insofar
as they are supposed to be so without any connection to observation and
interpretation.  In fact here we have a good example for consideration of
nominalism.  ‘Trees’ is a  universal, and depends upon
observation/interpretation regarding particular ones in order to be
instantiated at places and times.  Science believes it can transcend this
by, for example, observing different species interacting with a particular
kind of tree.  The worm, the moth and squirrel are observed interacting with
a kind of tree, under the idea that the more kinds of interactions we
observe the more actual is this kind of tree.  But the whole scene is a
social construct; placing a universal into an increasingly inclusive
observer-constructed context does not make it increasingly ‘real’ as a
universal. Recording our observations and combining them with those of
others merely increases the ‘scale’ of the observation.  A library full of
treatises on oaks does not make ‘oak’ a real universal -- unless your
philosophy deems it to be so.  Things-as-such are linguistic constructions.

--


Then to Joseph --


Joseph --


On Thu, May 5, 2011 at 2:59 PM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch <
joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> wrote:

Dear John,


The reference you cited looks like essential reading and I have ordered it.
Thank you for calling it to our attention.


I believe, also, that the conventional view of meaning leads to its erasure,
and this exactly why a Derridean view of writing (and speech) is required in
which erasure does not mean the total loss of meaning.


As far as signs go, the area of debate is clear. A theory of signs (or
sign-relations) is essential to the understanding of information and
questions of reality and illusion. You believe that Peirce delivers this and
I do not. The reason is that the critical fallibility, I think, is not in
our representations, about which there should be no debate, but in taking
signs (Peirce's icon and index) as representations in the first place. Doing
this leads straight to the illusions we as realists wanted to avoid.


Without this there can be no discourse about the origin of semiosis, which
requires the concept of indexical signs.

--



Then replying to Loet --


On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 9:12 AM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

Dear Koichiro and colleagues,



-snip-



 Meaning is provided to the events from the perspective of hindsight, and
with reference to other possible meanings (at t +1). Thus, acting against
the arrow of time, the communication of meaning increases the redundancy (as
different from the increasing entropy to which it is coupled as a feedback
mechanism).


>From a semiotic perspective, a system will already have its meanings
embodied in signs.  This involves foresight, even searching, as well.




-snip-



Your point of replacing the “why” with “by what” seems not necessary to me.
The communication is carried by those units which have communicative
competencies. This closes the domains operationally. You and I cannot
communicate in terms of atoms, whereas molecules can. The why-question is
utmost important because it involves evolutionary theorizing about the
systems under study; for example, chemical versus biological evolution.


I agree with this.  In semiotics the 'why' is embodied in the pragmatic
aspects of semiosis, resulting, in biological systems, from adaptation.  The
'why' is involved up front in the seeking for information. Totally
unrelated, uncalled-for, information will simply be missed (possibly at
peril!).


STAN


 Best wishes,

Loet
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[Fis] testing

[Stanley N Salthe]

I am having problems communicating with lists, So I am trying to see if this
gets through.

STAN
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Re: [Fis] Chemical information: a field of fuzzy contours ?

[Stanley N Salthe]

Michel -- Organic chemistry was known to be the most difficult course in
Columbia University.  But I got interested in it, worked very hard
constantly, and I achieved an  'A'.  But what you say here indicates several
orders of magnitude more difficulty than what I played with in university.
 For me this raises a question about the 'realms of nature', as in the
subsumptive hierarchy: {physical realm {chemical realm {biological realm}}.
 Do you think one should place an 'organic realm' between chemical and
biological?  Or, otherwise, do you think it possible that there might be
organic realms out in the universe not entrained into biology?

STAN

On Sat, Sep 17, 2011 at 1:53 PM, Michel Petitjean <
petitjean.chi...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear Joe, dear FISErs,
>
> An organic chemist is able to predict a number of properties from the
> structural formula, including much about reactivity of the compound.
> But as you know, doing that properly is extremely difficult in a
> number of cases, because the rules governing reactivity are much more
> complicated that the ones which are taught at Universities, and the
> number of rules expands rapidly each year. In fact, an experienced
> Organic Chemist has in his head a so extraordinary rich collection of
> rules and a so enormous knowledge that even many chemists which are
> not Organicians cannot imagine the extent of this knowledge.
> It is clear that the "doing chemistry" process derives from these
> rules (these rules are chemical information), not only from the
> formulas.
> Since the 70's, some cheminformaticians tried to store that in
> databases: reactions databases plus databases of reactivity rules for
> computer sssisted synthesis or retrosynthesis, etc., then built
> programmes intended to output proposals supposed to help the chemist.
> As far as I know, the brain of the Organician is still by far much
> more efficient than the best softwares which were produced.
> So, I may tell that the information available in the brain of the
> Organician is extremely difficult to store on computer, and it is even
> very difficult to teach it, apart the very beginning.
> There are examples other than reactivity. A huge of QSAR studies were
> done in order to predict various physico-chemical properties of simple
> chemical compounds, e.g., predicting from the structural formulas the
> boiling temperatures of monofunctional compounds such as alcohols,
> cetones, etc. at 20 C under 1 atm. But even in these apparently simple
> cases, the chemical information we need to do that with an acceptable
> accuracy is difficult to extract: the conclusions of such QSAR studies
> cannot be applied to any alcohol or cetone (still assumed to be
> monofunctional compounds), and it is even difficult to know the extent
> of validity of the published empirical rules, concretely often
> summarized by some regression coefficients.
> The example of spectroscopic databases is also of interest. How
> simulate spectras (infrared, NMR, mass spectras, etc.) of chemical
> compounds ? Starting from the structural formula, it is really hard to
> simulate, e.g. a low resolution mass spectra. Most time, it was
> attempted to extract rules from spectroscopic databases, then try to
> predict the spectra of a compound absent from the database, or
> conversely, retrieving the structural formula of a compound from its
> spectra(s). Many such softwares were developped since the 70's (one of
> the oldest ones is STIRS), but really the chemical information needed
> to do that properly is very difficult to extract.
> To conclude, I retain your example of crystallization: for sure when
> we will able to retrieve from the structural formula H-O-H that water
> under 1 atm should crystallize at 0 C, then for sure we will be ready
> to predict more about crystallization of chemicals.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Michel.
>
> 2011/9/17 joe.bren...@bluewin.ch :
> > Dear Michel and FIS Colleagues,
> >
> > This will be an interesting discussion, since the core nature and role of
> > information will be involved. Here is just one first point: to me, as a
> > chemist, chemical information is only secondarily an "object" capable of
> > being formalized, archived, etc. A formula has meaning for me in terms
> > of the potential reactions the molecule to which it refers can undergo,
> what
> > it looked like when crystallized for the first time and so on.
> >
> > Cheminformatics seems not to deal with such aspects of chemical
> information
> > as part of a process of "doing chemistry". Can this be captured by
> another system?
> >
> > Best wishes,
> >
> > Joseph
> >
>
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[Fis] Fwd: Chemical information: a field of fuzzy contours ?

