[PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Agree - it takes long term observation to observe the habits and
patterns of interaction within a society.

I examine it via a number of areas: First - the ecological biome
[soil type, water type, nature of plants and animals, climate]. Then,
the population size, which is a key hard statistic.. And then...and
one can almost 'guess' the result...the economic mode, which will, in
a pre-industrial society, be directly connected to the ecology and the
population size.  Then, the political mode, or 'who is authorized to
make the laws'. ..which will always be: whoever creates
wealth/food/sustenance in the society. This is the basic set and
aren't conceptual but can be deduced from hard data.  The ideologies,
the belief system and education/religion/etc..are rooted in the basic
set. 

As a cat-person, I agree - one can figure out if the cat has been a
pet..or, rather, if the cat has at some time, managed to control some
hapless human to serve its cat-needs. 

Edwina
 On Tue 10/04/18  4:33 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 4/10/2018 4:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 > As for societies, I view them as compositions of matter [made up
of  
 > ecological biomes and population size and economic mode], held
together  
 > by conceptual Thirdness. 
 Yes.  But a society is like a pet cat.  You can recognize the people

 or the cat, but what makes a cat into a pet or people into a society

 is not directly observable. 
 But it's possible to infer that role by long-term investigation. 
 By watching how the cat behaves, you can tell that it has been 
 and possibly still is a pet. 
 For cats, a direct question isn't helpful.  For people, you can 
 also ask them "Are you here for some sort of event?" 
 Summary:  role types cannot be distinguished by a snapshot, 
 but they can be detected by a combination of observations 
 and inferences. 
 John 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[John F Sowa]

On 4/10/2018 4:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
As for societies, I view them as compositions of matter [made up of 
ecological biomes and population size and economic mode], held together 
by conceptual Thirdness.


Yes.  But a society is like a pet cat.  You can recognize the people
or the cat, but what makes a cat into a pet or people into a society
is not directly observable.

But it's possible to infer that role by long-term investigation.
By watching how the cat behaves, you can tell that it has been
and possibly still is a pet.

For cats, a direct question isn't helpful.  For people, you can
also ask them "Are you here for some sort of event?"

Summary:  role types cannot be distinguished by a snapshot,
but they can be detected by a combination of observations
and inferences.

John




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[PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list: Thanks very much for your post; you seem to understand
quite well what I am pointing out in my focus on 'morphology'

Yes - I agree; the Type is the abstract mediation, operating as that
law/habit

So-, an input of chemicals will be mediated/transformed by the
laws/Type...into a specific/interpreted set of molecules.

Both the input/mark and the interpreted result are spatiotemporal
and existentially physical. 

NO human mind is involved.

And yes, yes, the meaning/Type definitely evolves, adapts, grows
over time. And can split into subsets/Types to enable more complex
adaptation. 

As for societies, I view them as compositions of matter [made up of
ecological biomes and population size and economic mode], held
together by conceptual Thirdness. But I think all three categories
are involved..I won't bother the list with these ideas.

Edwina
 On Tue 10/04/18  3:46 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 4/10/2018 12:33 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 > I... view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual construct but as 
 > an actual morphological unit, as an existential spatiotemporal 
 > unit of matter, formed by Mind, existent within constant relations

 > with other Signs/morphological units.  So, for me, this Sign is 
 > itself existential as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a plant, a 
 > word..and even, a society. 
 For the basic triad of mark (or tone)/token/type, the mark or tone 
 is always physical.  As an interpreted mark, the token is also
physical, 
 and the type is some abstract mediation (law, habit...). 
  From CP 2.302: 
 > Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other
signs, 
 > particularly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the
nature 
 > of icons and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs
are 
 > of mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If
a 
 > man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So
it 
 > is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum
de 
 > symbolo. A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In
use 
 > and in experience, its meaning grows. Such words as force, law,
wealth, 
 > marriage, bear for us very different meanings from those they bore

 > to our barbarous ancestors. 
 The original mark (such as a representation of an icon or a mixture 
 of letters or phonemes) is something physical.  The tokens, which 
 are marks that have been interpreted by the type, are also physical.

 But the meaning (type) grows over time. 
 For the examples above, I can accept "a crystal, a rock, a spider, 
 a plant, a word" as sinsigns that I could recognize and name.  But 
 I doubt that I have ever seen a "society". 
 I believe that societies exist, but I would treat them as roles 
 that are defined by some kind of Thirdness.   For example, you 
 can recognize a cat just by looking at it.  But you can't tell 
 whether it's a pet or a stray without determining how it's 
 related to some people. 
 John 

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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[John F Sowa]

On 4/10/2018 12:33 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

I... view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual construct but as
an actual morphological unit, as an existential spatiotemporal
unit of matter, formed by Mind, existent within constant relations
with other Signs/morphological units.  So, for me, this Sign is
itself existential as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a plant, a
word..and even, a society.


For the basic triad of mark (or tone)/token/type, the mark or tone
is always physical.  As an interpreted mark, the token is also physical,
and the type is some abstract mediation (law, habit...).

