Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

> On Jan 25, 2019, at 12:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > How should we characterize these various ways of uttering the same > Proposition? For example ... > We are going to the restaurant. > We are going to the restaurant? > We are going to the restaurant! > The only change here is the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

> On Jun 20, 2018, at 12:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > GF: It’s important to note that Stjernfelt’s definition of the immediate > object is a functional one--the immediate object plays an indexical role > within the functioning of a Dicisign ... > > According to Peirce, this is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

> On Jun 19, 2018, at 10:49 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > >> "Not quite sure what you’re asking. Could there have been a different >> movement less tied to Christianity? Probably." > > I say probably not. And certainly not Islam. I guess it depends upon what one sees as important and/or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

> On Jun 20, 2018, at 4:31 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote: > > The Pragmaticist Maxim cuts through all these considerations and focuses on > the practical results of thinking, musing, etc Peirce designated aesthetics > and ethics as normative sciences. He was agapaic in his core

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

> On Jun 19, 2018, at 2:38 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > > Christianity was particularly important to the European renaissance. Why? Not quite sure what you’re asking. Could there have been a different movement less tied to Christianity? Probably. If there was a tie I suspect it was

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

> On Jun 19, 2018, at 8:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Hmm- I'm inclined to think that 'religions' - by which I am assuming a belief > in metaphysical powers, begins first at the individual psychological level, > where the individual becomes aware of his own finite nature and lack of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

It’s worth noting that most evolutionary views of religion see much of it evolving intertwined with the evolution of government. To the point that it’s hard to separate the two. It’s true that particularly in evolutionary psychology religion has some key differences such as focus on the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] How language began, a Ted talk by Dan Everett

> On Jun 14, 2018, at 6:06 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > I came across a Ted talk by Dan E with the title > "How language began". At the halfway mark (9 minutes) > he mentions Peirce and relates his semiotic to the issues: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFxg5vkaPgk > > My only comment would

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Aug 9, 2017, at 7:18 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > But there is another side of the question revealed in Peirce’s 1909 letter to > Welby (SS 118): > “My studies must extend over the whole of general Semeiotic. I think, dear > Lady Welby, that you are in danger of falling into some

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Aug 7, 2017, at 10:21 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > Clark, > > Kirsti has presented zero evidence that the sign classifications Peirce > detailed in the 1908 Welby letters are summaries of earlier work rather than > current work on his part. In fact, if you actually read the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Aug 6, 2017, at 2:06 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > > As evidence backing up interpretations on CSP's then current main interests, > works at hand, I find Welby correspondence necessarily weak. Not strong, that > is. Again I’ve not kept carefully up on the nuances of what was

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion of this > classification recently discussed here was an important part of his letters > to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Jul 31, 2017, at 4:41 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > But I consider Kirsti's notion that "CSP was all his life after SIGNS. That > was earlier. Later he was after meanings" itself, if not 'gravely', at least > completely in wrong. Peirce was actively thinking about

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Jul 31, 2017, at 12:52 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > In my view Gary R. is gravely wrong in assuming that CSP was all his life > after SIGNS. That was earlier. Later he was after meanings. > > Heidegger was never attempting to create any theory of SIGNS. He was after > meanings.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

> On Jul 28, 2017, at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > By the 20th century Peirce will have somewhat changed his terminology; but > from 1902 on I believe he always refer to three branches of logica docens, or > logic as semeiotic: namely speculative grammar, critic,

[PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology

The recent discussion raised some thoughts I’d not entertained in some time. We know that there are huge differences between what Husserl called phenomenology and Peirce’s project. Indeed Peirce explicitly criticized Husserl for psychologism. There’s nothing really like the reduction or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [Sadhu Sanga] Re: Is relativity theory holding back progress in science?

> On Jul 20, 2017, at 6:24 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > I have been following new developments in physics for many years, > and I am also interested in Peirce's views on the subject. But I > agree with the summary below by Kashyap V Vasavada. > > I would prefer not to have

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

> On Jun 6, 2017, at 11:55 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > Clark, List, > > You say: "So Peirce clearly didn’t see conservation of energy as universal > due to the role of chance. While I don’t think he put it in quite those > terms, I believe the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Did Peirce Anticipate the Space-Time Continuum?

