Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Gary R., List: My sincere apologies--I thought that it was an obvious exaggeration, and it was supposed to be mildly humorous, but I did a poor job of conveying that. I certainly did not intend to mislead anyone. I loosely had in mind CP 1.19 (1903), where Peirce characterized Descartes, Locke,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon wrote: "Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label* any philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic*" (emphasis added). Please offer sufficient (considerable) support for this statement, in my view,, at very least a hugely overstated mere opinion. "Any

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Dear list: *Jerry*: I will take “Peirce at any stage of his life” for 100, Alex. *Alex*: The answer is, “label any philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic." *Jerry*: What is “Something Peirce would never say or do because fallibilism”? *Alex*: That’s right.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jerry, List: Answer which question? The one that you posed initially? CSP: A chaos of reactions utterly without any approach to law is absolutely nothing; JLRC: In view of the scope of your literality, what is the meaning of this sentence to you, pragmatically? philosophically?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Dear list: Oh, I now remember who asked to be informed when he was acting a nominalist. For nominalists do this: “The Nominalists flatly denied the existence of anything but the concrete. For them, a universal name was in itself a mere “flatus voices”, according to Ockam’s famous

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon: >From my perspective, the question posed to you was intelligible to an >undergraduate. You describe yourself as "Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman”. If you do not want to answer this question about your beliefs, simply say you do not want to answer. Cheers

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jerry, List: I am still not following you. Are you suggesting that meanings are always singular, never general? What makes dictionaries possible if everyone's "literal meanings" of the same terms are (or could be) completely different, just because we are different individual people? For that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Clark, List: In various fragmentary drafts of "A Neglected Argument" that appear in R 841 and R 843, Peirce states each of the following. "'God,' in what sense?" ask ye? When so 'capitalized' (as we Americans say) it is, throughout this paper, the definable proper noun, i.e. *Ens necessarium*,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

List: > On Jan 23, 2017, at 2:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Why would "[my] literal meanings" of those terms be different from anyone > else's, or from the "generic meaning"? In more than 20 years of posting to List serves, this is among the most surprising

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon, Edwina, list, I see nothing whatsoever Saussurean semiological, nominalistic, or literal-bound (whatever that might mean) in Jon's recent remarks and, rather, have seen him to *consistently* make at least the attempt here to analyze relevant concepts in the spirit of Peircean realism. So I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Jan 23, 2017, at 1:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Why would "[my] literal meanings" of those terms be different from anyone > else's, or from the "generic meaning"? As a first attempt ... > Pragmatically, all real

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Dear list: Someone previously asked how to know when he is being a nominalist. I forget who. To determine this, we could simply look to its effectiveness for “settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable.” “*Questioner*: What, then, is the *raison d’etre *of the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon Schmidt: Yes, that's the interpretation I made of your comments [i.e., Saussurian nominalism]. And no, I won't get into any 'alternative interpretation' or debate with you as you, in my view, are firmly operative within that mould [Saussurian nominalism] and tend to remould Peirce into a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List: Are you suggesting, then, that my "analysis" of the quotes that I cited from "New Elements" is "literal-bound" in that sense? If so, then what alternative interpretation do you think would result from properly applying Peircean semeiotic realism instead? Thanks, Jon On Mon, Jan

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jerry, List: Why would "[my] literal meanings" of those terms be different from anyone else's, or from the "generic meaning"? As a first attempt ... - Pragmatically, all real reactions have a tendency toward regularity (i.e., habit-taking). - Philosophically, 1ns and 2ns are both

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon - I explained a 'literal-bound' analysis in my post, when I gave the example of Saussurian semiological nominalism, where 'this word' stands for 'that meaning'. As for the triad of semiosis, I've explained mediation many times before and won't repeat that explanation. Edwina -

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Jan 23, 2017, at 1:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Jerry, List: > > I am not sure what you mean by "the scope of [my] literality," or the precise > distinction that you are drawing between "pragmatically" vs. > "philosophically" vs. "theologically."

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Edwina, List: Would you mind clarifying, as well? What exactly do you mean by "a 'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce"? What exactly is "that evolving and complex mediating 'law'" that you seem to believe is essential to proper interpretation? As far as I can tell, Jerry did not point out any

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jerry, List: I am not sure what you mean by "the scope of [my] literality," or the precise distinction that you are drawing between "pragmatically" vs. "philosophically" vs. "theologically." Would you mind clarifying? In any case, since it occurs only a few paragraphs later within the same

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

I think one has to be careful, as others have pointed out, in moving into a 'literal-bound' analysis of Peirce. That, in my view, moves into Saussurian semiological nominalism where 'this word' has just 'that meaning'. Such a dyadic one-to-one referential framework i.e., where interpretation

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Jon, Kirstima, List, I am not clear about (besides many others) the term "Nominalism", and why everybody does not like nominalism. Ockham thougt, that universals do not have an extra-mental substance. I think it is ok. to guess so, if I think, that the universe has a mind. So universals are not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jon: > On Jan 23, 2017, at 12:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CSP: A chaos of reactions utterly without any approach to law is absolutely > nothing; In view of the scope of your literality, what is the meaning of this sentence to you, pragmatically?