On 23 Nov 2008, at 03:24, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > 2008/11/23 Kory Heath <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >> >> >> On Nov 22, 2008, at 2:06 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> Yes, there must be a problem with the assumptions. The only >>> assumption >>> that I see we could eliminate, painful though it might be for >>> those of >>> a scientific bent, is the idea that consciousness supervenes on >>> physical activity. Q.E.D. >> >> Right. But the problem is that that conclusion doesn't tell me how to >> deal with the (equally persuasive) arguments that convince me there's >> something deeply correct about viewing consciousness in computational >> terms, and viewing computation in physical terms. So I'm really just >> left with a dilemma. As I've hinted earlier, I suspect that there's >> something wrong with the idea of "physical matter" and related ideas >> like causality, probability, etc. But that's pretty vague. > > We could say there are two aspects to mathematical objects, a physical > aspect and a non-physical aspect. Whenever we interact with the number > "three" it must be realised, say in the form of three objects. But > there is also an abstract three, with threeness properties, that lives > in Platonia independently of any realisation. Similarly, whenever we > interact with a computation, it must be realised on a physical > computer, such as a human brain. But there is also the abstract > computation, a Platonic object. It seems that consciousness, like > threeness, may be a property of the Platonic object, and not of its > physical realisation. This allows resolution of the apparent paradoxes > we have been discussing. I agree with you. It resolves the conceptual problems about mind and matter, but if forces us to redefine matter from how "consciousness differentiate in Platonia" (this comes from MGA + ... UDA(1..7). Comp really reduce the mind body problem to the body problem: it remains to show we don't have too much white rabbits. But the problem is a pure problem in computer science now. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