[Stanley N Salthe]

Michel -- Regarding:

Now, I ask you the following: please can you provide an extremely
simple example (the most simple you could imagine) of situation in
which you can say: << in this situation, information is ... >>.
Chemical information is welcome, but an example from physics would be
great, too. However, please, no biology example, that will be dicussed
at the occasion of a future session.


Would it not be the case that chemical information would relate to
catalysts?  That is, chemical scale configurations which have the property
of forming enabling constraints for some chemical bond alterations.  Then,
of course, at the physical level we have the fermion / boson transactions
that actually make up the basis of a chemical reaction.

STAN


On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 7:07 AM, Michel Petitjean <
petitjean.chi...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear FISers,
>
> Pedro raises several points.
> Among them:
>
> 1. "Chemoinformatics" or "Cheminformatics" ?
> Both terms are encountered. I would say that unless some authority
> takes a decision, both terms will continue to be used.
>
> 2. Despite I gave an example of what could be cheminformation in a
> concrete case, I did not tell what was exactly cheminformation in this
> concrete case. I just asked the question of what it could be.
> Now, I ask you the following: please can you provide an extremely
> simple example (the most simple you could imagine) of situation in
> which you can say: << in this situation, information is ... >>.
> Chemical information is welcome, but an example from physics would be
> great, too. However, please, no biology example, that will be dicussed
> at the occasion of a future session.
> These examples are expected to help us to define information in more
> general situations.
>
> 3. The comparison Pedro did with symmetry is of interest: can anyone
> define symmetry ?
> During a long time, symmetry had in common with information that many
> people attempted to define it in its own field, giving raise to many
> particular definitions, but not to a common and widely accepted one.
> Some years ago, although I needed to mention a definition of symmetry
> in one of my papers, I was surprised that I could not find an unifying
> one (symmetry is known since millenaries!!). Even in the book of Weyl
> I did not find the expected one.
> So, I decided to build my own one (Symmetry: Culture and Science,
> 2007, 18[2-3], 99-119; free reprint at
> http://petitjeanmichel.free.fr/itoweb.paper.SCS.2007). See also:
> http://petitjeanmichel.free.fr/itoweb.petitjean.html
> In fact, the group structure which is generally a priori imposed, is a
> consequence of several properties that the definition should satisfy
> to be in agreement with some obvious intuitive requirements (and so,
> five different groups appear naturally, none of them being imposed a
> priori). Of course, the proposed unifying definition applies to a
> broad spectrum of situations, not only the geometric one: matrices,
> functions, distributions, graphs, etc.
> But that was possible because I already had knowledge of the many
> definitions in particular domains or situations.
>
> Thus I expect that that you will post several examples of information
> in very simples cases.
> From the analysis of these situations we should move forward.
>
> E.g., for symmetry, one of the simple examples I gave was the set of
> three points of the real line: if one point is the mid of the two
> other, there is symmetry (in fact, it is a case of achirality, i.e.
> indirect symmetry, because here we deal with reflections rather than
> with rotations).
> It would be great to have so simple situations for information in
> chemistry or physics.
>
> Thanks by advance,
> ll my best,
>
> Michel.
>
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Re: [Fis] Category Theory and Information. Back to Basics

[Stanley N Salthe]

Joseph --

On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 11:14 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

> **
>  Dear Gavin, Loet and Colleagues,
>
> Gavin raises a fair question as to the reasons for my objection to the use
> of category theory
> with respect to information. My answer is that it suffers from the same
> limitations as standard truth-functional logic, set theory and mereology:
>
> Logic: absolute separation of premisses and conclusion
> Set Theory: absolute separation of set and elements of the set
> Mereology: absolute separation of part and who
>
Category Theory: exhaustivity and absolute separation of elements of
> different categories. (The logics of topoi are Boolean logics).
>

SS: Your objection seems to me to imply a fatal disjunction between our
usual logics -- the basis of science -- and the actual (changing) world.
 For example, in biological ontogeny we begin at one scale, and GRADUALLy
assemble a larger scale.  During this transition the system is ambiguous as
to scale.  It is CHANGE which faults our thinking here, not the idea that a
developing embryo can be modeled as existing at more than one scale.  I
suppose you can then tell us that your system of logic (LIR) takes care of
this, by encompassing change as it happens.  Yes?

STAN

>
> For complex process phenomena such as information, involving
> complementarity, overlap or physical interactions between elements, these
> doctrines fail. The "mathematical conceptualization" they provide does not
> capture the non-Markovian aspects of the processes involved for which no
> algorithm can be written. If any algebra is possible, it must be a
> non-Boolean one, something like that used in quantum mechanics extended to
> the macroscopic level.
>
> I have proposed a new categorial ontology in which the key categorial
> feature is NON-separability. This concept would seem to apply to some of the
> approaches to information which have been proposed recently, e.g. those of
> Deacon and Ulanowicz. I would greatly welcome the opportunity to see if my
> approach and its logic stand up to further scrutiny.
>
> As Loet suggests, we must avoid confounding such a (more qualitative)
> discourse with the standard one and translate meaningfully between them.
> However this means, as a minimum, accepting the existence and validity of
> both, as well as the possibility in principle of some areas of overlap,
> without conflation.
>
> Best,
>
> Joseph
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gavin Ritz
> *To:* 'Joseph Brenner'
> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 18, 2011 10:45 AM
> *Subject:* RE: [Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis -
> bothpractical and logical.
>
>  Hi there Joseph
>
>
>
> This takes us
>
> back to the question of the primacy of quantitative over qualitative
>
> properties, or, better, over qualitative + quantitative properties.
>
>
>
> Is this not a good reason to use category theory and a Topos (part of an
> object), does not the axiom of “limits” and the axiom of “exponentiation-
> map objects” deal philosophically with “quantity and limit” and “quality and
> variety” concepts respectively.
>
>
>
> Is this not the goal of category theory to explain the concepts in a
> conceptual mathematical way.
>
>
>
> Regards
>
> Gavin
>
>
>
> This for
>
> me is the real area for discussion, and points to the need for both lines
>
> being pursued, without excluding either.
>
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gavin Ritz 
> *To:* 'Joseph Brenner' 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 18, 2011 10:45 AM
> *Subject:* RE: [Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis -
> bothpractical and logical.
>
>  Hi there Joseph
>
>
>
> This takes us
>
> back to the question of the primacy of quantitative over qualitative
>
> properties, or, better, over qualitative + quantitative properties.
>
>
>
>
>
> Is this not a good reason to use category theory and a Topos (part of an
> object), does not the axiom of “limits” and the axiom of “exponentiation-
> map objects” deal philosophically with “quantity and limit” and “quality and
> variety” concepts respectively.
>
>
>
> Is this not the goal of category theory to explain the concepts in a
> conceptual mathematical way.
>
>
>
> Regards
>
> Gavin
>
>
>
> This for
>
> me is the real area for discussion, and points to the need for both lines
>
> being pursued, without excluding either.
>
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Category Theory and Information. Back to Basics