From CP 2.302:

Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs,
particularly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature
of icons and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are
of mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a
man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it
is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. Omne symbolum de
symbolo. A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use
and in experience, its meaning grows. Such words as force, law, wealth,
marriage, bear for us very different meanings from those they bore
to our barbarous ancestors.


The original mark (such as a representation of an icon or a mixture
of letters or phonemes) is something physical.  The tokens, which
are marks that have been interpreted by the type, are also physical.
But the meaning (type) grows over time.

For the examples above, I can accept "a crystal, a rock, a spider,
a plant, a word" as sinsigns that I could recognize and name.  But
I doubt that I have ever seen a "society".

I believe that societies exist, but I would treat them as roles
that are defined by some kind of Thirdness.   For example, you
can recognize a cat just by looking at it.  But you can't tell
whether it's a pet or a stray without determining how it's
related to some people.

John

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Focus on Phenomenology and the Categories, was, [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Gary Richmond]

Mike, list,

I'm glad you found the recent exchange worthwhile--it certainly was for me.
I didn't expect much "general agreement" early on, but I appreciate your
offering it. That Edwina and I seem to have come to solid agreement on some
points and some partial (or, perhaps, tentative) agreement on other matters
is encouraging, especially given our somewhat different "knowledge bases"
as Edwina put it in this thread.

In an off-list exchange both Edwina and I expressed our disappointment that
there wasn't more discussion of biosemiotics on the list especially given
that several forum members have at least some interest in it, while there
are even a few here with expertise in the field.

MB: What I especially like is your basing your points on the universal
categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation, generality,
continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says and you quote, be a
medium "between a Second and its First." In the sense I frequently use it,
namely categorization of things for knowledge representation, this is the
same as saying we find general types (Thirdness) of particulars
(Secondness) by looking at their essences and shared qualities (Firstness).

I can certainly see how the universal categories might provide a valuable
tool for categorization in KR, and I am almost certain that there are other
disciplines and, surely, other areas of inquiry, where the categories might
be of considerable value and usefulness.

MB: I see the universal categories as the governing primitives. (I believe
Peirce did as well.) For example, in the pure sense of the phaneron, the
reality of Firstness, I presently believe, is outside of the process of
semiosis. Once we try to signify Firstness, a reification of sorts, we make
it actual, which places it as a monadic idea in Secondness. (Not dissimilar
from quantum effects.) We can talk about it and describe it, but it remains
removed from the essence of Firstness.

For me as well, the universal categories  are "the governing primitives."
When one reflects on Peirce's architectonic as outlined in the
Classification of Sciences (for now restricting that classification to the
pure theoretical sciences, what he calls Science of Discovery) one might
begin by asking: What is First Science for Peirce?

​


For Theoretical Science as a whole, clearly pure Mathematics (as it appears
to be for nearly all modern scientists).

But for cenoscopic Philosophy (that is, for all theoretical inquiry prior
to that of Idioscopy, or, the special sciences), First Science is
Phenomenology, primarily if not exclusively concerned with the categories.
Peirce even says that the categories are *discovered* in phenomenology and
then only retrospectively seen to be present in monadic dyadic triadic
valency as an aspect of the simplest mathematics in theoretical mathematics
(and given his *Reduction Thesis*, these three are all that are needed for
all other -adicies; this holds for EGs as well).

Nothing could be clearer than that in *logic as semeiotic*--which is "down
the road" in the classification, following, as it does, theoretical
esthetics and theoretical ethics--that the principles involved in analyzing
the universal categories play a key role in the three sub-branches of
semeiotics, notably in theoretical grammar and theoretical rhetoric, or
methodeutic. They have a somewhat less important role to play in critical
logic, but appear there in an analysis of the three inference patters of
abduction, induction, and deduction which become essential in the final
branch of logic in structuring a "complete inquiry."

I should also add that the categories are found again in Metaphysics, and
even in Idioscopy (these Special Sciences requiring instruments like
microscopes and telescopes to do their work, having special methodologies,
etc.) in the ordering of Physical Science into the *classificatory,
descriptive, and nomonological *(law enunciating). And the diagram I
reproduced above does not show that this same tripartite
ordering--*classificatory,
descriptive, and nomonological--*is also given by Peirce for Psychical
Science. These divisions all can be analyzed in part via the universal
categories.

Finally, the very structure of the classification of science (as well as
the two principal classification of signs) is mainly based on the
categories (with a few dyadic exceptions in the former).

MB: One can take these viewpoints based on Peirce's own statements about
the categories and prescission. (CP 1.353) I guess put another way, for me,
the universal categories are the adjudicators in how I try to think about
Peirce, not semiosis, which is a process of representation.

While I have a keen interest in especially Peirce's phenomenology,
semeiotics, and metaphysics, I find that the universal categories are for
me as well the 'adjudicators' (to use your expression) in how I think about
Peirce's work in all other sciences which interest me (and in the arts,
etc. as well).

However, it 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, about "good": I think it is three things along with the three categories:

1.: A good feeling,

2.: The technically good (like a kalashnikov that works well: "brute" like "brutal"),

3.: The mediation between technically good and good feeling (which, after having drawn the balance sheet, excludes the kalashnikov).


So I think that, after reasonable reasoning, doxa and phantasia can be brought together again to reside in the same part of the soul.

