On 07 Dec 2010, at 22:40, Brent Meeker wrote:

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On 12/7/2010 1:10 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 06 Dec 2010, at 19:00, ronaldheld wrote:Bruno(and others) I am going to do this in two posts. The first is my interpretationof your UDA. Since the Brain is a Turing emulatable programrunning ona biological platform(to start), steps 1-5 are not controversal.Step6 scan(and annilates) the body and only places the program onanotherphysical hardware platform, for a finite amount of time. Step 7 istheusual scan and annihilate,Well, step 6 and 7 use step 5 where you don't need to annihilatethe original anymore.A (classical) teleportation without annihilation is a duplicationwhere the original is considered annihilate and reconstituted athis original place wihout delay.You need that to understand that if you do an experience ofphysics, you have to to consider into account all computations inthe UD execution to predict your future experience (including"looking at a measuring apparatus needle'. OK?and then looks for the program in the UD still on some physical platform?Yes. At step seven, you have already that DM entails indeterminacy,non locality and even (exercice) non clonability of anything'physically' observable. (mechanism accepts the 3-duplicability ofthe person which is not something physically observable (yetinferable)).Step 8 removes the physical universe and had the UD "running" in Arithmetical Platonia?Yes. The UD is somehow given by the true sigma_1 arithmeticalpropositions (with shape like ExP(x) P decidable) together withtheir many proofs. This can be derived from a well known resultasserting that the computable functions are representable inRobinson (tiny) arithmetic, or you can use the beautiful work ofPutnam, Juila Robinson, Davis, and Matiyazevitch). This makes itTuring universal, and makes the UD emulated in Platonia (or in anymodel of Peano Arithmetic, that is a tiny part of arithmeticaltruth).If I basically understand this correctly, then I will interpret UDA from my(physicla scineces POV).Normally the reasoning does not depend on any points of view (thatis why is a deductive reasoning or a proof). The step 8 is moredifficult, and I might resend the Movie Graph Argument (MGA)already sent. Step 8 explains the necessity of immateriality. Itexplains that the physical supervenience thesis cannot work, unlessyou accept the idea that an inactive piece of material has anactive physical activity in a computation, and still say "yes" tothe doctor, like Jack Mallah apparently.My reservation about step 8 is that the activity, in order to be acomputation, must have an interpretation.

`Hmm... This is already a bit ambiguous. Suppose some (real) computer`

`computes factorial(5). Some people could say that in order to be a`

`computation of factorial(5) we need a human interpreting the physical`

`process as a computation of factorial(5).`

`I would not. But I agree we need here some 'physical' interpreter of`

`the program.`

`Suppose someone dream that he computes fact(5). Here we can agree that`

`we need a physical interpreter interpreting or executing the brain so`

`as to compute the "dream of the computation of the factorial by that`

`person". But it is not the physical interpreter which computes the`

`factorial, it is the dreaming person. And the person would be doing`

`that computation even if nobody look at the brain and interpret that`

`brain as "dreaming that someone compute factorial(5). OK?`

If the computation realizes "I'm thinking about the number 5." then"the number 5" must mean something in this context.

`It must mean something to the person thinking to the number 5. Not to`

`someone observing that person.`

Otherwise the same strings of symbols might compute, "I'm thinkingof blxght." In order for "the number 5" to refer there must be acontext in which the number 5 exists in some sense. This is finefor your theory and in fact that's how you ground it by noting thatwe all agree on arithmetic and that there is a number 5 inarithmetic. But then it seems the same applies to "I'm thinking ofa chair." In order for that to be a possible interpretation of thestrings there must be some referent for "chair". Of course you cansay the "chair" refers to some bundles of computations of the UDthat are related to "sitting" bundles, etc.

`Hmm... the ambiguity is present throughout that reasoning. I think. I`

`will try to answer the next line:`

But then you are just saving the theory by mapping the physicalworld back into it.

