Dear discussion participants, lists -
Thanks to all participants and thread leaders in the long discussions about my
book – and especially thanks to Gary for organizing and keeping the the focus
over many months.
It has been highly instructive to encounter and speculate over the many
different
Thank you, Gary, for administering the seminar so reliably and well. I
would also like to thank Frederik for participating so richly in the
discussions, with such flair for clarifying differences and finding common
ground.
I'm going to go off the peirce-L list for a while now because I have some
a
To all participants in the Natural Propositions seminar on the peirce-l and
biosemiotics lists,
It's about time to wrap up the seminar by thanking you all for taking part. I
think the cross-conversation between the two lists has helped to break some new
ground on both, and you have all contr
lity; the
> categorical syllogisms (such as All A is B, all B is C, ergo all A is C)
> are deductive forms designed to assure some modicum of novelty in
> corollarial conclusions; and massive, brute-force corollarial computation
> may bring things to light that we couldn't find ot
then theorematic
deduction is needed in order to bring something to light.
Whew. I'm not sure I've addressed all in your post, but I'll let it stand for
now and retract who knows what tomorrow.
Best, Ben
On 4/19/2015 5:12 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
-- Forwarded messa
Frederik, lists,
I'm dissatisfied with my previous post in this thread, I feel like I've
missed the forest for the trees. While I'm not convinced that there's a
theorematic applied deduction in the Wegener example, still, the idea of
continental drift is not merely a simplifying explanation of
f the
four-color theorem). What Peirce says is that sometimes corollarial
deduction won't suffice, and that then theorematic deduction is needed
in order to bring something to light.
Whew. I'm not sure I've addressed all in your post, but I'll let it
stand for now and re
Frederik, lists,
You wrote,
My argument, which I may not have made sufficiently clear in the
chapter, is that the small step from having spatiotemporal cell
phone information represented in long lists of coordinates - and to
synthesize that same information in one geographical map, i
Dear Ben, Franklin, lists,
Den 19/04/2015 kl. 20.05 skrev Benjamin Udell
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com>>:
Franklin, lists,
I agree with Jon, thanks for your excellent starting post.
You wrote,
[] Why can't corollarial reasoning, which involves observation and
experimentation, reveal unnotic
Ben, lists,
The connection you drew between the first and the fourth definitions of
theorematic reasoning is quite interesting; I had not thought of conceptual
analysis in quite that way. At least, though, the complexity of the diagram
or icon is likely more complicated in the case of theorematic
Franklin, lists,
Again, thanks for your opening post.
Some further comments. (I just noticed your reply to my previous message
as I added finishing touches to my message below, which addresses other
points than my first message did, so I figure that I'm not about to get
the discussion crossed
-- Forwarded message --
From: Franklin Ransom
Date: Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 5:11 PM
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8342] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Ch.
10: Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Ben, lists,
Thank you, Ben, for a
Franklin, lists,
I agree with Jon, thanks for your excellent starting post.
You wrote,
[] Why can't corollarial reasoning, which involves observation
and experimentation, reveal unnoticed and hidden relations? After
all, on p.285-6, Frederik mentions the work of police detective Jo
Hello lists,
As Gary Fuhrman posted two weeks ago, I will be leading discussion on
Chapter 10 of NP. I am sorry for posting a week later than planned.
In what follows, I will treat each section of the chapter, partly to
summarize the important points up for discussion, and partly to remind
lister
Happy Easter holiday to all.
Those who have been following the NP seminar (although it fell behind
schedule in recent months) have probably noticed that we skipped Chapter
10 of the book. As the main organizer of the seminar schedule, I have to
take responsibility for that; I got distracted from t
he Relation of Thirdness-as-Secondness (3-2) is a major mode of
establishing a novel yet functional relation with the existing envt.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"
To: ; "Peirce-L"
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2015 12:17 PM
Subject: [
Lists,
I've seen a few people say that they have worries about Peirce's monism. Some
have gone so far as to say that they reject this part of his position. Given
the prevalence of monads, dyads and triads in all parts of his phenomenology,
normative sciences and metaphysics, I must admit that
Hi Ben,
Yes, and the key issue is how to get from 3 to 4, it seems to me. By this
question I mean to be staying within formal logic, not broaching Howard's
issue about levels of abstraction from natural language.
