Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Edwina, List: ET: I’m not sure why you have defined the object as ‘dynamical’; and the interpretant as ‘final’. Peirce didn’t do that in this section. This is not at all controversial among Peirce scholars. He does not refer to the *dynamical *object and *final *interpretant in 1903 because he has not yet recognized that each sign has two objects and three interpretants. We know for sure that the 1903 object is the *dynamical *object because the 1906-1908 trichotomy for the sign's relation to its dynamical object is icon/index/symbol, identical to the second 1903 trichotomy for the sign's relation to its object. We know for sure that the 1903 interpretant is the *final *interpretant because the 1906-1908 trichotomy for the sign's relation to its final interpretant is seme/pheme/delome, the generalization of rheme/dicisign/argument, which is the third 1903 trichotomy for the sign's relation to its interpretant. ET: I note that you have added, without informing the reader, all the terms in brackets; they are not in the original writing of Peirce. The use of brackets is standard practice when inserting words into a quotation that do not appear in the original text, often for the sake of clarification. CP, EP, and other published collections of Peirce's writings do this routinely. ET: What do YOU mean by ‘genuine’ and how does that explain the semiotic process? The term and concept are Peirce's, not mine. I suggest reading CP 1.521-544 (1903). ET: And what is the functional difference between the three categories and the three universes? The three categories are the irreducible elements of whatever is or could be present to the mind (quality/reaction/mediation), while the three universes together contain whatever could serve as the dynamical objects of signs (possibles/existents/necessitants). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 5, 2024 at 5:58 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > 1] ET: I’m not sure why you have defined the object as ‘dynamical’; and > the interpretant as ‘final’. Peirce didn’t do that in this section.. Again > - my problem is with your focus on the Final Interpretant. > > ET: I note that you have added, without informing the reader, all the > terms in brackets; they are not in the original writing of Peirce. Again - > Peirce does not write ’the relation of the sign to its (dynamical) object; > he writes only: ‘the relation of the sign to its object". And he also does > not write ‘according as its [final] Interpretant…but only “in its relation > to an interpretant”. > > 2] ET: I don’t agree that the fact that the Representamen/Sign is not > split up [ as the object is into the DO and IO] snd the Interpretant is > into the II, DI, FI] means that these can be defined as ‘degenerate > sub-correlates'. > > I understand them instead, within their functional semiosic role, where > the IO is understood as the data accepted within the capacities of the S/R > to process it. That is - even though an entity’s S/R may be interacting > with an external Object [ DO], it is a fact that not all of the data input > of that DO can be processed/received by that individual S/R. A baby > receives different sensual data from an adult; a bee, a dog, a plant..can > interact with that same DO but can only accept receive different sensual > data [IO]. . > > 3] ET: Again, I don’t agree with your view about ‘genuine dyadic > relations’ and ‘genuine triadic relation’. What do YOU mean by ‘genuine’ > and how does that explain the semiotic process? And what is the functional > difference between the three categories and the three universes??? > > 4] The fact that these three are the ’three correlates' doesn’t mean that > each has any capacity to exist ‘as itself’. Distinguishing them, > analytically, from each other within a relationship is conceptually not > the same as proving that each is existing ‘in itself’. I disagree that > when we are speaking of the ‘interpretant’ we are speaking of it ‘itself’. > Again, the interpretant functions only as a form of information > within interaction - and that differs according to the type of > Interpretant [ Immediate, dynamic, Final] and its modal category. > > 5]ET - I’ve explained my rejection of your placing the Final Interpretant > before the S-Id in another post, with an example, and an outline of what I > consider the functional role of the FI - in today’s posts. > > 6] ET: To say that the semiotic process is a cognitive process is hardly > outside the Peircean framework, but, in my view, is basic. After all- as > I’ve quoted so often, from Peirce, “Thought is not necessarily connected > with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals and throughout > the purely physical world”. 4.551. That is, cognition does not require a > separate brain. Therefore, even a semiosic triad operating in total >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Jon, Edwina, List, Please note the subject line. The 1903 Harvard and Lowell lectures were an important starting point for the major developments in Peirce's final decade. And note Tony's word 'evolving' for the developments during that decade. In any decision about Peirce's directions and intensions, it's important to note the evolution of Peirce's thinking and writing. JAS: As John Sowa observes, the shift is instead from phenomenology to phaneroscopy--hypostasizing the three categories (predicates) into the constituents of the three universes (subjects). That's not what I observed. I observed that Welby's emphasis on concrete examples led Peirce to make phaneroscopy closer to observation than to the abstract theories of Kant's phenomenology. In 1903, Peirce was right to object to Kant's Ding an sich. But he had no good replacement. For Welby, significs had no need for anything different from what we see, feel, think about, talk about, and act upon. When Peirce adopted phaneroscopy, he chose Wellby's foundation as a replacement for Kant's. Whenever there is any discrepancy between any MS from 1903 and a later MS, the later one takes precedence. The only exceptions are when an even later MS takes precedence over the middle one. (For example, his recto-verso cuts were a disaster, which he dumped in June 1911 -- along with several words he had used for many years: cut, scroll, recto, verso, illative, illation.) Re the classification of the sciences: That is an idea from 1903 that is generally acceptable. But Max Fisch wrote that the term 'logic as semeiotic' should be abbreviated as 'semeiotic', not 'logic'. The use of the term 'logic' for the Trivium was acceptable in Whateley's day, but it was archaic in 1903, and confusing for everybody who reads Peirce today. For other issues, I agree with Tony Jappy's writings about developments beyond 1903. John _ From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Edwina, List: ET: I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the ’phaneroscopic analysis' differs from the ‘classification of signs’. I will try one more time to explain, and then I will likely have to leave it at that. Peirce's well-known 1903 taxonomy for sign classification includes only three correlates--the sign (or representamen) itself, its (dynamical) object, and its (final) interpretant. However, its three trichotomies that result in ten sign classes are for the first correlate itself and its dyadic relations to the other two correlates (S, S-Od, S-If). These are divisions based on Peirce's three categories. CSP: Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law [qualisign/sinsign/legisign]; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its [dynamical] object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant [icon/index/symbol]; thirdly, according as its [final] Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason [rheme/dicisign/argument]. (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903) Phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating soon leads Peirce to recognize that there are really six correlates, not just three--each sign has two objects and three interpretants. The sign itself is the first and simplest correlate of that relation, with no degenerate sub-correlates. The object is the second correlate of that relation, of middling complexity, with not only the genuine (dynamical) correlate, but also a degenerate (immediate) sub-correlate. The interpretant is the third and most complex correlate of that relation, with not only the genuine (final) correlate and a degenerate (dynamical) sub-correlate, but also a doubly degenerate (immediate) sub-correlate. This is all grounded in the principle that in addition to genuine 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, "there is such a thing as the 1ns of 2ns and such a thing as the 1ns of 3ns; and there is such a thing as the 2ns of 3ns" (CP 1.530, 1903). In this context, the sub-correlates that correspond to 1ns of 2ns (immediate object) and 1ns of 3ns (immediate interpretant) are internal to the first correlate (sign), such that they have only degenerate dyadic relations with it--like the inherence of a quality in a thing. Accordingly, Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies for sign classification (e.g., EP 2:478-490, 1908 Dec 23-25) have ten trichotomies that result in 66 sign classes. Those trichotomies are for the six correlates themselves (Od, Oi, S, If, Id, Ii), their three genuine dyadic relations (S-Od, S-If, S-Id), and the genuine triadic relation (S-Od-If). Instead of the three categories, they are divisions into the three universes of possibles, existents, and necessitants. Tony Jappy suggests that this
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