[Stanley N Salthe]

Joseph --

On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 3:37 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

> **
> Dear Stan,
>
> To return to your question, I think that there is a disjunction between our
> usual logics and the actual, changing world but that it is fatal only in 
> *those
> *logics. Logic in Reality reduces to standard logic for simple process
> phenomena involving minimal interactive aspects - those which
> science handles easily. But LIR  applies to more complex phenomena whose
> evolution I would not consider outside science. Could we say that LIR is a
> way of bringing change better within science?
>
> Thus my answer to your question is yes. LIR, to use your phrase,
> encompasses change as it happens. It describes logical characteristics
> of the evolution of processes in a multi-dimensional configuration space.
> The elements of the logic are changing values of the actuality and
> potentiality of the elements in interaction (e.g., system and environment). 
> The
> disjunction thus becomes, itself, a process describable by LIR.
>

So, just to get a clearer statement -- we can have a differential equation
describing some kind of change. But here the constants are fixed, and so the
change is predetermined, and used to describe only average, standard or
characteristic changes.  So, you seem to be saying that in LIR format one
can describe changes where the constraints are not fixed.

If so, would the changes of the constants be in some way predetermined?  Or
could that be open as well?

>
> I do not expect that people who wish to retain the characteristics of
> standard category theory can accept the above any more than those who
> require that logic refer only to propositions and their truth-values. I
> have said that a conceptual mathematical theory applicable to my Logic in
> Reality is both possible in principle and desirable. I only insist that none
> such yet exists, since what does exist is eliminative with respect to the
> interactive realities LIR attempts to discuss, among them information.
>

Does the above comment give some hint of what would be required, or
accomplished by this math?

STAN

>
> Cheers,
>
> Joseph
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Stanley N Salthe 
> *To:* joe.bren...@bluewin.ch ; fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 18, 2011 11:16 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Category Theory and Information. Back to Basics
>
> Joseph --
>  SS: Your objection seems to me to imply a fatal disjunction between our
> usual logics -- the basis of science -- and the actual (changing) world.
>  For example, in biological ontogeny we begin at one scale, and GRADUALLy
> assemble a larger scale.  During this transition the system is ambiguous as
> to scale.  It is CHANGE which faults our thinking here, not the idea that a
> developing embryo can be modeled as existing at more than one scale.  I
> suppose you can then tell us that your system of logic (LIR) takes care of
> this, by encompassing change as it happens.  Yes?
>
> STAN
>
>>
>> For complex process phenomena such as information, involving
>> complementarity, overlap or physical interactions between elements, these
>> doctrines fail. The "mathematical conceptualization" they provide does not
>> capture the non-Markovian aspects of the processes involved for which no
>> algorithm can be written. If any algebra is possible, it must be a
>> non-Boolean one, something like that used in quantum mechanics extended to
>> the macroscopic level.
>>
>> I have proposed a new categorial ontology in which the key categorial
>> feature is NON-separability. This concept would seem to apply to some of the
>> approaches to information which have been proposed recently, e.g. those of
>> Deacon and Ulanowicz. I would greatly welcome the opportunity to see if my
>> approach and its logic stand up to further scrutiny.
>>
>> As Loet suggests, we must avoid confounding such a (more qualitative)
>> discourse with the standard one and translate meaningfully between them.
>> However this means, as a minimum, accepting the existence and validity of
>> both, as well as the possibility in principle of some areas of overlap,
>> without conflation.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Joseph
>>
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Gavin Ritz
>> *To:* 'Joseph Brenner'
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 18, 2011 10:45 AM
>> *Subject:* RE: [Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis -
>> bothpractical and logical.
>>
>>  Hi there Joseph
>>
>> This takes us
>>
>> back to the question of the primacy of quantitative over qualitative
>>
>> properties, or, better, over qualitative

Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Stanley N Salthe]

Regarding:

>Information Science is a perfect tool for integration of curriculum,
especially in the context of Liberal Arts education. >Which other concept,
if not information, can be applied in all possible contexts of education?

I would point out that there have been two previous disciplines that have
attempted this reasonable goal -- systems science and semiotics.  Neither
one ever became a major program except in one or two universities where
major players worked.  Our culture rewards specializations much more than
general applications.

STAN



On Sat, Dec 3, 2011 at 7:23 AM,  wrote:

> Dear Colleagues:
> There are some questions which periodically return to FIS
> discussions without conclusive answers. For instance: "What is
> information?" However, the lack of consensus regarding central
> concept is not an obstacle in the development of Information
> Science. There is no commonly accepted answer to the question
> "What is life?" But, this does not threaten the identity of
> Biology.
>
> Information Science has not yet achieved a status of a
> commonly recognized discipline. It is frequently confused with
> Computer Science, because of the term Informatics which in
> Europe denotes what in the US is called Computing, or with
> Library
> Science and sometimes even with Philosophy of Information,
> as visible from the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information
> http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ where philosophy and science
> interleave
> on many levels.
>
> Information Science will never receive recognition without an
> organized effort of research community to introduce its
> philosophy,
> goals, methods, and achievements to the general audience.
>
> Books and articles popularizing the theme of information as
> a subject of independent study do not have big enough
> circulation to be sufficient in establishing an identity of
> the discipline. The only effective way is to introduce
> Information Science as a subject of education at the college
> level for students who do not necessarily want to specialize
> in this direction.
>
> Certainly, introduction of a new subject to curriculum is not
> easy, but it is possible. After all, Information Science is a
> perfect tool for integration of curriculum, especially in the
> context of Liberal Arts education. Which other concept, if not
> information, can be applied in all possible contexts of
> education?
>
> Now, the question is whether we are ready to come out with a
> syllabus for such a course acceptable for all of us, those who
> are involved in the subject, and those who aren't, but
> participate in the development of curricula. Can we overcome
> differences between our views on the definition of
> information, on the relationship of information understood in
> a general way to its particular manifestations in other
> disciplines?
>
> Since the course (or courses) should present an identity of
> the discipline of Information Science, it is very important
> that we are convinced about the authentic existence of a large
> enough common ground. Can we develop a map of this territory?
> Can we pool resources to establish foundations for a standard,
> Information Science curriculum?
>
> Marcin and Gordana
>
> Marcin J. Schroeder, Ph.D.
> Professor and Dean of Academic Affairs
> Akita International University
> Akita, Japan
> m...@aiu.ac.jp
>
>
> Gordana Dodig Crnkovic,
> Associate Professor
> Head of the Computer Science and Networks Department
> School of Innovation, Design and Engineering
> Mälardalen University
> Sweden
> http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/
>
> Organizer of the Symposium on Natural/Unconventional
> Computing,
> the Turing Centenary  World Congress of AISB/IACAP
> https://sites.google.com/site/naturalcomputingaisbiacap2012
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Stanley N Salthe]

And it could feature in 'Science for Non-Majors' courses as well.

STAN

On Mon, Dec 5, 2011 at 12:44 PM, Guy A Hoelzer  wrote:

> Hi All,
>
> I agree with those who are suggesting that Information Science makes sense
> as a widely useful way to think about different scientific disciplines
> even if we don't have a strong consensus on how to define 'information'.
> I think there is enough coherence among views of 'information' to underpin
> the unity and universality of the approach.  Perhaps Information Science
> is less a discipline of its own and more of a common approach to
> understanding that can be applied across disciplines.  While I can imagine
> good courses focusing on Information Science, it might be most productive
> to include a common framework for information-based models/viewpoints
> across the curriculum.
>
> Guy Hoelzer
>
>
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Re: [Fis] THEORY AND SCIENCE From QTQ

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bob -- Agreed. The way I see it is that there are two orientations in
science, and these depend upon personality.  One is the strategy of
confirmation (of a favored theory), the other is the strategy of testing
(of other's theories).  The gist of confirmation is to conjure, and then
firm up, a concept with increasing examples (this fits my own, basically
artistic, temperament).  The gist of testing, as Popper persuaded us, is to
try to destroy any theory, with the notion that all of them would
eventually get overturned. This fits with pessimistic personalities. This
view seems inconsistent with the now-getting-popular idea from C.S. Peirce,
that we will discover 'truth' in the long run.  Of course, from semiotics
we also have the view (originally from von Uexküll) that each species is
locked into its own sensorium (and so each culture into its own linguistic
and conceptual biases as well), meaning that this truth could only be one
possible version of the world.  (Note that technological effectiveness
cannot suggest that a theory is 'true', even though many scientists believe
this.)

STAN

On Wed, Jan 11, 2012 at 9:49 AM, Bob Logan wrote:

> Caro Colleagues - Etymology is always a useful exercise - theory and
> theatre come from the same root 'to see' and science from the root 'to
> know'. "The word *theoria* θεωρία, meant 'a looking at, viewing,
> beholding', and referring to contemplation or speculation (wikipedia
> article on theory)." Now most often we say to see is to believe or know.
> This translate into the idea that  theory helps us to believe or to know or
> to do science. But Marshall McLuhan said I did not see it until I believed
> it. In other words to believe or know is a necessary condition to be able
> to see which translates into the idea that we need science to make a
> theory. Science is a way of organizing theories and theories are a way of
> organizing science. The relation of science and theory is a chicken and egg
> problem. It is a question of emergence. The relation of science and theory
> is one of non-linear dynamics. One needs science to make a theory and a
> theory or theories to make science. As is the case with emergent phenomena
> one cannot predict what theories will emerge from science or what science
> will emerge from theories. This is my theory of science and my science of
> theories.
>
> I hope you enjoyed my playful take on the relation of science and theory
> which I offer as a serious resolution to the challenges raised in this
> thread. I also hope you will comment.
>
> with kind regards - Bob Logan
>
>
> On 2012-01-11, at 2:42 AM, Krassimir Markov wrote:
>
>  Dear QTQ and FIS Colleagues,
>
> I am afraid we had not define the terms ‘theory” and “science” but start
> discussion.
> Let firstly clear what they means and after that to make conclusions.
>
> It is clear the theories are part of the science but the science is
> something more.
>
> In our area - the Information Science is quite more than any theory for
> information.
>
> Of course,  “What is information?” is the basic question, but after it
> follow the questions “How it is used by live organisms?” and “Why it is
> needed for social structures?”, “Why one and the same reflection is
> information for one but not for another subject?” and “Can the information
> be totally destroyed or not, i.e. is the information depended with physical
> (material) world or not?”, etc.
>
> ---
>
> About the journals:
>
> I have more than 35 year experience in editing and publishing scientific
> collections and journals.
> My personal position is: “The Variety and Independence cause Development!”
>
>
> Every journal has its own politic and there is no sense to discus its
> rules.
> My personal position is presented in the name of my firs Int. Journal:
> “Information Theories and Applications”.
> Yes – Theories.
>
> Some scientists prefer to be protected from “spam” papers by the
> reviewers, but this has simple decision – “Do not read papers at all !”
>
> The science needs new ideas.
> Sometimes the proper way is not in the fat books but in the thin papers.
> We have long history of development but are we sure that all in it
> (especially for information) is absolutely correct ant may be accepted
> without doubt?
>
> ---
>
> Happy New 2012 Year!
> Friendly regards
>
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
>  *From:* Pedro C. Marijuan 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 10, 2012 5:48 PM
> *To:* fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Subject:* [Fis] [Fwd: THEORY AND SCIENCE] From QTQ
>
>
>
>  Mensaje original   Asunto: THEORY AND SCIENCE Fecha: Tue,
> 10 Jan 2012 10:49:58 +0800 De: whhbs...@sina.com Responder a:
> whhbs...@sina.com Para: Pedro C. Marijuan 
> mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es,
> mjs mailto:m...@aiu.ac.jp , Joseph Brenner
> mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch , fislist
> mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es 
>
> Dear Pedro, Dear Marcin, Dear Joseph, Dear FIS Colleagues, 
> Theory is important and necessary, but theory is different from science,
> theor

