I stand corrected on steps 6 and 7. I believe I understand your UDA
diagrams. Before I can comment, I need to decide waht progrmas are and
are not Turing emulatable, and if the brain runs a program, parallel
programs, or something else.
On Dec 7, 4:10 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 06 Dec 2010, at 19:00, ronaldheld wrote:
> > Bruno(and others)
> > I am going to do this in two posts. The first is my interpretation
> > of your UDA. Since the Brain is a Turing emulatable program running on
> > a biological platform(to start), steps 1-5 are not controversal. Step
> > 6 scan(and annilates) the body and only places the program on another
> > physical hardware platform, for a finite amount of time. Step 7 is the
> > usual scan and annihilate,
> Well, step 6 and 7 use step 5 where you don't need to annihilate the
> original anymore.
> A (classical) teleportation without annihilation is a duplication
> where the original is considered annihilate and reconstituted at his
> original place wihout delay.
> You need that to understand that if you do an experience of physics,
> you have to to consider into account all computations in the UD
> execution to predict your future experience (including "looking at a
> measuring apparatus needle'. OK?
> > and then looks for the program in the UD
> > still on some physical platform?
> Yes. At step seven, you have already that DM entails indeterminacy,
> non locality and even (exercice) non clonability of anything
> 'physically' observable. (mechanism accepts the 3-duplicability of the
> person which is not something physically observable (yet inferable)).
> > Step 8 removes the physical universe
> > and had the UD "running" in Arithmetical Platonia?
> Yes. The UD is somehow given by the true sigma_1 arithmetical
> propositions (with shape like ExP(x) P decidable) together with their
> many proofs. This can be derived from a well known result asserting
> that the computable functions are representable in Robinson (tiny)
> arithmetic, or you can use the beautiful work of Putnam, Juila
> Robinson, Davis, and Matiyazevitch). This makes it Turing universal,
> and makes the UD emulated in Platonia (or in any model of Peano
> Arithmetic, that is a tiny part of arithmetical truth).
> > If I basically understand this correctly, then I will interpret UDA
> > from my(physicla scineces POV).
> Normally the reasoning does not depend on any points of view (that is
> why is a deductive reasoning or a proof). The step 8 is more
> difficult, and I might resend the Movie Graph Argument (MGA) already
> sent. Step 8 explains the necessity of immateriality. It explains that
> the physical supervenience thesis cannot work, unless you accept the
> idea that an inactive piece of material has an active physical
> activity in a computation, and still say "yes" to the doctor, like
> Jack Mallah apparently. To avoid this I add sometimes that the
> survival, when saying yes to the doctor, is done "qua computatio", and
> I am working to make this more precise. It is always possible to put
> some magic in the notion of matter to build a fake comp hypothesis
> saving primary matter, but then you can save any theology, and it
> seems to me quite an ad hoc move. But I am interested in hearing your
> Physical Science point of view.
> > Ronald
> > On Dec 2, 10:55 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 02 Dec 2010, at 15:51, ronaldheld wrote:
> >>> Bruno:
> >>> I looked at UDA via the SANE paper. I am not certain the the mind is
> >>> Turing emulatable, but will move onward.
> >> OK. It is better to say brain instead of mind. The doctor proposes an
> >> artificial digital brain, and keep silent on what is the mind, just
> >> that it will be preserved locally through the running of the adequate
> >> computer.
> >>> Using Star Trek transporter
> >>> concepts, I can accept steps 1 through 5.
> >> Nice. Note that the Star trek transporter usually annihilates the
> >> original (like in quantum teleportation), but if I am a "program" (a
> >> natural program) then it can be duplicated (cut, copy and paste apply
> >> to it).
> >>> Step 6 takes only the mind
> >> (the program, or the digital instantaneous state of a program)
> >>> and sends it to a finite computational device or the entire person
> >>> into a device similar to a Holodeck,
> >> It is just a computer. A physical embodiment of a (Turing) Universal
> >> Machine. Assuming the "mind state" (here and now) can be captured as
> >> an instantaneous description of a digital program, nobody can feel
> >> the
> >> difference between "reality" and its physical digital emulation, at
> >> least for a period (which is all what is needed for the probability
> >> or
> >> credibility measure).
> >>> where the person is a
> >>> Holocharacter?
> >> A person is what appears when the correct program (which exists by
> >> the
> >> mechanist assumption) is executed ('runned') in a physical computer.
> >>> I am not certain a UD is physically possible in a
> >>> finite resource Universe.
> >> You don't need this to get the indeterminacy, non-locality and even
> >> the non clonability, unless you add that the resource are finite and
> >> enough little (in which case you still have the indeterminacy and
> >> non-
> >> locality in case of self-duplication in that little universe of
> >> course).