> On Apr 5, 2024, at 5:35 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the > ’phaneroscopic analysis' differs from the ‘classification of signs’. > > I will try one more time to explain, and then I will likely have to leave it > at that. Peirce's well-known 1903 taxonomy for sign classification includes > only three correlates--the sign (or representamen) itself, its (dynamical) > object, and its (final) interpretant. However, its three trichotomies that > result in ten sign classes are for the first correlate itself and its dyadic > relations to the other two correlates (S, S-Od, S-If). These are divisions > based on Peirce's three categories. 1] ET: I’m not sure why you have defined the object as ‘dynamical’; and the interpretant as ‘final’. Peirce didn’t do that in this section.. Again - my problem is with your focus on the Final Interpretant. > > CSP: Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the sign > in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law > [qualisign/sinsign/legisign]; secondly, according as the relation of the sign > to its [dynamical] object consists in the sign's having some character in > itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to > an interpretant [icon/index/symbol]; thirdly, according as its [final] > Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a > sign of reason [rheme/dicisign/argument]. (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903) ET: I note that you have added, without informing the reader, all the terms in brackets; they are not in the original writing of Peirce. Again - Peirce does not write ’the relation of the sign to its (dynamical) object; he writes only: ‘the relation of the sign to its object". And he also does not write ‘according as its [final] Interpretant…but only “in its relation to an interpretant”. > > Phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of > representing/mediating soon leads Peirce to recognize that there are really > six correlates, not just three--each sign has two objects and three > interpretants. The sign itself is the first and simplest correlate of that > relation, with no degenerate sub-correlates. The object is the second > correlate of that relation, of middling complexity, with not only the genuine > (dynamical) correlate, but also a degenerate (immediate) sub-correlate. The > interpretant is the third and most complex correlate of that relation, with > not only the genuine (final) correlate and a degenerate (dynamical) > sub-correlate, but also a doubly degenerate (immediate) sub-correlate. This > is all grounded in the principle that in addition to genuine 1ns, 2ns, and > 3ns, "there is such a thing as the 1ns of 2ns and such a thing as the 1ns of > 3ns; and there is such a thing as the 2ns of 3ns" (CP 1.530, 1903). In this > context, the sub-correlates that correspond to 1ns of 2ns (immediate object) > and 1ns of 3ns (immediate interpretant) are internal to the first correlate > (sign), such that they have only degenerate dyadic relations with it--like > the inherence of a quality in a thing. 2] ET: I don’t agree that the fact that the Representamen/Sign is not split up [ as the object is into the DO and IO] snd the Interpretant is into the II, DI, FI] means that these can be defined as ‘degenerate sub-correlates'. I understand them instead, within their functional semiosic role, where the IO is understood as the data accepted within the capacities of the S/R to process it. That is - even though an entity’s S/R may be interacting with an external Object [ DO], it is a fact that not all of the data input of that DO can be processed/received by that individual S/R. A baby receives different sensual data from an adult; a bee, a dog, a plant..can interact with that same DO but can only accept receive different sensual data [IO]. . > > Accordingly, Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies for sign classification (e.g., EP > 2:478-490, 1908 Dec 23-25) have ten trichotomies that result in 66 sign > classes. Those trichotomies are for the six correlates themselves (Od, Oi, S, > If, Id, Ii), their three genuine dyadic relations (S-Od, S-If, S-Id), and the > genuine triadic relation (S-Od-If). Instead of the three categories, they are > divisions into the three universes of possibles, existents, and necessitants. > Tony Jappy suggests that this reflects a shift in Peirce's approach from > phenomenology to ontology for classifying signs, but that would be blatantly > inconsistent with his architectonic arrangement of the sciences. Speculative > grammar, the first branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic, > provides principles to ontology, the first branch of metaphysics--not the > other way around. As John Sowa observes, the shift is instead from > phenomenology to phaneroscopy--hypostasizing the
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Edwina, List: ET: I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the ’phaneroscopic analysis' differs from the ‘classification of signs’. I will try one more time to explain, and then I will likely have to leave it at that. Peirce's well-known 1903 taxonomy for sign classification includes only *three* correlates--the sign (or representamen) itself, its (dynamical) object, and its (final) interpretant. However, its three trichotomies that result in ten sign classes are for the first correlate *itself* and its dyadic *relations* to the other two correlates (S, S-Od, S-If). These are divisions based on Peirce's three categories. CSP: Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law [qualisign/sinsign/legisign]; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its [dynamical] object consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant [icon/index/symbol]; thirdly, according as its [final] Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason [rheme/dicisign/argument]. (CP 2.243, EP 2:291, 1903) Phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating soon leads Peirce to recognize that there are really *six* correlates, not just three--each sign has *two* objects and *three* interpretants. The sign itself is the first and simplest correlate of that relation, with no degenerate sub-correlates. The object is the second correlate of that relation, of middling complexity, with not only the genuine (dynamical) correlate, but also a degenerate (immediate) sub-correlate. The interpretant is the third and most complex correlate of that relation, with not only the genuine (final) correlate and a degenerate (dynamical) sub-correlate, but also a doubly degenerate (immediate) sub-correlate. This is all grounded in the principle that in addition to genuine 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, "there is such a thing as the 1ns of 2ns and such a thing as the 1ns of 3ns; and there is such a thing as the 2ns of 3ns" (CP 1.530, 1903). In this context, the sub-correlates that correspond to 1ns of 2ns (immediate object) and 1ns of 3ns (immediate interpretant) are *internal *to the first correlate (sign), such that they have only *degenerate *dyadic relations with it--like the inherence of a quality in a thing. Accordingly, Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies for sign classification (e.g., EP 2:478-490, 1908 Dec 23-25) have ten trichotomies that result in 66 sign classes. Those trichotomies are for the six correlates themselves (Od, Oi, S, If, Id, Ii), their three *genuine *dyadic relations (S-Od, S-If, S-Id), and the genuine triadic relation (S-Od-If). Instead of the three *categories*, they are divisions into the three *universes* of possibles, existents, and necessitants. Tony Jappy suggests that this reflects a shift in Peirce's approach from phenomenology to ontology for classifying signs, but that would be blatantly inconsistent with his architectonic arrangement of the sciences. Speculative grammar, the first branch of the normative science of logic as semeiotic, provides principles to ontology, the first branch of metaphysics--not the other way around. As John Sowa observes, the shift is instead from phenomenology to phaneroscopy--hypostasizing the three categories (predicates) into the constituents of the three universes (subjects). ET: There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’; or the ‘object itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘interpretant', of course we are speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign. This is clearly inconsistent with Peirce's own writings. He states explicitly and repeatedly that the sign (or representamen), the (dynamical) object, and the (final) interpretant are the three *correlates* of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating. While it is true that they only serve in those specific *roles* within that specific relation to each other, he nevertheless carefully and consistently distinguishes them from each other and from their dyadic relations with each other. When we speak of the "interpretant," we are speaking of the third correlate *itself*, not its dyadic *relation* with the sign--these have *separate* trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies (If, S-If). In fact, there are six separate trichotomies for the three interpretants (If, Id, Ii), the two genuine dyadic relations (S-lf, S-Id), and the genuine triadic relation (S-Od-If). The *only* *one* of these that appears in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy is its third trichotomy, the one for the sign's genuine dyadic *relation* with its (final) interpretant (S-If). ET: I don’t see how the 8.338 reference suggests your conclusion. In that passage, Peirce
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
A few more comments. 1] With regard to your post, John - I support the shift from a language based analysis to an image based one - but - question whether the phaneron is “in direct contact with the ding an sich’. My understanding is that such a relationship never takes place. 2]with regard to the continuing exploration of JAS’s switch of the hexadic pattern of the Interpretants from II-DI-FI, to FI-DI-II… I continue to examine this. I’ll try an example.. First - my understanding of the FI is that it is not always operative, but it “does not consist in any way in which any mind does act but in the way in which every mind would act [8.315.1909. -and ’the effect the Sign would produce upon any mind upon which the circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect’. SS110-1. 1909 -“The Final Interpretant meaning that Habit in the production of which the function of the Sign, as such, is exhausted” 1910. ILS 285. I note several things from the above: - namely that the FI is not always operative, and that it is intimately connected to the Sign/Representamen [S/R]. The S/R is the site of knowledge production and generation and operates as the mediative process in understanding/ dealing with the effects and interactions of one entity with another. I am therefore concluding that the FI has the function and capacity to ADD to the knowledge base of the S/R. 3] Example. I am walking outside. Suddenly I feel ’something’ hit my arm. This first sensation sets up an interaction with the external world as a Dynamic Object. This DO immediately then, becomes ‘part’ of my experience and as such, is now an Immediate Object. My S/R or knowledge-producing system then goes to work..to process this input. My first experience is pure sensation, non-interpreted, non-described [ Firstness], which I would define as the Immediate Interpretant. In this phase, the S/R is itself in a mode of Firstness. But then, my system Reacts and moves into the Dynamic Interpretant phase, when I realize that I have been hit with an external object [Secondness or more likely Secondness-as-Firstness. [ a non-analyzed awareness of an external input]. ]. NOTE; In order to move from the II in a mode of 1ns into the DI in a mode of 2ns, my S/R has ADDED information. That is, my S/R has the knowledge base to tell me that what is going on is from an external interaction. Without such an addition - my interaction with the external object would remain as pure sensation and go no further. I might then react to this interaction with ‘ a spontaneous cry’ - a ‘local, non-intentional reaction to a local indexical stimulus. However my S/R might have the stored knowledge base to provide further informational input to enable me to analyze further what has taken place; my S/R is then operating within a mode of Thirdness - and enables me to move into a Dicent Symbolic Legisgn, an ‘informed’ conclusion, when I realize I’ve been hit with a baseball from the nearby game…- it’s an informed conclusion. Do I move into an FI - which would provide more information to store in my knowledge base, ie, a general hypothesis that IF you walk near a playing field, THEN, you might be hit. Not always, but, my point is only that the FI works to increase the knowledge base of the S/R I think the above example shares its explanations with the example provided by Peirce in 1909 8,314, when he outlines his wife’s experience to his description of the weather. I note that his outline of the FI “is the sum of the Lessons of the reply. Moral, Scientific, etc'" 4] This then moves to my questions about JAS’s placement of the FI as primary to the other Interpretants. I am defining the FI as a basic means of knowledge development - which knowledge is stored in the S/R. I can understand this primary role, BUT my point is only that for most of our experiences, we never involve the FI; ie, there is no knowledge generation and our Interpretant relations are confined to the II and DI. I therefore, can only continue to support the pattern of II-DI-FI. Edwina > On Apr 4, 2024, at 11:07 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Edwina, Jon, List, > > The following observation is a good starting point for analyzing the > development iof Peirce's thought and writing from 1903 to 1908 and later: > > ET: I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic > semiosic process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY > to linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word > ’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s > extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is > confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would > require merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work. > > Yes indeed. Peirce's shift from Kant's language-based phenomenology to an > image-based phaneroscopy was