Re: [Fis] FW: [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

[Stanley N Salthe]

Concerning the meaning (or effect) of information (or constraint) in
general, I have proposed that context is crucial in modulating the effect
-- in all cases.  Thus: it would be like the logical example:

 Effect = context a   x   Constraint ^context b

STAN




On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 2:18 PM, Christophe Menant <
christophe.men...@hotmail.fr> wrote:

>  *Dear FISers,
> Indeed information can be considered downwards (physical & meaningless)
> and upwards (biological & meaningful). The difference being about
> interpretation or not.
> It also introduces an evolutionary approach to information processing and
> meaning generation.
> There is a chapter on that subject in a recent book (
> http://www.amazon.co.uk/Information-Computation-Philosophical-Understanding-Foundations/dp/toc/9814295477
> ).
> “Computation on Information, Meaning and Representations.An Evolutionary
> Approach”
> Content of the chapter:
> 1. Information and Meaning. Meaning Generation
> 1.1. Information.Meaning of information and quantity of information
> 1.2. Meaningful information and constraint satisfaction. A systemic
> approach
> 2. Information, Meaning and Representations. An Evolutionary Approach
> 2.1. Stay alive constraint and meaning generation for organisms
> 2.2. The Meaning Generator System (MGS). A systemic and evolutionary
> approach
> 2.3. Meaning transmission
> 2.4. Individual and species constraints. Group life constraints. Networks
> of meanings
> 2.5. From meaningful information to meaningful representations
> 3. Meaningful Information and Representations in Humans
> 4. Meaningful Information and Representations in Artificial Systems
> 4.1. Meaningful information and representations from traditional AI to
> Nouvelle AI. Embodied-situated AI
> 4.2. Meaningful representations versus the guidance theory of
> representation
> 4.3. Meaningful information and representations versus the enactive
> approach
> 5. Conclusion and Continuation
> 5.1. Conclusion
> 5.2. Continuation
> A version close to the final text can be reached at
> http://crmenant.free.fr/2009BookChapter/C.Menant.211009.pdf
>
> As Plamen says, we may be at the beginning of a new scientific revolution.
> But I’m afraid that an understanding of the meaning of information needs
> clear enough an understanding of the constraint at the source of the
> meaning generation process. And even for basic organic meanings coming from
> a “stay alive” constraint, we have to face the still mysterious nature of
> life. And for human meanings, the even more mysterious nature of human mind.
> This is not to discourage our efforts in investigating these questions.
> Just to put a stick in the ground showing where we stand.
> Best,
> Christophe
> *
> --
> Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 13:47:28 +0100
> From: pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.
>
>  Mensaje original   Asunto: Re: [Fis] Physics of computing  
> Fecha:
> Fri, 16 Mar 2012 13:24:38 +0100  De: Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov
>Para: Pedro
> C. Marijuan
> Referencias:
> <20120316041607.66ffc68000...@1w8.tpn.terra.com><20120316041607.66ffc68000...@1w8.tpn.terra.com>
> <4f6321c3.5000...@aragon.es> <4f6321c3.5000...@aragon.es>
>
>
> +++
>
> Dear All,
>
> I could not agree more with Pedro's opinion. The referred article is
> interesting indeed. but, information is only physical in the narrow sense
> taken by conventional physicalistic-mechanistic-computational approaches.
> Such a statement defends the reductionist view at nature: sorry. But
> information is more than bits and Shanno's law and biology has far more to
> offer. I think we are at the beginning of a new scientific revolution. So,
> we may need to take our (Maxwell) "daemons" and (Turing) "oracles" closer
> under the lens. In fact, David Ball, the author of the Nature paper
> approached me after my talk in Brussels in 2010 on the Integral Biomathics
> approach and told me he thinks it were a step in the right direction:
> biology driven mathematics and computation.
>
> By the way, our book of ideas on IB will be released next month by
> Springer:
> http://www.springer.com/engineering/computational+intelligence+and+complexity/book/978-3-642-28110-5
> If you wish to obtain it at a lower price (65 EUR incl. worldwide
> delivery) please send me your names, mailing addresses and phone numbers
> via email to: pla...@simeio.org. There must be at least 9 orders to keep
> that discount price..
>
> Best,
>
> Plamen
>
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:
>
>  Dear discussants,
>
> I tend to disagree with the motto "information is physical" if taken too
> strictly. Obviously if we look "downwards" it is OK, but in the "upward"
> direction it is different. Info is not only physical then, and the
> dimension of self-construction along the realization of life cycle has to
> be entered. Then the signal

Re: [Fis] Physics of computing

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bruno -- As an idealist, I think you have it all backward!  I would argue
that cardinal numbers are the most 'crisp' entities that we know, and this
disqualifies them or being primeval.  That is, I think it makes sense to
see all developments as beginning relatively vaguely and then becoming more
definite over time.  So, then, it will have taken these numbers a very long
period of evolution (passing through the 'real' stage) to have become as
definite as they are now. Or, even if cardinal numbers became quite crisp
at the time, say, of the origin of chemistry, that too will have been a
long way from primeval.

