On 05/03/11 14:46, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Chalmers told me that first person indeterminacy does not exist, and
not much more, and Bitbol never reply to me when I sent him my PhD.
I am still not sure if I correctly understand your concept of first
person indeterminacy, though I have gone over your paper The first
person computationalist indeterminacy many times. Your opening paragraph
states "The notion of first person, or subjective, computationalist
indeterminacy is a notion which makes possible to explain how, in a
context of purely third person (objective) determinacy, experiments can
be designed exhibiting, from the points of view of the subjects
involved, a necessary lack of apparent determinate outcome", but for all
known experiments and experiential reporting, there is always a
determinate outcome. I imagine I am simply misunderstanding the
language. Do you mean simply the apparent lack of determincy of Wigner's
friend's experience of the experiment in Wigner's point of view? My
confusion comes from the fact that from Wigner's friend's point of view,
the point of view of the subject involved, the outcome is always
determinate.
I was trying to establish the exact meaning of the phrase first person
indeterminacy in an earlier conversation. I stated
By 'first person indeterminacy' in 1 below, I am reading this as the
indeterminacy regarding the actual location and thus physical context /
instantiation of this observer.
but your answer simply stated that I was making 'treachery to invoke the
physical', and gave me no answer on the meaning of the phrase I was
trying to clarify!
They seems to act like pseudo-religious philosopher to me. I still
don't know if it is ideological or politics.
Are you referring to Chalmers, Bitbol or both?
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