Cheers, Cathy
On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 2:49 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
> Argh, err
Howard, Cathy, list,
I've been advised off-list that the post of mine below was quite
unclear. I was talking, likewise as Howard and indeed Peirce in
"Prolegomena" CP 4.569 were
http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/prolegomena.htm#Paragraph569
, about how the ordinary-language sense of
Howard, Cathy, list,
Howard, at first I thought you were making a point that I had made in a
previous thread on the subject, when I said that Peirce disbelieved that
the seeming meaning of the ordinary language was captured by the formal
logic, and I started talking about veiled constants, mod
List, Ben:
On Feb 24, 2015, at 6:45 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
> Anyway:
> "Wxy" ≡ "xy are wife and husband together" (two people uniquely paired in
> ordered relation)
Did you really mean this?
Or, is a married couple the same couple if they are not an ordered pair in the
sense of set theory?
Argh, error, I said "How to get from 3. to 4.?" I meant "How to get from
2. to 3.?" Corrected below. - Best, Ben
On 2/24/2015 7:45 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Cathy, list,
Sometimes Peirce speaks of lines of identity as crossing a cut.
Elsewhere he insists that a line of identity can only abut a
Ben, Catherine and list,
At 04:29 PM 2/24/2015, Catherine Legg wrote:
I'm confused though about Peirce's big announcement about now being
able to give a meaning to graphs which cross a cut.
[snip]
I once tried to prove Peirce's famous two statements about the
suiciding wife and the man who fail
Cathy, list,
Sometimes Peirce speaks of lines of identity as crossing a cut.
Elsewhere he insists that a line of identity can only abut a cut,
meeting up with another line of identity from the cut's other side. In
those cases the line of identity is a graph, and the ligature formed of
the abu
Hello all - sorry to come late onto this thread.
I'm very interested to hear about Peirce's late shift in view as to
the meaning of his cut - from simple univocal falsity, to varieties of
possibility (which may divide into further kinds). I am reminded to
Wittgenstein's Tractatus where logical spa
Negations are very, very troublesome in logic. I think it would serve a purpose
to return to the meanings of the terms. - Contradictories apply to statements
only. To what is claimed. Contraries apply to empereia, too.
Kirsti
Kirsti Määttänen [kirst...@saunalahti.fi] kirjoitti:
Leading princ
Leading principle(s) may not be fixed. The principle of triadicity contains
Mediation, thus change. Anything organic stays changeable, still with some
continuity. This is something empirical and valid in all cases. - Is it not?
Kirsti
Jerry LR Chandler [jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] kirjoitti:
B
Ben, John, List:
Thank you for the stimulating perspectives. As you both know, I am interested
in the logic of chemistry as it relates to biology and mathematics.
The discussion under this thread illustrates the differences between the
foundations of chemical logic and classical logic in an
e, or anther woman. committing suicide.
Jim W
Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2015 13:55:36 -0500
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of sem
'non-local space and progressive time'.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"
To: "'Peirce List'" ;
Sent: Monday, January 19, 2015 11:16 PM
Subject: RE: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
Propo
nt: January 20, 2015 7:08 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?
Jerry,
I was posting about a hexagon and a hexadecagon (not really, two of its corners
were internal) of opposit
Jerry,
In 2006, I posted this
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=199707#199707 with an image of an
Aristotelian hexagon of opposition (which I'd thought up years before,
figuring that I probably wasn't the first)
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/attachment/199707/2/HexOpp.gif
As to contradictor
Jerry,
I was posting about a hexagon and a hexadecagon (not really, two of its
corners were internal) of opposition many years ago at peirce-l before I
learned that they had all been found as obvious many years before. The
hexadecagon (which looks like a shadow of a tesseract) were covered by
List, Ben:
Let's look at the history of your posts on this topic:
Jan. 17: I think that Gary F. is looking for the diametrical contrary of
'indubitability' in Peirce's sense.