STAN

On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 4:38 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 16 Mar 2012, at 18:43, Guy A Hoelzer wrote:
>
> Greetings All,
>
> While I like to think that I am not limited to reductionistic thinking, I
> find it difficult to understand any perspective on information that is not
> limited to physical manifestation. I would appreciate further justification
> for a non-physicalist perspective on information.  How can something exist
> in the absence of physical manifestation?
>
>
> If you are realist about elementary arithmetic, that is if you agree that
> elementary arithmetical proposition like "17 is prime" are true
> independently of you, then, by arithmetic's Turing universality, you can
> show that the numbers exchange information relatively to universal numbers,
> which are playing the role of relative interpreters.
>
>
>
>
>  I am not interested in a metaphysical perspective here, which might have
> heuristic value even if it is not 'real'.  The issue of 'content' and
> 'meaning' strikes me as entirely physical, so mentioning those issues
> doesn't help me understand what non-physical information might be.  I would
> say that if information is physically manifested by contrasts (gradients,
> negentropy, …), then content or meaning refers to the internal dynamics of
> complex systems induced by interaction between the system and the
> physically manifested information.  If there is no affect on internal
> dynamics, then the system did not 'perceive' the information.  If the
> information merely causes a transient fluctuation of the internal dynamics,
> then the perceived information was not meaningful to the system.  At least
> this is a sketch of my view that I hope illustrates why the notions of
> 'content' and 'meaning' does not depart the physical realm for me.
>
>
> I can prove that if we are machine at some description level, then the
> physical is both ontologically and epistemologically emerging from numbers
> relation. The hypothesis of mechanism can be shown logically incompatible
> with very weak form of materialism. Physics can not be fundamental, it
> emerges from mathematics, indeed from what has been called the sharable
> part of mathematics (sharable between classical logicians and intuitionist
> logicians, it is basically arithmetic or something recursively equivalent).
> We can already derive propositional quantum logic from classical number
> self-reference. Arithmetic is full of life at the start, and matter appears
> to be arithmetical truth as seen from "inside".
>
> Poetically, to be short, numbers dreams, and physical realities are dream
> sharing. The quantum emerges, if mechanism is correct, from a statistics on
> all computations. This makes both matter and consciousness NON Turing
> emulable. In particular digital physics can be shown self-contradictory.
> Those (actually old) results are not well known but have been verified by
> many people. I don't think there is a flaw, but we never can be sure, of
> course.
>
> Bruno Marchal
>
> PS see below for a concise version of the proof:
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Guy
>
> From: Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez  mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es >>
> Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 04:19:31 -0700
> To: Foundations of Information Science Information Science <
> fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Physics of computing
>
> Dear discussants,
>
> I tend to disagree with the motto "information is physical" if taken too
> strictly. Obviously if we look "downwards" it is OK, but in the "upward"
> direction it is different. Info is not only physical then, and the
> dimension of self-construction along the realization of life cycle has to
> be entered. Then the signal, the info, has "content" and "meaning".
> Otherwise if we insist only in the physical downward dimension we have just
> conventional computing/ info processing. My opinion is that the notion of
> absence is crucial for advancing in the upward, but useless in the downward.
> By the way, I already wrote about info and the absence theme in a 1994 or
> 1995 paper in BioSystems...
>
> best
>
> ---Pedro
>
>
>
> walter.riof...@terra.com.pe
> escribió:
>
> Thanks John and Kevin to update issues in information, computation, energy
> and rea

Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

[Stanley N Salthe]

As my first posting for this week:

Bob, Loet -- I respond by clarifying that my meaning in this little
equation is that (following Sebeok) semiosis is a universal phenomenon.
 The system of interpretance in my effort here is the LOCALE.  It is such
locales that have evolved into organisms and social systems.  In organisms
and other distinct systems of interpretance, the sign is the context for
interpretation.  So, in the little equation, I am GENERALIZING semiosis
into abiotic Nature.

STAN


On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 2:57 AM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> Dear Bob, 
>
> ** **
>
> Yes, I agree: the difference that makes a difference is operationally
> generated by a receiving system; information itself is nothing but a series
> of differences (contained in a probability distribution). The selection
> mechanisms in the receiving systems that position the incoming uncertainty
> have to be specified (as hypotheses). Meaningful information emerges from
> selecting the signal from the noise.
>
> ** **
>
> The meaningful information (the differences that make a difference) can
> again be communicated as information (for example, in and among biological
> systems). Thus, the operation is recursive and the communication /
> autopoiesis continues. Meaning can only be communicated by systems which
> are able to entertain a symbolic order reflexively such as human beings and
> in interhuman discourses.
>
> ** **
>
> I’ll read the book by Reading.
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
> ** **
> --
>
> **Loet** **Leydesdorff** 
>
> Professor, University of Amsterdam
> **Amsterdam** **School** of Communications Research (ASCoR),
> Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
> Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ ;
> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en 
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *On Behalf Of *Bob Logan
> *Sent:* Saturday, March 17, 2012 10:55 PM
> *To:* Stanley N Salthe
> *Cc:* fis
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] FW: [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.
>
> ** **
>
> Stan - great formula but as I learned from Anthony Reading who wrote a
> lovely book on information Meaningful Information - it is the recipient
> that brings the meaning to the information. 
>
> ** **
>
> PS My book What is Information was been translated into Portuguese and
> published in Brazil where I am doing a 4 city, 5 university speaking tour.
> The book has not yet appeared in English but it is scheduled to be
> published soon by Demo press.
>
> ** **
>
> Regards from Brazil - Bob
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> On 2012-03-17, at 11:17 AM, Stanley N Salthe wrote:
>
>
>
> 
>
> Concerning the meaning (or effect) of information (or constraint) in
> general, I have proposed that context is crucial in modulating the effect
> -- in all cases.  Thus: it would be like the logical example:
>
> ** **
>
>  Effect = context a   x   Constraint ^context b
>
> ** **
>
> STAN
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 2:18 PM, Christophe Menant <
> christophe.men...@hotmail.fr> wrote:
>
> *Dear FISers, *
> *Indeed information can be considered downwards (physical & meaningless)
> and upwards (biological & meaningful). The difference being about
> interpretation or not. *
> *It also introduces an evolutionary approach to information processing
> and meaning generation.*
> *There is a chapter on that subject in a recent book** **(**
> http://www.amazon.co.uk/Information-Computation-Philosophical-Understanding-Foundations/dp/toc/9814295477
> ).** *
> *“Computation on Information, Meaning and Representations.An Evolutionary
> Approach”*
> *Content of the chapter:*
> *1. Information and Meaning. Meaning Generation**
> **1.1. Information.Meaning of information and quantity of information**
> **1.2. Meaningful information and constraint satisfaction. A systemic
> approach**
> **2. Information, Meaning and Representations. An Evolutionary Approach **
> **2.1. Stay alive constraint and meaning generation for organisms**
> 2.2. The Meaning Generator System (MGS). A systemic and evolutionary
> approach
> 2.3. Meaning transmission
> 2.4. Individual and species constraints. Group life constraints. Networks
> of meanings
> 2.5. From meaningful information to meaningful representations
> **3. Meaningful Information and Representations in Humans**
> 4. Meaningful Information and Representations in Artificial Systems
> **4.1. Meaningful informa

Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bob -- I seem to have missed your statement here, and id not answer, so I
do so now.

