Sorry for the comment delay.

Le 23-oct.-06, à 16:49, David Nyman a écrit :

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
>>> prove Platonism.
>> By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
>> by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of "OR" 
>> statements.
> Lest we go yet another round in the 'reification' debate, is it not
> possible to reconcile what is being claimed here?
> Bruno, I'm assuming that when you eschew 'Platonic existence' for AR,
> you are thereby saying that your project is to formalise certain
> arguments about the logical structure of possibility - and through
> this, to put actuality to the test in certain empirical aspects.

Yes. Although people are so often wrong on what "formalization" 
consists in, that I prefer to say that I just interview a machine.

> Questions of how this may finally be reconciled with 'RITSIAR' (I hope
> you recall what this means) are in abeyance.

I don't recall what RITSIAR means. Nor BU.

> Nevertheless, some aspect
> of this approach may ultimately be ascribed a status as 'foundational
> existent' analogous to that of 'primary matter' in materialism.

I don't think so. This would lead to a reification of numbers, which I 
think is just a little bit less meaningless than reifying matter. But 
still fundamentally wrong.

> Alternatively, such a hypothesis may be shown to be redundant or
> incoherent.

Not really. It is SWE which should be made redundant.

> Peter, as we've agreed, materialism is also metaphysics, and as a route
> to 'ultimate reality' via a physics of observables, is vulnerable to
> 'reification'. Might it not be premature to finalise precisely what it
> is that physical theory decribes that might actually be RITSIAR? You
> may be tempted to respond, Johnsonianly, that it is precisely the world
> that kicks back that is RITSIAR, but theoretical physics and COMP are
> both in the business of modelling what is not so directly accessible.


> This notwithstanding that we may believe one or other theory to be
> further developed, more widely accepted, or better supported
> empirically. Or is there some irreducible sense in which 'primary
> matter' could be deemed to exist in a way that nothing else can?

Note that "consciousness" can be deemed to exist in a way that nothing 
else can. In particular "consciousness of numbers".
But "Primary Matter", Ether, Phlogiston, Vital Principle,  .... I doubt 


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to