> On May 30, 2017, at 2:49 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > I am not happy with tychism: Conservation laws require infinite exactness of > conservation: Energy or impulse before a reaction must be exactly the same > before and after a reaction. Though in a very small (quantum)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 20, 2017, at 9:32 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > After that one can consider > the fine points of generic versus degenerate cases, and that is > all well and good, but until you venture to say exactly *which* > monadic, dyadic, or triadic predicate you have in mind, you >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

> On Apr 15, 2017, at 12:14 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > Clark, yes, that’s why I was careful to qualify my comments by saying “In > NDTR.” But when you say that “what happens actually affects what is > possible,” what you mean is that what happens now affects what can possibly > happen

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

> On Apr 15, 2017, at 10:28 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) > cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness > cannot determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 12, 2017, at 9:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > I'm guessing an engineer would have some acquaintance with > relational databases, which have after all a history going > back to Peirce, and I would recommend keeping that example > in mind for thinking about k-adic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 12, 2017, at 8:15 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > CG >> I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t >> reducible to chemistry or physics... attempting to make the >> reduction... did perhaps help in getting biologists to think >> more carefully about the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 10, 2017, at 12:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'? > What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it? I take it primarily as the problem of reference. While

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 8, 2017, at 10:46 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of > determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that "Ideas, > or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 9, 2017, at 7:41 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > The surface is a vague boundary. All plants and animals have > exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark) > and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins). > > The outer layers are always

[PEIRCE-L] Nature of Habit

On more thing before I leave for the weekend. It seems to me that 1907’s famous MS 318 is pretty key to all this the more I think about it. That’s partially because he speaks of three habit-interpretants and changes how he talks of habit somewhat. Part of the manuscript is in EP 2:398. I didn’t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 7, 2017, at 2:53 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > 1) You write that 'chance isn't separate from Thirdness'. I think it is. > Chance/Firstness is a basic modal category; it's not part of Thirdness. > > 2) I don't read Peirce's view as Neoplatonism ..i.e., that the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 7, 2017, at 2:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > I don't see that 'repetition depends on chance'. I think that you are > ignoring that Thirdness [the action of developing and taking habits] is > primordial and not a result of another modal category, i.e.,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 7, 2017, at 2:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > "We are brought, then, to this: conformity to law exists only within a > limited range of events and even there is not perfect, for an element of pure > spontaneity or lawless originality mingles, or at least must be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 7, 2017, at 11:58 AM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > But, as I see it, this is not at all the case. Chance may break up old > habits--and this is essential, for example, for evolution to occur Breaking up habits to create new habits is habit creation. The key point

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 6, 2017, at 12:50 PM, John Collier wrote: > > SM is statistical mechanics. I don’t recall Peirce ever discussing it, though > it was well known at his time, and proven beyond a doubt with Einstein’s ex > planation of Brownian motion in 1906. Before that many

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

> On Apr 6, 2017, at 1:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis in the > physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred to me. What > class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 6, 2017, at 12:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > I don't accept the neoDarwinian hypothesis that adaptation and evolution are > due to randomness and Natural Selection. I think that adaptation and > evolution are actions of Mind; that is, the biological systems

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 6, 2017, at 12:03 AM, John Collier wrote: > > There is still an understanding gap between QM and SM, largely due to the > fact that the theory of QM is deterministic. I have heard good scientists say > that QM is the basis of entropy, but I don’t find their

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 6, 2017, at 6:34 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > - chance does not form habits but only facilitates breaking them - and since > chance/Firstness is primordial, then, breaking habits is so to speak, > necessary and normal in the universe. Just as habits are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 2:16 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > “So fundamentally the question is whether Peirce’s view that the universe is > growing to more reasonableness is incompatible with thermodynamics. Clearly > it is. > > > Hmmm… then what’s the semiotic answer to why

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark, list: Hmm - it's always interesting to read how others view oneself. > > I hadn't thought that I was saying that " that thinking of all this in the > idealist ways Peirce did is wrong. That is we should