Dear Stanley - how can there be information in the abiotic world?
Information is the noun associated with the verb to inform or informing. A
rock can not be informed. An abiotic entity can not be informed.
Information begins with life. A bacterium can be informed but not an
abiotic entity. When we look at stars or the moon or a fossil, they are not
information. Our interpretation of the things in nature we observe, biotic
or abiotic is the information. Perhaps I am missing something but that is
how I see things from my naive point of view. The star, the moon or the
fossil are not signs unless you believe that God exists and he or she made
these signs for us to interpret. What do you mean that semiosis is a
universal phenomenon?

The short answer is that any condition or context that persists
significantly beyond the time required for some process or event to occur
is a nonholonomic constraint on that process, and 'informs' it.  This is
represented by the values of constants in a physical equation.

STAN




On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 5:54 AM, Søren Brier  wrote:

> Dear Bill and Bob
>
> Thanks. I hope to see you both here if you pass through Copenhagen. We are
> having a PhD. course on cybersemiotics based on the book the 22-26. of
> August here. We hope for a lovely discussion.
>
> Venlig hilsen/best wishes
>
> Søren Brier
>
> Professor of semiotics of Information , Cognition and Communication, at
> Department of International Studies of Culture and Communication, research
> group on Language, Cognition and Communication (LaCoMe), CBS.
>  uk.cbs.dk/staff/soeren_brier
> Dalgas Have 15, DK-2000 Frederiksberg. Room DH2Ø042. Tel. (+ 45) 38153132
> Ed. Cybernetics & Human Knowing http://www.imprint.co.uk/C&HK/ ,
> Subscription $ 104
> Book: Cybersemiotics: Why Information Is Not Enough, Toronto University
> Press, 2008, sec. ed. 2010. Google book.
> ENTROPI, Special Issue "Cybersemiotics—Integration of the informational
> and semiotic paradigms of cognition and communication"
> http://www.mdpi.com/journal/entropy/special_issues/cybersemiotics-paradigms/
> 
> From: Bob Logan [lo...@physics.utoronto.ca]
> Sent: Saturday, April 07, 2012 2:48 PM
> To: Bill Seaman
> Cc: Loet Leydesdorff; Stanley N Salthe; fis; Søren Brier
> Subject: Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.
>
> Dear Bill - thanks for alerting me to Soren's book. When I was last in
> Copenhagen two years ago I had a very enjoyable meeting with Soren. I look
> forward to reading his book. - Bob
>
> Hi Soren - congrats on what looks to be a fascinating book. Hope all is
> well in Copenhagen - Bob
>
>
> On 2012-03-30, at 2:09 PM, Bill Seaman wrote:
>
> I came across this book which is quite interesting and related to the
> topic:
>
>
> Cybersemiotics: Why Information Is Not Enough (Toronto Studies in
> Semiotics and Communication) [Hardcover]
> Soren Brier<
> http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=ntt_athr_dp_sr_1?_encoding=UTF8&sort=relevancerank&search-alias=books&ie=UTF8&field-author=Soren%20Brier>
> (Author)
>
>
> http://www.amazon.com/Cybersemiotics-Information-Toronto-Semiotics-Communication/dp/0802092209
>
> Book description:
> A growing field of inquiry, biosemiotics is a theory of cognition and
> communication that unites the living and the cultural world. What is
> missing from this theory, however, is the unification of the information
> and computational realms of the non-living natural and technical world.
> Cybersemiotics provides such a framework.
>
> By integrating cybernetic information theory into the unique semiotic
> framework of C.S. Peirce, Søren Brier attempts to find a unified conceptual
> framework that encompasses the complex area of information, cognition, and
> communication science. This integration is performed through Niklas
> Luhmann's autopoietic systems theory of social communication. The link
> between cybernetics and semiotics is, further, an ethological and
> evolutionary theory of embodiment combined with Lakoff and Johnson's
> 'philosophy in the flesh.' This demands the development of a
> transdisciplinary philosophy of knowledge as much common sense as it is
> cultured in the humanities and the sciences. Such an epistemological and
> ontological framework is also developed in this volume.
>
> Cybersemiotics not only builds a bridge between science and culture, it
> provides a framework that encompasses them both. The cybersemiotic
> framework offers a platform for a new level of global dialogue between
> knowledge systems, including a view of science that does not compete with
> religion but o

Re: [Fis] POSTS ON TERRY' S BOOK

[Stanley N Salthe]

Not only among fis. I can tell you that it is very well written.  As far as
I have read (1/3), it goes over what (I suppose) we all (me anyhow) know
already, but with a spin of great rhetoric.  Perhaps it acts as a focus.

STAN

On Fri, Apr 27, 2012 at 4:39 PM, Hector Zenil  wrote:

> Could someone summarize why Terrence Deacon's book is such a presumed
> breakthrough judging by the buzz it has generated among FIS
> enthusiasts?
>
> Thanks.
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 27, 2012 at 11:09 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan
>  wrote:
> > Dear colleagues,
> >
> > Krassimir Markov's suggestion is excellent. Next year we could have a
> > FIS conference in his place, centered in the exploration of the new info
> > avenue drafted by Terrence Deacon's book, and started by Stuart Kauffman
> > and others. Previously my suggestion is that we have a regular
> > discussion session (like the many ones had in this list). A couple of
> > voluntary chairs, and an opening text would be needed. Sure Bob Logan
> > could handle this (perhaps off list) and we would have a fresh
> > discussion session for the coming months.
> >
> > Technical Note: the current messages are not entering in the list; the
> > filter is rejecting them as there are too many addresses together.
> > Please, send the fis address single, and all the others separated or as
> > as Cc. Otherwise I will have to enter them one by one.
> >
> > best
> >
> > ---Pedro
> > (fis list coordination)
> >
> > -
> > Pedro C. Marijuán
> > Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> > Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> > Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
> > 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> > Telf: 34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
> > pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> > http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> > -
> >
> >
> > ___
> > fis mailing list
> > fis@listas.unizar.es
> > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
___
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fis@listas.unizar.es
https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

Re: [Fis] The Information Flow

[Stanley N Salthe]

On that "curious definition of knowledge", it looks like 'knowing how'
rather than 'knowing that'.