Best, Helmut


10. April 2018 um 18:51 Uhr
 "Jerry Rhee" 
 



Dear list,

 

Here is an interesting alternate translation; both from Jessica Moss:

 

The desired and the wished for is either the good or the apparent good (phainomenon agathon). And this is why the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good; for some believe it is, and to some it appears [so] although they do not believe it so. For phantasia and belief do not reside in the same part of the soul. (EE VII.2 1235b26-29) ~ Aristotle on the Apparent Good

 

The desired and the wished for is either the good or the apparent good (phainomenon agathon). And this is why the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good; for some believe it is, and to some it appears [good] although they do not believe it so. For phantasia [quasi-perceptual appearance] and doxa [rational belief] do not reside in the same part of the soul. (EE 1235b26–29)

~ Aristotle’s Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View that Everyone Always Desires Things under the Guise of the Good

 

With best wishes,

Jerry R


 
On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:39 AM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:



Dear list,

 

Helmut said:

controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and again. 

I wonder what could we do about this.

 

And Edwina said:

our difficulties are based on our own knowledge bases and agendas.

 

To which Peirce had said:

 

It appears, then, that   ~Commens

 

... the rule for attaining the third [the highest] grade of clearness is as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we con- ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object (5.402, 1878).  

~ Haack, The Meaning of Pragmatism:
The Ethics of Terminology and the Language of Philosophy

 

This maxim once accepted, – intelligently accepted, in the light of the evidence of its truth, – speedily sweeps all metaphysical rubbish out of one’s house.

We must therefore attempt to decide about these matters and others akin to them, taking as a starting point the following. 

The thing desired and wished is either the good or the apparent good. Therefore also the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good, since some people think it good, and to others it appears good even though they do not think it so (as appearance and opinion are not in the same part of the spirit). [Note] Yet it is clear that both the good and the pleasant are dear.

This being decided, we must make another assumption. Things good are some of them absolutely good, others good for someone but not good absolutely; and the same things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant.

With best wishes,
Jerry R




 
On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:33 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Helmut, list

I think it's very difficult, not at all due to Peirce, but to our own developed knowledge bases and our own agendas, to find agreement.

For example, many view 'the Sign' as a conceptual re-presentation of an object, with the human agent as an interpreter of some object or word 'out there'. The focus is on 'the ultimate truth' of the image, in this interpreter's mind, of that 'out there' object/word.

I, on the other hand, view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual construct but as a actual morphological unit, as an existential spatiotemporal unit of matter, formed by Mind, existent within constant relations with other Signs/morphological units.  So, for me, this Sign is itself existential as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a plant, a word..and even, a society. Operating within the three categorical modes. Constantly interactive via the basic format of the Sign Process of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI

Not many people are interested in such a perspective - and, I maintain, that it does not deny or contradict any Peircean theory. Most people are interested in the human conceptual domain - where a human interprets what someone said or did - and this re-presentation is deemed 'the Sign'.

So- again, our difficulties, I maintain, have nothing to do with Peirce. His insights permit both views - our difficulties are based on our own knowledge bases and agendas.

Edwina



 

On Tue 10/04/18 12:04 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Edwina, Mike, list,

I too don´t see a versus there. Maybe that is because I see sign, object, interpretant as examples for 1ns, 2ns, 3ns. But I guess that this is a subject both fundamental and controversial like some others 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



Here is an interesting alternate translation; both from Jessica Moss:



The desired and the wished for is either the good or the apparent good
(*phainomenon
agathon*). And this is why the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent
good; for some believe it is, and to some it appears [so] although they do
not believe it so. For *phantasia* and belief do not reside in the same
part of the soul. (EE VII.2 1235b26-29) ~ *Aristotle on the Apparent Good*



The desired and the wished for is either the good or the apparent good
(*phainomenon
agathon*). And this is why the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent
good; for some believe it is, and to some it appears [good] although they
do not believe it so. For *phantasia* [quasi-perceptual appearance] and
*doxa* [rational belief] do not reside in the same part of the soul. (EE
1235b26–29)

~ *Aristotle’s Non-Trivial, Non-Insane View that Everyone Always Desires
Things under the Guise of the Good*