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 1:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > I am not sure exactly how this bears on your entropy conversation, except > that entropy is often described as disorder; so from that standpoint, > uniformity and habit-taking both seem to be negentropic in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 1:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > So- I don't see how Peirce's view is incompatible with the current view - but > I might be missing what you are trying to explain. > Peirce explicitly saw entropy and conservation as not applying universally

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 12:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears to be the > ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit. Habits don't move toward > more differentiation but towards more generality. > >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Mar 31, 2017, at 3:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > It turns out that Short "counts" different Signs based on different Immediate > Interpretants, but not based on different Dynamic Interpretants. This makes > sense, given that the Immediate Interpretant

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 5, 2017, at 11:29 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > I know that was all long, but I want to return to Edwina’s initial comment > that firstness is both chance and entropy. For Peirce, I’ve hopefully shown, > those are actually opposed. Firstness is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

> On Apr 3, 2017, at 12:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > That is - I am also suggesting that Firstness is not simply quality, feeling, > chance - but - is entropy. Could you unpack that a little more? I *think* I understand what you’re getting at — how chance undermines

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

(Sorry - been swamped so I’ve not said much) > On Apr 1, 2017, at 12:53 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Some new words may be useful, but there's already an overabundance > of terminology from several millennia of philosophy, most of which > Peirce replaced with a new set of terms.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

I don’t have time to chime in right now Edwina due to work but I’ll hopefully have some comments Monday. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To

Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

> On Mar 30, 2017, at 3:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > So- given the make-up of the posters on this list and their interest [in > philosophy] then, I don't see the point of bringing up the non-philosophical > focus of Peirce's work. I should note that while my own

Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

> On Mar 30, 2017, at 8:35 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > I don't see the point of outlining my research on this list - as I'd get > reactions of 'Peirce didn't say that!' and 'That's Taborsky-semiotics and > it's not Pure Peirce!... > I think my point was just that what

Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

> On Mar 30, 2017, at 6:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > In Peirce, we read about semiosis within protoplasm, within crystals, within > the formation of matter [matter is effete Mind]. None of this deals with > terminology but with the pragmatic function of semiosis -

Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

> On Mar 30, 2017, at 6:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is its > isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions. But > Peirce wasn't focused on that. As John points out, he used his

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 29, 2017, at 1:58 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > J.A.S., your post quoting “New Elements” makes much more sense that the other > Jon’s claim that “icons and indices are species under the genus” of symbol, > which I’m pretty sure Peirce would never say. The point that Peirce makes

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 28, 2017, at 6:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > But the point of Peirce's extreme scholastic realism is that the universal > "red" is not defined by the collection of all red things, and the universal > "lion" is not defined by the collection of all

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 27, 2017, at 9:59 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything we can > imagine, and mathematics can analyze anything we can imagine. > (This point is independent of the nominalist-realist debate.) There’s a bit to unpack there

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 26, 2017, at 1:45 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > So, yes, I would have to say that Peirce was a realist about > possibilities, and patterns of possibilities, from the start. > That much is simply implicit in his mathematical approach to > logic, probability, and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 25, 2017, at 8:54 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > I declared myself long ago as one who sees more continuity > of development than radical shift in Peirce's thought over > his lifetime. What I do see changing through the years is > the greater diversity of his audiences as

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

Catching up on my reading - apologies for not responding much the past week or two. It seems to me the starting point for thinking about truth for Peirce ought be externalism. That is are we talking about a knower who is roughly a human individual at a specific time or are we talking about

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 19, 2017, at 9:54 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > Re: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth > > > I have been giving another look at the InterSciWiki (ISW) article on the >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 16, 2017, at 7:48 AM, John F Sowa > wrote: > > To formalize the idea of convergence, I combined a Lindenbaum > lattice with methods of belief (or theory) revision. The lattice > contains all possible theories expressible within a given

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

> On Mar 13, 2017, at 7:00 AM, Jon Awbrey > wrote: > > I think John Sowa's remarks about the “major failures caused by ignoring > [Peirce]” > and Jerry Chandler's remarks about later readings serving as a “Procrustian > bed > for CSP's concepts” are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