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Edwina, List, I think, "classification" has two meanings: The classifying act, where causality goes along with temporality, and second the state of classes in the present, like a snapshot, where so there cannot be a temporality. But in this latter definition too, causality is detectable, because it is inherited, due to the preceding classifying act. For example, if you look at the x-ray-snapshot of a fish, there is a spine. If it is a fish, it is a vertebrate. "Vertebrate" determines "fish", because if it would not have a spine, it would not be a fish. But the temporal development of a spine, that has classified "fish" away from "snail" (just a guessed example) has happened some million years ago. Best, Helmut 05. April 2024 um 03:07 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: I will try to answer in pints: On Apr 4, 2024, at 8:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Edwina, List: In light of our longstanding and all-too-often contentious disagreements about Peirce's speculative grammar, I generally prefer to refrain from direct engagement these days, but I have decided to make an exception in this case. Hopefully, I will not regret it. ET: I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ or ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint? Again, we are discussing an abstract classification of signs that utilizes a series of different trichotomies, not the concrete process of semiosis that consists of a series of different events. To say that one trichotomy follows another is merely to say that classification in accordance with the first trichotomy logically constrains classification in accordance with the second trichotomy. If we assign numbers to the universes--1 for possibles, 2 for existents, and 3 for necessitants--then the number assigned for each subsequent trichotomy must be equal to or less than the number assigned for the preceding trichotomy. 1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of semiosis. Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical modes to the interpretants? ET: And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes an assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he says: possible-existent-necessitant [for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. No, this is a misunderstanding of my position. It confuses the phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating (one sign, two objects, three interpretants) with the classification of signs in accordance with Peirce's 1908 taxonomy using ten trichotomies for those six correlates and their four distinct relations as divisions into three universes (possibles, existents, necessitants). These are two different applications of Peirce's three universal categories (1ns, 2ns, 3ns). 2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the’ phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’. ET: And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [understood as a necessitant] but, if we consider the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY ONE of the ten has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are in a mode of 1ns and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. I think this is a key point - only one of the ten classes has the Final Interpretant in a mode of 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot impose constraint. This seems to be a reference to Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, not the 1908 taxonomy that we are actually discussing. In that 1903 taxonomy, the third trichotomy is not for the interpretant itself, but for its dyadic relation with the sign (rheme/dicisign/argument). An argument is indeed the only sign class for which this sign-interpretant relation is a necessitant, but no one is talking about that relation or the final interpretant itself constraining anything--its trichotomy constrains any subsequent trichotomies for sign classification. For example, according to Peirce himself, the S-If trichotomy constrains the S-Id trichotomy. 3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘inerpretant, of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign. CSP: According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic interpretant in three ways: 1st, an argument [delome] only may be submitted to
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Edwina, Jon, List, The following observation is a good starting point for analyzing the development iof Peirce's thought and writing from 1903 to 1908 and later: ET: I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY to linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word ’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would require merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work. Yes indeed. Peirce's shift from Kant's language-based phenomenology to an image-based phaneroscopy was necessary to get rid of Kant's struggle with a Ding an sich, Peirce's1903 terminology was based on language, which, by itself, is hopelessly inadequate for mapping the phaneron to a linear notation. But his shift from phenomenology to phaneroscopy coincided with an emphasis on diagrams and images as more fundamental representations than language or even his 1885 algebra of logic. That shift coincided with his generalization of term, proposition, argument to seme, pheme, and delome. For example, the following paragraph from 1906 summarizes the issues: "It is necessary that the Diagram should be an Icon in which the inferred relation should be preserved. And it is necessary that it should be insofar General that one sees that accompaniments are no part of the Object. The Diagram is an Interpretant of a Symbol in which the signification of the Symbol becomes a part of the object of the icon. No other kind of sign can make a Truth evident. For the evident is that which is presented in an image, leaving for the work of the understanding merely the Interpretation of the Image in a Symbol." (LNB 286r, 1906) In his version of phenomenology, Kant was left with an unbridgeable gap between a Ding an sich and the words that describe it. Peirce removed that gap by replacing phenomenology with phaneroscopy. Too many people treat those two words as synonyms. But the crucial difference is that the phaneron is in direct contact with the Ding an sich. by means of the sensations, feelings, and physical actions. The images and feelings become semes, and constructions of them become phemes. Phaneroscopy is the science of images, diagrams of images, and their mapping to symbols that may be expressed in various ways, including language. But language is secondary. It is not the primary medium of thought. That is why the 1903 lectures are just the starting point for his last decade of research and his evolution to completely new ways of thinking and a revolution in his methods of analyzing and diagramming his own thoughts and his system of representing it. I started to write an article for the book Kees was editing, but I missed the deadline because I kept revising it over and over again, as I kept running into all these issues. It eventually evolved into an article on phaneroscopy for the book that Ahti was editing. And after I finished that article, I saw how those issues were related to (1) the topics that Tony was working on and (2) the topics that Peirce was addressing with his Delta graphs. I believe that if Peirce had not had that accident in December 1911, he would have written an outstanding proof of pragmatism with the help of his Delta graphs and the methods he developed in the years after 1903. John From: "Edwina Taborsky" List I think it’s almost useless to discuss these issues, since I’m aware that JAS has his set of beliefs about the Peircean framework - and I [ and others] - have our own beliefs - which may or may not, align with his. But just a few points: 1] JAS quote Peirce: “ No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one predestined belief” 7.327]. This quote is to support his belief in the primacy of the order of the Final Interpretant in the set of three Interpretants. But- JAS left out the following sentence, which is” “Hence it appears tha in the process of investigation wholly new ideas and elements of belief must spring up in the mind that were not there before” …He continues on with this examination of the development of entirely new ideas in the following paragraphs.[ Note = the process of abduction]. 2] And the same with his quotation from 5.407 “ No modification..can enable a man to escape the predestined opinion" . Again- like the other quotation, this is not referring to the three interpretants or the Final Interpretant, but is an analysis of the ‘process of investigation’ - which obviously involves all parts of the semiosic hexad. 3] And the same with 3.161 …carrying belief …toward certain predestinate conclusions”. Again, this refers to the “process of inference”
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