With best wishes,

Jerry R


On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:39 AM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear list,
>
>
>
> Helmut said:
>
> controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and again.
>
> I wonder what could we do about this.
>
>
>
> And Edwina said:
>
> our difficulties are based on our own knowledge bases and agendas.
>
>
>
> To which Peirce had said:
>
>
>
> *It appears, then, that*   ~Commens
>
>
>
> ... the rule for attaining the third [the highest] grade of clearness is
> as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical
> bearings, we con- ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our
> conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object
> (5.402, 1878).
>
> ~ Haack, The Meaning of Pragmatism: The Ethics of Terminology and the
> Language of Philosophy
>
>
>
> This maxim once accepted, – *intelligently accepted*, in the light of the
> evidence of its truth, – speedily sweeps all metaphysical rubbish out of
> one’s house.
>
> We must therefore attempt to decide about these matters and others akin to
> them, taking as a starting point the following.
>
> The thing desired and wished is either the good or the apparent good.
> Therefore also the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good, since
> some people think it good, and to others it appears good even though they
> do not think it so (as appearance and opinion are not in the same part of
> the spirit). [Note] Yet it is clear that both the good and the pleasant
> are dear.
>
> This being decided, we must make another assumption. Things good are some
> of them absolutely good, others good for someone but not good absolutely;
> and the same things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant.
>
> With best wishes,
> Jerry R
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:33 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Helmut, list
>>
>> I think it's very difficult, not at all due to Peirce, but to our
>> own developed knowledge bases and our own agendas, to find agreement.
>>
>> For example, many view 'the Sign' as a conceptual re-presentation of an
>> object, with the human agent as an interpreter of some object or word 'out
>> there'. The focus is on 'the ultimate truth' of the image, in this
>> interpreter's mind, of that 'out there' object/word.
>>
>> I, on the other hand, view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual construct
>> but as a actual morphological unit, as an existential spatiotemporal unit
>> of matter, formed by Mind, existent within constant relations with other
>> Signs/morphological units.  So, for me, this Sign is itself existential
>> as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a plant, a word..and even, a
>> society. Operating within the three categorical modes. Constantly
>> interactive via the basic format of the Sign Process of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI
>>
>> Not many people are interested in such a perspective - and, I maintain,
>> that it does not deny or contradict any Peircean theory. Most people are
>> interested in the human conceptual domain - where a human interprets what
>> someone said or did - and this re-presentation is deemed 'the Sign'.
>>
>> So- again, our difficulties, I maintain, have nothing to do with Peirce.
>> His insights permit both views - our difficulties are based on our own
>> knowledge bases and agendas.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue 10/04/18 12:04 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>>
>> Edwina, Mike, list,
>> I too don´t see a versus there. Maybe that is because I see sign, object,
>> interpretant as examples for 1ns, 2ns, 3ns. But I guess that this is a
>> subject both fundamental and controversial like some others (e.g whether
>> sign is the same as representamen or not, whether the DO (same problem with
>> the DI and the FI) is external to the sign, being the subject it is about,
>> or the subject´s function in the sign, therefore internal, which
>> controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and again.
>> I wonder what could we do about 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



Helmut said:

controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and again.

I wonder what could we do about this.



And Edwina said:

our difficulties are based on our own knowledge bases and agendas.



To which Peirce had said:



*It appears, then, that*   ~Commens



... the rule for attaining the third [the highest] grade of clearness is as
follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical
bearings, we con- ceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object
(5.402, 1878).

~ Haack, The Meaning of Pragmatism: The Ethics of Terminology and the
Language of Philosophy



This maxim once accepted, – *intelligently accepted*, in the light of the
evidence of its truth, – speedily sweeps all metaphysical rubbish out of
one’s house.

We must therefore attempt to decide about these matters and others akin to
them, taking as a starting point the following.

The thing desired and wished is either the good or the apparent good.
Therefore also the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good, since
some people think it good, and to others it appears good even though they
do not think it so (as appearance and opinion are not in the same part of
the spirit). [Note] Yet it is clear that both the good and the pleasant are
dear.

This being decided, we must make another assumption. Things good are some
of them absolutely good, others good for someone but not good absolutely;
and the same things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant.

With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:33 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Helmut, list
>
> I think it's very difficult, not at all due to Peirce, but to our
> own developed knowledge bases and our own agendas, to find agreement.
>
> For example, many view 'the Sign' as a conceptual re-presentation of an
> object, with the human agent as an interpreter of some object or word 'out
> there'. The focus is on 'the ultimate truth' of the image, in this
> interpreter's mind, of that 'out there' object/word.
>
> I, on the other hand, view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual construct but
> as a actual morphological unit, as an existential spatiotemporal unit of
> matter, formed by Mind, existent within constant relations with other
> Signs/morphological units.  So, for me, this Sign is itself existential
> as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a plant, a word..and even, a
> society. Operating within the three categorical modes. Constantly
> interactive via the basic format of the Sign Process of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI
>
> Not many people are interested in such a perspective - and, I maintain,
> that it does not deny or contradict any Peircean theory. Most people are
> interested in the human conceptual domain - where a human interprets what
> someone said or did - and this re-presentation is deemed 'the Sign'.
>
> So- again, our difficulties, I maintain, have nothing to do with Peirce.
> His insights permit both views - our difficulties are based on our own
> knowledge bases and agendas.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue 10/04/18 12:04 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Edwina, Mike, list,
> I too don´t see a versus there. Maybe that is because I see sign, object,
> interpretant as examples for 1ns, 2ns, 3ns. But I guess that this is a
> subject both fundamental and controversial like some others (e.g whether
> sign is the same as representamen or not, whether the DO (same problem with
> the DI and the FI) is external to the sign, being the subject it is about,
> or the subject´s function in the sign, therefore internal, which
> controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and again.
> I wonder what could we do about this.
> Best, Helmut
>
>  10. April 2018 um 14:35 Uhr
> "Edwina Taborsky"
>
>
> Mike, list
>
> Nice post - I'll just comment briefly before specifically commenting on
> Gary R's post.
>
> I'm not in the camp of 'signs and semiosis' vs the three categories. I
> don't see how the one can function without the other. I self-define my
> perspective as a focus on morphology - on how energy, so to speak,
> transforms into matter or how the unformed becomes the formed. This matter
> can be within the physical-chemical realm, the biological, the conceptual,
> the societal. I'm NOT focused on re-presentation, which is, in my view, a
> purely cerebral focus on words; or words to images. I'm focused on
> morphology, and view this transformation as taking place within the
> semiosic triad and the three categories.
>
> So, a plethora of cells is transformed from one morphological primitive
> form into a more complex form via the habit formations [Thirdness]...But
> Thirdness is complex with three types [3-3, 3-2, 3-1] and this enables
> information exchange with the environment [via 3-2] rather than simple
> repetition of type [3-1]. So, Firstness is involved to enable adaptation,
> and Secondness is involved to 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut, list