> On Mar 10, 2017, at 6:57 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > In chapter 8 of Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism, Paul Forster > argues--convincingly, I think--that the different "theories of truth" are > competitors only within a nominalist epistemology and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

> On Mar 7, 2017, at 9:10 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > On 3/7/2017 3:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: >> pure mathematics starts from a set of hypotheses of a particular sort, >> and it does not seem obvious to me that these games are grounded >> on such hypotheses. > > More

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > In the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without providing a > reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be recognized by the > synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since synechism is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Logic of Ingenuity

> On Mar 1, 2017, at 8:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Part 4, subtitled "Beyond Engineering," is now online at > http://www.structuremag.org/?p=11107 . > It discusses how anyone can use the logic of ingenuity to imagine >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

On Feb 16, 2017, at 6:17 AM, John Collier wrote:One of the hardest things for me in learning analytic philosophy (after original training and work in physics) was to think in words.Yes, the undue focus on the language turn in analytic philosophy has not necessarily been

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

Whoops, neglected the end. > On Feb 15, 2017, at 9:16 AM, Eric Charles > wrote: > > One can readily, for example, find individuals who (by all evidence) seem to > think more readily and more commonly in words than in "images and diagrams". > One can also find

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

> On Feb 15, 2017, at 9:16 AM, Eric Charles > wrote: > > Further, when Peirce elsewhere starts making broad pronouncements about > "thought" it oftentimes seems that he is referring solely to those rare > instances of clear thinking, but other times is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

> On Feb 14, 2017, at 12:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > A Replica of the word "unicorn" is thus a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign that > calls up the idea of a unicorn because, although no unicorn really exists, > real descriptions of the unicorn are well known to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

> On Feb 6, 2017, at 8:01 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > > Here is my answer. Triadic thinking is conscious consideration by > individuals. The first stage is that vague reality that comes up as a sign > and ends up becoming more likely a word than anything else. That

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

> On Feb 6, 2017, at 5:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like Mill's, > are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like Peirce's, that > are more radically realist, by focusing

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

> On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:09 AM, Eric Charles > wrote: > > There, as now, I'm not convinced that being a nominalist or realist would > adhere one to a particular sense of right or wrong in such a case. I would > imagine it was relatively trivial to argue in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

> On Feb 6, 2017, at 7:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Yes, I agree with your outline of the neglect of Aristotle during the period > when the Church controlled knowledge - and the 13th c. re-emergence of his > works [Aquinas etc].. I’m not sure it’s quite that simple.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

> On Feb 5, 2017, at 11:12 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > At the beginning of the 13th c, the translations of Aristotle > were denounced by theologians who had a vested interest in Plato. > The fact that they were translated from Arabic sources also raised > suspicions of heresy.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [peirce-l] First, second, third, etc.

> On Feb 2, 2017, at 2:31 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > Here is an article that I scanned some time ago, it was written by Andre de > Tienne: > > http://www.medic.chalmers.se/~jmo/semiotic/Peirce_s_semiotic_monism.pdf > <http://www.m

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

> On Jan 30, 2017, at 12:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Regarding #2, once again you insist on assigning a pejorative label to my > view. It is not Platonic, it is Aristotelian (and Peircean), since I clearly > and consistently affirm that 3ns does not exist

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

> On Jan 30, 2017, at 1:05 PM, Eric Charles > wrote: > > Well... that seems like a different sort of issue. That is a straight forward > issue of whether we exist in a deterministic world, and that can't be > nominalist-realist distinction, can it? Even if

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

> On Jan 30, 2017, at 10:16 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > What you quoted from Clark was his description of "a very nominalist > conception of thermodynamics." By contrast, I think that Peirce quite > clearly held (1) that the mental (psychical law) is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

> On Jan 29, 2017, at 12:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > I would not call it a "force," but I agree that the traditional debate is > about whether there is something real (hence "realism") that all rabbits have > in common to make them rabbits vs. "rabbits"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