> >> After UDA 1-7, you know that if you make a physical experiment, the
> >> result that you will perceive depend on the absence of similar state
> >> of "your body" in the (physical) universe.
> >> Then, with step 8, you can realize that even that move toward a
> >> little
> >> physical universe will not help to throw away the 1-indterminacy,
> >> non-
> >> locality and non clonability. The reason is that Arithmetical
> >> Platonia
> >> becomes the universal "Holodeck", if you want.
> >> UDA 1-7 shows that the mind (the first person) cannot distinguish a
> >> physical reality from a physical emulation of it (for a short time),
> >> but after step 8, we can see that the person cannot even feel the
> >> difference between a physical emulation and an arithmetical
> >> emulation,
> >> which exists out of space and time independently of any observers (by
> >> Church thesis, arithmetic and computer science). That is subtler than
> >> UDA 1-7, but it makes the argument a proof, i.e. a proof that physics
> >> just cannot be the fundamental theory, once we assume digital
> >> mechanism. The physical laws have a reason, and even a
> >> "space" (arithmetical truth) where, from the point of view of the
> >> observers, they have been selected.
> >> Thanks for your reply, and ask any supplementary questions if
> >> interested. I am trying to work on the official "english" papers.
> >> After that I will write a book. I have succeeded in explaining step 8
> >> to many different publics now, so that I think I have the whole thing
> >> straight.
> >> AUDA, on the contrary, is well understood only by logicians, but
> >> physicists have still problem with basic logic. There is a real big
> >> gap between logicians and physicists. I was hoping that quantum
> >> computations would make a bridge, but that will still take a long
> >> time. Anyway, UDA is enough to understand the main point.
> >> AUDA is cute, because it shows that the intelligent machine are
> >> already here. It shows also that intelligence is mainly a right,
> >> not a
> >> gift (but many people dislike this, and that is hardly astonishing
> >> when you look at the history of humanity: it is the sempiternal fear
> >> of the others).
> >> Bruno
> >>> On Nov 28, 5:52 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>>> On 27 Nov 2010, at 19:05, ronaldheld wrote:
> >>>>> Jason(and any others)
> >>>>> Both. Level IV Universe is hard to explain even if real. Bruno's
> >>>>> reality is equally hard to convincing present.
> >>>>> Ronald
> >>>> Do you agree/understand that if we are machine then we are in
> >>>> principle duplicable? This entails subjective indeterminacy.
> >>>> All the rest follows from that, and few people have problems to
> >>>> understand UDA 1-7.
> >>>> UDA-8, which justifies immateriality, is slightly more subtle,
> >>>> but if
> >>>> you have followed the last conversation on it on the list (with
> >>>> Jacques Mallah, Stathis, ..) you could understand than to block the
> >>>> movie graph argument you have to attribute a computational role to
> >>>> the
> >>>> physical activity of something having non physical activity, and I
> >>>> don't see how we could still accept a digital brain in this case.
> >>>> With
> >>>> just UDA 1-7 you could already understand that most of quantum
> >>>> weirdness (indeterminacy, non-locality, non-clonability) is a
> >>>> qualitative almost direct consequence of digital mechanism (even in
> >>>> presence of a primitively material universe).
> >>>> AUDA, the Löbian interview, is another matter because you need
> >>>> familiarity with mathematical logic and recursion theory.
> >>>> Tell me please what you don't understand in the first steps of
> >>>> UDA. I
> >>>> am always interested to have an idea of what is it that people
> >>>> don't
> >>>> grasp. I am writing some "official" papers now, and that could
> >>>> help.
> >>>> Up to now the results are more ignored than criticized, or is
> >>>> considered as crap by religious atheist/materialist, without
> >>>> rational
> >>>> arguments. Tell me if you have a problem with the subjective (first
> >>>> person) indeterminacy. Thanks.
> >>>> Bruno
> >>>>> On Nov 26, 12:02 am, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>>>> On Wed, Nov 24, 2010 at 1:50 PM, ronaldheld
> >>>>>> <ronaldh...@gmail.com>
> >>>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>> Jason:
> >>>>>>> I see what you are saying up at our level of understanding, I
> >>>>>>> do
> >>>>>>> not
> >>>>>>> know how to present that in a technically convincing matter.
> >>>>>>> Ronald
> >>>>>> Which message in particular do you think is difficult to
> >>>>>> present convincingly? Tegmark's ideas that everything is real,
> >>>>>> or
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>> suggestion that computer simulation might be a legitimate tool
> >>>>>> for
> >>>>>> exploration?
> >>>>>> Jason
> >>>>> --
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