I think it's very difficult, not at all due to Peirce, but to our
own developed knowledge bases and our own agendas, to find agreement.

For example, many view 'the Sign' as a conceptual re-presentation of
an object, with the human agent as an interpreter of some object or
word 'out there'. The focus is on 'the ultimate truth' of the image,
in this interpreter's mind, of that 'out there' object/word.

I, on the other hand, view 'the Sign' not as an intellectual
construct but as a actual morphological unit, as an existential
spatiotemporal unit of matter, formed by Mind, existent within
constant relations with other Signs/morphological units.  So, for me,
this Sign is itself existential as a crystal, a rock, a spider, a
plant, a word..and even, a society. Operating within the three
categorical modes. Constantly interactive via the basic format of the
Sign Process of DO-[IO-R-II]-DI

Not many people are interested in such a perspective - and, I
maintain, that it does not deny or contradict any Peircean theory.
Most people are interested in the human conceptual domain - where a
human interprets what someone said or did - and this re-presentation
is deemed 'the Sign'. 

So- again, our difficulties, I maintain, have nothing to do with
Peirce. His insights permit both views - our difficulties are based
on our own knowledge bases and agendas.

Edwina
 On Tue 10/04/18 12:04 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, Mike, list, I too don´t see a versus there. Maybe that is
because I see sign, object, interpretant as examples for 1ns, 2ns,
3ns. But I guess that this is a subject both fundamental and
controversial like some others (e.g whether sign is the same as
representamen or not, whether the DO (same problem with the DI and
the FI) is external to the sign, being the subject it is about, or
the subject´s function in the sign, therefore internal, which
controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and
again. I wonder what could we do about this. Best, Helmut 10.
April 2018 um 14:35 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
Mike, list 

Nice post - I'll just comment briefly before specifically commenting
on Gary R's post. 

I'm not in the camp of 'signs and semiosis' vs the three categories.
I don't see how the one can function without the other. I self-define
my perspective as a focus on morphology - on how energy, so to speak,
transforms into matter or how the unformed becomes the formed. This
matter can be within the physical-chemical realm, the biological, the
conceptual, the societal. I'm NOT focused on re-presentation, which
is, in my view, a purely cerebral focus on words; or words to images.
I'm focused on morphology, and view this transformation as taking
place within the semiosic triad and the three categories. 

So, a plethora of cells is transformed from one morphological
primitive form into a more complex form via the habit formations
[Thirdness]...But Thirdness is complex with three types [3-3, 3-2,
3-1] and this enables information exchange with the environment [via
3-2] rather than simple repetition of type [3-1]. So, Firstness is
involved to enable adaptation, and Secondness is involved to enable
direct contact with the local environmental realities. The result -
is an adapted insect. 

Edwina
 On Mon 09/04/18 10:34 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:  

Hi Gary R, List, 

I thought this exchange was very worthwhile, esp. your current
response. I have read your points multiple times and tried to think
clearly about what you said. I find that I am in 'general agreement'
with all that you have written in this response. As a result, I
changed the subject line from 'Re: Order of Determination' to reflect
my view. We have found at least one overlap in the Venn diagram. 

What I especially like is your basing your points on the universal
categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation, generality,
continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says and you quote, be
a medium "between a Second and its First." In the sense I frequently
use it, namely categorization of things for knowledge representation,
this is the same as saying we find general types (Thirdness) of
particulars (Secondness) by looking at their essences and shared
qualities (Firstness). I frankly do not see why we need to use
language such as "quasi-necessarily" as Edwina poses. I can not see
where habit or any of the other senses of Thirdness may occur without
Secondness and Firstness.  

I also like your pointing to the use of prescission to look at these
questions. One observation I would make is that there is a community
of Peirce researchers who see their investigations primarily through
the lens of signs and semiosis. I believe Edwina would place herself
in this group. That is well and good and in the sense of sign use and
making and representation may 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, Mike, list,

I too don´t see a versus there. Maybe that is because I see sign, object, interpretant as examples for 1ns, 2ns, 3ns. But I guess that this is a subject both fundamental and controversial like some others (e.g whether sign is the same as representamen or not, whether the DO (same problem with the DI and the FI) is external to the sign, being the subject it is about, or the subject´s function in the sign, therefore internal, which controversalities appear as obstacles in every discussion again and again. I wonder what could we do about this.

