2008/11/23 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > On Nov 22, 2008, at 2:06 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> Yes, there must be a problem with the assumptions. The only assumption >> that I see we could eliminate, painful though it might be for those of >> a scientific bent, is the idea that consciousness supervenes on >> physical activity. Q.E.D. > > Right. But the problem is that that conclusion doesn't tell me how to > deal with the (equally persuasive) arguments that convince me there's > something deeply correct about viewing consciousness in computational > terms, and viewing computation in physical terms. So I'm really just > left with a dilemma. As I've hinted earlier, I suspect that there's > something wrong with the idea of "physical matter" and related ideas > like causality, probability, etc. But that's pretty vague.
We could say there are two aspects to mathematical objects, a physical aspect and a non-physical aspect. Whenever we interact with the number "three" it must be realised, say in the form of three objects. But there is also an abstract three, with threeness properties, that lives in Platonia independently of any realisation. Similarly, whenever we interact with a computation, it must be realised on a physical computer, such as a human brain. But there is also the abstract computation, a Platonic object. It seems that consciousness, like threeness, may be a property of the Platonic object, and not of its physical realisation. This allows resolution of the apparent paradoxes we have been discussing. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---