STAN

On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 11:56 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>
> Thanks to Zhao Chuan for the Computer Poem/Song. It is a soft way to
> retake our discussions. These weeks there have been a couple of
> important achievements in the bio-information field. On the one side,
> the first 'complete' model of a prokaryotic cell ("A Whole-Cell
> Computational Model Predicts Phenotype from Genotype", by Karr et al.,
> Cell, 150, 389-401, 2012). On the other, there was the report of another
> 'complete' scheme, that of the C. elegans nervous system, now at the
> level of individual synaptic contacts, which was able to explain the
> mating behavior of the worm ("The Connectome of a Decision-Making Neural
> Network", by Jarrell et al., Science, 337, 437-444, 2012). It contained
> several references to the "information flow" through interneurons and
> sensorimotor circuits, and a very curious definition of knowledge (as
> "the set of activity weights in an adjacency matrix of a neural network,
> upon which the network's input-output function in part depends...").
>
> Both papers are very interesting, relatively consistent with each other,
> and I think both represent symbolic milestones in the bio-information
> field. The point on information flows left me thinking on the larger
> perspective beyond single information items that we rarely focus on.
> Actually the first Shannonian information metaphor was about "sources"
> and "channels" --wasn't it? Particularly thinking on social information
> matters, how many aspects of contemporary life relate to the maintenance
> of the information flows intertwining and directing the economic flows.
> No doubt that the "forces of communication" have definitely won the
> upper hand upon the "forces of production ".
>
> Somehow, Zhao Chuan's poem is but a celebration of the central role that
> computers have come to play in the gigantic information flows of our time.
>
> best wishes
>
> --Pedro
>
> --
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
>
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
___
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Re: [Fis] The Information Flow

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro -- it is of interest to me that

On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 3:38 PM, PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Dear FISers,
>
> Continuing with the comments on the "how" versus the "what", it is an
> important topic in mammalian (&vertebrate) nervous systems. They are
> subtended by mostly separate neural tracts (though partially
> interconnected), it is the dorsal stream, specialized in the how & where,
> and the ventral stream stream about the what.

-snip-

I think it of some interest that I have previously ( 2006  On Aristotle’s
conception of causality.  General Systems Bulletin 35: 11.) proposed that
the Aristotelian 'formal cause' determines both 'what happens' and 'how it
happens', and that the combination of this with material cause ('what it
happens to') delivers 'where' it happens.

(For completeness sake I add that efficient cause determines only 'when it
happens', while final cause points to 'why it happens'.  It would be quite
exciting to find that these informations were also carried on separate
tracts.)

STAN


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Re: [Fis] The Information Flow

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro -- The Aristotelian causal categories are conceptual tools, providing
language for distinguishing aspects of a scene.  Without them we are liable
to miss certain aspects of nature. For example, Francis Bacon eliminated
final cause from science discourse, explicitly stating that finality can
only apply to human needs. This eliminated much in nature -- in fact those
aspects not useful for the construction of machines.  Note that
experimental science -- most of physics -- embodies formal and final causes
in the construction of an experimental setup, eliminating these categories
from the observation of what happens when an observed system is stimulated
by an efficient cause (to be noted only afterward in 'materials and
methods').  Thus, formal and final causes tend to become invisible.  This
is valid in physics, or any experimental science which seeks to discover
the possibilities of observed systems, and not to explain actual phenomena
(which are mostly influenced by historically determined nonholonomic
constraints and context (formal causes).

The fact that 'what, how and where' may be transported along one route in a
natural system cannot eliminate them as conceptual tools.

STAN


On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 4:32 PM, PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Dear FISers,
>
> Is it interesting the discussion on wether those informational entities
> contain realizations of the Aristotelian scheme of causality or not?
>
> The cell, in my view, conspicuously fails --it would be too artifactual an
> scheme. Some parts of the sensory paths of advanced nervous systems seem to
> separate some of those causes --but only in a few parts or patches of the
> concerned pathway. For instance, in visual processing the "what" and the
> "how/where" seem to be travelling together undifferentiated along the optic
> nerve and are separated --more or less-- after the visual superior
> colliculus in the midbrain before discharging onto the visual cortex. The
> really big flow of spikes arriving each instant (many millions every few
> milisec) are mixed and correlated with themselves and with other top-down
> and bottom-up preexisting flows in multiple neural mappings... and further,
> when those flows mix with the association areas under the influence of
> languaje, then, and only then, all those logic and conceptual
> categorizations of human thought are enacted in the ephemeral synaptic
> networks.
>
> I am optimistic that  a new "Heraclitean" way of thinking boils down in
> network science, neuroinformatics, systems biology, bioinformation etc.
> Neither the "Parmenidean" eliminative fixism of classical reductionists,
> nor the Aristotelian organicism of systemicists. Say that this is a
> caricature. However "you cannot bathe twice in the same river" not just
> because we all are caught into the universal physical flow of photons and
> forces, but for the "Heraclitean flux" of our own neurons and brains, for
> the inner torrents of the aggregated information flows. The same for
> whatever cells, societies, etc. and their physical structures for info
> transportation.
>
> Either we produce an interesting new vision of the world, finally making
> sense of those perennial metaphors among the different (informational)
> realms, or information science will continue to be that small portion of
> incoherent patches more or less close to information theory or to
> artificial intelligence. In spite of decades of bla-bla- about information
> revolution and information society and tons of ad hoc literature, the
> educated thought of our contemporary society continues to be deeply
> mechanistic!
>
> Why?
>
> best wishes
>
> ---Pedro
>
>
> >
> > -snip-
> >
> > I think it of some interest that I have
> > previously ( 2006  On
> > Aristotle’s conception of causality.
> > General Systems Bulletin 35:
> > 11.) proposed that the Aristotelian 'formal
> > cause' determines both
> > 'what happens' and 'how it happens', and that
> > the combination of
> > this with material cause ('what it happens
> > to') delivers 'where' it
> > happens.
> >
> > (For completeness sake I add that efficient
> > cause determines only
> > 'when it happens', while final cause points
> > to 'why it happens'.  It
> > would be quite exciting to find that these
> > informations were also
> > carried on separate tracts.)
> >
> >
> > It would be exciting, as that would seem to refute the
> > Aristotelean idea
> > of the four causes as four aspects of all causation. However an
> > information channel can carry some part of the information from
> > its
> > source, which would be a sort of filter or abstraction of the
> > source.
> > So, for example, a channel might be sensitive only to the "how",
> > but not
> > the "what", and vice versa. A channel is fundamentally a mapping
> > of
> > classes from a source to a sink that through instances that
> > retain the
> > mapping (see Barwsie and Seligman, I