Best, Helmut

 

 10. April 2018 um 14:35 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Mike, list

Nice post - I'll just comment briefly before specifically commenting on Gary R's post.

I'm not in the camp of 'signs and semiosis' vs the three categories. I don't see how the one can function without the other. I self-define my perspective as a focus on morphology - on how energy, so to speak, transforms into matter or how the unformed becomes the formed. This matter can be within the physical-chemical realm, the biological, the conceptual, the societal. I'm NOT focused on re-presentation, which is, in my view, a purely cerebral focus on words; or words to images. I'm focused on morphology, and view this transformation as taking place within the semiosic triad and the three categories.

So, a plethora of cells is transformed from one morphological primitive form into a more complex form via the habit formations [Thirdness]...But Thirdness is complex with three types [3-3, 3-2, 3-1] and this enables information exchange with the environment [via 3-2] rather than simple repetition of type [3-1]. So, Firstness is involved to enable adaptation, and Secondness is involved to enable direct contact with the local environmental realities. The result - is an adapted insect.

Edwina

 

On Mon 09/04/18 10:34 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:


Hi Gary R, List,

I thought this exchange was very worthwhile, esp. your current response. I have read your points multiple times and tried to think clearly about what you said. I find that I am in 'general agreement' with all that you have written in this response. As a result, I changed the subject line from 'Re: Order of Determination' to reflect my view. We have found at least one overlap in the Venn diagram.

What I especially like is your basing your points on the universal categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation, generality, continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says and you quote, be a medium "between a Second and its First." In the sense I frequently use it, namely categorization of things for knowledge representation, this is the same as saying we find general types (Thirdness) of particulars (Secondness) by looking at their essences and shared qualities (Firstness). I frankly do not see why we need to use language such as "quasi-necessarily" as Edwina poses. I can not see where habit or any of the other senses of Thirdness may occur without Secondness and Firstness.

I also like your pointing to the use of prescission to look at these questions. One observation I would make is that there is a community of Peirce researchers who see their investigations primarily through the lens of signs and semiosis. I believe Edwina would place herself in this group. That is well and good and in the sense of sign use and making and representation may indeed be the best perspective. But, for me, I see the universal categories as the governing primitives. (I believe Peirce did as well.) For example, in the pure sense of the phaneron, the reality of Firstness, I presently believe, is outside of the process of semiosis. Once we try to signify Firstness, a reification of sorts, we make it actual, which places it as a monadic idea in Secondness. (Not dissimilar from quantum effects.) We can talk about it and describe it, but it remains removed from the essence of Firstness. One can take these viewpoints based on Peirce's own statements about the categories and prescission. (CP 1.353) I guess put another way, for me, the universal categories are the adjudicators in how I try to think about Peirce, not semiosis, which is a process of representation. However, of course, from the vantage of representation, semiosis naturally holds sway.

Thanks for trying to find common ground. From my perspective, you did an admirable job.

Mike

On 4/9/2018 6:10 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:



Edwina, list,

 

Thanks for responding to my post, Edwina. I'm sorry that it's taken me a couple of days to reply, but this weekend happened to be especially busy.

 

In the spirit of trying to see if it's possible to come to agreement on certain recent points of contention, I'd like to begin my response with a principle upon which we appear to be in agreement. You quoted me, then commented.

 


3] Gary R: Similarly Peirce uses the phrase "regulative hope" in consideration of just those habits of thought and action which, 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Order of Determination

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

Thanks for an excellent post. I agree with much of it - I'll make a
few comments

2] I have never thought that Peirce's view was Hegelian! Peirce was
very specific in his opposition to Hegel's
thesis/antithesis/synthesis. I felt that Jon's outline was Hegelian.

4] Habit-taking, as Thirdness, is one of the three vital
modes-of-being. But it is not the only action of mediation. Within
the ten classes, 6 of them do indeed view Thirdness as the mediation,
but, four do not - and we can't discount them.

 In addition, it is vital to consider that Thirdness is complex,
occurring in three forms: 3-3, 3-2, 3-1. In fact, I consider these
two 'degenerate' modes extremely important. That's because they
ground the action of Reason [Thirdness] within current
instantiations. So, 3-2 acts as habits-indexically-connecting with
local instantiations, gathering information from them, to 'inform'
the General Habits within Thirdness. And, 3-1 acts as
habits-iconically- privileging the dominant set of habits. An example
of 3-2 is a situation where a species will inform itself of changes in
its environment and will adapt its habit-base to better function in
that new environment. And example of 3-1 is Natural Selection where a
dominant Type will re-produce itself more than marginal types.

As for 'entelechy - I consider that its practice belongs, more
often, in the heady confines of the seminar room rather than in the
messy realities of the pragmatic world, a world which, filled as it
is with the three categories in their six modes [1-1, 2-2, 2-1, 3-3,
3-2, 3-1] is always constructing and deconstructing
matter-to-different morphologies - and as such - there is no final or
'perfect' state of being- or even, of knowledge. 

