On Jun 20, 8:56 am, "Mohsen Ravanbakhsh" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first > person experience." > > Once more here you've interpreted the situation from a third person point of > view. I don't care what YOU can conclude from MY behavior. It's ONE'S own > perception of his OWN experience matters! and it is more obvious than any > other fact. Mohsen, I agree with what you're trying to say here, but I wonder whether the best 'move' against Torgny's little 'game' (I'm sure he's playing with us!) is actually to accept what he's saying. I can agree with him that: "there is no first person experience" because I don't find myself 'experiencing' my 'first person experience' (this would lead to an infinite regression of 'experiencers'). Rather, I find myself always simply participating in a 1-person world, which is a subset of a larger participatory actuality. Torgny is of course equally a participant in this actuality. His error is that he confuses 3-person descriptions with the 'participants' they merely 'represent'. 3-person descriptions are always proxies for some distal participant, 'external' to our own 1- person world: they are 'abstractions'. As soon as one commits this cognitive error, one is of course struck by the lack of 1-person characteristics from the proxy 3-person 'point of view'. Quite correct: the proxy in itself *doesn't have* an independent point of view: it's just a parasite on one's own 1-person world. Metaphorically, it's a sort of 'mirror' that 'reflects' an external actuality. 'Proxy Torgny' *represents* something else: i.e. 'Participatory Torgny' - and *he* of course may well be granted such a point of view (as you imply) by reflexive analogy. But the two must not be confused. Ironically, Torgny is presenting us with a textbook case of the category error that arises from mistaking one's 'reflection' for oneself! David > What you're referring to, is another problem, namely the "other's mind". how > we know that another human is experiencing what we do? We actually assume > that to be true, that everyone has consciousness. > But it doesn't justify the other mistake. This does not mean you can deny > your possible(!) consciousness. > > "What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some sort > of behaviour. When you claim that you have "the subjective experience of > first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of > behaviour. You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of first > person". And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show up > the exact same behaviour. But in the case of the computer, you can see that > there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of electrical > fenomena interacting with each other. > > There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first > person experience." > > Once more here you've interpreted the situation from a third person point of > view. I don't care what YOU can conclude from MY behavior. It's ONE'S own > perception of his OWN experience matters! and it is more obvious than any > other fact. > > On 6/19/07, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote: > > >> What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just some > > >> sort of behaviour. When you claim that you have "the subjective > > >> experience > > >> of first person", I can see that you are just showing a special kind of > > >> behaviour. You behave as if you have "the subjective experience of > > >> first > > >> person". And it is possible for an enough complicated computer to show > > >> up > > >> the exact same behaviour. But in the case of the computer, you can see > > >> that there is no "subjective experience", there are just a lot of > > >> electrical fenomena interacting with each other. > > > >> There is no first person experience problem, because there is no first > > >> person experience. > > > > In all your reasoning you implicitely use "consciousness" for example > > when > > > you > > > says "When you claim that you have the subjective experience > > > of first person, *I* can see that you are just showing a special kind of > > > behaviour." > > > > Who/what is "I" ? Who/what is seeing ? What does it means for you to see > > > if > > > you have no inner representation of what you (hmmm if you're not > > > conscious, > > > you is not an appropriate word) see, what does it means to see at all ? > > > > In all your reasonning you allude to "I", this is what 1st pov is about > > > not > > > about you (the conscious being/knower) looking at another person as if > > > there > > > was no obsever (means you) in the observation. > > > > Quentin > > > Our language is very primitive. You can not decribe the reality with it. > > > If you have a computer robot with a camera and an arm, how should that > > robot express itself to descibe what it observes? Could the robot say: "I > > see a red brick and a blue brick, och when I take the blue brick and > > places it on the red brick, then I see that the blue brick is over the red > > brick."? > > > But if the robot says this, then you will say that this proves that the > > robot is conscious, because it uses the word "I". > > > How shall the robot express itself, so it will be correct? It this > > possible? Or is our language incapable of expressing reality? > > > We human beings are slaves under our language. The language restricts out > > thinking. > > > -- > > Torgny Tholerus > > -- > > Mohsen Ravanbakhsh, > Sharif University of Technology, > Tehran. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---