I will try to answer in pints: > On Apr 4, 2024, at 8:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Edwina, List: > > In light of our longstanding and all-too-often contentious disagreements > about Peirce's speculative grammar, I generally prefer to refrain from direct > engagement these days, but I have decided to make an exception in this case. > Hopefully, I will not regret it. > > ET: I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ > or ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that > ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to > other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint? > > Again, we are discussing an abstract classification of signs that utilizes a > series of different trichotomies, not the concrete process of semiosis that > consists of a series of different events. To say that one trichotomy follows > another is merely to say that classification in accordance with the first > trichotomy logically constrains classification in accordance with the second > trichotomy. If we assign numbers to the universes--1 for possibles, 2 for > existents, and 3 for necessitants--then the number assigned for each > subsequent trichotomy must be equal to or less than the number assigned for > the preceding trichotomy. 1] I’m afraid that I don’t see why or how an ‘abstract classification of signs’ can differ from the outline of the pragmatic/concrete process of semiosis. Again - who and how and why ‘assign’ ‘universe/categorical modes to the interpretants? > > ET: And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes > an assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he > says: possible-existent-necessitant [for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But > this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. > > No, this is a misunderstanding of my position. It confuses the phaneroscopic > analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating (one sign, > two objects, three interpretants) with the classification of signs in > accordance with Peirce's 1908 taxonomy using ten trichotomies for those six > correlates and their four distinct relations as divisions into three > universes (possibles, existents, necessitants). These are two different > applications of Peirce's three universal categories (1ns, 2ns, 3ns). 2] I’m afraid I simply don’t understand your outline - and wonder why the’ phaneroscopic analysis differs from the ‘classification of signs’. > > ET: And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the > Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [understood as a necessitant] > but, if we consider the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY ONE of the ten > has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are in a mode of 1ns > and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. I think this is a key > point - only one of the ten classes has the Final Interpretant in a mode of > 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot > impose constraint. > > This seems to be a reference to Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, not the 1908 taxonomy > that we are actually discussing. In that 1903 taxonomy, the third trichotomy > is not for the interpretant itself, but for its dyadic relation with the sign > (rheme/dicisign/argument). An argument is indeed the only sign class for > which this sign-interpretant relation is a necessitant, but no one is talking > about that relation or the final interpretant itself constraining > anything--its trichotomy constrains any subsequent trichotomies for sign > classification. For example, according to Peirce himself, the S-If trichotomy > constrains the S-Id trichotomy. 3] There is no such thing as ’the interpretant itself’ ; or the ‘object itself’ or the ‘representamen itself’. All function only within the semiosic process. The triad is irreducible - and when we speak of the ‘inerpretant, of course we ae speaking of its relationship with the representamen/sign. > > CSP: According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic > interpretant in three ways: 1st, an argument [delome] only may be submitted > to its interpretant [indicative], as something the reasonableness of which > will be acknowledged. 2nd, an argument or dicent [pheme] may be urged upon > the interpretant by an act of insistence [imperative]. 3rd, argument or > dicent may be, and a rheme [seme] can only be, presented to the interpretant > for contemplation [suggestive]. (CP 8.338, 1904 Oct 12) 4] The above, to me, means that the relation between theSign/representamen and the Dynamic Interpretant can be in any one of the three categorical modes. > > In fact, this is my fourth reason for believing that the proper logical order > of the three interpretant trichotomies for sign classification is final, then > dynamical, then immediate--since the
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
John, List: I have likewise already read (and carefully studied) about a dozen articles by Tony Jappy, as well as his 2017 book, *Peirce's Twenty-Eight Sign Classes and the Philosophy of Representation*. Why assume otherwise? I still disagree with him on destinate=final and explicit=immediate (as I maintain) vs. destinate=immediate and explicit=final (as he maintains). However, having made our cases, I agree with him that we must ultimately "leave the list members to make up their own minds." The only authority that really matters here is that of Peirce himself. I strongly urge everyone to study *his *writings in light of our different arguments, and then draw their own conclusions about *his *views based on those texts. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 2:46 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I have read your comments, and I have read several articles by Tony Jappy > that explain these issues in far greater depth and generality. I strongly > urge you to study his writings. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Edwina, List: In light of our longstanding and all-too-often contentious disagreements about Peirce's speculative grammar, I generally prefer to refrain from direct engagement these days, but I have decided to make an exception in this case. Hopefully, I will not regret it. ET: I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ or ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint? Again, we are discussing an abstract *classification *of signs that utilizes a series of different *trichotomies*, not the concrete *process *of semiosis that consists of a series of different *events*. To say that one trichotomy *follows *another is merely to say that classification in accordance with the first trichotomy *logically constrains *classification in accordance with the second trichotomy. If we assign numbers to the universes--1 for possibles, 2 for existents, and 3 for necessitants--then the number assigned for each subsequent trichotomy must be equal to or less than the number assigned for the preceding trichotomy. ET: And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes an assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he says: possible-existent-necessitant [for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. No, this is a *mis*understanding of my position. It confuses the phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating (one sign, two objects, three interpretants) with the classification of signs in accordance with Peirce's 1908 taxonomy using ten trichotomies for those six correlates and their four distinct relations as divisions into three universes (possibles, existents, necessitants). These are two *different *applications of Peirce's three universal categories (1ns, 2ns, 3ns). ET: And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [understood as a necessitant] but, if we consider the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY ONE of the ten has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are in a mode of 1ns and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. I think this is a key point - only one of the ten classes has the Final Interpretant in a mode of 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot impose constraint. This seems to be a reference to Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, not the 1908 taxonomy that we are actually discussing. In that 1903 taxonomy, the third trichotomy is not for the interpretant *itself*, but for its dyadic *relation *with the sign (rheme/dicisign/argument). An argument is indeed the only sign class for which this sign-interpretant relation is a necessitant, but no one is talking about that relation or the final interpretant *itself *constraining anything--its *trichotomy *constrains any subsequent *trichotomies *for sign classification. For example, according to Peirce himself, the S-If trichotomy constrains the S-Id trichotomy. CSP: According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic interpretant in three ways: 1st, an argument [delome] only may be *submitted *to its interpretant [indicative], as something the reasonableness of which will be acknowledged. 2nd, an argument or dicent [pheme] may be *urged *upon the interpretant by an act of insistence [imperative]. 3rd, argument or dicent may be, and a rheme [seme] can only be, presented to the interpretant for *contemplation* [suggestive]. (CP 8.338, 1904 Oct 12) In fact, this is my fourth reason for believing that the proper logical order of the three interpretant trichotomies for sign classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--since the S-If trichotomy unambiguously comes *before *the S-Id trichotomy, it makes sense that the If trichotomy likewise comes *before *the Id trichotomy. ET: And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from possible to existent to necessitate [1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not then mean that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is that, if the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant is in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either in a modes of 1ns or 2ns. Again, we are discussing sign classification, not "cognitive movement" (whatever that is). My position is that the *purpose *of the final interpretant (to produce feeling/action/self-control) constrains the *mode of being* of the dynamical interpretant (feeling/exertion/sign), which constrains the *mode of presentation* of the immediate interpretant (hypothetic/categorical/relative). The competing claim is that the mode of presentation of the immediate
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Jon, I have read your comments, and I have read several articles by Tony Jappy that explain these issues in far greater depth and generality. I strongly urge you to study his writings. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 4/4/24 12:39 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: Ahti Pietarinen , Francesco Bellucci Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end List: While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of determination are much more plausible than the other way around, especially when accounting for the possibility of misinterpretations. Again, in this context, "determines" is not synonymous with "causes" nor "precedes." Instead, it means "logically constrains," such that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). For the interpretant divisions in Peirce’s last complete taxonomy (CP 8.344-375, EP 2:482-490, 1908 Dec 24-25)--using "actuous" or "temperative" for a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is "to produce action" or "to produce self-control," respectively (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31)--this imposes the following restrictions. - A gratific sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is possible, must be a sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible; i.e., a sign that would ideally produce feelings can actually produce only feelings. - Only a temperative sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is necessitant, can be a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a percussive sign) or possible (for a sympathetic sign); i.e., only a sign that would ideally produce self-control can actually produce further signs, although it might instead produce exertions or feelings. - A sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible, must be a hypothetic sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation is possible; i.e., a sign that actually produces feelings can only present those effects as abstract qualities. - Only a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is necessitant, can be a relative sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a categorical sign) or possible (for a hypothetic sign); i.e., only a sign that actually produces further signs can present those effects as real relations, although it might instead present them as concrete inherences or abstract qualities. Hence, the ten sign classes are gratific, sympathetic actuous, hypothetic percussive actuous, categorical actuous, sympathetic temperative, hypothetic percussive temperative, categorical percussive temperative, hypothetic usual, categorical usual, and relative. The upshot is that when a sign is misinterpreted, such that its dynamical interpretant's mode of being is of a different universe from that of its final interpretant's purpose, the direction of the deviation is always from necessitant to existent to possible--which makes sense since 3ns always involves 2ns, which always involves 1ns. By contrast, reversing the order of the interpretant trichotomies would require the opposite, such that deviation would always be from possible to existent to necessitant--which does not make sense since 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns. A sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce feelings could sometimes (somehow) actually produce exertions or further signs as its dynamical interpretants instead, while a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control would always actually produce further signs as its dynamical interpretants. Moreover, as I discussed on the List a few weeks ago, the trichotomy according to the nature or mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant is hypothetic/categorical/relative, directly corresponding to the three kinds of propositions that are distinguishable by the number of lines of identity that they require in Existential Graphs (EGs)--zero/one/two or more. The phemic sheet is a strictly logical quasi-mind, so it can only be determined to a further sign, namely, an EG that is explicitly scribed on it. Since all three kinds of propositions can be represented by such an EG, the trichotomy for the immediate interpretant must come after the one for the dynamical interpretant--if it were the other way around, then only relative propositions with at least two lines of ide
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
List I am aware that JAS’s use of ‘determines’ is not synonymous with ‘causes’ or ‘precedes’ - but is ‘logically constrains’. However, something that ‘logically constrains’ DOES, functionally operate as causal and precedent to other forces- otherwise - how would it function as that constraint?. And, to my understanding, JAS’s definition of the Interpretants includes an assumption that each is also in a different categorical mode, ie, as he says: possible-existent-necessitnat [ for Immediate/Dynamic and Final]. But this is not found in Peirce’s outline of the ten classes. And, for an Interpretant to function as ‘constraint’ would mean that the Interpretant would have to be in a mode of 3ns, [ understood as a necessitant] but, if we consider the ten classes, then, we find that ONLY ONE of the ten has the Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. The others - six are in a mode of 1ns and three are in a mode of 2ns, ie, are dicisigns. . I think this is a key point - only one of the ten classes has the Final Interpretant in a mode of 3ns, ie, capable of imposing constraint. A FI in a mode of 1ns or 2ns cannot impose constraint. And when we consider Robert Marty’s outline of the hexadic ten classes - we see, of course, the same format Where then is the constraint? It’s within the mediative representamen/sign, not within the Interpretants. It is this site that plays the key role in forming the nature of the sign triad’/hexad. And - there is no argument that, one cannot move, cognitively, from possible to existent to necessitate [ 1ns to 2ns to 3ns] BUT this does not then mean that the Final Interpretant is in a mode of 3ns! All it means is that, if the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of 1ns, then, the other two interpretants will be in the same mode. BUT, if the immediate interpretant is in a mode of 2ns, then, the Dynamic and Final Intepretants can be either in a modes of 1ns or 2ns. Again - see Robert Marty’s outlines. Edwina > On Apr 4, 2024, at 12:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > List: > > While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing > that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign > classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten sign > classes that result from applying the rule of determination are much more > plausible than the other way around, especially when accounting for the > possibility of misinterpretations. > > Again, in this context, "determines" is not synonymous with "causes" nor > "precedes." Instead, it means "logically constrains," such that "a Possible > can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by > nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). For the interpretant > divisions in Peirce’s last complete taxonomy (CP 8.344-375, EP 2:482-490, > 1908 Dec 24-25)--using "actuous" or "temperative" for a sign whose final > interpretant's purpose is "to produce action" or "to produce self-control," > respectively (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31)--this imposes the following > restrictions. > A gratific sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is possible, must be a > sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible; > i.e., a sign that would ideally produce feelings can actually produce only > feelings. > Only a temperative sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is necessitant, > can be a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is > necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a percussive sign) or > possible (for a sympathetic sign); i.e., only a sign that would ideally > produce self-control can actually produce further signs, although it might > instead produce exertions or feelings. > A sympathetic sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible, > must be a hypothetic sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of > presentation is possible; i.e., a sign that actually produces feelings can > only present those effects as abstract qualities. > Only a usual sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is > necessitant, can be a relative sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of > presentation is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a > categorical sign) or possible (for a hypothetic sign); i.e., only a sign that > actually produces further signs can present those effects as real relations, > although it might instead present them as concrete inherences or abstract > qualities. > Hence, the ten sign classes are gratific, sympathetic actuous, hypothetic > percussive actuous, categorical actuous, sympathetic temperative, hypothetic > percussive temperative, categorical percussive temperative, hypothetic usual, > categorical usual, and relative. The upshot is that when a sign is > misinterpreted, such that its dynamical interpretant's mode of being is of a > different universe from that of its final interpretant's
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
List: While I am at it, I might as well elaborate on my third reason for believing that the proper order of the interpretant trichotomies for sign classification is final, then dynamical, then immediate--namely, the ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of determination are much more plausible than the other way around, especially when accounting for the possibility of *mis*interpretations. Again, in this context, "determines" is not synonymous with "causes" nor "precedes." Instead, it means "logically constrains," such that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23). For the interpretant divisions in Peirce’s last complete taxonomy (CP 8.344-375, EP 2:482-490, 1908 Dec 24-25)--using "actuous" or "temperative" for a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is "to produce action" or "to produce self-control," respectively (R 339:424[285r], 1906 Aug 31)--this imposes the following restrictions. - A *gratific* sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is possible, must be a *sympathetic* sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible; i.e., a sign that would ideally produce feelings can actually produce only feelings. - Only a *temperative* sign, whose final interpretant’s purpose is necessitant, can be a *usual* sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a *percussive* sign) or possible (for a *sympathetic* sign); i.e., only a sign that would ideally produce self-control can actually produce further signs, although it might instead produce exertions or feelings. - A *sympathetic* sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is possible, must be a *hypothetic* sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation is possible; i.e., a sign that actually produces feelings can only present those effects as abstract qualities. - Only a *usual* sign, whose dynamical interpretant’s mode of being is necessitant, can be a *relative* sign, whose immediate interpretant’s mode of presentation is necessitant, although it might instead be existent (for a *categorical* sign) or possible (for a *hypothetic* sign); i.e., only a sign that actually produces further signs can present those effects as real relations, although it might instead present them as concrete inherences or abstract qualities. Hence, the ten sign classes are gratific, sympathetic actuous, hypothetic percussive actuous, categorical actuous, sympathetic temperative, hypothetic percussive temperative, categorical percussive temperative, hypothetic usual, categorical usual, and relative. The upshot is that when a sign is *mis*interpreted, such that its dynamical interpretant's mode of being is of a different universe from that of its final interpretant's purpose, the direction of the deviation is always from necessitant to existent to possible--which makes sense since 3ns always involves 2ns, which always involves 1ns. By contrast, reversing the order of the interpretant trichotomies would require the opposite, such that deviation would always be from possible to existent to necessitant--which *does not* make sense since 2ns cannot be built up from 1ns, and 3ns cannot be built up from 1ns and 2ns. A sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce feelings could sometimes (somehow) actually produce exertions or further signs as its dynamical interpretants instead, while a sign whose final interpretant's purpose is to produce self-control would always actually produce further signs as its dynamical interpretants. Moreover, as I discussed on the List a few weeks ago, the trichotomy according to the nature or mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant is hypothetic/categorical/relative, directly corresponding to the three kinds of propositions that are distinguishable by the number of lines of identity that they require in Existential Graphs (EGs)--zero/one/two or more. The phemic sheet is a strictly *logical *quasi-mind, so it can *only *be determined to a further sign, namely, an EG that is explicitly scribed on it. Since all three kinds of propositions can be represented by such an EG, the trichotomy for the immediate interpretant must come *after* the one for the dynamical interpretant--if it were the other way around, then *only *relative propositions with at least two lines of identity could be scribed on the phemic sheet, which is obviously not the case. That said, since the trichotomy for the sign's dyadic relation with its final interpretant (name/proposition/argument or seme/pheme/delome) presumably comes *after *all three trichotomies for the interpretants themselves, regardless of which way we arrange them, only categorical and relative signs can be propositions (phemes). Hypothetic signs can only be names (semes), which would be scribed on the phemic sheet without
