I wanted to write positively to your posts, procrastinated it though and
others took it up.
Now I want to reflect to one word, I use differently:
*---- MODEL ----*
There are several 'models', the mathematical (or simple physical) metaphor
of a different subject is one, not to mention the pretty women in
I use *model* in the sense of a reductionist cut from the totality aspect
for a topical view: the epitom of which is Occams razor. Observing
(studying) a topic within chosen boundaries - limitations of our selection
by our interest.
Of course Bruno's all encompassing arithmetic system can cover for this,
too, but I am not for restricting our discussions to the limitations of the
present human mind's potential (even if only in an allowance for what we
cannot comprehend or imagine). Beyond Brent's "yam-y" extension.
What we don't know or understand or even find possible is not impossible. It
is part of 'everything'.
I chose to be vague and scientifically agnostic.
Have fun in science
On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 7:41 PM, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:
> A. Wolf wrote:
> >> So universes that consisted just of lists of (state_i)(state_i+1)...
> >> would exist, where a state might or might not have an implicate time
> > Of course, but would something that arbitrary be capable of supporting
> > the kind of self-referential behavior necessary for sapience?
> > Anna
> "Capable of supporting" implies some physical laws that connect an
> environment and sapient beings. In an arbitrary list universe, the
> occurrence of sapience might be just another arbitrary entry in the list
> (like Boltzman brains). And what about the rules of inference? Do we
> consider universes with different rules of inference? Are universes
> considered contradictory, and hence non-existent, if you can prove X and
> not-X for some X, or only if you can prove Y for all Y?
> You see, that's what I like about Bruno's scheme, he assumes a definite
> mathematical structure (arithmetic) and proposes that everything comes
> out of it. I think there is still problem avoiding wonderland, but in
> Tegmark's broader approach the problem is much bigger and all the work
> has to be done by some anthropic principle (which in it's full
> generality might be called "the Popeye" principle - "I yam what I
> yam."). Once you start with all non-contradictory mathematics, you
> might as well let in the contradictory ones too. The Popeye principle
> can eliminate them as well.
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