On 25 Dec 2010, at 18:48, ronaldheld wrote:

  Given what I know about the laws of Physics. A matter human in a
matter Universe(similar to ours) is Consciousness and self aware. An
antimatter human in an antimatter Universe should be expected to be
Consciousness and self aware.

It should be expected from what? What is your theory?
It certainly should be expected from DIGITAL MECHANISM + the substitution level makes consciousness invariant for matter/antimatter change, or mechanism + the level of substitution is higher than the complexity of particles (roughly speaking).

  I do not understand the second to last paragraph. One starts with a
Universe that "splits" upon taking measuremennts, or there are N
parallel Universes to start and diverge from each other as unique
measurements occur over time.

I am saying that those two pictures are epistemologically equivalent, both with DM and QM.


On Dec 22, 11:49 am, Bruno Marchal <> wrote:
On 21 Dec 2010, at 21:40, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 12/21/2010 5:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Dec 2010, at 20:01, Brent Meeker wrote:

Russell has given the correct answer. Here by mind I mean the
conscious first person mind. By UDA-8 (MGA), consciousness is not
attached to the physical running of a computer, but is attached
to the logical number-theoretical relations describing that
computation ... and all similar (with respect to the relevant
levels) computations which exist in Sigma_1 (computational)
arithmetical truth (and which might bear on beliefs and proofs
which extends far beyond the computable).

But do you mean to assert that all computations have consciousness
attached?  In what sense does this allow us to distinguish human
introspection from human perception from my dog's awareness from a
snail's awareness from a rock's awareness?

Not at all. Only very special computations have consciousness,
although it is better to attach consciousness to the sheaf of
equivalent computations, going through the relevant (relative)
states. For example, assuming many things by default, for any
different electron positions in the atoms in your brain you have a
different computations. Your actual consciousness is attached to
all those computations.

When you express it that way it sounds as if you take consciousness
to be something apart from the sheaf of equivalent computations -
something I have but maybe a snail does not.  Don't you rely on
Everett's idea that consciousness just goes with the computations -
so that when computations of quantum events become classically
inconsistent then there is a different consciousness associated with
the each (classically) consistent sheaf?

Consciousness differentiates only when it is aware of a specific
result making his world different from the worlds where the observer
would have seen another result, both in the WM duplication, or in the
measure of an electron position or spin. If not, we would not been
able to be aware of the quantum coherence.
Here there is an ambiguity present in both quantum mechanics and

Suppose an electron in your brain, or elsewhere, is in the
superposition state here+there. You are described by B.
The state of you + the electron is described as well by B . (here
+there) or by B . here + B . there. If B does not interact (observe)
the electron he will be able to decide to do a measure of the electron
in the complementary base of {here, there}, and observe interference
between the two different "classical" worlds (where the electron is
respectively here and there. But if the observer looks where is the
electron, then the evolution leads to B_here . here  +  B_there .
there. And without amnesia, the observer will be unable to make the
two worlds above fusing, and he has lost the ability to observe the

The ambiguity is due to the factorization. I suggest, both for the
definition of the measure on the computational histories, and the
consistent quantum histories, to use the rule Y = II. This consists in
interpreting a(b+c) always as a shorthand for a.b + a.c. I think that
David Deutsch does the same in the quantum case when he says that the
universe never splits: it is split right at the start, and the
parallel universe only differentiate. With comp it is really
consciousness which differentiate, and somehow the subjective
experience plays the role of the universes.

But those two views are really equivalent. The splitting/fusing
vocabulary is more easy for the description of the statistical
interference between subjective experience/ first person plural
realities, but the global measure on the computations is better seen
when distributing all the factors at once, unravelling all histories
by applying the rule Y = II all along the complete universal deployment.

Does this make sense?



If electrons are specified by continuous variable, your
consciousness will be related to a continuum of computations
generated by the UD. In that case you have to consider the
dovetailing of the UD on the real and complex numbers. Of course
that continuum is an internal first person view which existence is
due to your non-awareness of the delays made by the UD. It belongs
to the epistemology, not the ontology where everything is finite
(can be considered as finite once we assume digitalism).
Humans, dogs, snails and even rock (immaterial rock patterns) share
histories, notably thanks to the plausible linearity of the
computations at the bottom, and the computational depth of our very
long history. Actually I begin to think that computationalism makes
the big bang a cosmic explosion among an infinity of similar
explosions. First person computational depth is probably infinite
(but here I speculate a little bit, and I will not insist on that).


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