Edwina
 On Mon 09/04/18  7:10 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, list,
 Thanks for responding to my post, Edwina. I'm sorry that it's taken
me a couple of days to reply, but this weekend happened to be
especially busy.
 In the spirit of trying to see if it's possible to come to agreement
on certain recent points of contention, I'd like to begin my response
with a principle upon which we appear to be in agreement. You quoted
me, then commented. 
 3] Gary R: Similarly Peirce uses the phrase "regulative hope" in
consideration of just those habits of thought and action which,
through hetero- and homo-correction (science as critical commonsense
writ large) tend toward a belief wholly congruent with Reality,
whatever you, I, Jon, or any given community of inquirers might
think.  EDWINA: Agree. 
 Mike and John S suggested that it might be a valuable strategy to
see if through dialogue here that there might be some significant
ideas or principles of Peircean semeiotics and philosophy more
generally with which we might come to at least some agreement. While
I'm not looking for anything like "general agreement" on any point,
I'd be interested to see if there's anyone in the forum who 
disagrees that this (stated perhaps too tersely above) is what Peirce
means by the expression "regulative hope," that is, in referring it to
the sense of how inquiry taken up in the scientific spirit brings us
closer to a grasp of the Real?
 Now, on to the other points.  1] Gary R: Edwina, all the things that
you question, disagree, or reject here will be found in Peirce. He
himself, for example, says that 'the subject matter of normative
science consists of the relations of phenomena to ends'. 
 EDWINA: I'm not questioning their being 'found' in Peirce. One can
cherry pick a zillion quotes from Peirce. I'm questioning their
pragmatic use within an analysis. 
 I agree in a general sense. But in this particular matter of the
quotation, 'the subject matter of normative science consists of the
relations of phenomena to ends,'   I don't believe that there is any
cherry picking going on whatsoever The subject matter of the other
two branches of cenoscopic philosophy, phenomenology and metaphysics,
are different from that of the normative sciences. One can agree or
disagree with with what Peirce saw as the purpose of each of these
three branches, but at least in a pragmatic analysis of his
architectonic philosophy in consideration of scientific inquiry, it
is important, I believe, to distinguish them. This is principally, I
believe,  because he develops his architectonic philosophy, outlined
in his Classification of Sciences, as an aid to pragmatic inquiry,
including what you referred to above as "their pragmatic use within
an analysis." 2] Gary R: Similarly, the 'ideal end of semiosis is the
development of habits that would never be confounded by subsequent
experience - including, but not limited to, true beliefs' is a
decidedly Peircean notion concerning an asymptotic tendency of
scientific inquiry towards the Truth such that Truth == Reality. It
is not Hegelian whatsoever in my view 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Stephen C. Rose]

It would be interesting to see what seems to me a convincing response
applied to the most ordinary of situations -- something all could relate
to. That's not a challenge but a genuine concern. If Semiotics (and Peirce
for that matter) is to have the currency that I believe is warranted, we
are going to need to see how this understanding changes the dominant binary
character of most ordinary discourse. Because things move as they move as
Peirce understood (realism), I think the world is indeed on the cusp of
triadic understandings, but I feel the academic realm needs a bit of a push
to move it into some sort of universal comprehension. A simple narrative
examplle of semiosis involving 123 would be illuminating to say the least.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 8:35 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Mike, list
>
> Nice post - I'll just comment briefly before specifically commenting on
> Gary R's post.
>
> I'm not in the camp of 'signs and semiosis' vs the three categories. I
> don't see how the one can function without the other. I self-define my
> perspective as a focus on morphology - on how energy, so to speak,
> transforms into matter or how the unformed becomes the formed. This matter
> can be within the physical-chemical realm, the biological, the conceptual,
> the societal. I'm NOT focused on re-presentation, which is, in my view, a
> purely cerebral focus on words; or words to images. I'm focused on
> morphology, and view this transformation as taking place within the
> semiosic triad and the three categories.
>
> So, a plethora of cells is transformed from one morphological primitive
> form into a more complex form via the habit formations [Thirdness]...But
> Thirdness is complex with three types [3-3, 3-2, 3-1] and this enables
> information exchange with the environment [via 3-2] rather than simple
> repetition of type [3-1]. So, Firstness is involved to enable adaptation,
> and Secondness is involved to enable direct contact with the local
> environmental realities. The result - is an adapted insect.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Mon 09/04/18 10:34 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
>
> Hi Gary R, List,
>
> I thought this exchange was very worthwhile, esp. your current response. I
> have read your points multiple times and tried to think clearly about what
> you said. I find that I am in 'general agreement' with all that you have
> written in this response. As a result, I changed the subject line from 'Re:
> Order of Determination' to reflect my view. We have found at least one
> overlap in the Venn diagram.
>
> What I especially like is your basing your points on the universal
> categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation, generality,
> continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says and you quote, be a
> medium "between a Second and its First." In the sense I frequently use it,
> namely categorization of things for knowledge representation, this is the
> same as saying we find general types (Thirdness) of particulars
> (Secondness) by looking at their essences and shared qualities (Firstness).
> I frankly do not see why we need to use language such as
> "quasi-necessarily" as Edwina poses. I can not see where habit or any of
> the other senses of Thirdness may occur without Secondness and Firstness.
>
> I also like your pointing to the use of prescission to look at these
> questions. One observation I would make is that there is a community of
> Peirce researchers who see their investigations primarily through the lens
> of signs and semiosis. I believe Edwina would place herself in this group.
> That is well and good and in the sense of sign use and making and
> representation may indeed be the best perspective. But, for me, I see the
> universal categories as the governing primitives. (I believe Peirce did as
> well.) For example, in the pure sense of the phaneron, the reality of
> Firstness, I presently believe, is outside of the process of semiosis. Once
> we try to signify Firstness, a reification of sorts, we make it actual,
> which places it as a monadic idea in Secondness. (Not dissimilar from
> quantum effects.) We can talk about it and describe it, but it remains
> removed from the essence of Firstness. One can take these viewpoints based
> on Peirce's own statements about the categories and prescission. (CP 1.353)
> I guess put another way, for me, the universal categories are the
> adjudicators in how I try to think about Peirce, not semiosis, which is a
> process of representation. However, of course, from the vantage of
> representation, semiosis naturally holds sway.
>
> Thanks for trying to find common ground. From my perspective, you did an
> admirable job.
>
> Mike
> On 4/9/2018 6:10 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
> Thanks for responding to my post, Edwina. I'm sorry that it's taken me a
> couple of days to reply, but this weekend happened to be especially busy.
>
> In the spirit of trying to see if it's 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] General Agreement