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
List I think it’s almost useless to discuss these issues, since I’m aware that JAS has his set of beliefs about the Peircean framework - and I [ and others] - have our own beliefs - which may or may not, align with his. But just a few points: 1] JAS quote Peirce: “ No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one predestined belief” 7.327]. This quote is to support his belief in the primacy of the order of the Final Interpretant in the set of three Interpretants. But- JAS left out the following sentence, which is” “Hence it appears tha in the process of investigation wholly new ideas and elements of belief must spring up in the mind that were not there before” …He continues on with this examination of the development of entirely new ideas in the following paragraphs.[ Note = the process of abduction]. 2] And the same with his quotation from 5.407 “ No modification..can enable a man to escape the predestined opinion" . Again- like the other quotation, this is not referring to the three interpretants or the Final Interpretant, but is an analysis of the ‘process of investigation’ - which obviously involves all parts of the semiosic hexad. 3] And the same with 3.161 …carrying belief …toward certain predestinate conclusions”. Again, this refers to the “process of inference” 3.161, snd not the Fi, and as Peirce writes, these “fresh peripheral excitations are also continually creating new belief-habits” [3.161. I could also note that the Final or logical interpretant is, “that of the conditional mood’ [5.482] and therefore, in my view, not destinate’. And I don’t think that there is much difference in these conclusions as to whether the terms are logical or temporal. 4] I remain concerned about out the definition of the Dynamic Object, which I reject JAS’s view as “independent of the sign’. Peirce is quite explicit that “reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general, but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it” 5.408… I refer to this comment of Peirce only to state that the reality of objects ‘out there’ is, as he notes elsewhere, outside of our experience [see his explanations of the ‘ding an sich’ which is not the same as the Dynamic Object- which is “the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign of its Representation” 4.536.1906. And “the dynamical object does not mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the mind in perception” SS197..1906. That is, my understanding of the DO is that it functions as such ONLY when it becomes part of the semiotic process. And as I’ve said before - I reject the use of the terms of genuine, degenerate etc referring to the DO and IO [ and II, DI, FI] for this use of terms I think refer more properly to the categorical modes-of-being - and these nodal sites in the hexad can be in any one of the three modes. . 5] I note that JAS seems to refer to his examination of the hexadic semiosic process as within the linguistic realm. If this outline refers ONLY to linguistic terms - then, I can see his point, where, for example, the word ’STOP’ does have a ‘predestined meaning’ . But - I cannot see that Peirce’s extensive examination of the semiotic process and the interpretants - is confined to the linguistic realm, for such a realm-of-examination would require merely half a paragraph - and not years of thought and work. But- I am aware that JAS will not change his conclusions - and I, am not ready to subscribe to his, so this post seems almost irrelevant, other than that I prefer to not ‘be silent’ about issues which, to me, undermine the value of the Peircean framework. Edwina > On Apr 3, 2024, at 9:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > List: > > It is telling that this rebuttal does not address my first and most important > reason for equating "the Destinate Interpretant" to the final interpretant > and "the Explicit Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant (SS84, EP > 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), namely, because the terms themselves clearly imply this. > In fact, some of the textual evidence offered below strongly supports my > position. > > TJ: In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear definition > of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means that it is > present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions Peirce > gives of the immediate interpretant as being the interpretant ‘in the sign’: > ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e., > the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic > Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, > 1908). > > Being "immediate" in this sense is practically synonymous with being > "explicit." It is the interpretant that is right there in the sign itself, > which is why the corresponding trichotomy for sign
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
John, List: JFS: I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark' instead of 'tone'. Again, going by the manuscript dates, Peirce's *final *choice was "tone" (R 339, 27 Dec 1908, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i), not "mark" (CP 8.363-364, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25)--especially since the latter passage includes the word "might" and a parenthetical question mark, clearly indicating that "mark" was tentative rather than definitive. JFS: The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason for preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system As quoted, Lady Welby does not say that she does not *understand *Peirce's "exposition of the 'possible' Sign"--on the contrary, she calls it "profoundly interesting"--only that she is "not equal to the effort of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer *tone *to *mark*"; and again, her stated rationale for this preference is strikingly similar to Peirce's stated rationale for coining "tone" in the first place (CP 4.537, 1906). Besides ... JFS: That is the primary reason why he [Peirce] found Lady Welby's correspondence so important: She had a solid intuitive way of explaining principles that he tended to explain in ways that were more abstract and difficult to understand. Her influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing explanations for his abstract ideas. ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html) Why think that "tone" vs. "mark" was an exception to this, such that her "homely" opinion about it did not sway him--especially since he was still vacillating between these two options, and specifically *asked *her to help him choose one? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 1:08 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Edwina, Tony, Jon, List, > > I'd like to emphasize the first word of the subject line: Evolution. I > believe that is the best single word to describe Peirce's developments in > from 1903 to 1906 to 1908 to 1911 to his last long letter of 1913, in which > he highlighted the features he considered important. I'd also emphasize > Tony's point that too many Peirce scholars stopped at the issues, > terminology, and notations of 1903. That was an important beginning, but > the evolution in the following decade made fundamental changes. > > One important source of evidence is Peirce's choice of terminology. He > coined and adopted a wide range of terms, some of which he retained to the > end. But there are others that he stopped using and replaced with new > words. The points where he changed terms also involve critical > innovations. If he never again uses the old terms, that is an important > indication that he began a new way of thinking (paradigm). For example, > the words 'cut' and 'scroll' were banished in June 1911. > > There are multiple places where he made a major shift in terminology, and > every one of them shows a significant innovation in his system. The shift > from phenomenology to phaneroscopy is a permanent shift, and I believe that > it indicates a shift from an abstract Kantian style to the more concrete > examples that Lady Welby used. Another shift from the word-based > terminology, such as dicisign, to terms that include diagrams and images, > such as semes and phemes, is significant. Since semes include hypericons, > he never again needed that word. He also used the term "phemic sheet" as > replacement for 'sheet of assertion'. > > I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark' instead > of 'tone'. The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she > admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason > for preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system: "Your > exposition of the 'possible' Sign is profoundly interesting; but I am not > equal to the effort of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer > *tone* to *mark* for the homely reason that we often have occasion to say > 'I do not object to his words, but to his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21). > > There's more to say about these issues, and I'll send another note when I > have the time. > > John > > PS: The initials JS are ambiguous. It's better to write JAS or JFS. > > -- > *From*: "Edwina Taborsky" > *Subject*: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation > from 1903 to the end > > This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
