Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
> 
>  > > > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the
>  > > "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure
>  > > what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something
>  > > other than just sharing memories. At any given time my 
> consciousness is
>  > > accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually
>  > > forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some
>  > > long-term memories.
>  > > >
>  > > > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that
>  > > identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital 
> computation
>  > > doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed.
>  > >
>  > > Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire
>  > > content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time 
> only
>  > > a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same
>  > > person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less
>  > > than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such
>  > > sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be
>  > > indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such 
> that
>  > > if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience 
> continuity of
>  > > consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone
>  > > else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally
>  > > indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only
>  > > happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my
>  > > situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, 
> motivations,
>  > > personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously
>  > > accessed) makes me, me.
>  >
>  > Yes I understand that you would eventually, say when waking from 
> anesthesia, have some memories unique to Stathis Papaioannou. But in the 
> meantime I think you are still you - and not all those other people who 
> shared those vague thoughts in the recovery room. And it can't be 
> because your memories are "instantly accessible"; that's a mere 
> potentiality not a state. If we start to reify potentialities in a 
> multi-verse where we already have a white rabbit problem, we'll really 
> be in trouble.
> 
> Perhaps even in a minimally conscious state your experiences are 
> specific enough to distinguish them from those of everyone else in a 
> superficially similar state. But what if, through amazing coincidence, 
> you had a 5 second period of consciousness which exactly matched that of 
> a stranger on the other side of the world? During that period it would 
> be impossible to say (from a 1st person perspective) where you were 
> being run or which person you were, in the same way as it would be 
> impossible to say where you were being run if your consciousness were 
> implemented on two computers running in perfect lockstep.
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou

Which is to say there is no "you", or at least you are not your consciousness.

This raises the question again of "what is the minimum duration of a conscious 
state"?  You mention 5sec as being a long time for a coincidental match (would 
there still be two consciousnesses for that 5sec - I think not), but what about 
300msec, or 100msec.  There's not much consciousness in 100msec; so little that 
it may be occuring hundreds of times over in different brains.

Brent Meeker

Brent Meeker

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