On 12/8/2010 11:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

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On 07 Dec 2010, at 22:40, Brent Meeker wrote:On 12/7/2010 1:10 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 06 Dec 2010, at 19:00, ronaldheld wrote:Bruno(and others) I am going to do this in two posts. The first is my interpretation of your UDA. Since the Brain is a Turing emulatable program running on a biological platform(to start), steps 1-5 are not controversal. Step 6 scan(and annilates) the body and only places the program on another physical hardware platform, for a finite amount of time. Step 7 is the usual scan and annihilate,Well, step 6 and 7 use step 5 where you don't need to annihilate theoriginal anymore.A (classical) teleportation without annihilation is a duplicationwhere the original is considered annihilate and reconstituted at hisoriginal place wihout delay.You need that to understand that if you do an experience of physics,you have to to consider into account all computations in the UDexecution to predict your future experience (including "looking at ameasuring apparatus needle'. OK?and then looks for the program in the UD still on some physical platform?Yes. At step seven, you have already that DM entails indeterminacy,non locality and even (exercice) non clonability of anything'physically' observable. (mechanism accepts the 3-duplicability ofthe person which is not something physically observable (yetinferable)).Step 8 removes the physical universe and had the UD "running" in Arithmetical Platonia?Yes. The UD is somehow given by the true sigma_1 arithmeticalpropositions (with shape like ExP(x) P decidable) together withtheir many proofs. This can be derived from a well known resultasserting that the computable functions are representable inRobinson (tiny) arithmetic, or you can use the beautiful work ofPutnam, Juila Robinson, Davis, and Matiyazevitch). This makes itTuring universal, and makes the UD emulated in Platonia (or in anymodel of Peano Arithmetic, that is a tiny part of arithmetical truth).If I basically understand this correctly, then I will interpret UDA from my(physicla scineces POV).Normally the reasoning does not depend on any points of view (thatis why is a deductive reasoning or a proof). The step 8 is moredifficult, and I might resend the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) alreadysent. Step 8 explains the necessity of immateriality. It explainsthat the physical supervenience thesis cannot work, unless youaccept the idea that an inactive piece of material has an activephysical activity in a computation, and still say "yes" to thedoctor, like Jack Mallah apparently.My reservation about step 8 is that the activity, in order to be acomputation, must have an interpretation.Hmm... This is already a bit ambiguous. Suppose some (real) computercomputes factorial(5). Some people could say that in order to be acomputation of factorial(5) we need a human interpreting the physicalprocess as a computation of factorial(5).I would not. But I agree we need here some 'physical' interpreter ofthe program.Suppose someone dream that he computes fact(5). Here we can agree thatwe need a physical interpreter interpreting or executing the brain soas to compute the "dream of the computation of the factorial by thatperson". But it is not the physical interpreter which computes thefactorial, it is the dreaming person. And the person would be doingthat computation even if nobody look at the brain and interpret thatbrain as "dreaming that someone compute factorial(5). OK?

`Sure, the person is interpreting the meaning, but I would say he is only`

`doing so by reference to a world in which there are quintuples. It is`

`because he can wake up and hold up his hand say, "I dreamed that this`

`many fingers is prime."`

If the computation realizes "I'm thinking about the number 5." then"the number 5" must mean something in this context.It must mean something to the person thinking to the number 5. Not tosomeone observing that person.Otherwise the same strings of symbols might compute, "I'm thinking ofblxght." In order for "the number 5" to refer there must be acontext in which the number 5 exists in some sense. This is fine foryour theory and in fact that's how you ground it by noting that weall agree on arithmetic and that there is a number 5 in arithmetic.But then it seems the same applies to "I'm thinking of a chair." Inorder for that to be a possible interpretation of the strings theremust be some referent for "chair". Of course you can say the "chair"refers to some bundles of computations of the UD that are related to"sitting" bundles, etc.Hmm... the ambiguity is present throughout that reasoning. I think. Iwill try to answer the next line:But then you are just saving the theory by mapping the physical worldback into it.Once we assume comp, and assuming that the 'generalized brain' is theusual biological brain inside the skull (to make the pictures moreeasy), all we need is a computation of the relevant states of that brain.

