Günther Greindl wrote:
> Kory Heath wrote:
>> If Lucky Alice is conscious and Empty-Headed Alice is not conscious,
>> then there are partial zombies halfway between them. Like you, I can't
>> make any sense of these partial zombies. But
> also can't make any
I don't see why partial "zombies" are problematic. My dog is conscious of
perceptions, of being an individual, of memories and even dreams, but he
have an inner narrative - so is he a partial zombie?
> I think a materialist would either have to argue that Lucky Alice is
> conscious (if he focuses on physical states) and that removing neurons
> would lead to fading qualia (the "partial zombies") or simply assume
> that already Lucky Alice is a Zombie (because he focuses on causal
> (I would like to note that I have dropped MAT in the meantime and tend
> to MECH. Just wanted to "simulate" a materialist argumentation :-) -
> maybe I can convince myself of MAT and not MECH again *grin*)
> Could we say that MAT focuses on _physical states_ (exclusively) and
> MECH on _dynamics_? And that MGA shows that one can't have both?
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