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Mike, list

Nice post - I'll just comment briefly before specifically commenting
on Gary R's post.

I'm not in the camp of 'signs and semiosis' vs the three categories.
I don't see how the one can function without the other. I self-define
my perspective as a focus on morphology - on how energy, so to speak,
transforms into matter or how the unformed becomes the formed. This
matter can be within the physical-chemical realm, the biological, the
conceptual, the societal. I'm NOT focused on re-presentation, which
is, in my view, a purely cerebral focus on words; or words to images.
I'm focused on morphology, and view this transformation as taking
place within the semiosic triad and the three categories.

So, a plethora of cells is transformed from one morphological
primitive form into a more complex form via the habit formations
[Thirdness]...But Thirdness is complex with three types [3-3, 3-2,
3-1] and this enables information exchange with the environment [via
3-2] rather than simple repetition of type [3-1]. So, Firstness is
involved to enable adaptation, and Secondness is involved to enable
direct contact with the local environmental realities. The result -
is an adapted insect. 

Edwina
 On Mon 09/04/18 10:34 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
Hi Gary R, List, 

I thought this exchange was very worthwhile, esp. your current  
  response. I have read your points multiple times and tried to think 
   clearly about what you said. I find that I am in 'general  
  agreement' with all that you have written in this response. As a
result, I changed the subject line from 'Re: Order of
Determination' to reflect my view. We have found at least one
overlap in the Venn diagram.
What I especially like is your basing your points on the
universal categories. Thirdness is the mode of habit, mediation, 
   generality, continuity. Genuine Thirdness must, as Peirce says 
   and you quote, be a medium "between a Second and its First." In
the sense I frequently use it, namely categorization of things
for knowledge representation, this is the same as saying we find  
  general types (Thirdness) of particulars (Secondness) by looking
at their essences and shared qualities (Firstness). I frankly
do not see why we need to use language such as
"quasi-necessarily" as Edwina poses. I can not see where
habit or any of the other senses of Thirdness may occur
without Secondness and Firstness. 

I also like your pointing to the use of prescission to look
at these questions. One observation I would make is that there   
 is a community of Peirce researchers who see their investigations
primarily through the lens of signs and semiosis. I believe   
 Edwina would place herself in this group. That is well and good  
  and in the sense of sign use and making and representation may  
  indeed be the best perspective. But, for me, I see the universal
categories as the governing primitives. (I believe Peirce did as  
  well.) For example, in the pure sense of the phaneron, the  
  reality of Firstness, I presently believe, is outside of the
process of semiosis. Once we try to signify Firstness, a reification  
  of sorts, we make it actual, which places it as a monadic idea  
  in Secondness. (Not dissimilar from quantum effects.) We can
talk about it and describe it, but it remains removed from the
essence of Firstness. One can take these viewpoints based on
Peirce's own statements about the categories and prescission.
(CP 1.353) I guess put another way, for me, the universal
categories are the adjudicators in how I try to think about
Peirce, not semiosis, which is a process of representation.
However, of course, from the vantage of representation,
semiosis naturally holds sway. 

Thanks for trying to find common ground. From my perspective,   
 you did an admirable job. 

Mike On 4/9/2018 6:10 PM, Gary Richmond   wrote:
  Edwina, list, 
  Thanks for responding to my   post, Edwina.
I'm sorry that it's taken me a couple of days to   reply, but
this weekend happened to be especially busy. 
  In the spirit of trying to   see if it's
possible to come to agreement on certain recent   points of
contention, I'd like to begin my response with a   principle
upon which we appear to be in agreement. You quoted   me,
then commented. 
 3] Gary R: Similarly Peirce
uses the phrase "regulative hope" in consideration of
just those habits of thought and action which, through
hetero- and homo-correction (science as