`But here is where I think you help yourself to too much. It is only`

`because the biological brain exists and evolved in a certain world that`

`it has "relevant states". We as outsiders cannot generally observe what`

`the brain is thinking about (it's as though it has invented it's own`

`simulation code for the world), but you help yourself to the assumption`

`that it is thinking about things - things that you and I can communicate`

`about, i.e. are in our common world.`

This create a human interpreter experience of "thinking" to the chair.That computation might be a dream by someone who know well aboutchair, and has seen many example of it in his memory-life.Now the UD will "generate", in his special static way, infinitely manycomputations going through those relevant states. They are alldescribed by sequence of phi_i^n (j), n = 0 to infinity, with thedifferent computations being distinguished by different i and j. OK?"n" represents the computational steps of the computation of phi_i(j),and the computation are really given by the arithmetical (andcomputable, in the mathematical sense) relation linking (i, j, n).For example phi_587610093811908883744(45456901000456338867611906369579006532113536953) could describe thequantum state of a computer emulating that "human thinking of the chair",and many others with (actually) much bigger index i and data j. (notethat even with the same i and j there are infinitely manycomputations, those being based on different universal interpreters.

`But each universal interpreter provides a mapping from such numbers`

`to...what? another world, I think.`

Some computation could emulate the quantum state evolution of thesuper cluster of galaxies including the Milky way, and thus the sunand earth and the guy thinking to that chair (and all his life withall its chairs).Now, UDA1-7 and the movie graph (UDA-8) shows that the guy, whichplays the role of the interpreter of its own brain state is unable todistinguish any of those phi_i^n(j). Actually, it shows we cannotdistinguish a phi_i(j) computed by the real "galaxy" if that exist,and the one emulated by the DU in arithmetic, emulating the samegalaxy (at a level relative to the relevant state of its brain 'course).

`This is the tricky part. The same computation in the guy's brain can be`

`interpreted as an emulation of the milky way or as thinking that five is`

`prime. He provides the interpretation of the brain state - in his world.`

The physical activity are the one described by those manycomputations, and this predicts that if the guy looks below itssubstitution level, he should find the trace of the infinitelycomputations going through those relevant states (by first personindeterminacy).

`Are you assuming that, at the substitution level, the interpretation is`

`unique - regardless of which world it is in?`

Suppose someone says that for consciousness to exists we need the"real physical galaxy" (whatever that could mean). Then it means thatwhatever computations going through its states, none are enough forhis consciousness to appear (he remains zombie).

`Or that computations must be physically realized and that determines`

`where the consciousness appears. But I'm not arguing that there must be`

`a physical world (though that would be one solution). I'm arguing that`

`there has to be a world that provides the interpretation of the`

`numbers. I realize that this world can consist of just some class of`

`numbers, but whatever it is, it seems to me it must be arbitrarily large`

`and arguments about brain states and substitution are fallacious because`

`they implicitly help themselves to the bigger world in order to ground`

`their interpretations.`

But that means (assuming comp) that we have not choose the right levelof simulation, and this means that we have to go deeper in the UD,using phi_i(j) with still bigger j and i. Or it means that the realgalaxy contains something which prevent any emulation of it to appearin the UD, but that means that his generalized brain (of the guythinking to the chair) is not really emulable by any computationalprocess, and this means he should better say no to the doctor.So, depending of the substitution level, for emulating the rightamount of "activity" we have to map sufficiently deep digitaltruncation of the 'physical world'. But that means that the realphysics, from the point of view of the guy who has his first person(plural) reality) indeterminated on any of his relative incarnationsin the deployment of the UD, will be given by the sum of all thetruncated part of all the digital truncations of all themultiverses/multidreams in the whole (sigma_1) arithmetic.We will never been able to map the whole physics in one computation ofthe UD, given that physics is a first person (plural) view defined byall its digital incarnations in the UD, and that leads to a sum on theentire work of the UD (this really comes from both the invariance ofthe first person for the UD-delays, /and/ step 8).So you have to really address the step-8 point, to rejectimmateriality, to link consciousness to something not Turing emulable.But then I'm afraid you have to attribute a physical role to objecthaving no physical activity relevant to a computation done in "realrelative time". That seems to me to be an ad hoc move close to nonsense (assuming comp throughout). So consciousness is not related to aphysical active brain, but to the infinitely many arithmeticalrelations relating those states.It is not excluded that *some* universal number (a "physics") playsspecial prominent role, but then, what the reasoning shows is that theexistence of such number(s) have to be derived from the "arithmeticalmeasure problem". The loss, is any simple basic physics (but then tryto predict an eclipse with Feynman integral with all the decimalexacts). The gain, with the classical theory of knowledge, is that weget both the quanta and the qualia (by the G/G*, Z1/Z1*, etc.splittings).

`But doesn't that splitting depend on interpreting relations between`

`computations as representing certain conscious thoughts? I don't reject`

`it on that account, since if it can be shown to predict things that's as`

`much as we ask of any theory. But it seems to me that you have so far`

`only an analogy between proof and belief.`

Brent

We might come back to step 8 :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email toeverything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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