> If you don't require some mathematical model of evolution of states > determining what happens in a Markovian way (like a Schroedinger eqn for > example) then one consistent mathematical model is just a list:... "Anna > wore a red sweater on 6 Nov 2008", "Anna wore a blue sweater on 7 Nov > 2008", Anna wore a coat on 8 Nov 2008",... And there can be no > *logical* contradiction between lists. One is as good as another. As I > understand it, this sort of list is what Bruno's UD generates all > possible instances of and from them, somehow, the physical world emerges > as those lists which satisfy some consistency criteria. But I'm not > clear on how these consistency criteria emerge from within the theory.

I'm not certain I was clear in what I described as being extant. When I say "me wearing a red sweater today" I mean "some model of the universe identical to the one that existed yesterday with the difference that today my sweater is red". I'm not talking about time at all. Time is just part of the overall structure of the multiverse. I mean, the main appeal of Everett (to me) is that it reduces a problem which is difficult to define to a structural description of the universe. So you can think of one consistent object as a mathematical structure that models our entire multiverse with all of its possibilities, from the start of the Big Bang according to the physical laws that govern it. For an example of an inconsistent structure I'd have to bust out some set theory, but there are plenty of "ideas" for things which sound nice but end up being mathematically inconsistent. Being mathematically inconsistent takes the cow example I used earlier from the "almost none" realm to the "none" realm. We don't have access to enough information to know with certainty that certain states are possible, though from the psychological perspective, any set of events could be experienced, yes. Maybe I should reformulate what I'm saying because I think I'm being misunderstood. Anna --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---