A. Wolf wrote:
>> If you don't require some mathematical model of evolution of states
>> determining what happens in a Markovian way (like a Schroedinger eqn for
>> example) then one consistent mathematical model is just a list:... "Anna
>> wore a red sweater on 6 Nov 2008", "Anna wore a blue sweater on 7 Nov
>> 2008", Anna wore a coat on 8 Nov 2008",... And there can be no
>> *logical* contradiction between lists. One is as good as another. As I
>> understand it, this sort of list is what Bruno's UD generates all
>> possible instances of and from them, somehow, the physical world emerges
>> as those lists which satisfy some consistency criteria. But I'm not
>> clear on how these consistency criteria emerge from within the theory.
> I'm not certain I was clear in what I described as being extant. When I say
> "me wearing a red sweater today" I mean "some model of the universe
> identical to the one that existed yesterday with the difference that today
> my sweater is red".
Does "model" imply a theory which predicts the evolution of states
(possibly probabilistic) so that the state of universe yesterday limits
what might exist today?
> I'm not talking about time at all.
So why the reference to "today" and "yesterday".
> Time is just part of the overall
> structure of the multiverse. I mean, the main appeal of Everett (to me) is
> that it reduces a problem which is difficult to define to a structural
> description of the universe.
So you're taking a block universe picture in which time is implicit some
sequence of states.
> So you can think of one consistent object as a mathematical structure that
> models our entire multiverse with all of its possibilities, from the start
> of the Big Bang according to the physical laws that govern it.
But I'm concerned about what defines "consistent". If it is just
non-contradiction then any sequence of states seems to be as good as
another. The mathematical consistency only applies within each state.
> For an example of an inconsistent structure I'd have to bust out some set
> theory, but there are plenty of "ideas" for things which sound nice but end
> up being mathematically inconsistent. Being mathematically inconsistent
> takes the cow example I used earlier from the "almost none" realm to the
> "none" realm. We don't have access to enough information to know with
> certainty that certain states are possible, though from the psychological
> perspective, any set of events could be experienced, yes.
> Maybe I should reformulate what I'm saying because I think I'm being
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