List: It is telling that this rebuttal does not address my first and most important reason for equating "the Destinate Interpretant" to the final interpretant and "the Explicit Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant (SS84, EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), namely, because the terms themselves clearly imply this. In fact, some of the textual evidence offered below strongly *supports *my position. TJ: In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions Peirce gives of the immediate interpretant as being the interpretant ‘in the sign’: ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e., the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, 1908). Being "immediate" in this sense is practically synonymous with being "explicit." It is the interpretant that is *right there* in the sign itself, which is why the corresponding trichotomy for sign classification is a division according to its mode of *presentation*. CSP as quoted by TJ: The Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered ... The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS 111, 1909) Here the final interpretant is unambiguously identified as the "destined" interpretant, i.e., the "destinate" interpretant. CSP as quoted by TJ: But we must note that there is certainly a third kind of Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP 2:496, 1909) As Peirce says elsewhere, "No matter what his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one predestinated belief" (CP 7.327, 1873). Also, "No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion" (CP 5.407, 1878). Also, "The logician maintains that there is, namely, that they are all adapted to an end, that of carrying belief, in the long run, toward certain predestinate conclusions which are the same for all men" (CP 3.161, 1880). Also, "I call 'truth' the predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that which *would *ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that particular direction" (EP 2:457, 1911). Since the "ultimate opinion" is the "predestinate opinion," the final interpretant is likewise the "destinate" interpretant. TJ: JAS’s phenomenological hierarchy would suggest, too, that the dynamic object is genuine and the immediate degenerate ... Indeed, Peirce's recognition around 1904 that each sign has two objects and three interpretants is the result of phaneroscopic analysis--within the genuine triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, the sign is the first and simplest correlate, the object is the second correlate of middling complexity, and the interpretant is the third and most complex correlate (CP 2.235-242, EP 2:290, 1903). Accordingly, the dynamical object is the *genuine *object, as it is in itself, independent of the sign; and the immediate object is the *degenerate *object, as it is represented by the sign. TJ: It seems illogical to me to seek to place the immediate interpretant in a classification or process at two places from the sign in which it is defined to be present. It is perfectly logical in a classification of *signs*, because the three correlates of the *genuine *triadic relation of representing/mediating are the *genuine *correlates--the sign itself, its *dynamical *object, and its *final *interpretant. On the other hand, there is only a *degenerate *triadic relation between the sign, its dynamical object, and its *dynamical *interpretant--it is reducible to the sign's genuine *dyadic *relations with its dynamical object/interpretant, each of which has its own trichotomy; and there are only *degenerate *dyadic relations between the sign and its immediate object/interpretant, which is why there are no separate trichotomies for these relations. Moreover, all six discrete correlates are *entia rationis*--artifacts of analysis prescinded from the real and continuous process of semiosis. TJ: if the final interpretant as Peirce defines it here is that toward which the actual tends one wonders at what point any actual interpretation (Id) might take place, surely not *after *the final interpretant. Again, this is a matter of *logical *ordering for the classification of signs, not *causal/temporal* sequence within the process of semiosis. The final interpretant is not the *last *interpretant in a series of dynamical interpretants--recall
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
Edwina, Tony, Jon, List, I'd like to emphasize the first word of the subject line: Evolution. I believe that is the best single word to describe Peirce's developments in from 1903 to 1906 to 1908 to 1911 to his last long letter of 1913, in which he highlighted the features he considered important. I'd also emphasize Tony's point that too many Peirce scholars stopped at the issues, terminology, and notations of 1903. That was an important beginning, but the evolution in the following decade made fundamental changes. One important source of evidence is Peirce's choice of terminology. He coined and adopted a wide range of terms, some of which he retained to the end. But there are others that he stopped using and replaced with new words. The points where he changed terms also involve critical innovations. If he never again uses the old terms, that is an important indication that he began a new way of thinking (paradigm). For example, the words 'cut' and 'scroll' were banished in June 1911. There are multiple places where he made a major shift in terminology, and every one of them shows a significant innovation in his system. The shift from phenomenology to phaneroscopy is a permanent shift, and I believe that it indicates a shift from an abstract Kantian style to the more concrete examples that Lady Welby used. Another shift from the word-based terminology, such as dicisign, to terms that include diagrams and images, such as semes and phemes, is significant. Since semes include hypericons, he never again needed that word. He also used the term "phemic sheet" as replacement for 'sheet of assertion'. I noticed that Tony also adopted Peirce's final choice of 'mark' instead of 'tone'. The fact that Welby preferred 'tone' is irrelevant, because she admitted that she did not understand Peirce's discussion, and her reason for preferring 'tone' has nothing to do with Peirce's system: "Your exposition of the 'possible' Sign is profoundly interesting; but I am not equal to the effort of discussing it beyond saying that I should prefer tone to mark for the homely reason that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to his words, but to his tone'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21). There's more to say about these issues, and I'll send another note when I have the time. John PS: The initials JS are ambiguous. It's better to write JAS or JFS. From: "Edwina Taborsky" Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before - and I agree with Dr. Jappy [TJ]. . I agree with his view of semiosis as ’thought in action’ . My own view of Peircean semiosis is that it outlines an active, adaptive, evolving process of mind-as-matter formation; ie, an agapastic process. This would require that the three interpretants function as capable of this generative, creative agapastic evolution - and this means that the Immediate Interpretant, which is internal to the sign-vehicle operates as the most immediate and ambiguously open interpretant form…. Followed by the Dynamic Interpretant as a more specific and discrete result…and sometimes, not always..by the Final Interpretant, which is a communal not individual result. And, any of these Interpretants can be in any of the categorical modes. The way that JAS has set up the three Interpretants, seems to me to set up an priori deterministic, necessitarian process, which is obviously closed [ by the Final Interpretant’s privileged first step role]…and to me, this is the opposite of that open, adaptive Peircean semeiosis. And as TJ points out - it doesn’t make sense that the Dynamic Interpretant follows the Final…unless, in my view, that DI is merely a determined clone of the authoritarian FI. Edwina On Apr 3, 2024, at 3:45 AM, Anthony Jappy wrote: List, I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the three interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper published in Semiotica (which is indeed the published version of the text mentioned by John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his posting, I prefer not to get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless will offer an alternative interpretation which is dealt with in much greater detail in Chapter Four of my recent book, where I dispute the interpretant ordering of David Savan (the one proposed by JS). I quote JS and reply to two of his objections to my ordering. These replies are sufficient to support my position. First this statement: ‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical determination for sign classification, not causal nor temporal determination within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate (If) determines the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate (Ii)’. (JS) Here are two
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
This is a discussion we’ve had with JAS before - and I agree with Dr. Jappy [TJ]. . I agree with his view of semiosis as ’thought in action’ . My own view of Peircean semiosis is that it outlines an active, adaptive, evolving process of mind-as-matter formation; ie, an agapastic process. This would require that the three interpretants function as capable of this generative, creative agapastic evolution - and this means that the Immediate Interpretant, which is internal to the sign-vehicle operates as the most immediate and ambiguously open interpretant form…. Followed by the Dynamic Interpretant as a more specific and discrete result…and sometimes, not always..by the Final Interpretant, which is a communal not individual result. And, any of these Interpretants can be in any of the categorical modes. The way that JAS has set up the three Interpretants, seems to me to set up an priori deterministic, necessitarian process, which is obviously closed [ by the Final Interpretant’s privileged first step role]…and to me, this is the opposite of that open, adaptive Peircean semeiosis. And as TJ points out - it doesn’t make sense that the Dynamic Interpretant follows the Final…unless, in my view, that DI is merely a determined clone of the authoritarian FI. Edwina > On Apr 3, 2024, at 3:45 AM, Anthony Jappy wrote: > > List, > > I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the three > interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper published in > Semiotica (which is indeed the published version of the text mentioned by > John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his posting, I prefer > not to get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless will offer an > alternative interpretation which is dealt with in much greater detail in > Chapter Four of my recent book, where I dispute the interpretant ordering of > David Savan (the one proposed by JS). I quote JS and reply to two of his > objections to my ordering. These replies are sufficient to support my > position. First this statement: > > ‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical > determination for sign classification, not causal nor temporal determination > within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate (If) determines > the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly degenerate > correlate (Ii)’. (JS) > > Here are two premisses on which we disagree irreconcilably: > > 1) That Peirce distinguished between the logical and the empirical > (causal, temporal). As I understand Peirce, logic was the theory of thought > and reason. I don’t believe he considered that logic was simply the concern > of books and blackboards, rather that it was the process of ratiocination out > in the world and common to animate and inanimate agencies alike (‘The action > of a sign generally takes place between two parties, the utterer and the > interpreter. They need not be persons; for a chamelion and many kinds of > insects and even plants make their livings by uttering signs, and lying > signs, at that’ (R318: 419, 1907)). Semiosis, I believe, is simply thought in > action, irrespective of triggering agency, and a process in which there is no > difference between the logical and the empirical, a process in which the > empirical simply actualises the logical. Moreover, I maintain that the > six-correlate passage yielding 28 classes is also a ‘blueprint’ for the > process of semiosis. > 2) That Peirce attributed ‘horizontal’ phenomenological values within > the correlate/interpretant sequence (If genuine, Id degenerate, Ii doubly > degenerate). If such values were to be associated with the interpretant, for > example, it would surely be more logical to apply them vertically within each > interpretant division, following the universe distinction from least to most > complex within the possible, existent and necessitant universe hierarchy. > Although Peirce states in R318 ‘It is now necessary to point out that there > are three kinds of interpretant. Our categories suggest them, and the > suggestion is confirmed by careful consideration.’ (R318: 251, 1907), there > is no suggestion in the manuscript that they are hierarchically organized; > they simply differ in complexity. JS’s phenomenological hierarchy would > suggest, too, that the dynamic object is genuine and the immediate > degenerate, which is surely not the case. > > What proof do I have? None, simply, like those adduced by JS, opinions, > opinions based on snatches of text from various Peirce sources. > > > > I would justify the order …S > Ii > Id > If for the following reasons (there > are others): > > · In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear > definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means > that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions > Peirce gives of the
