A. Wolf wrote:
>> So universes that consisted just of lists of (state_i)(state_i+1)...
>> would exist, where a state might or might not have an implicate time value.
> Of course, but would something that arbitrary be capable of supporting
> the kind of self-referential behavior necessary for sapience?
> Anna
"Capable of supporting" implies some physical laws that connect an 
environment and sapient beings.  In an arbitrary list universe, the 
occurrence of sapience might be just another arbitrary entry in the list 
(like Boltzman brains).  And what about the rules of inference?  Do we 
consider universes with different rules of inference?  Are universes 
considered contradictory, and hence non-existent, if you can prove X and 
not-X for some X, or only if you can prove Y for all Y?

You see, that's what I like about Bruno's scheme, he assumes a definite 
mathematical structure (arithmetic) and proposes that everything comes 
out of it.  I think there is still problem avoiding wonderland, but in 
Tegmark's broader approach the problem is much bigger and all the work 
has to be done by some anthropic principle (which in it's full 
generality might be called "the Popeye" principle - "I yam what I 
yam.").  Once you start with all non-contradictory mathematics, you 
might as well let in the contradictory ones too.  The Popeye principle 
can eliminate them as well.


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