Jan. 17: I guess I should have said 'diametrical opposite' instead of
'diametrical contrary' which is an atypical phr
Gary F., Lists,
You’ve provided a sketch of some of the developments you see in Peirce’s
account of how we should interpret the two sides of the sheet of assertion.
One amendment I’d like to add to your sketch is that, as early as the Lowell
Lectures of 1903, Peirce described a book of multipl
Jeff, you've put your finger on the crucial point that remains mysterious to
me, and doesn't seem to be addressed in Ben's posts, helpful as they
certainly are. It's about the verso of the sheet of assertion. Here I'll try
to outline the steps leading to Peirce's "new discovery", as near as I can
m
ate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2015 11:55 AM
To: Peirce List; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
Propositions : Chapter 8 - On t
cide" if the two
men are identical. Thus, back to the first problem. Importantly, I am
changing quantifiers and not simply adding or subtracting the same
one. Secondly, I am curious about the previous role of "a man."
Jim W
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2015 18:20:03 -050
Jim W
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2015 18:20:03 -0500
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?
Jim, list,
Expos
Dear Frederik, lists,
In your example, (A) 'Something is blue AND round' and (B) 'Something is
blue AND something is round' are indeed non-equivalent in standard
logic. (A) implies but is not implied by (B), so that does not seem to
be what raises the question for Peirce. What troubles him is
Dear Ben -
The Gamma graph paper where P discusses these things is pretty late (1908) - I
do not think he ever finalizes this revision. But of course, giving up the
"strange rule" is equivalent with Beta becoming different from FOL with rules
of passage (as the strange rule is such a rule).
Ahti
Dear Frederik, lists,
Thank you. My questions are: does Peirce revise the Beta graph system to
remove the "strange rule", and wouldn't that render the Beta graph
system non-equivalent to first-order logic? Or is it only the Gamma
graph system that's affected? If he did revise the Beta system
Dear Ben, lists -
Thank you for good illustrations of the issue.
I discuss the example with suicide and banrkuptcy from "An Improvement of the
Gamma graphs" towards the end of ch. 8. Here Peirce denies the rule of passage
- the "strange rule" as he has it - granting the equivalence between your
EIRCE-L] Natural
Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?
Jim, list,
Expository examples in everyday language are usually open to
logical criticism. If 'these beans' lack reference, then
Peirce's example
Jim, list,
Here's a plainer case of a rule of passage.
Best, Ben
On 1/17/2015 6:20 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jim, list,
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list
Jim, list,
Expository examples in everyday language are usually open to logical
criticism. If 'these beans' lack reference, then Peirce's examples of
inference modes don't work any more than my examples with 'John'.
As to the rules of passage in terms of graphs, here are some examples.
Note
015 16:07:03 -0500
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?
Jerry,
The examples that you use from the
Jerry,
The examples that you use from the Aristotelian Square of Opposition are
standard examples of contradictories, contraries, subcontraries, and
subalterns. The examples are not definitive of them, however. Every pair
of propositions (aside from self-referring propositions and that sort of
List, Ben:
On Jan 17, 2015, at 12:16 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
> Jerry,
>
> But your 'S is P' & 'S is not P' are contradictories, not contraries; they
> can't both be true and can't both be false.
>
> 'The dogs are four' and 'the dogs are five' are contraries: they can't both
> be true but c
Lists,
As we move into 2015 we'll be resuming our study of Stjernfelt's Natural
Propositions, with Gary Richmond continuing the discussion of Chapter 8.
We'll also have time in January to revisit questions about previous
chapters, as we won't be starting Chapter 9 etc. until next month, but we'
Michael, the attachment still arrives here named “.dat”, but knowing it’s a
PDF, I can read it now with Adobe Reader — Thanks!
gary f.
From: Michael Shapiro [mailto:poo...@earthlink.net]
Sent: 21-Dec-14 10:27 AM
To: Gary Fuhrman; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Pr
Michael, can you send it in a text, PDF or webpage format, for those of us who
can’t read .dat files?
gary f.