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
List, I learn that Jon Schmid (henceforth JS) has proposed an ordering of the three interpretants which differs from one that I suggest in a paper published in *Semiotica *(which is indeed the published version of the text mentioned by John Sowa in a private conversation). As JS states in his posting, I prefer not to get involved in list disputes, but nevertheless will offer an alternative interpretation which is dealt with in much greater detail in Chapter Four of my recent book, where I dispute the interpretant ordering of David Savan (the one proposed by JS). I quote JS and reply to two of his objections to my ordering. These replies are sufficient to support my position. First this statement: ‘The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is logical determination for sign classification, not *causal* nor *temporal* determination within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate (If) determines the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate (Ii)’. (JS) Here are two premisses on which we disagree irreconcilably: 1) *That Peirce distinguished between the logical and the empirical (causal, temporal).* As I understand Peirce, logic was the theory of thought and reason. I don’t believe he considered that logic was simply the concern of books and blackboards, rather that it was the process of ratiocination out in the world and common to animate and inanimate agencies alike (‘The action of a sign generally takes place between two parties, the utterer and the interpreter. They need not be persons; for a chamelion and many kinds of insects and even plants make their livings by uttering signs, and lying signs, at that’ (R318: 419, 1907)). Semiosis, I believe, is simply thought in action, irrespective of triggering agency, and a process in which there is no difference between the logical and the empirical, a process in which the empirical simply actualises the logical. Moreover, I maintain that the six-correlate passage yielding 28 classes is also a ‘blueprint’ for the process of semiosis. 2) *That Peirce attributed ‘horizontal’ phenomenological values within the correlate/interpretant sequence (If genuine, Id degenerate, Ii doubly degenerate).* If such values were to be associated with the interpretant, for example, it would surely be more logical to apply them vertically *within* each interpretant division, following the universe distinction from least to most complex within the possible, existent and necessitant universe hierarchy. Although Peirce states in R318 ‘It is now necessary to point out that there are three kinds of interpretant. Our categories suggest them, and the suggestion is confirmed by careful consideration.’ (R318: 251, 1907), there is no suggestion in the manuscript that they are hierarchically organized; they simply differ in complexity. JS’s phenomenological hierarchy would suggest, too, that the dynamic object is genuine and the immediate degenerate, which is surely not the case. What proof do I have? None, simply, like those adduced by JS, opinions, opinions based on snatches of text from various Peirce sources. I would justify the order …S > Ii > Id > If for the following reasons (there are others): · In the Logic Notebook, Peirce offers the following very clear definition of the term ‘immediate’: ‘to say that A is immediate to B means that it is present in B’ (R339: 243Av,1905). This corresponds to descriptions Peirce gives of the immediate interpretant as being the interpretant ‘in the sign’: ‘It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i.e., the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect actually produced on the mind by the Sign’ (EP2: 482, 1908). It seems illogical to me to seek to place the immediate interpretant in a classification or process at two places from the sign in which it is defined to be present. · As for the possibility of misinterpretation, consider the descriptions Peirce gives LW in 1909 of his three interpretants: ‘My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have its peculiar interpretability before it gets any Interpreter. My Dynamical Interpretant is that which is experienced in each act of Interpretation and is different in each from that of any other; and the Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the sign is sufficiently considered. The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a Possibility. The Dynamical Interpretant is a single actual event. The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends.’ (SS: 111, 1909) ...the Immediate Interpretant is what the Question expresses, all that it *immediately* expresses. (CP: 8.314, 1909; emphasis added) And of the *final interpretant* (If) he says this: That ultimate, definitive, and final (i.e. eventually to be reached), interpretant (final
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Evolution of Peirce's theoretical foundation from 1903 to the end
John, List:
FYI, I removed Dr. Jappy from the cc: line because he has told me in the
past that he greatly values his privacy and thus prefers not to be included
in any List discussions.
JFS: This is an unpublished article by Tony Jappy.
The title is different, but the abstract exactly matches "From
Phenomenology to Ontology in Peirce's Typologies" as published in *Semiotica
*in 2019 (https://doi.org/10.1515/sem-2018-0080). Regarding the content, as
I have said before, I strongly disagree with equating "the Destinate
Interpretant" to the immediate interpretant and "the Explicit Interpretant"
to the final interpretant (SS84, EP 2:481, 1908 Dec 23), for at least four
reasons.
- The terms themselves clearly imply the opposite, namely,
destinate=final/normal ("effect that would be produced on the mind by the
Sign after sufficient development of thought," CP 8.343, EP 2:482, 1908 Dec
24-28) and explicit=immediate ("the Interpretant represented or signified
in the Sign," ibid).
- The context of the destinate/effective/explicit passage is
*logical *determination
for sign classification, not *causal *nor *temporal *determination
within the process of semiosis; hence, the genuine correlate (If)
determines the degenerate correlate (Id), which determines the doubly
degenerate correlate (Ii).
- The ten sign classes that result from applying the rule of
determination to these three trichotomies are much more plausible when the
order is (If, Id, Ii) than when it is (Ii, Id, If), especially when
accounting for the possibility of *mis*interpretations.
- The S-If trichotomy unambiguously comes *before *the S-Id trichotomy
(CP 8.338, SS 34-35, 1904 Oct 12), so it makes sense for the If trichotomy
likewise to come *before *the Id trichotomy.
I can elaborate on any or all of these if anyone is interested. As for the
inserted comments ...
JFS: Note that “Mark Token Type” is Peirce's final choice of labels for
that trichotomy.
In that draft letter to Lady Welby, Peirce states, "But I dare say some of
my former names are better than those I now use. I formerly called a *Potisign
*a *Tinge *or *Tone*, an *Actisign *a *Token*, a *Famisign *a *Type *... I
think *Potisign Actisign Famisign* might be called *Mark Token Type (?)*
..." (CP 8.363-364, EP 2:488, 1908 Dec 25). The word "might" and the
parenthetical question mark indicate that his choice of "mark" is *not *final.
In fact, he reverts to "Tone" in a Logic Notebook entry dated two days
later (27 Dec 1908,
https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:15255301$636i).
Moreover, two days earlier, Peirce writes, "For a 'possible' Sign I have no
better designation than a *Tone*, though I am considering replacing this by
'Mark.' Can you suggest a really good name?" (SS 83, 1908 Dec 23). Lady
Welby replies a few weeks later, "Your exposition of the 'possible' Sign is
profoundly interesting; but I am not equal to the effort of discussing it
beyond saying that I should prefer *tone* to *mark* for the homely reason
that we often have occasion to say 'I do not object to his words, but to
his *tone*'" (SS 91, 1909 Jan 21).
I agree with her, especially since Peirce himself gives essentially the
same rationale for "tone" when he introduces it--"An indefinite significant
character such as a tone of voice can neither be called a Type nor a Token.
I propose to call such a Sign a *Tone*" (CP 4.537, 1906). Besides, "mark"
already had a well-established and quite different definition in logic,
which Peirce presents in his entry for it in Baldwin's *Dictionary of
Philosophy and Psychology* (https://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Mark);
and as discussed on the List recently, "markedness" is now an unrelated
technical term in linguistics.
JFS: In computer science and applications, the Lewis-style of modal logic
has been useless in practical computations.
Again, "useless" strikes me as an overstatement, and even if accurate, it
does not entail that modern formal systems of modal logic will *never *turn
out to be useful in these or any other applications. More to the point,
such an assessment is *utterly irrelevant* for ascertaining what *Peirce *had
in mind when writing R L376, including his statement, "I shall now have to
add a *Delta *part [to Existential Graphs] in order to deal with modals." A
straightforward reading of that text itself is that he simply needs a new
notation to replace the unsatisfactory (broken) cuts of 1903 and
nonsensical tinctures of 1906 for representing and reasoning about
propositions involving possibility and necessity.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 2:46 PM John F Sowa wrote:
> To provide some background and alternative interpretations of Peirce's
> theories during his last decade, the attached article by Tony Jappy
> discusses
