On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 3:38 PM, John Rose via AGI <[email protected]> wrote: >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Matt Mahoney [mailto:[email protected]] >> >> Brier also seems mystified by phenomenal consciousness (qualia). Do you >> have any comments on my previous post where I explained why we evolved >> to believe that such a thing exists? Do you understand or agree with my >> explanation of how this belief works? >> > > Well, I assume some possibility of it being true. There are some issues when > you talk about Wolpert's theorem related to self-modelling and > self-reflection. These can be done fuzzily or probabilistically or > neutrosoficly... Also with consciousness really I don't see who's talking > about breaking the laws of physics. And your reference to a soul is rather > off I would say, I won't elaborate there.
I don't believe in souls. But many people do. Many people also believe that it is impossible, even in principle, for a computer to do everything that the human brain can do (for example, Penrose). These beliefs arise because our models of our own brains are incomplete. We think it is doing something different than what it is really doing. Wolpert's theorem proves that all self-models must be incomplete. Specifically, he proves that two computers cannot mutually predict each other's actions, even when each can take the source code and initial state of the other as input. As a corollary, a computer cannot predict its own actions for the special case where both computers are the same. We use models to make predictions, and we use prediction to test understanding. Thus, no agent can completely understand itself. Wolpert gives a formal proof, but there is an easy to understand informal proof. Suppose that two computers played each other in a rock-scissors-paper game. If I could take your source code and initial state as input, then I could run a simulation of you playing the game up to the last move and predict your next move. Then if my simulation of you plays, e.g. scissors, then I play rock. Likewise, if you could do the same and predict that I would play rock, then you could play paper. But I think you see the problem. We can't both do this because only one of us can win. Newcomb's paradox is another proof. It supposes an impossible situation where you and Omega can both predict the other's actions with certainty. > I don't think algorithmic information theory alone gives us all the tools. > And I don't think we need to wait for a particular hypothesis to be proven or > a theory to be popularly accepted to take action. For example if you're going > to build consciousness in a virtual world do we need a proven theory of human > consciousness? Or even for AGI. Of course not. There are two important problems for AGI to solve. 1. People don't want to work. 2. People don't want to die. To solve the first problem, we need to make machines smart enough to do any kind of work that humans can do. It means solving hard problems in AI like vision, language, robotics, art, and modeling human behavior. It does *not* require machines to be human-like by having weaknesses like poor arithmetic skills or a need to take time off work. It doesn't require machines to have emotions. However, it does require machines to recognize and predict human emotions and their effect on behavior. This is a critical communication skill for almost every job. You have to know how your words will make someone feel, and how that will affect their actions. Therefore machines need this skill too. Although we don't require machines that would be mistaken for humans to do useful work (for example, Google), we do require it for the second case. But this is easy once the first problem is solved. Since a requirement of effective communication with you is to have a model of your mind (a function that takes sensory input and returns a prediction of your actions), then making a copy of you simply means programming a robot to carry out its predictions of your actions in real time. At this point, a theory of human consciousness might be in order. You might ask: how will you transfer my soul into the silicon brain of this robot so that it becomes "me" after disposing of my old carbon-based body? The answer, of course, is that we don't because there is no such thing as a soul. It is only an illusion that you have one, and the robot would be programmed to express this illusion as well so nothing feels different. People naturally attribute consciousness (in both senses of the word) to themselves and to other people. If this robot looks and acts just like you, they will attribute your consciousness to it as well. So the only thing that has changed is that you now have a new and improved body and the capability to back up your memories to the cloud to effectively achieve immortality. -- -- Matt Mahoney, [email protected] ------------------------------------------- AGI Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/21088071-f452e424 Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=21088071&id_secret=21088071-58d57657 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