From: Michael Shapiro [mailto:poo...@earthlink.net]
Sent: 21-Dec-14 5:45 AM
To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions
more material is available on my blog (www.languagelore.net)by typing in the word in the Search feature. Comments always welcome.Michael-Original Message-
From: Gary Richmond
Sent: Dec 17, 2014 2:57 PM
To: Peirce-L , "biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee"
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propos
Lists,
Since we're now squarely into the holiday season, I'm going to try to keep
this post and the ones which follow as short and as simple as is possible.
Chapter 8, "Operational and Optimal Iconicity in Peirce's Diagrammatology,"
turns to matters perhaps more strictly logical and philosophical
Dear Mara, Garys, lists -
A good summary.
But I do not think neutral objects are confined to human being Umwelt only. It
is correct that Uexküll sometimes said things in that direction, just as, other
times, he said the opposite.
But we have no reason to assume that mammals or birds, e.g., have a
> From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
> Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 12:50 PM
> To: Gary Fuhrman; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce Discussion Forum'
> Subject: [biosemiotics:7453] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6
>
__
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 12:46 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce Discussion Forum'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6
Lists,
Peirce makes the following suggestion:
6.322. For forty years, that is, since th
...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce Discussion Forum'
Subject: [biosemiotics:7453] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6
Yes, I was thinking of activity that goes through the environment, including
through unexpected channels. That is why I used “distributed through the
environment”, though I see what I sai
*From:* John Collier
*To:* Gary Fuhrman ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee> ; 'Peirce Discussion Forum'
<mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
*Sent:* Wednesday, November 19, 2014 2:50 PM
*Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6
Yes, I was
m: John Collier
To: Gary Fuhrman ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; 'Peirce Discussion Forum'
Sent: Wednesday, November 19, 2014 2:50 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6
Yes, I was thinking of activity that goes through the environment, including
through unexpected cha
.ee <mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>; 'Peirce
> Discussion Forum'
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6
>
> Good introduction, John. I don’t have much to say about your “two large
> questions”, so I’ll leave those for others who are better prepared to o
art of the endobiosemiotics "leaking out") which enhances lineage
survival. There is a lot more.
John
From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: November 19, 2014 9:11 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce Discussion Forum'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6
Go
nvironment." Actually I'm not even sure what that would mean.
(Likewise, I don't know what you mean when you ask about "complex
endobiosemiotics" "leaking out into its umwelt.")
gary f.
From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 18-Nov-14 3:16 AM
T
Ben,
Thanks for your clarifying answers.
Sung
> Sungchul, lists,
>
> To the 1st question: "This" is usually a rheme. A symptom in general
> could, I guess, be a rheme or a dicisign, dependently on context.
>
> To the 2nd question: It's okay to discuss rhemes when the main topic is
> dicisigns,
Sungchul, lists,
To the 1st question: "This" is usually a rheme. A symptom in general
could, I guess, be a rheme or a dicisign, dependently on context.
To the 2nd question: It's okay to discuss rhemes when the main topic is
dicisigns, since dicisigns contain rhemes. In this case I was address
Dear John,
A nice introduction to Chapter 6.
Hope your email problems have been resolved by now and you have a nice
trip to Vienna next week. It so happens that my wife and I will be
travelling to Graz, Austria, next Monday as well, to give a talk at the
Creditions Conference and meet with some
Ben wrote (111814-1) and (111814-2):
"Indices can be legisigns, for example a symptom in(111814-1)
general of a disease in general, or the indexical
legisign 'this' which can be instanced in a variety
of cases."
Are you here referring to one of the 10 classes of signs, i.e., dicent
i
John Collier, lists,
Thanks for starting this chapter, in your usual clear and thoughtful
way, despite pressing matters!
You wrote:
Icons are too vague to be useful, giving pure possibilities, whereas
indexes are restricted to individual instances, unlike symbols,
which are general,
Still problems with my normal email system, so I am sending this by an
alternate route. You may get further copies eventually. Sorry in advance.