`Once we assume comp, and assuming that the 'generalized brain' is the`

`usual biological brain inside the skull (to make the pictures more`

`easy), all we need is a computation of the relevant states of that`

`brain. This create a human interpreter experience of "thinking" to the`

`chair. That computation might be a dream by someone who know well`

`about chair, and has seen many example of it in his memory-life.`

`Now the UD will "generate", in his special static way, infinitely many`

`computations going through those relevant states. They are all`

`described by sequence of phi_i^n (j), n = 0 to infinity, with the`

`different computations being distinguished by different i and j. OK?`

`"n" represents the computational steps of the computation of phi_i(j),`

`and the computation are really given by the arithmetical (and`

`computable, in the mathematical sense) relation linking (i, j, n).`

`For example phi_587610093811908883744`

`(45456901000456338867611906369579006532113536953) could describe the`

`quantum state of a computer emulating that "human thinking of the`

`chair",`

`and many others with (actually) much bigger index i and data j. (note`

`that even with the same i and j there are infinitely many`

`computations, those being based on different universal interpreters.`

`Some computation could emulate the quantum state evolution of the`

`super cluster of galaxies including the Milky way, and thus the sun`

`and earth and the guy thinking to that chair (and all his life with`

`all its chairs).`

`Now, UDA1-7 and the movie graph (UDA-8) shows that the guy, which`

`plays the role of the interpreter of its own brain state is unable to`

`distinguish any of those phi_i^n(j). Actually, it shows we cannot`

`distinguish a phi_i(j) computed by the real "galaxy" if that exist,`

`and the one emulated by the DU in arithmetic, emulating the same`

`galaxy (at a level relative to the relevant state of its brain`

`'course). The physical activity are the one described by those many`

`computations, and this predicts that if the guy looks below its`

`substitution level, he should find the trace of the infinitely`

`computations going through those relevant states (by first person`

`indeterminacy).`

`Suppose someone says that for consciousness to exists we need the`

`"real physical galaxy" (whatever that could mean). Then it means that`

`whatever computations going through its states, none are enough for`

`his consciousness to appear (he remains zombie). But that means`

`(assuming comp) that we have not choose the right level of simulation,`

`and this means that we have to go deeper in the UD, using phi_i(j)`

`with still bigger j and i. Or it means that the real galaxy contains`

`something which prevent any emulation of it to appear in the UD, but`

`that means that his generalized brain (of the guy thinking to the`

`chair) is not really emulable by any computational process, and this`

`means he should better say no to the doctor.`

`So, depending of the substitution level, for emulating the right`

`amount of "activity" we have to map sufficiently deep digital`

`truncation of the 'physical world'. But that means that the real`

`physics, from the point of view of the guy who has his first person`

`(plural) reality) indeterminated on any of his relative incarnations`

`in the deployment of the UD, will be given by the sum of all the`

`truncated part of all the digital truncations of all the multiverses/`

`multidreams in the whole (sigma_1) arithmetic.`

`We will never been able to map the whole physics in one computation of`

`the UD, given that physics is a first person (plural) view defined by`

`all its digital incarnations in the UD, and that leads to a sum on the`

`entire work of the UD (this really comes from both the invariance of`

`the first person for the UD-delays, and step 8).`

`So you have to really address the step-8 point, to reject`

`immateriality, to link consciousness to something not Turing emulable.`

`But then I'm afraid you have to attribute a physical role to object`

`having no physical activity relevant to a computation done in "real`

`relative time". That seems to me to be an ad hoc move close to non`

`sense (assuming comp throughout). So consciousness is not related to a`

`physical active brain, but to the infinitely many arithmetical`

`relations relating those states.`

`It is not excluded that *some* universal number (a "physics") plays`

`special prominent role, but then, what the reasoning shows is that the`

`existence of such number(s) have to be derived from the "arithmetical`

`measure problem". The loss, is any simple basic physics (but then try`

`to predict an eclipse with Feynman integral with all the decimal`

`exacts). The gain, with the classical theory of knowledge, is that we`

`get both the quanta and the qualia (by the G/G*, Z1/Z1*, etc.`

`splittings).`

We might come back to step 8 :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.