Bruno: Thanks for the weekend wishes. I believe the Brain runs programs, in parallel, but are they the Mind, and are they able to be run as Turing emulable programs with no impact to one's consciousness? Ronald

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On Dec 11, 7:51 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 11 Dec 2010, at 01:01, ronaldheld wrote: > > > Bruno: > > I stand corrected on steps 6 and 7. I believe I understand your UDA > > diagrams. > > OK. Thanks for saying. > > > Before I can comment, I need to decide waht progrmas are and > > are not Turing emulatable, > > All programs are Turing-emulable. That is a consequence of Church > thesis. > Many computer scientists tend to consider that Church Thesis is > trivially true, but, when you study it you might realize that CT is on > the contrary quite miraculous. Like Gödel saw, it is a miracle that > the Cantor-like diagonalization procedure does not lead outside the > class of partial recursive functions. The gift is a very robust notion > of universality. The price to pay for that is also very big: the > abandon of any complete TOE (unless ultrafinitism, ...). But > psycholically that price is a relief: it prevents computer science to > be reductionist. > > > and if the brain runs a program, parallel > > programs, or something else. > > Brains and other biological organs and organisms, run parallel > programs. But all digitalizable parallel programs can be made > equivalent with dovetailing on non parallel programs. The UD does run > an infinity of programs in parallel, for example. So the brain > parallelism does not change anything unless the brain is not a > digitalizable physical process (but then we go outside the scope of > Digital Mechanism, the theory I am working in). > Theoretical Computer Science is, amazingly enough, something non > dimensional. This of course forces us to explain why dimensionality > seems so important in the physical sciences, or in the observable > sharable (first person plural) realities. > > Don't hesitate to ask for precisions. > > Good week-end, > > Bruno > > > > > On Dec 7, 4:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 06 Dec 2010, at 19:00, ronaldheld wrote: > > >>> Bruno(and others) > >>> I am going to do this in two posts. The first is my interpretation > >>> of your UDA. Since the Brain is a Turing emulatable program > >>> running on > >>> a biological platform(to start), steps 1-5 are not controversal. > >>> Step > >>> 6 scan(and annilates) the body and only places the program on > >>> another > >>> physical hardware platform, for a finite amount of time. Step 7 is > >>> the > >>> usual scan and annihilate, > > >> Well, step 6 and 7 use step 5 where you don't need to annihilate the > >> original anymore. > >> A (classical) teleportation without annihilation is a duplication > >> where the original is considered annihilate and reconstituted at his > >> original place wihout delay. > >> You need that to understand that if you do an experience of physics, > >> you have to to consider into account all computations in the UD > >> execution to predict your future experience (including "looking at a > >> measuring apparatus needle'. OK? > > >>> and then looks for the program in the UD > >>> still on some physical platform? > > >> Yes. At step seven, you have already that DM entails indeterminacy, > >> non locality and even (exercice) non clonability of anything > >> 'physically' observable. (mechanism accepts the 3-duplicability of > >> the > >> person which is not something physically observable (yet inferable)). > > >>> Step 8 removes the physical universe > >>> and had the UD "running" in Arithmetical Platonia? > > >> Yes. The UD is somehow given by the true sigma_1 arithmetical > >> propositions (with shape like ExP(x) P decidable) together with their > >> many proofs. This can be derived from a well known result asserting > >> that the computable functions are representable in Robinson (tiny) > >> arithmetic, or you can use the beautiful work of Putnam, Juila > >> Robinson, Davis, and Matiyazevitch). This makes it Turing universal, > >> and makes the UD emulated in Platonia (or in any model of Peano > >> Arithmetic, that is a tiny part of arithmetical truth). > > >>> If I basically understand this correctly, then I will interpret UDA > >>> from my(physicla scineces POV). > > >> Normally the reasoning does not depend on any points of view (that is > >> why is a deductive reasoning or a proof). The step 8 is more > >> difficult, and I might resend the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) already > >> sent. Step 8 explains the necessity of immateriality. It explains > >> that > >> the physical supervenience thesis cannot work, unless you accept the > >> idea that an inactive piece of material has an active physical > >> activity in a computation, and still say "yes" to the doctor, like > >> Jack Mallah apparently. To avoid this I add sometimes that the > >> survival, when saying yes to the doctor, is done "qua computatio", > >> and > >> I am working to make this more precise. It is always possible to put > >> some magic in the notion of matter to build a fake comp hypothesis > >> saving primary matter, but then you can save any theology, and it > >> seems to me quite an ad hoc move. But I am interested in hearing > >> your > >> Physical Science point of view. > > >> Bruno > > >>> Ronald > > >>> On Dec 2, 10:55 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >>>> On 02 Dec 2010, at 15:51, ronaldheld wrote: > > >>>>> Bruno: > >>>>> I looked at UDA via the SANE paper. I am not certain the the > >>>>> mind is > >>>>> Turing emulatable, but will move onward. > > >>>> OK. It is better to say brain instead of mind. The doctor > >>>> proposes an > >>>> artificial digital brain, and keep silent on what is the mind, just > >>>> that it will be preserved locally through the running of the > >>>> adequate > >>>> computer. > > >>>>> Using Star Trek transporter > >>>>> concepts, I can accept steps 1 through 5. > > >>>> Nice. Note that the Star trek transporter usually annihilates the > >>>> original (like in quantum teleportation), but if I am a > >>>> "program" (a > >>>> natural program) then it can be duplicated (cut, copy and paste > >>>> apply > >>>> to it). > > >>>>> Step 6 takes only the mind > > >>>> (the program, or the digital instantaneous state of a program) > > >>>>> and sends it to a finite computational device or the entire person > >>>>> into a device similar to a Holodeck, > > >>>> It is just a computer. A physical embodiment of a (Turing) > >>>> Universal > >>>> Machine. Assuming the "mind state" (here and now) can be captured > >>>> as > >>>> an instantaneous description of a digital program, nobody can feel > >>>> the > >>>> difference between "reality" and its physical digital emulation, at > >>>> least for a period (which is all what is needed for the probability > >>>> or > >>>> credibility measure). > > >>>>> where the person is a > >>>>> Holocharacter? > > >>>> A person is what appears when the correct program (which exists by > >>>> the > >>>> mechanist assumption) is executed ('runned') in a physical > >>>> computer. > > >>>>> I am not certain a UD is physically possible in a > >>>>> finite resource Universe. > > >>>> You don't need this to get the indeterminacy, non-locality and even > >>>> the non clonability, unless you add that the resource are finite > >>>> and > >>>> enough little (in which case you still have the indeterminacy and > >>>> non- > >>>> locality in case of self-duplication in that little universe of > >>>> course). > >>>> After UDA 1-7, you know that if you make a physical experiment, the > >>>> result that you will perceive depend on the absence of similar > >>>> state > >>>> of "your body" in the (physical) universe. > > >>>> Then, with step 8, you can realize that even that move toward a > >>>> little > >>>> physical universe will not help to throw away the 1-indterminacy, > >>>> non- > >>>> locality and non clonability. The reason is that Arithmetical > >>>> Platonia > >>>> becomes the universal "Holodeck", if you want. > >>>> UDA 1-7 shows that the mind (the first person) cannot distinguish a > >>>> physical reality from a physical emulation of it (for a short > >>>> time), > >>>> but after step 8, we can see that the person cannot even feel the > >>>> difference between a physical emulation and an arithmetical > >>>> emulation, > >>>> which exists out of space and time independently of any observers > >>>> (by > >>>> Church thesis, arithmetic and computer science). That is subtler > >>>> than > >>>> UDA 1-7, but it makes the argument a proof, i.e. a proof that > >>>> physics > >>>> just cannot be the fundamental theory, once we assume digital > >>>> mechanism. The physical laws have a reason, and even a > >>>> "space" (arithmetical truth) where, from the point of view of the > >>>> observers, they have been selected. > > >>>> Thanks for your reply, and ask any supplementary questions if > >>>> interested. I am trying to work on the official "english" papers. > >>>> After that I will write a book. I have succeeded in explaining > >>>> step 8 > >>>> to many different publics now, so that I think I have the whole > >>>> thing > >>>> straight. > > >>>> AUDA, on the contrary, is well understood only by logicians, but > >>>> physicists have still problem with basic logic. There is a real big > >>>> gap between logicians and physicists. I was hoping that quantum > >>>> computations would make a bridge, but that will still take a long > >>>> time. Anyway, UDA is enough to understand the main point. > >>>> AUDA is cute, because it shows that the intelligent machine are > >>>> already here. It shows also that intelligence is mainly a right, > >>>> not a > >>>> gift (but many people dislike this, and that is hardly astonishing > >>>> when you look at the history of humanity: it is the sempiternal > >>>> fear > >>>> of the others). > > >>>> Bruno > > >>>>> On Nov 28, 5:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >>>>>> On 27 Nov 2010, at 19:05, ronaldheld wrote: > > >>>>>>> Jason(and any others) > >>>>>>> Both. Level IV Universe is hard to explain even if real. > >>>>>>> Bruno's > >>>>>>> reality is equally hard to convincing present. > >>>>>>> Ronald > > >>>>>> Do you agree/understand that if we are machine then we are in > >>>>>> principle duplicable? This entails subjective indeterminacy. > >>>>>> All the rest follows from that, and few people have problems to > >>>>>> understand UDA 1-7. > > >>>>>> UDA-8, which... > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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