Le 11-juil.-06, à 16:24, 1Z a écrit :

>> How could a substantial world be' a modest metaphysical posit?
> By explaining a lot from on e premiss.

I could agree that it eases the mind. Like God's notion. But it 
explains nothing, like when "God" is used as an (empty) explanation.
Today, physician relates numbers with numbers (like in F = ma, or E = 
mc^2), but we still don't know if particles exist, in which sense, if 
they are as big as the universe like expanding waves, etc.
(You talk sometimes if physics was not confronted to conceptual 
difficulties, which can be enlightened by MWI ideas, but, wait, there 
is still many remaining questions OK?

>> First nobody knows what such a "substance" can be defined without
>> infinite regress.
> "No one" ? But there are far more materialist
> philosophers than idealist ones , nowadays.

For the same reason they are far more Christians than Buddhist. And 
none of your materialist even try to define matter. They take it for 
granted, following mainly Aristotle. Almost all materialist react by 
knocking a table when they want me to realize matter exists.
(btw, invoking the number of people believing something is not an 
All what I say, is that the notion of "primitive matter" is unclear. 
The only definition which we can find in Aristotle is contradict by QM 
and comp, independently.

>> Second, those who have defined it, are always led to the admittance
>> such a substance must be decomposable and get his property for the
>> property of its subparts (Aristotle the first).
> Noy always. Things have moved on since Aristotle's day.

Not about matter. Except recently through the slow admittance of 
quantum (computation) which makes even engineers accepting (like 
Mellac) that the quantum formalism forces us to choose between:
1) a NON observed reality does not exist (like Bohr often said)
2) Parallel realities exist

>> But then, the
>> ontological existence of such "substance" does not fit neither the
>> experimental facts, nor the quantum theory (which describes those
>> facts), nor the computationalist hypothesis (see my URL).
> The modern-version of substance is mass-energy, which
> can be measured and does feature in theories.

But the measurment gives numbers. *You* posit some (which btw?) 

>> If you want use the ontological existence of "matter" to solve the
>> Harry Potter enigma, I can prove to you in all details that the only
>> way to do that would consist in positing actual non computable
>> infinities in matter. Just ask, or read the already available info on
>> the list or in my url.
> if you are going to assume that
> a) all computations already exist immaterially

OK, but in the same sense that PI or sqrt(2) exists.

> b) matter must be distinguished by some comptutational
> or mathematical property

Where do I make that assumption.
You forget the main assumption I do: my (generlaized) brain is turing 
emulable. (or more simply: "yes doctor").
Church thesis and AR are assumed explicitly for making things clearer, 
and avoiding spurious debate in the course of the proof.

Now if you assume "primary matter", no doubt you need to reject comp, 
giving that what I show is that you cannot have both.

>> And then, having that heavy matter to play with, you will still have 
>> to
>> explain how do you link the first person experience to it (the
>> mind/body problem).
> The problem of the MBP is linking 1st person experience
> to mathematical descriptions.  Adding matter to Platonia certainly
> doesn't make things worse.

It does (with comp). cf UDA. (or just the movie graph, or Maudlin's 

>> That the "observed world" is smaller than platonia is trivial: our
>> observation are finite, and platonia is infinite.
>> Now, you, following (I agree) common sense infer the existence of an
>> ontological world, but I don't see any clues from which you can infer
>> it is smaller than platonia.
> The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
> as predicted by Platonic theories.

Platonic resetting of Everret's QM *does* explained why the Quantum HP 
universes are *very* difficulmt to observe. Hall Finney-like Universal 
distribution could explain the same thing for some of the thrid person 
white rabbits.
I show a path leading to a possible explanation of why the first person 
rabbits are non observable.
This has led to 5 mathematical conjectures. The first one has been 
solved since ... our last conversation ...

> You are not going to get anywhere with the
> UDA until you prove mathematical Platonism,

Why should I prove my assumptions?
Also, proving "mathematical platonism" or proving "physical 
materialism" is impossible (what would that means). You could ask me to 
prove Church thesis at this point. It is non sense, unless you give me 
some precise other assumption to build on.

> and your
> argument for that -- AR as you call it --
> just repeats the same error: the epistemological
> claim that "the truth -alue of '17 is prime is mind-independent"

That is my only claim.

> is confused with the ontological claim "the number of 17 exists
> separately
> from us in Plato's heaven".

Frequent and annoying confusion, I agree.
Please, tell me where I could have been unclear on this, so that I 
should make that passage clearer.



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