A. Wolf wrote: >> If you don't require some mathematical model of evolution of states >> determining what happens in a Markovian way (like a Schroedinger eqn for >> example) then one consistent mathematical model is just a list:... "Anna >> wore a red sweater on 6 Nov 2008", "Anna wore a blue sweater on 7 Nov >> 2008", Anna wore a coat on 8 Nov 2008",... And there can be no >> *logical* contradiction between lists. One is as good as another. As I >> understand it, this sort of list is what Bruno's UD generates all >> possible instances of and from them, somehow, the physical world emerges >> as those lists which satisfy some consistency criteria. But I'm not >> clear on how these consistency criteria emerge from within the theory. >> > > I'm not certain I was clear in what I described as being extant. When I say > "me wearing a red sweater today" I mean "some model of the universe > identical to the one that existed yesterday with the difference that today > my sweater is red". > Does "model" imply a theory which predicts the evolution of states (possibly probabilistic) so that the state of universe yesterday limits what might exist today?
> I'm not talking about time at all. So why the reference to "today" and "yesterday". > Time is just part of the overall > structure of the multiverse. I mean, the main appeal of Everett (to me) is > that it reduces a problem which is difficult to define to a structural > description of the universe. > So you're taking a block universe picture in which time is implicit some sequence of states. > So you can think of one consistent object as a mathematical structure that > models our entire multiverse with all of its possibilities, from the start > of the Big Bang according to the physical laws that govern it. > But I'm concerned about what defines "consistent". If it is just non-contradiction then any sequence of states seems to be as good as another. The mathematical consistency only applies within each state. Brent > For an example of an inconsistent structure I'd have to bust out some set > theory, but there are plenty of "ideas" for things which sound nice but end > up being mathematically inconsistent. Being mathematically inconsistent > takes the cow example I used earlier from the "almost none" realm to the > "none" realm. We don't have access to enough information to know with > certainty that certain states are possible, though from the psychological > perspective, any set of events could be experienced, yes. > > Maybe I should reformulate what I'm saying because I think I'm being > misunderstood. > > Anna > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
