> -----Original Message----- > From: George Levy [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 7:48 a.m. > > I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the > conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that > seems logical > to me is that the consciousness extensions should be logically > consistent, because logical consistenty is a prerequisite for > consciousness.
I think the only constraint is that the extensions should be physically possible, i.e. possible outcomes of the schrodinger wave equation. If those are also logical outcomes then fine, but the SWE is the constraining factor. > I can imagine certain branches in which memory is totally lost, (the > null case so to speak - because there is really no consciousness > continuation) and other branches where memory is totally > conserved, yet > other cases where memory is transformed to reflect a different > past....All these will come true as long as there is a logical > explanation for them to happen. You must keep in mind as Jacques > mentionned, that memory is not necessary identical with the past. It > only represents the present brain state which reflects in a consistent > fashion more or less precisely what the past was. Memory represents the past, basically, because matter is (semi) stable and because the arrow of time only operates in one direction. Obviously there will be errors of recording (our senses and our interpretation of them are not perfect) plus errors in storage (memories degrading with time, false associations being created, etc). This isn't necessarily so. Presumably an advanced AI, assuming such a thing can exist, would be able to have perfect recall. Whether memory is continuous in the QTI depends on what continuations the SWE allows for a given situation. The SWE might allow you to survive being shot through the head, for example (people *have* survived having objects propelled through their heads occasionally) but the most likely continuation might well include you losing part of your memory and undergoing a personality change. > In some branches you will experience increasing old age > without limit... > all ou need is the logical explanation. > For example upon dying as a human, you may wake up as a > billion year old > ten arm octopus living in a 30 dimensional space realizing > that you were > just dreaming in 3-Land. The number of explanations seems limitless. This assumes that identical quantum states can be generated in different parts of the multiverse WITHOUT having evolved from identical previous states. I don't see that this is impossible (and if it isn't impossible it will happen - that's what the multiverse is all about). You are ALSO assuming that identical quantum states - no matter how they might be separated along spacelike, timelike or other-dimension-like intervals - can experience continuous consciousness. To assume that you need a theory which explains how we manage to experience continuous consciousness from instant to instant - of IF we do, or just (heh heh) think we do. > In this list, we are what we are, our age probably ranging > from 20 to 80 > because of our surrounding, because of anthropic reasons. Had > we been a > billion year old group (with the corresponding historical-anthropic > reasons for being 1 billion year old), God knows what we would be > talking and worrying about, but we would certainly not be > debating this > (F)allacious (I)nsane (N)onsense. :-) (Again assuming QTI is true for a moment . . . ) we couldn't be a billion year old group unless advanced technology has enabled everyone to live "forever" (and we've tidied up the solar system, or found a quieter neighbourhood to live in...!) - I mean, you can't have a billion year old GROUP according to QTI, only billion year old individuals in different (and "thermodynamically unlikely") branches of the multiverse. One of the cunning features of the QTI is that it can only be "proved" from the 1st person perspective (and in an incredibly small proportion of universes - maybe the Queen Mother is doing it in our one?). From the 3rd person perspective, i.e. your perspective on everyone else, QTI still predicts death at the normal sort of age. Hence by definition, according to QTI a discussion group will always be composed of people very near the start of their worldlines (in QTI terms), except in an infinitesimal proportion of universes. I'm not putting the arguments for QTI because I believe it but because I've yet to see a good counter-argument. So far the only counter argument I've seen is the SSA one, which doesn't take into account what we might call the "anthropic principle" that leads to people who are able to have discussions being in 99.9999999999999999999....% of cases "QTI-young". Charles