Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Le 19-juin-07, à 21:27, Brent Meeker wrote to Quentin:
>
>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 20:16:57 Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>>> On Tuesday 19 June 2007 11:37:09 Torgny Tholerus wrote:
>>>>>> Mohsen Ravanbakhsh skrev:
>>>>>>> The "subjective experience" is just some sort of behaviour. You
>>>>>>> can
>>>>>>> make computers show the same sort of >behavior, if the computers
>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>> enough complicated.
>>>>>> But we're not talking about 3rd person point of view. I can not
>>>>>> see how
>>>>>> you reduce the subjective experience of first person to the
>>>>>> behavior
>>>>>> that a third person view can evaluate! All the problem is this
>>>>>> first
>>>>>> person experience.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What you call "the subjective experience of first person" is just
>>>>>> some
>>>>>> sort of behaviour. When you claim that you have "the subjective
>>>>>> experience of first person", I can see that you are just showing a
>>>>>> special kind of behaviour. You behave as if you have "the
>>>>>> subjective
>>>>>> experience of first person". And it is possible for an enough
>>>>>> complicated computer to show up the exact same behaviour. But in
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> case of the computer, you can see that there is no "subjective
>>>>>> experience", there are just a lot of electrical fenomena
>>>>>> interacting
>>>>>> with each other.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There is no first person experience problem, because there is no
>>>>>> first
>>>>>> person experience.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Torgny Tholerus
>>>>> Like I said earlier, this is pure nonsense as I have proof that I
>>>>> have
>>>>> inner experience... I can't prove it to you because this is what
>>>>> this is
>>>>> all about, you can't prove 1st person pov to others. And I don't
>>>>> see why
>>>>> the fact that a computer is made of wire can't give it
>>>>> consciousness...
>>>>> there is no implication at all.
>>>>>
>>>>> Again denying the phenomena does not make it disappear... it's no
>>>>> explanation at all.
>>>>>
>>>>> Quentin
>>>> I think the point is that after all the behavior is explained,
>>>> including
>>>> brain processes, we will just say, "See, that's the consciousness
>>>> there."
>>>> Just as after explaining metabolism and growth and reproduction we
>>>> said,
>>>> "See, that's life." Some people still wanted to know where the
>>>> "life"
>>>> (i.e. "elan vital") was, but it seemed to be an uninteresting
>>>> question of
>>>> semantics.
>>>>
>>>> Brent Meeker
>>> I don't think the comparison is fair... between 'elan vital' and
>>> consciousness.
>> I think it is fair. Remember that in prospect people argued that
>> chemistry and physics could never explain life no matter how
>> completely they described the physical processes in a living thing.
>> All those cells and molecules and atoms were inanimate, none of them
>> had life - so they couldn't possibly explain the difference between
>> alive and dead.
>
>
> I think you miss the point. To define life/death can only be a useless
> semantic game. But nobody really doubts about his own consciousness
> (especially going to the dentist), despite we cannot define it nor
> explain it completely. Like Quentin I do think it is unfair to compare
> "elan vital" and "consciousness". Somehow "elan vital" is a poor theory
> which has been overthrown by a better one. "consciousness" is a fact,
> albeit a peculiar personal one" in need of an explanation; and there is
> a quasi consensus among workers in that field that we don't see how to
> explain consciousness from something simpler (a bit like the number
> btw...).
Whether we can explain consciousness completely (or at least as
completely as we have explained life) is an open question - no need to
give up yet. I think there is a good deal of mystery mongering about
consciousness, as there was about life, which may one day be seen as a
matter of asking the wrong questions. There was also a quasi consensus
that life could not be explained. Every theory is seen to be a poor one
from the viewpoint of a better one.
>
>
>
>>> I don't think consciousness is just a semantic question.
>> I didn't mean to imply that. I meant that the residual question,
>> after all the behavior and processes are explained (answering very
>> substantive questions) will seem to be a matter of making semantic
>> distinctions, like the question, "Is a virus alive?"
>>
>>> As I
>>> don't believe that you could pin point consciousness... until proved
>>> otherwise.
>> No it won't be pin pointed. It will be diffuse, an interaction of
>> multiple sensory and action processes and you won't be able to point
>> to a single location. But, if we do succeed with our explanation,
>> maybe we'll be able to say, "This being is conscious of this now and
>> not conscious of that." or "This being does not have self-awareness
>> and this one does."
>
>
>
> Well, now, I can prove that if the comp hyp is true then those
> "brave-new-worlds"-like assertions are provably wrong. If comp is true,
> nobody, I should perhaps say nosoul, will ever been able to decide if
> any other entity is conscious or not. Actually comp could be false
> because it is not even clear some entity can be completely sure of
> his/her/it own consciousness ....
In that case I'd say comp has been disproved; as I can decide whether
another person is conscious, just as you seem confident in asserting
Torgny is not a zombie. Of course I know you mean "decide" in the
mathematical sense of "prove within an axiomatic system" - but very few
things about the world can be decided in that sense.
Brent Meeker
>
>
>
>
>
>> And "conscious" and "aware" will have well defined operational ("3rd
>> person") meanings.
>>
>> Or maybe we'll discover that we have to talk in some other terms not
>> yet invented, just as our predecessors had to stop talking about
>> "animate" and "inanimate" and instead talk about "metabolism" and
>> "replication".
>
> Terms by themselves will not sort out the difficulty. Even just our
> beliefs or bets in numbers presents big conceptual difficulty.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>> Brent Meeker
>> "One cannot guess the real difficulties of a problem before
>> having solved it."
>> --- Carl Ludwig Siegel
>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>
>>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
> >
>
>
>
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