On 07 Dec 2010, at 22:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 12/7/2010 1:10 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Dec 2010, at 19:00, ronaldheld wrote:
I am going to do this in two posts. The first is my interpretation
of your UDA. Since the Brain is a Turing emulatable program
a biological platform(to start), steps 1-5 are not controversal.
6 scan(and annilates) the body and only places the program on
physical hardware platform, for a finite amount of time. Step 7 is
usual scan and annihilate,
Well, step 6 and 7 use step 5 where you don't need to annihilate
the original anymore.
A (classical) teleportation without annihilation is a duplication
where the original is considered annihilate and reconstituted at
his original place wihout delay.
You need that to understand that if you do an experience of
physics, you have to to consider into account all computations in
the UD execution to predict your future experience (including
"looking at a measuring apparatus needle'. OK?
and then looks for the program in the UD
still on some physical platform?
Yes. At step seven, you have already that DM entails indeterminacy,
non locality and even (exercice) non clonability of anything
'physically' observable. (mechanism accepts the 3-duplicability of
the person which is not something physically observable (yet
Step 8 removes the physical universe
and had the UD "running" in Arithmetical Platonia?
Yes. The UD is somehow given by the true sigma_1 arithmetical
propositions (with shape like ExP(x) P decidable) together with
their many proofs. This can be derived from a well known result
asserting that the computable functions are representable in
Robinson (tiny) arithmetic, or you can use the beautiful work of
Putnam, Juila Robinson, Davis, and Matiyazevitch). This makes it
Turing universal, and makes the UD emulated in Platonia (or in any
model of Peano Arithmetic, that is a tiny part of arithmetical
If I basically understand this correctly, then I will interpret UDA
from my(physicla scineces POV).
Normally the reasoning does not depend on any points of view (that
is why is a deductive reasoning or a proof). The step 8 is more
difficult, and I might resend the Movie Graph Argument (MGA)
already sent. Step 8 explains the necessity of immateriality. It
explains that the physical supervenience thesis cannot work, unless
you accept the idea that an inactive piece of material has an
active physical activity in a computation, and still say "yes" to
the doctor, like Jack Mallah apparently.
My reservation about step 8 is that the activity, in order to be a
computation, must have an interpretation.
Hmm... This is already a bit ambiguous. Suppose some (real) computer
computes factorial(5). Some people could say that in order to be a
computation of factorial(5) we need a human interpreting the physical
process as a computation of factorial(5).
I would not. But I agree we need here some 'physical' interpreter of
Suppose someone dream that he computes fact(5). Here we can agree that
we need a physical interpreter interpreting or executing the brain so
as to compute the "dream of the computation of the factorial by that
person". But it is not the physical interpreter which computes the
factorial, it is the dreaming person. And the person would be doing
that computation even if nobody look at the brain and interpret that
brain as "dreaming that someone compute factorial(5). OK?
If the computation realizes "I'm thinking about the number 5." then
"the number 5" must mean something in this context.
It must mean something to the person thinking to the number 5. Not to
someone observing that person.
Otherwise the same strings of symbols might compute, "I'm thinking
of blxght." In order for "the number 5" to refer there must be a
context in which the number 5 exists in some sense. This is fine
for your theory and in fact that's how you ground it by noting that
we all agree on arithmetic and that there is a number 5 in
arithmetic. But then it seems the same applies to "I'm thinking of
a chair." In order for that to be a possible interpretation of the
strings there must be some referent for "chair". Of course you can
say the "chair" refers to some bundles of computations of the UD
that are related to "sitting" bundles, etc.
Hmm... the ambiguity is present throughout that reasoning. I think. I
will try to answer the next line:
But then you are just saving the theory by mapping the physical
world back into it.
Once we assume comp, and assuming that the 'generalized brain' is the
usual biological brain inside the skull (to make the pictures more
easy), all we need is a computation of the relevant states of that
brain. This create a human interpreter experience of "thinking" to the
chair. That computation might be a dream by someone who know well
about chair, and has seen many example of it in his memory-life.
Now the UD will "generate", in his special static way, infinitely many
computations going through those relevant states. They are all
described by sequence of phi_i^n (j), n = 0 to infinity, with the
different computations being distinguished by different i and j. OK?
"n" represents the computational steps of the computation of phi_i(j),
and the computation are really given by the arithmetical (and
computable, in the mathematical sense) relation linking (i, j, n).
For example phi_587610093811908883744
(45456901000456338867611906369579006532113536953) could describe the
quantum state of a computer emulating that "human thinking of the
and many others with (actually) much bigger index i and data j. (note
that even with the same i and j there are infinitely many
computations, those being based on different universal interpreters.
Some computation could emulate the quantum state evolution of the
super cluster of galaxies including the Milky way, and thus the sun
and earth and the guy thinking to that chair (and all his life with
all its chairs).
Now, UDA1-7 and the movie graph (UDA-8) shows that the guy, which
plays the role of the interpreter of its own brain state is unable to
distinguish any of those phi_i^n(j). Actually, it shows we cannot
distinguish a phi_i(j) computed by the real "galaxy" if that exist,
and the one emulated by the DU in arithmetic, emulating the same
galaxy (at a level relative to the relevant state of its brain
'course). The physical activity are the one described by those many
computations, and this predicts that if the guy looks below its
substitution level, he should find the trace of the infinitely
computations going through those relevant states (by first person
Suppose someone says that for consciousness to exists we need the
"real physical galaxy" (whatever that could mean). Then it means that
whatever computations going through its states, none are enough for
his consciousness to appear (he remains zombie). But that means
(assuming comp) that we have not choose the right level of simulation,
and this means that we have to go deeper in the UD, using phi_i(j)
with still bigger j and i. Or it means that the real galaxy contains
something which prevent any emulation of it to appear in the UD, but
that means that his generalized brain (of the guy thinking to the
chair) is not really emulable by any computational process, and this
means he should better say no to the doctor.
So, depending of the substitution level, for emulating the right
amount of "activity" we have to map sufficiently deep digital
truncation of the 'physical world'. But that means that the real
physics, from the point of view of the guy who has his first person
(plural) reality) indeterminated on any of his relative incarnations
in the deployment of the UD, will be given by the sum of all the
truncated part of all the digital truncations of all the multiverses/
multidreams in the whole (sigma_1) arithmetic.
We will never been able to map the whole physics in one computation of
the UD, given that physics is a first person (plural) view defined by
all its digital incarnations in the UD, and that leads to a sum on the
entire work of the UD (this really comes from both the invariance of
the first person for the UD-delays, and step 8).
So you have to really address the step-8 point, to reject
immateriality, to link consciousness to something not Turing emulable.
But then I'm afraid you have to attribute a physical role to object
having no physical activity relevant to a computation done in "real
relative time". That seems to me to be an ad hoc move close to non
sense (assuming comp throughout). So consciousness is not related to a
physical active brain, but to the infinitely many arithmetical
relations relating those states.
It is not excluded that *some* universal number (a "physics") plays
special prominent role, but then, what the reasoning shows is that the
existence of such number(s) have to be derived from the "arithmetical
measure problem". The loss, is any simple basic physics (but then try
to predict an eclipse with Feynman integral with all the decimal
exacts). The gain, with the classical theory of knowledge, is that we
get both the quanta and the qualia (by the G/G*, Z1/Z1*, etc.
We might come back to step 8 :)
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