Folks, I am a bit indisposed right now due to snowballing problems concerning
visas, and also three attacks on my money accounts in Canada, one of whic
Mara, Gary F. Lists,
Thank you for your recent, exhilarating and insightful dialogue on several
key issues taken up in Chapter 5 as it helped clarify much which I just
couldn't seem to get my head around regarding the dorsal stream and how
Frederik employs the logical lessons which Hurford draws f
Hi,
I have a longish post on chapter 6 in my other mail system, but it is suddenly
giving me a SSL negotiation rejected, though it worked fine three hours ago. I
will try again tomorrow morning. If it doesn't work then I will try to transfer
it to this system, but it has no record of my posting
Mara, that’s a very good question you’ve raised. I’ll insert my responses below.
From: Mara Woods [mailto:mara.wo...@gmail.com]
Sent: 14-Nov-14 3:45 PM
All,
In section 5.2, Stjernfelt brings up the “Adaptation to Rationality” hypothesis
in conjunction with the issue of "logical constan
Mara, thanks for this! Damasio is one of the neuroscientists who have developed
in great detail our understanding of perception as part of a functional cycle.
He’s not the only one, of course; I’ve cited several others in my book Turning
Signs, especially in Chapter 9
(http://www.gnusystems.ca/
Very interesting, Gary F.
Damasio's view of the mapping of body states are already loaded with
interpretation and, as you suggest, underlie self-control. First, they are
indexes of particular physiological states that can be influenced by
further action in the environment. For example, blood sugar
Lists,
Two quotations, one from NP and one from Damasio’s Self Comes to Mind, which I
think make an interesting juxtaposition:
Minds are a subtle, flowing combination of actual images and recalled images,
in ever-changing proportions. The mind’s images tend to be logically
interrelated,
All,
In section 5.2, Stjernfelt brings up the “Adaptation to Rationality”
hypothesis in conjunction with the issue of "logical constants" so
problematic in Hurford's account. The logical constants problem is mostly a
consequence of Hurford's limited view that reference to a dynamic object
require
rpretant
(splitting of tree).
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Fuhrman
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; 'peirce List'
Sent: Saturday, November 08, 2014 10:14 AM
Subject: [biosemiotics:7393] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5 :
Ventral-Dorsal split
Mara, lists,
Mara, your excellent summary and especially your questions at the end point
toward a research program that is beyond me (perhaps beyond any one person?) to
pursue. All I can do at this point is take a step back and present a simplified
version of the connection I see between the
Hello everyone,
Now we move on to the heart of Chapter 5: that the ventral-dorsal split of
the visual perception system corresponds to the double function of the
Dicisign. Recall that, according to Stjernfelt, this similarity between the
syntax of the Dicisign and that of the functions of these tw
-
From: "Howard Pattee"
To: "'Peirce List'" ;
Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2014 4:45 PM
Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7361] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions,
Chapter 5
At 02:40 PM 11/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
It seems to me that you're in danger here o
At 02:40 PM 11/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
It seems to me that you're in danger here of falling into the trap
that Howard sometimes falls into, of thinking that the existence of
discontinuities or "punctuations" refutes the reality of continuity.
HP: I have never said or implied anything lik
was
to refer" etc.).
Best, Ben
gary f.
*From:*Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
*Sent:* 4-Nov-14 1:04 PM
*To:* 'Peirce List'; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5
Gary F., Mara, Clark, lists,
In your quote from "Mr. Peterson
t that sentence very
closely resembles the definition of “experience” that Peirce gives elsewhere
(EP2:435, for instance).
gary f.
From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: 4-Nov-14 1:04 PM
To: 'Peirce List'; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Prop
Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2014 2:40 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5
Edwina, a brief reply …
ET: I think that experience has to consist of more than Secondness.
GF: I agree. Secondness is one of three kinds of elements of experience. I
just didn’t
rce List'; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5
A few comments, Gary F; thanks for the long post and for Damasio's excellent
selection:
I think that experience has to consist of more than Secondness. Certainly,
Secondness is basic, for it se
Gary F., Mara, Clark, lists,
In your quote from "Mr. Peterson's Proposed Discussion" (_The Monist_ v.
