Breuno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to
suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), "

Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility?
Richard

On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 6:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Richard,
>
>  On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>  Bruno,
>
> If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices,
> could not it choose to select a single world from the many possible worlds?
> Richard Ruquist
>
>
> Suppose that you are read (scanned) at Brussels, and reconstituted in W and
> M. Your consciousness will select W, in W, and will select M, in M. Both
> happenings will happen, if I can say.
>
> You can decompose a "choice of going to M" into such a duplication +
>  killing yourself in W, or better: disallowing the reconstitution to be done
> in W. Likewise, you can choose to go to M, by deciding to "not take a plane
> for W, nor for any other places". That is why a choice is possible in the
> MW, through a notion of normal world (or most probable relative world) that
> you can influence by the usual "determinist" means. If not you would give to
> consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse
> (like with the wave collapse), or even less plausible, to suppress the
> existence of computations in the arithmetical world, which is as impossible
> as suppressing the existence of a number.
> So the choices are relative to the state you are in, but even the cosmic
> consciousness cannot chose between being me and someone else. It can, or has
> to be both.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:29 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:
>>
>> On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply):
>>>>>
>>>>>                  (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", Chaos
>>>>> is: "I don't know" and                stochastic is sort of a random. ..."
>>>>>
>>>>> BM: Not necessarily.  Why not free-up your mind to think wider and
>>>>> include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the result 
>>>>> of
>>>>> ignorance of some deeper level?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a
>>>> perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence of
>>>> determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated by the
>>>> iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly
>>>> duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like
>>>> WWMMMWMMMWWWWWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible
>>>> experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication gives an example of
>>>> abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist chaotic
>>>> behavior).
>>>>
>>>> In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of the
>>>> most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look below our
>>>> computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our sub-level
>>>> computations) are random.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a
>>> consequence of unitary evolution of the wf.  It is curious that the
>>> deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the level of
>>> conscious experience.
>>>
>>
>> This is easily explained by the digital mechanist assumption, through
>> self-duplication. No need of QM, except for a confirmation of comp.
>> Note that he non cloning theorem is itself a consequence of digital
>> mechanism. In fact all the weirdness of quantum mechanics are obvious in
>> digital mechanism (DM, which does not postulate QM). Indeed DM entails first
>> person indeterminacy, first person plural indeterminacy (many worlds), first
>> person non locality, and it is an "easy" exercise to show that it entials
>> non cloning of matter, and non emulability of matter (and thus the falsity
>> of digital physics a priori).
>>
>> It is still an open problem if unitarity follows from comp, as it should
>> if both DM and QM are correct. But the room for unitarity is already there,
>> because the logic of arithmetical observability by machine/numbers is indeed
>> a quantum logic. Comp can be said to already implies that the bottom
>> physicalness is symmetrical and non clonable. The arithmetical qubit cannot
>> be cloned nor erased (nor emulated by a digital machine, and this is perhaps
>> not confirmed by QM!).
>>
>> Bruno Marchal
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
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