> On Jan 27, 2017, at 4:19 PM, Eric Charles > wrote: > > I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, > this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism > distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 25, 2017, at 8:28 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: > > Peirce was more than a pingpong ball in a long and repetitive exegetical > battle involving I suppose the core group of this forum. But I have had > enough. I simply will not open mail from the correspondents

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Just to add, I think the big break between Peirce and the nominalists is because a general can’t be limited to any collection of actual entities. This is obvious in mathematics if we talk about a general like “even integers.” Clearly that’s an infinite collection. But if you say something like

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 3:40 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > I think our problem may be that we’re not using the term “general” in the > same way. I’m trying to observe what Peirce calls “the proper distinction > between the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz.: indefiniteness and generality, >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I > think you’re talking about. > > Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot represent an > object that is a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 1:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Would you say that agapasm is a 'drive towards unity' or is it a 'feeling' of > attraction to Otherness, and an action of the development of some, just some, > commonalities. That is, agapasm requires diversity of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 12:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > As Edwina and I have discussed ad nauseam in the past, I disagree with her > interpretation that there was no "metaphysical agent," that there was no 3ns > prior to 1ns and 2ns, and that mind emerged with

Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 12:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > This nothing is limitless possibilities BUT, after those first two 'flashes' > outlined by Peirce, these flashes which introduce particular matter also > introduce Thirdness or habits of formation, and these then

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 10:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > I acknowledge that I may be confused here, but how can a sign that is general > have an object that is not general? Just a guess but I suspect the issue here is how one identifies a sign. That is what

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Jan 23, 2017, at 1:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Why would "[my] literal meanings" of those terms be different from anyone > else's, or from the "generic meaning"? As a first attempt ... > Pragmatically, all real

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 16, 2017, at 2:56 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > I don't believe that it's possible or desirable to put any limits on > the way symbols grow. Any attempt would "block the way of inquiry." One should distinguish between epistemological limits - that is artificial bounds

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 15, 2017, at 11:50 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Gary F., when Peirce in Harvard Lecture 6 says that "the totality of all real > objects" is a "singular", he is pretty clearly discussing that which he > elsewhere calls an individual. Jon A.S. was discussing

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 15, 2017, at 8:02 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > > Peircer's qualities of feelings are not 'generals'. When reflected upon they > appear vague, which does not have any direct relation with tte philosphical > concept of 'general'. I thought Peirce defined them as inversely

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Nominalism and Essentialism are the Scylla and Charybdis that Pragmatism Must Navigate Its Middle Way Between

> On Jan 14, 2017, at 8:15 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > But I did find this previous comment on Houser on Forster on Peirce while > I was looking for something else, and it reflects my sense that Peirceans > have more trouble controlling that slippery slide toward what I've called

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 10, 2017, at 12:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > In a few cases, I have decided to go ahead and buy the book after reading it > for free--most recently, Forster's Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism. > Coincidentally I’m halfway through that right now.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 9, 2017, at 8:35 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: I agree that this definitely tends to make nominalism self-refuting > which I see as a problem rather than a strength. > > A problem for nominalism or for realism? Is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 9, 2017, at 4:44 PM, jacob longshore wrote: > > Yes, I think you're right about that. Peirce's definitions of "generals" are > framed in terms of parts of a whole (and thereforefinite), whereas > "universal" would apply to an infinite number of possible

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 7, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are certain > general terms whose objects can only be in one place at one time, and these > are called individuals. They are generals that is, not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 9, 2017, at 2:25 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > Here metaphysics seems important if only to show what hidden premises > undergird our thinking. It’s also possible that he might mean approaching > metaphysics in a somewhat transcendental approach akin

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 9, 2017, at 1:58 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > I always liked his use of "general" since the word "universal" unqualified in > English seems to mean true of absolutely everything, and that's certainly not > what Aristotle meant by the Greek word traditionally

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theism and Peircean Cosmology

> On Dec 29, 2016, at 12:52 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > I think, maybe the concept of Christ is (btw) an attempt to solve the > almightiness-paradoxon (Can God create a rock He cannot move), by introducing > Himself in the role of a person who is not almighty, even got

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