Günther Greindl wrote:
> Kory Heath wrote:
>> If Lucky Alice is conscious and Empty-Headed Alice is not conscious,  
>> then there are partial zombies halfway between them. Like you, I can't  
>> make any sense of these partial zombies. But 
>   also can't make any

I don't see why partial "zombies" are problematic.  My dog is conscious of 
perceptions, of being an individual, of memories and even dreams, but he 
have an inner narrative - so is he a partial zombie?


> I think a materialist would either have to argue that Lucky Alice is 
> conscious (if he focuses on physical states) and that removing neurons 
> would lead to fading qualia (the "partial zombies") or simply assume 
> that already Lucky Alice is a Zombie (because he focuses on causal 
> dynamics).
> (I would like to note that I have dropped MAT in the meantime and tend 
> to MECH. Just wanted to "simulate" a materialist argumentation :-) - 
> maybe I can convince myself of MAT and not MECH again *grin*)
> Could we say that MAT focuses on _physical states_ (exclusively) and 
> MECH on _dynamics_? And that MGA shows that one can't have both?
> Cheers,
> Günther
> > 

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