XVI n. 1, January 1906, pages 147-151,
http://books.google.com/books?id=3KoLIAAJ&pg=PA147&lpg=PA147),
Peirce discusses not one but two conceptions that need names other than
that of exper
down to the physico-chemical.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Gary Fuhrman
To: 'Peirce List' ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Sent: Tuesday, November 04, 2014 11:27 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 5
Mara, Clark, lists,
Clark quoted so
> On Nov 4, 2014, at 9:27 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>
> I place these here because I see a number of parallels between Damasio’s
> psychobiological approach to cognitive development and Peirce’s
> logical-semiotic approach.
I’d noticed years ago when I’d first encountered Damasio how much his a
Mara, Clark, lists,
Clark quoted some very interesting passages in a post on Chapter 4, and
following up on one of them led me to another that seems relevant to the idea
of “adaptation to rationality”, so I’m addressing it here in connection with
Chapter 5.
Here again is the passage Clar
Hello everyone,
Chapter 5 is a first step to applying the doctrine of Dicisigns to
cognition. Let's begin with the Adaptation to Rationality hypothesis. We'll
move into the ventral-dorsal split and its relation to Dicisigns in a few
days.
Stjernfelt focuses on the promising work of linguist James
Frederik wrote:
"I think there must be posited a continuous scale (110214-1)
between Dicent Indexical Sinsigns in one end and
full Symbolic Propositions in the other."
By "symbolic Propositions", do you mean "Dicent Symbolic Legisign"
or "Dicent Symbolic Sinsign"? If the latter, sin
(Sorry if Figure 1 is distorted. Please refer to one of my previous
emails for a undistorted version.)
Clark wrote:
" . . . It seems that for Peirce experience (and thus(110214-1)
cognitive thought) consist of three worlds: the internal,
the external and the logical."
I wonder if this
Dear Clark, lists -
As I write in the book, I think there must be posited a continuous scale
between Dicent Indexical Sinsigns in one end and full Symbolic Propositions in
the other.
Given that, I think it is easy to recognize symbols in non-human animals. The
requirement is that they are habitu
> (W1, 168f; 1865, Harvard Lecture on Logic I) [the slash mark enclosures are
> the editor's way of showing that in the MS Peirce hesitated between two
> alternative wordings.]
>
I probably should have added that this was a view Peirce explicitly held in his
mature era. He wrote about this t
> The pragmatistic character of that last paragraph should be obvious enough.
> What may not be so obvious is the definition of consciousness as “connection
> with an internal world.” This is rather vague on the face of it, but I think
> it offers the key to a concept of “consciousness” which h
> On Nov 2, 2014, at 1:24 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
>
>
> There is a bit terminological confusion here. Peirce's distinction within
> Dicisigns was between propositions and quasi-propositions, the latter being
> those Dicisigns which are not symbols.
I wanted to talk about this earlier
Frederik, List:
Thanks for the clarification.
In my writings, I used the term "proto-proposition" to refer to either the
first proposition in a sequence of propositions or to a prior proposition which
precedes (perhaps by several steps) the final proposition from which the
conclusion(s) of the
.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions Chapter four
Edwina, Gary R, Gary F, Frederik, list,
In my initial post I wanted to raise the question of the taxonomic approach
mainly because, from one perspective it is not possible within the dicisign
d
Dear Jeff, Gary, lists
Den 24/10/2014 kl. 00.10 skrev Jeffrey Brian Downard
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>>:
Gary R., Lists,
Here is a minor point. You say: "But Frederik is arguing in his book that the
other two, the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Indexical Sinsign, may
at times
Dear Jerry, lists -
There is a bit terminological confusion here. Peirce's distinction within
Dicisigns was between propositions and quasi-propositions, the latter being
those Dicisigns which are not symbols. (One confusion comes from the fact that
Peirce often uses "Dicisign" and "propositio
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