2008/11/23 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> On Nov 22, 2008, at 2:06 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> Yes, there must be a problem with the assumptions. The only assumption
>> that I see we could eliminate, painful though it might be for those of
>> a scientific bent, is the idea that consciousness supervenes on
>> physical activity. Q.E.D.
> Right. But the problem is that that conclusion doesn't tell me how to
> deal with the (equally persuasive) arguments that convince me there's
> something deeply correct about viewing consciousness in computational
> terms, and viewing computation in physical terms. So I'm really just
> left with a dilemma. As I've hinted earlier, I suspect that there's
> something wrong with the idea of "physical matter" and related ideas
> like causality, probability, etc. But that's pretty vague.

We could say there are two aspects to mathematical objects, a physical
aspect and a non-physical aspect. Whenever we interact with the number
"three" it must be realised, say in the form of three objects. But
there is also an abstract three, with threeness properties, that lives
in Platonia independently of any realisation. Similarly, whenever we
interact with a computation, it must be realised on a physical
computer, such as a human brain. But there is also the abstract
computation, a Platonic object. It seems that consciousness, like
threeness, may be a property of the Platonic object, and not of its
physical realisation. This allows resolution of the apparent paradoxes
we have been discussing.

Stathis Papaioannou

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