Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent meeker writes: > > > > > As I understand it, Bruno's theory is that you are all the > > > "consistent continuations" of your consciousness. I'm not exactly sure > > > what constitutes a consistent continuation, but it must be something > > > other than just sharing memories. At any given time my > consciousness is > > > accessing only a tiny fraction of my memories. Further I'm continually > > > forming and forgetting short-term memories as well as forgetting some > > > long-term memories. > > > > > > > > Basing identity on memory seems inconsistent with supposing that > > > identity is some property of consciousness alone. A digital > computation > > > doesn't depend on memory/data that isn't accessed. > > > > > > Identity from moment to moment is not just memory, it is the entire > > > content of conscious experience, perhaps accessing at any one time > only > > > a small portion of memory. It may be just a sense that I am the same > > > person continuing the same thought as I was a moment ago, or even less > > > than this when I am waking up from sleep, for example. At such > > > sufficiently vague moments, my consciousness may even be > > > indistinguishable with that of many other people in the world, such > that > > > if I ceased to exist momentarily I would still experience > continuity of > > > consciousness as if nothing had happened, piggy-backing on someone > > > else's thoughts: all equivalent observer moments are internally > > > indistinguishable, by definition. However, such a thing could only > > > happen momentarily, because very quickly I might reflect on my > > > situation, and it is here that having a store of memories, > motivations, > > > personality style etc. instantly accessible (even if not continuously > > > accessed) makes me, me. > > > > Yes I understand that you would eventually, say when waking from > anesthesia, have some memories unique to Stathis Papaioannou. But in the > meantime I think you are still you - and not all those other people who > shared those vague thoughts in the recovery room. And it can't be > because your memories are "instantly accessible"; that's a mere > potentiality not a state. If we start to reify potentialities in a > multi-verse where we already have a white rabbit problem, we'll really > be in trouble. > > Perhaps even in a minimally conscious state your experiences are > specific enough to distinguish them from those of everyone else in a > superficially similar state. But what if, through amazing coincidence, > you had a 5 second period of consciousness which exactly matched that of > a stranger on the other side of the world? During that period it would > be impossible to say (from a 1st person perspective) where you were > being run or which person you were, in the same way as it would be > impossible to say where you were being run if your consciousness were > implemented on two computers running in perfect lockstep. > > Stathis Papaioannou
Which is to say there is no "you", or at least you are not your consciousness. This raises the question again of "what is the minimum duration of a conscious state"? You mention 5sec as being a long time for a coincidental match (would there still be two consciousnesses for that 5sec - I think not), but what about 300msec, or 100msec. There's not much consciousness in 100msec; so little that it may be occuring hundreds of times over in different brains. Brent Meeker Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---