Le 27-oct.-06, à 15:58, 1Z a écrit :

>
> If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality
> (ITSIAR).


You beg the question. Numbers are not physically real does not entails 
that numbers don't exist at all, unless you define "real" by "physical 
real".
The question you should ask is: "are number sufficiently real to 
explain why some of them believes in a physical reality". My answer, 
which I agree need some amount of work to get through, is "yes". 
"Existing" in the standard mathematical meaning of existence is enough 
to explain why a "stable and lawful "illusion" of physical reality" 
exists, again in that mathematical sense. Recall that the UDA explains 
why, assuming comp,  a turing machine cannot distinguish the 
"physical", virtual and "arithmetical" aspect of any reality.
Perhaps one day we will find a way to make those distinction. My work 
proposes a transparently clear way to observe that distinction if it 
exists, but then that would be a refutation of (standard) comp.





>
>>> Alternatively, such a hypothesis may be shown to be redundant or
>>> incoherent.
>>
>> Not really. It is SWE which should be made redundant.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Peter, as we've agreed, materialism is also metaphysics, and as a 
>>> route
>>> to 'ultimate reality' via a physics of observables, is vulnerable to
>>> 'reification'. Might it not be premature to finalise precisely what 
>>> it
>>> is that physical theory decribes that might actually be RITSIAR?
>
> I have answered these questions before: but
>
> 1. Contingent existence.
> 2. The ability to causally interact
> 3. A primary substance which endures through change ( explaining
> dynamic, non-BU time)
> 4. Optionally, the ability to explain phenomenal consiousness in a
> basically non-mathematical way.(Property dualism)


The AUDA hypostases explains this, including 4. Wait a bit perhaps, or 
read my papers.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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